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THE MORAL LAW

OR THE

THEORY AND PRACTICE

OF

DUTY

AN ETHICAL TEXT-BOOK

BY

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PREFACE.

DURING the past twenty-five years the theory of morals has been discussed by many writers, each of whom, doubtless, has entertained the hope that his views might prove acceptable to the majority of scholars. The outcome has been discouraging. The teachings of text-books to-day are as divergent as at any previous time. Under these circumstances another attempt to grapple with "the ethical problem" should be accompanied with justifying reasons. The mere fact that no solution hitherto offered has won general approval does not warrant new philosophizing. One must have some ground of confidence that his efforts have, at the least, been rightly directed.

The chief recommendation of the doctrines now presented is, *that they have been very carefully formed according to the rules of inductive logic*. Not a single abstract principle has been asserted, except so far as it follows fairly from an analysis of the moral thought of men. No attempt has been made to found theory on the untested assertions of reason, or on the unexplained dictates of common sense; much less to deduce it from the arguments of great authorities. In every case the actual thought of men has been made the subject of analytic scrutiny. The aim has been to employ fact—fact only—as the basis of theory.

At the same time, the tenets of every school and the reasons alleged in their behalf have been compared and investigated. The aid of every earnest inquirer has been sought that the truth as seen from his point of view might be fully apprehended. To this end more books have been consulted than have been quoted. While only so many citations have been made in the text as were needed to

exemplify theories, the desire has been to recognize every aspect of truth which has commended itself to serious minds.

Another ground for confidence in the opinions advocated is that *they are the growth of years*. In his early manhood the writer was contented with a traditional system, in which he had been instructed, till he found that it failed to throw light on certain theological questions. Then he began to modify his views till, more than thirty years ago, they commenced to take on the form of a distinct system. After this, at the request of a distinguished man, he elaborated a theory in some articles which were published first in a quarterly review, and afterwards, in 1870, as a short treatise entitled "*A New Analysis in Fundamental Morals*." Subsequently the author advocated the doctrines of this analysis in lectures before young men in an Eastern university, and, yet later, in a new course of lectures, before the young men and women of a Western university. Finally, the greater part of the last three or four years has been devoted to the chapters of *THE MORAL LAW*. A review of these, since they have been printed, is suggestive of improvements possible upon further elaboration, but, on the whole, the statements of the book seem substantially correct.

An additional circumstance corroborative of the teachings now presented is that *they have followed upon a methodical study of the non-moral activities of the human spirit, and especially of its intellectual operations*. The more important part of ethical science, and that in which its difficulties arise, concerns man's moral perceptions and judgments; and these cannot be adequately understood without an analytic knowledge of our mental faculties in general. To comprehend the speculative and practical workings of the moral reason we must first comprehend the speculative and practical workings of the natural reason. Hence a satisfactory system of ethics has been an impossibility for some philosophers.

The significance of these statements will become apparent when the discussions of *THE MORAL LAW* are read, especially those in which reference is made to the *PERCEP-*

TIONALIST, a text-book in mental science, or to the MODALIST, a logic. Some doctrines of the present treatise could not have been perfected without the improvements in psychological theory advocated in these works. Many years ago, and some time after the writer had entered upon his duties as a professor, he was called upon for an annual report. He took that opportunity to make known his purpose to write a series of books—particularly a mental science, a logic, an ethics, and a history of philosophy. At that time he had little conception of the importance of the order of study contemplated in his plan, or of the vital connection existing between different departments of psychological research. He realizes these things now. For him the present case specially illustrates the thought of Cicero, that all studies pertaining to humanity have a bond of mutual connection, and are, as it were, united by blood-relationship.—*Etenim omnes artes quae ad humanitatem pertinent, habent commune quoddam vinculum et, quasi cognatione, inter se continentur* (ORATION FOR ARCHIAS).

Here, however, it is to be confessed that the following treatise has not been controlled by what some call "the modern point of view," and has not adopted, as the fundamental rule of its investigations, what some call "the modern method."

Not a few scholars, now-a-days, believe that no philosophy is worthy of the name if it be not, in some way, rooted in Evolutionism; by which doctrine they generally mean the hypothesis of Mr. Herbert Spencer, that all phenomena, including the spiritual and the moral, are the gradual outcome of self-governed atomic or molecular interactions of greater or less complexity. Now we hold to theistic evolution. That the universe was once a homogeneous nebula of inconceivable extent, and that, under the direction of a superintending wisdom, it has passed through a marvelous development is a well-supported doctrine. Moreover, every stage and every step of this progress everywhere seems to have been a preparation for that next succeeding. We cannot, however, concede that all the existing forms and organisms of the Universe have originated without any interposition of creative and providen-

tial power. When we consider the limitations of observable agencies, and when we scrutinize all the evidence on which theory must rest, our interpretation of Nature calls for a supernatural Deity. At the risk of being condemned as wanting in scientific insight, we must reject that evolution which has no place or use for either providence or creation.

It is, however, aside from our purpose to contrast different theories of the Universe. What we would say is that *ethical principles cannot properly be based on any doctrine of evolution, whether theistic or atheistic*; they should rest immediately on the facts of rational and moral life, as these present themselves for our observation, or are historically known. That the adoption of a cosmology may modify our appreciation of ethical principles may be admitted; but those principles themselves should be derived inductively from the facts of human consciousness. Any attempt to base them on an hypothesis concerning a distant and non-ethical past must result in failure.

The so-called "modern method" is defined, by those who use it, as "proceeding along comparative and critical lines." It is followed under the conviction that there is an evolution of knowledge, as well as of existence, whereby the opinions of the thoughtful are constantly advancing towards the truth, and that, therefore, progress may be expected through the dialectic study of the doctrines of the wise and the learned. This method has its value. It is by no means so incompetent as "the modern point of view." It often proves effective when used in conjunction with the method of analysis and induction. It is always stimulating to intellectual activity and conducive to scholarly judgment. It is also a mode of procedure open to any industrious man; and it has its attractions as admitting a display of bibliography and erudition. Nevertheless, used alone, it seldom accomplishes positive success. While it may lead to the rejection of errors, it gives no guarantee against the formulation of new mistakes. It is scarcely more favorable to progress than the old dogmatism. It is especially unsatisfactory when an investigator, ambitious to rank among "the advanced thinkers," bases his work on

an unproved and irrelevant hypothesis, and thereupon, more or less eclectically, constructs an ethical theory of his own. In such a case, though one may claim an independence, he is sure to be controlled by scholastic influence, if, indeed, he do not consciously follow what he may regard as "the trend of opinion;" that is, the intellectual fashion of the day. True philosophy conforms to no fashion, and is fundamentally affected by fact only. But, while we cannot accept "the new method" as the principal instrument of progress, any reader can see that the aid of philosophical criticism has been invoked during the writing of *THE MORAL LAW*. Not only are many opinions reviewed as the discussions proceed, but seven chapters of the treatise are expressly given to the examination of systems. It is only after this critical consideration of doctrines that the inductive argument concerning the universal principle of morality begins, in Chapter XXI.

In conclusion, we have a word for those who may be induced to use this book. Our endeavor has been to prepare a volume equally suited for general circulation and for college classes. The private student is advised to read the discussions in their order: yet this will not be necessary if he desire immediate light upon some topic. The nature of the subject has rendered it possible to treat specific questions in such a way that each may be considered by itself.

Occasionally a doctrinal passage may be found difficult. In that case it is hoped that a second reading will make it clear and plain. Any writing which deals adequately with disputed philosophical questions cannot be understood without close attention. But if, after careful study, it be found illuminating and convincing, a peculiar satisfaction is experienced.

The professor who may adopt *THE MORAL LAW* as a text-book must judge for himself whether any of its pages should be omitted, especially from a short or from a primary course of instruction. Should the allotted number of exercises be so limited as not to allow the thorough mastery and a review of the whole treatise, nothing would be lost if some subordinate discussions were left for the voluntary reading of the student at some future time. A few

hints are given in the book regarding omittable portions, but, in every case, the professor's own judgment can best determine what is most advisable.

NEW YORK CITY, DEC., 1901.



THE MORAL LAW

CHAPTER I.

ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.

1. Ethics is the science of moral life.—2. Life in this connection signifies the possession and exercise of spiritual powers.—3. Moral life is a species of rational life.—4. A study of the intellectual operations of moral life brings every other part of that life under review.—5. A more explicit definition of ethics.—6. This science is divided into the theoretical and the practical. Mackenzie quoted.—7. Five theories contend with one another for pre-eminence. Utilitarianism. Perfectionism.—8. Motivity Ethics. Authority Ethics. Duty Ethics.—9. The fundamental question of ethics has not yet been clearly answered. The method of enquiry followed in the present treatise.—10. The plan of the treatise; and the fundamental doctrine advocated in it.

1. SOME say that ethics, or moral science, is the science of obligation, or duty; others, that it is the science of the morally right and obligatory, considering also with this the morally wrong, as being opposite to the right and obligatory on us not to do; others say that it is the science of moral law, meaning by this law those rules collectively which reason teaches to be right and dutiful. These definitions are equivalent to one another. They are all justified by the fact that rational beings perceive or judge certain objects of pursuit and certain modes of conduct to be right and obligatory, and by the fact that a certain style of life, which we call moral, originates from these judgments and perceptions.

Others, again, make the subject of ethical science to be what is best in the conduct, the character or disposition, and the aims or objects of pursuit, of rational beings. Accordingly we are told that ethics is "the science of the ideal in human life." This statement and the thought from which it

springs are not sufficiently exact and specific. We prefer the definition that ethics is the science of the morally right and obligatory. But, as whatever is right and dutiful, either in any individual case or as set forth in any precept of the moral law, is of interest only as it enters into and affects our lives—and as moral science considers not merely the right and obligatory, but also the action of the intellect in apprehending it, together with those activities which accompany or flow from that apprehension—we may advantageously define ethics as *the science of moral life*. This definition will indicate the scope as well as the nature of the science.

2. The word "life" as here used, signifies the possession and exercise of spiritual powers; such as sensation and thought, emotion and motivity, will and exertion, and the capability of pleasure and pain. According to this, the ordinary and proper use of the term, life is a system of psychical powers and functions. In a lower sense the word is applied to the powers and functions of a corporeal or even of a vegetable organism. We conceive of a life which comprises merely those unconscious and material potencies which are latent in the seed or in the egg, and which manifest themselves in the growing plant and in the breathing, pulsating body. This physical use of the term is secondary, and is founded on a loose analogy rather than on any specific, or even generic, identity between the nature of an animal or vegetable organism and that of a spiritual substance. But it is favored by the intimate union of the physical with the psychical observable in human life.

In ethics our thought must be directed chiefly to that form of psychical life which is known as rational. For creatures without reason cannot make the distinction between right and wrong and can neither observe nor disregard the moral law.

3. Rational life assumes different modes, or phases, according to the character of the perceptions in which it originates and of the objects of those perceptions. We hear of commercial and of professional life; of public, of political, of domestic and of social life; and of religious or scientific or literary life; each of these being a phase of man's intelligent activity. But of all modes of rational life none is more important or more worthy of our study than the moral. The thoughts and perceptions of moral life bring before us those objects which should be the supreme aims of our desire and our aversion. Its emotions and affections, its impulses and

motive principles, are the chief source of that nobility and excellence, as well as that of degradation and ruin, of which spiritual beings are capable. Its good and its evil deeds, its courses of labor and of accomplishment, form a fit basis for the determination of our future destiny. And its pleasures and pains are of so inward and of so enduring a nature that wise men in all ages have spoken of them as the chief elements of eternal happiness and of hopeless misery.

4. While every part of moral life is invested with interest the attention of the student must be given principally to its intellectual operations. It is only through an analysis of our moral judgments and perceptions that the nature of right ends and actions and of the desire or will to realize them can be clearly understood. It is to be noticed, too, that a considerable proportion of the objects of moral effort are not ends to be externally accomplished but natural dispositions which should be regulated while seeking ends of their own, and which should be intentionally incorporated with the life of duty. Hence a study of moral thought involves a general study of human nature. We must also bear in mind that the exercise of moral principle becomes itself an object of its own perception and desire. That more primary development of virtue in which man both seeks right ends and regulates his natural propensities and affections, upon being regarded with an attentive consciousness, becomes in its turn itself an aim of moral purpose. One great duty of the virtuous man is to cultivate virtue in himself and in others. Thus not merely the moral judgment of the philosopher, but also the ordinary thinking of mankind, covers all of human life that has any ethical significance.

5. If any should desire to define ethics more explicitly than by the statement that it is the science of moral life, this statement might be combined with that which mentions the right and obligatory together with the wrong as the opposite of the right. Upon this basis we might say that *ethics is the science of the right and of the wrong and of that life which arises from the perception of the right and of the wrong and which is commonly called moral*. This definition, certainly, is sufficiently explicit.

6. As this science—this philosophy of moral life—has its chief importance not in satisfying our thirst for knowledge, but in qualifying us for the more intelligent performance of duty, it might be called a practical science. It might even

be styled the art of right conduct just as logic has been styled the art of correct thinking, the word "art" here meaning not acquired skill, but only a system of knowledge bearing on practice. This was Cicero's thought in his "*De Finibus*" when he defined ethics as the art of living—*ars vivendi; doctrina bene vivendi*. Nevertheless this science is commonly divided into theoretical and practical ethics; and with reason. For a considerable portion of it deals with general principles which pertain to all duty, and which are studied in order to enlighten and indoctrinate the understanding; while another portion relates to specific laws of duty and to the immediate application of principles to the exigencies of life, and is, therefore, preeminently practical.

Some ethical works are devoted to theoretical and some to practical morals, while others treat of both. Of late years the theory of morals has received much more attention than specific questions of duty; the idea has even been advanced that ethics is not a practical science at all. Prof. Mackenzie says, "The science of ethics cannot properly be described as practical. It must content itself with understanding the nature of the ideal and must not hope to formulate rules for its attainment. Hence most writers have preferred to treat it as a purely speculative rather than as a practical science. This is probably the best view to take." (MANUAL OF ETHICS, p. 9.) In opposition to this teaching we hold that the science of moral life cannot be complete without two courses of study, the theoretical and the practical. For it does not seem possible that specific questions can be settled in the best way by those who are ignorant of general principles, nor that any theory of morals can be well founded and well formed if it do not throw a powerful light on every practical problem. Theoretical and practical questions should be studied with equal care and thoroughness if we are to have a well developed science of morality; though it is to be admitted that thus far more philosophical thought has been bestowed upon the theory than upon the practice of duty. Instructions in regard to conduct have shown much wisdom, but have left difficult questions, and new problems especially, without adequate solution. This is partly the result of the concentration of attention on the theory of morals, but it is chiefly to be accounted for by the fact that this theory is as yet in a confused and unsettled state. The student of applied or practical ethics has to depend on his own good

sense and judgment with little aid from fundamental principles, and is at times impeded rather than forwarded by his adherence to some system.

7. The unsatisfactory condition of our science at the present time becomes evident when we consider that no one of those theories which have been, and are now, advocated by men of ability, has gained any decided preeminence over the rest. The philosophy of moral life is still under debate. Throwing out of consideration that degraded materialism which takes for its rule, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," five different forms of doctrine contend with one another respecting the ultimate law of duty. Utilitarians say that *the promotion of the welfare of men is the radical moral end*. With them the highest aim is not virtue but happiness. They have developed an intelligent and systematic humanitarianism, founded upon the great duty of doing good. Yet this system is not generally accepted as a complete account of morality. Perfectionists, on the other hand, assert that *inward spiritual excellence is the fundamental aim of duty*. They say that the essence of virtue is to desire and seek the realization of the true self, or person, in a noble character and life. But they very properly deny that their doctrine is a selfish doctrine; inasmuch as the true self is not selfish, and also because the good man seeks to develop not himself only but other selves as well. The central thought of this system sets forth a great duty, and has always attracted noble-minded men. Just now, at the beginning of this twentieth century, Perfectionism is the most popular of ethical theories, at least in scholastic quarters. Yet this doctrine is not likely to gain universal favor. It gives no philosophical—that is, no thorough and satisfying—explanation of the duties of benevolence and of justice, or of the common duty of doing good. It does not even render any very intelligible account of the perfection which it advocates.

8. Another class of thinkers teach that *the essence of all duty lies in the regulation of one's own motive dispositions*, either through the supremacy of love for beings or under the guidance of a faculty which judges between "springs of action" as higher and lower. This style of doctrine is preeminently subjective, and may be named Motivity Ethics. It brings into prominence the duty of keeping the heart with all diligence. Yet it does not explain all duty, and is not even a satisfactory philosophy of that virtue which it specially in-

culcates. The more primary exercises of moral principle do not aim at one's self-regulation but at the external accomplishment of things right and good. Self-regulation is a secondary development of virtue.

Again, some able writers maintain that *all duty consists in obedience to the will and direction of a superior*, and that all virtue is loyalty to the authority of government. The government may be that of God or of the State or of the sentiments and customs of the community; and it may have for its *ratio essendi* the common welfare or some other good end. Nevertheless, *according to what may be styled Authority Ethics, moral obligation is an external legal relation to a governmental power*. This doctrine is plausible from the fact that most men perform duty out of respect for authority and as a matter of obedience; which respect and obedience are a part of moral life, and not merely a supplementary addition. But the primary exercise of morality seems not to be respect for authority but respect for the right. Obedience to rulers or laws is dutiful only so far as it presupposes a principle of right and is founded upon it. If government were not fitted to serve right ends, no person would have the right to rule over other persons. Right and wrong do not originate from government and authority, but just authority exists for the sake of things right and obligatory, and to promote the realization of them.

Finally, *it is asserted by some that "oughtness," or "moral obligation," or "the categorical imperative," is the fundamental conception of ethics*. These thinkers define the right as the obligatory and ascribe to the moral faculty the power to perceive intuitively what is right and what is wrong. According to writers of this class there is no universal law except only that one should do what "oughtness," or duty, requires of him; therefore their doctrine may be distinguished as Duty Ethics. This school takes the position that the search for an all-comprehensive moral aim is useless, if not chimerical. It claims, and it receives, a certain support from the "common sense," that is, from the intuitive moral judgment, of mankind; and its views are acceptable to those who deny that the dictates of the practical reason can be profitably submitted to the analysis of the speculative reason. Nevertheless the right of Duty Ethics to philosophical consideration rests chiefly on the incompetence of competitive systems. No one has yet shown that the moral law is inca-

pable of analysis and unification; nor is it true that "oughtness," or moral obligation, is identical with moral rightness. On the contrary, *the moral obligation of an action or end is a property consequent upon the rightness of the action or end.* Every duty is obligatory because it is right. So the question remains, Wherein does that rightness consist?

9. Such is the state of moral philosophy at the present day. While various aspects of the life of duty have been illuminated, the fundamental problem of ethics has not yet been solved.

This state of affairs should not discourage the earnest student. It should inspire for patient persevering work in the hope that a clearer vision of truth may be gained provided those methods of inquiry to which the marvelous scientific progress of the past century is due, be followed faithfully.

The theory elaborated in the following chapters is an outgrowth of the study of the facts of the moral consciousness. Its doctrines—and especially its radical doctrine—have been obtained through a slow process of analysis and generalization. Therefore, while claiming little originality, and less ingenuity, it hopes for consideration from those who approve of the inductive method of philosophizing. Some use has been made of auxiliary plans of procedure. The critical and historical method, which traces the development of doctrines and endeavors to extract truth from conflicting opinions, has been found helpful. Recourse has been had, also, to the dogmatic, or intuitionist, method, which first asserts principles and then tests them; this method enables one to consult the teachings of the practical reason. The derivative, or deductive, method which, in constructing any science, makes proper use of the ascertained truths of other sciences, has also been employed. But the main effort has been to obtain ethical principles through the analysis and generalization of the moral judgments of mankind. If the system thus produced has any superiority over others, it is because the inductive method has now, perhaps as never before, been faithfully applied to ethics.

10. On account of the existing state of the theory of morals the problem respecting the ultimate rule of duty has a more prominent place in the plan of the treatise than that which it would otherwise have had. Consideration for this question has determined the order in which topics have been taken up, and, to some extent, the manner of dealing with

them. The first twelve chapters of the book consider subjects essential to ethics, yet which are fairly intelligible without first determining the radical principle of the moral law. These chapters discuss the objects about which moral life is concerned and the modes of activity in which that life is developed, these modes and those objects being, to some extent, identical. The next eight chapters review the different ethical theories which are contending with one another in the world of thought; they consider also the phases of moral life to which these theories are specially related. The work of these eight chapters is facilitated by that of the preceding twelve. The next part of the book, composed of seven chapters (XXI.--XXVII.), contains an analysis of the moral law as found in human consciousness. For the purposes of this investigation the duties of life are divided into those of Moral Goodness, Moral Esteem, Regulative Righteousness, and Causative Righteousness. The conclusion drawn from the analysis of the moral law is that the right, the generic aim of duty, is identical with absolute good considered as an end of rational pursuit. The signification of the phrase "absolute good" in this connection is fully explained both at the beginning and at the end of the discussion of the moral law. It is quite different from the meaning given to the phrase by Janet and other authors, and is to be distinguished also from the ordinary notion of good.

Absolute good is the supreme conception of the practical reason. Because of its abstract character, and because it is seldom used alone but commonly with some qualifying addition, the distinct apprehension of it requires care. After the definition of this good in the chapter on Moral Goodness the idea of it is rendered more and more determinate as the constituent parts of the law are successively considered.

The remaining portion of the treatise is devoted to subjects which are best considered after one's views respecting the fundamental moral rule have been settled. Personality and free-will are discussed; they are factors in all ethical life. An understanding of them throws light on the more subjective side of morality and on the treatment due rational beings as responsible agents. Then the conflict of duties—the next subject considered—illustrates the relation of specific laws of duty to the universal law and the manner in which all moral rules cooperate in an harmonious unity. So, also, some discussions concerning the application of ethical principles to so-

cial, economic, political, and religious life are intended to indicate the value of moral theory in practical inquiries. Finally a chapter on the general philosophy of life shows how the theory of duty and the theory of happiness are connected with each other; and how these theories exist in an intimate correlation.

CHAPTER II.

PLEASURE, HAPPINESS, AND GOOD.

1. The generic meaning of "pleasure" or "enjoyment."—2. Rational and irrational pleasure.—3. Three significations of "happiness," of which the last is the most important.—4. The good and the right are closely related. A "good man" defined. Also a "good deed."—5. Things are called good, (1) as producing pleasure, (2) as being thoroughly adapted for some work or end.—6. In a higher sense (3) a thing is good as being a means or a mode of happiness.—7. Most good things are good conditionally; and many only mediately and indirectly.—8. Welfare, well-being good actions, and rational good, defined. 9. Sometimes happiness itself is called "good" and "a good." But it is misleading to say that it is the only good. Hopkins criticized.—10. Moral good, defined. Why is virtue called good. Janet quoted.—11. The theory of pleasure. Many pleasures (and pains) are concomitants of other spiritual activities. The powers of the soul, enumerated. Hamilton and Calderwood quoted.—12. Other enjoyments (and sufferings) arise upon the perception of objects fitted to affect us.—13. Pleasure and pain spring also from the gratification and the disappointment of desire. Plato's doctrine. Aristotle quoted.—14. Aristotle's doctrine criticized. The truth stated. But for a full philosophy of pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, we must go to the Stoics.

1. THE words "pleasure" and "enjoyment" are often used as equivalent to each other. As such they have three meanings, or uses, one generic or essential, the others specific or specialized. Generically, they indicate an ultimate element of spiritual life, which, like all other things not admitting of analytical definition, must be defined by its relations. Let us say that *pleasure is that constituent of experience which when felt excites desire for the continuance or repetition of it and which is the opposite of pain or suffering.* In this generic sense the word "pleasure" is sometimes preferred when the experience comes from the more passive exercise of our powers, and "enjoyment" when it comes from the more active exercise. But this distinction is not of great importance.

2. The specific uses of these terms arise from the fact that

the pursuit and realization of enjoyment may or may not be regulated and modified by reason. Having reference to this *we distinguish what may be called rational and irrational pleasures*. The difference between these meanings is commonly evident from the context. The Bible, speaking of the woman who lives a butterfly life, says, "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth"; but, referring to the enjoyments of Heaven, it says, "At thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore." In like manner philosophers tell us that the wise man does not seek pleasure, or enjoyment, but happiness, while, at the same time, they assert that happiness is the sum of the pleasures of a wisely ordered life. Evidently there are two modes of enjoyment, which, though possessing radically a common nature, are estimated differently by intelligent persons. Irrational pleasures are enjoyed as long as they last, yet, being pursued aimlessly or recklessly, they are not only consistent with the loss of happiness, but may result in misery. In their total operation they are not good but evil. Rational enjoyments, on the contrary, exclude injurious or wasteful indulgence and the sacrifice of enduring and satisfying for transitory gratification. They not only comport with happiness, but are the components of happiness; and are not evil but good.

The difference between these two kinds of pleasures enters into our judgment concerning each as an object of choice. *The pursuit of irrational enjoyments does not excite our respect*. If it be conducted against wisdom and prudence, we regard it with contempt. *But to seek rational pleasures for ourselves and for others is commendable*. We do not now refer to the conscientious approbation of the duty of promoting happiness; we speak merely of that natural appreciation with which men contemplate the wise pursuit of happiness.

The terms "pleasure" and "enjoyment" have other meanings in addition to those above mentioned, but we aim at present to define only such ideas as may throw light on the conceptions of happiness and of good.

3. The term "happiness" *sometimes signifies a state of unalloyed comfort and enjoyment no matter how temporary it may be*. We speak of the happiness of a bride or of a bridegroom, or of the successful candidate for some honorable or lucrative office. The experience of such persons for the time being is completely pleasurable; they are "perfectly happy." This sort of felicity is that referred to in a polite

exaggeration when one gentleman assures another that he is extremely happy to make his acquaintance. It is a high degree of enjoyment, or conscious pleasure, however effervescent.

Again, happiness may denote *a state of continued or permanent enjoyment*. The life promised our first parents in Eden was to be one of happiness. They were assured of blessedness so long as they should remain obedient to the divine commands. They may have been subjected to the occasional uneasiness of hunger and thirst and weariness and of mental and spiritual longings, but these experiences were only the conditions of the greatest enjoyment possible for creatures such as they were. Unmixed felicity appears not to be possible for finite beings. For this reason while the idea of happiness may be so held as to exclude all pain or uneasiness whatever, it frequently admits such concomitant pains and troubles as may be necessary for the avoidance of misery and the realization of great and permanent satisfaction. Our ordinary practical conception of happiness is formed in this way.

Finally; in ethics happiness commonly signifies *a condition of more or less permanent enjoyment so far as this can be attained by the thought and effort of a rational being*. Some, at least, of the happiness of Adam and Eve, if they had not fallen, would not have come from what they themselves might do but from the perfection and riches of their surroundings. The blessedness of Heaven does not result wholly from the wisdom and virtue of its inhabitants but also from the splendors of their home. And, among men, happiness is mostly thought of as largely dependent on one's circumstances. Hence prosperity is called "good fortune" (glück; bonheur); and happiness is connected with that which happens. The happy man is the "lucky fellow." Some Stoics taught that one's happiness depends entirely on his own disposition and doings; but Aristotle disproved this position. Enumerating the causes of a desirable experience, he showed that many—though not the most important—of them, are not under one's own control. With reference to the influence of a superior power he called the state of happiness "*ευδαιμονία*" as if it resulted chiefly from supernatural agencies. A similar thought is suggested when we speak of "the blessed" and their blessedness.

Evidently, however, when we say that the wise man seeks

happiness for himself and for others and that it is the duty of every man to do so, we are thinking of happiness *only so far as it comes within the scope of human prosecution and attainment*. We conceive of a state of permanent enjoyment so far as such a state can be realized through rational purpose and effort. We also recognize that some labors, sacrifices and pains are necessary elements in a successful career, and that great and enduring pleasures cannot be obtained without them. In short, happiness, as an object of rational pursuit, is not a condition of absolutely unalloyed enjoyment, but is *the sum of those comforts and gratifications which*, however mingled with unavoidable or needful sufferings, *the wise man seeks wisely for himself and for others*.

The end thus sought by reason is a very comprehensive one. It includes the gratification of every part of our nature as sentient beings. It neglects no pleasure which can find place in a wisely chosen course of enjoyable experience. It rejects only what may conflict with its own development and tend towards misery. The scope of its plans varies according to the character and intelligence of the rational agent, but, otherwise, it is unlimited in its selection of aims, in its use of agencies, and as to the length of the experience desired.

4. Another idea, closely related to those of pleasure and of happiness, occupies a more prominent place than either of these in the philosophy of morals. The conception of "good" (*ἡ ἀγαθόν*, *bonum*), whether expressed by the adjective or by the noun, constantly enters into moral thought. We say that it is right and obligatory to seek the good of ourselves and of others. We often speak of some end or action or course of conduct as being both right and good. We also assert that it is right because it is good, and that, in being right, it is the highest form of good possible in the case. Moreover, we call virtue moral good and say that this is the supreme aim of rational desire. Thus good of some kind is constantly mentioned in moral philosophy.

It is to be admitted, however, that *the word "good" has a variety of significations*, and that its use in ethics cannot be understood unless these be distinguished. Let us note, first, that *the meaning of this word as descriptive of persons is quite different from its meaning as descriptive of things*. A good man, a good woman, or a good child signifies one disposed towards what is right and good, a person of virtuous character and conduct—especially one given to deeds of be-

nevolence. The abstract name for the quality thus indicated by the adjective is not *good* but *goodness*. It might be spoken of as "personal good," but this would be an arbitrary and ambiguous use of language. Nor is the word "good" used as a noun to designate the person or persons possessing the quality except occasionally in the plural; as when we say, "The good love one another." The Latin and Greek languages, in which adjectives are declined with three genders, are not limited in this way like the English.

While the excellence ascribed to persons when we call them good should be sought by all and for all, this thought is not that immediately before the mind when we call them good. We mean only that such persons are morally excellent and worthy of moral esteem. Moreover, though goodness accomplishes good and good men are instruments of good, this is not our thought when we call them good. We simply ascribe to them a character or disposition which seeks good, and is, therefore, worthy of approbation. The same idea is often expressed by saying that they are excellent or worthy persons. In like manner a bad man is one disposed towards evil.

This personal, or subjective, use of the term "good" appears in a derivative and secondary way when we speak of "good actions" or "good deeds," meaning, not actions which accomplish good or which aim at what is good and right, but those which spring from benevolence and goodness. For one can do what is right and good intentionally yet without any love for it; in which case his conduct would not be good in the sense now considered. To do a thing right and good in order to accomplish a wrong end is not good but bad, not virtuous but vicious. A "good deed," that is, a virtuous deed, may be distinguished from a doing of good.

5. In ethics, however, the term "good" more frequently relates to certain objects of pursuit and to the actions in which these are realized than to the dispositions which lead us to seek them. This arises because the objects of our dutiful desire, though connected with persons, are properly conceived of as things.

There are *four principal senses in which things are styled good*. First of all, *a thing may be good simply as producing pleasure or enjoyment*. In this way the sweetmeats of a child are good, and are called "goodies"; an article of food may, in this sense, have a good or a bad taste. A "good time" often signifies just an enjoyable time. When Peter, at the

transfiguration, said, "Lord, it is good for us to be here; let us make here three tabernacles." (or booths), he expressed a sense of present happiness and his desire that this should be continued for a time. So when we say that many pleasures result from the apprehension of a good as in relation to oneself, the word "good" applies to any object the apprehension of which yields gratification whether it be sought rationally or not. With this wide use of the term one might accept the old doctrine that no object is sought except "*sub specie boni*." The word "*bonum*" or "good" in that case denotes simply the pleasure-producing and attractive, whether rationally desirable or not.

Another sense of the word contains no immediate reference to pleasure or pain but *simply sets forth a high degree of adaptedness to some work or end*. A sharp knife or sword is a good instrument because it is thoroughly suited for cutting. It retains this designation even while it may be used for evil purposes. In like manner one may have a good intellect or a good knowledge of business who yet employs his gifts in the service of vice. A good speaker or a good debater may be a bad man and the advocate of evil. The mind conceives of an ideal instrument as doing some work perfectly or as perfectly suited for some purpose; then an object is good if it approach this ideal. A good blow, a good shout, a good scolding, a good statement, is one effectively developed and delivered. This sense of "good" may be accompanied by the implication that a thing *could* be used in promoting welfare, but it does not include the idea that a thing is positively useful or beneficial; it simply sets forth efficiency.

But, although what has high efficiency is called good, we do not call it "a good," nor do we speak of such things collectively under the noun "good." These terms are reserved for things good in a higher sense which we are about to mention. The idea of fitness or efficiency, however, is occasionally expressed by the noun in the plural, as when we speak of the "goods" of a merchant.

6. We now come to the most important sense of the term, which also is the most common in ethical discussions. *Men often speak of a thing as good when they mean that it is a mode or means or instrument of happiness*. Whatever removes or prevents suffering or produces comfort or any form of rational enjoyment, is said to be "good" or "a good"; and all such things collectively are "Good" in the general, or

"The Good," these last two expressions being equivalent to each other. "Good" presents the idea simply; "The Good" presents it as opposed to other cognate ideas, such as the right, the true, the beautiful, the bad and the wrong.

General notions of things as good arise when anything is found to be a cause or condition of happiness; and objects are called good as falling under these notions. Food, clothing, furniture, air, light and heat, farming lands, dwelling houses, money and every kind of wealth, are forms of good. Knowledge, intelligence, bodily and mental vigor, honor, friendship, love, an upright character, an unblemished reputation, a noble and virtuous disposition, are also good things; for they are productive of happiness.

7. Most forms of good are such not absolutely but on some condition which is taken for granted. For example, riches and talent are good things as employed rationally and for their proper purposes. Used foolishly or viciously they are sources of evil.

In order that a thing may be good it makes no difference whether it be immediately and directly, or only mediately and indirectly, promotive of happiness or preventive of misery. That which produces good is itself a good. Moreover that may be a good the immediate effect of which is disagreeable or painful, as in the case of a nauseous medicine or a severe surgical operation. An arrangement or transaction is good when the total effect of it is to produce much more enjoyment than suffering, even though it may involve considerable suffering. Generally, however, in our more important determinations respecting good no nice calculation of loss and gain is needed. Some trouble and suffering are seen to be the necessary conditions of avoiding vastly greater misery and of obtaining vastly greater happiness. Moral life, certainly, seldom makes any close comparison of values. When no great evil is to be avoided and the question of more or less good admits of debate, men commonly decide from interest or inclination and feel themselves at liberty to do so.

8. The permanent conditions of one's comfort and happiness are named, collectively, his *welfare*, and, so far as these conditions may be included in the state of the person himself, they are called his *well-being*. Welfare and well-being, therefore, are comprehensive forms of good.

The intentional actions of rational beings, when performed as promotive of welfare and happiness, are good in the sense

now considered. Sometimes, as already said, "good deeds" signify those which proceed from a benevolent or virtuous disposition without reference to their actual results. This use of language is a modification of that according to which persons are called good; it relates to actions as proceeding from dispositions. But we are now thinking of actions simply as doings or intentional performances, no matter whether they spring from a good or from a bad animus. Such an action is often conceived of as including its result (Chap. VI.), and when the result is good the action also is good. The virtue of moral goodness desires the accomplishment of such actions as good. (Chap. XXII.)

As the good of which we now speak is not that productive of pleasure simply but that promotive of happiness, and as happiness is the sum of rational enjoyments (which the wise man seeks wisely), this good may be distinguished as *rational good*. But it is that commonly intended when the term "good" is used by serious persons without any qualification, and especially when it is used by philosophers. This was probably the original and primary sense of the word from which other significations have been derived. It is an idea of extremely wide application; it covers not only the immediate means of happiness but also those indirect means which, did they operate alone, would produce pain only and not pleasure.

9. Ordinarily, in speaking of good and forms of good, our thought is confined to the conditions and means of happiness, but sometimes happiness itself—in the general, and in its various forms and parts—is included under the conception. As every mode of pain not necessary for some important purpose, is an evil, so every mode of rational enjoyment is a good. This language is certainly allowable; and sometimes in philosophy it is desirable to think of good as a comprehensive end including both happiness and the means of its attainment. We cannot, however, agree with some who would confine the word "good" to the satisfaction obtainable from those good things which are the means of happiness. It would be misleading to say that happiness is the only real good. The statement of Dr. Mark Hopkins that "a good is always subjective," and "is to be found only in some result in a sensibility," conflicts with ordinary thought and language. Dr. Hopkins argues that a good must be that which has "value in itself, for its own sake," and in this he speaks truly. But he does not note that the idea of good is a formation, not of the

speculative, but of the practical, exercise of reason, and that the latter of these modes of apprehension is much more synthetic than the former (Chap. V.). Speculatively we separate in thought the means of pleasure and that "result in a sensibility" which the instrumentality produces. But the intuitive or practical reason embraces the result together with the cause or instrument in one conception, and so an object is thought of and desired not simply as a means to an end but as including the result or results desired and as being in itself an end. Under this aspect we seek food and drink, health and life, knowledge and power, society, friendship, money and all the ordinary means of gratification. To the practical reason these are ultimate and have "value in themselves."

10. We have now distinguished three conceptions of "good." The first relates to pleasure as opposed to happiness; the second neither to pleasure nor happiness; the third to happiness as contrasted with pleasure. There is a fourth conception concerning which it is disputed whether or not it contains any reference to either pleasure or happiness. This is "moral good." It is defined by President Hopkins as "the satisfaction that is inseparably connected with that form of activity which we call goodness," in other words, the happiness concomitant of virtue. So far as we know, Dr. Hopkins is the only philosopher who uses the phrase this way. President Porter says, "Moral good is the voluntary choice of the highest natural good possible to man." This agrees with the teaching of Professor Janet, who says, "Moral good seems to be nothing but the good use of natural goods." According to these authors, moral good consists in dutiful choosing and doing. Others identify this good with the morally obligatory, because one can always say that this is both right and good. But, ordinarily, the phrase "moral good" is applied to *virtue, or moral principle, not as seeking ends, but as being itself a valuable and worthy end*. After this fashion we speak of the moral good of an individual or of the community. In like manner moral evil is vice considered as ruinous and detestable. Without an unavoidable necessity an important phrase of common speech should not be employed in any peculiar and arbitrary way.

The question, also, has been asked, "Why is virtue called a good and vice an evil? Is it simply because virtue is promotive of happiness and vice of misery, or is it both for that and for some other reason?" We incline to say that men use

this language partly because virtue produces happiness and partly because virtue is moral goodness—the estimable quality of a good man; in like manner that vice is called evil both because it produces misery and because it is detestable as the disposition of a bad man. In short, the conception of “personal good” (or goodness) affects and modifies the conception of impersonal good as applied to virtue, and so gives rise to the fourth impersonal conception of good, the conception of moral good.

II. Since happiness—and good, as the means of happiness—are conditioned on the capability of enjoyment, additional light may be thrown on the nature of these aims of reason if we further consider *the philosophy of pleasure, which also includes, by an implication, the philosophy of pain, or suffering.*

One point of importance in this theory is that *many pleasures and pains* have no separate existence of their own, but *are merely concomitants of our other spiritual activities.* This fact has been overlooked by many writers, of whom Sir William Hamilton may be the representative. Having divided all psychical phenomena into those of knowledge (or intellect), those of feeling (or sensibility), and those of conation (or will), Sir William identifies “the second great class of mental phenomena—the phenomena of feeling” with “the phenomena of pleasure and pain” (MET. LECT. XLII.). This teaching confines pleasure and pain to the sensibilities and ignores the fact that they attend every mode of spiritual life. It is especially neglectful of the bodily senses as causes of enjoyment and of suffering.

A statement less objectionable than that of Hamilton is made by Professor Calderwood, who says: “Pleasure and pain are forms of personal feeling dependent either on susceptibility of organism as provided for in the sensori-motor system or on the action of thought and attendant mental susceptibility. Pleasures differ in kind, varying according to the mental exercise they accompany. In this way we distinguish the pleasures of the senses, of the affections, of the intellect, of the imagination.”

That pleasure and pain spontaneously accompany every mode of psychical life, including that connected with the body, will be evident if we *enumerate the powers of the soul as given by an ultimate analysis.* Instead of a three-fold classification exact discrimination calls for a six-fold divi-

sion. (See PERCEPTIONALIST, Chap. III.) There is first sensation, or the power of bodily feelings; secondly, intellect, or the power of thinking and knowing; thirdly, emotion, or the susceptibility of that feeling which arises in view of things perceived or imagined; fourthly, desire, or motivity, including all those active principles, or tendencies, which seek ends and from which the action of the will—the formation of purposes and resolutions—proceeds; fifthly, conation, or exertion, embracing all intentional effort and doing; and, finally, the capability of pleasure and pain. One prominent mode of this last manifests itself as a flavoring concomitant of every form of psychical life. For pleasure, as a kind of aroma, emanates from various natural modes of activity, while pain is given forth as an effluvium by experiences which, in a certain sense, are unnatural.

12. The concomitant pleasures and pains just mentioned are not conditioned on the apprehension of objects but only on the exercise of our faculties. *There are, however, other enjoyments and sufferings which arise upon the appreciative perception of objects* which affect us as intelligent beings. These enjoyments and sufferings are experienced in connection with various exercises of the emotional power; and are, doubtless, the feelings which Hamilton had in mind when he identified “the phenomena of pleasure and pain” with “the phenomena of sensibility.” For while emotions, like sensations, are not necessarily either pleasurable or painful, it is certain that a large part of human enjoyment and suffering is experienced in connection with these cognitional feelings.

The objects which excite our emotions are of great variety, but all of them appeal to spiritual susceptibilities. Many scenes or faces, for example, may be contemplated with a feeling of indifference, but one that is beautiful excites admiration, and one that is ugly, disgust. A special pleasure arises when truth is perceived or knowledge is gained; this does not come from the exercise of our powers but from the new relation in which the mind finds itself to reality. In a corresponding manner we are dissatisfied with ignorance and falsehood. The visible presence of very great power produces the sentiment of awe and sublimity, which, if not mingled with dread, is found delightful. A very grateful feeling accompanies the assurance that one is honored or esteemed by others, or that he is worthy of his own esteem; while disgrace and humiliation are grievous things. Companionship and the sympathy

of friends yield comfort and gratification; to be lonely and neglected is hard to bear. The conscious possession of influence or means gives pleasure; while no one likes to be helpless or without resources. There is enjoyment in one's consciousness of his own prosperity, and also in beholding that of others; to be unfortunate and to be surrounded with unfortunates is disheartening and saddening. Finally, there is high satisfaction in perceiving that right is done, that wrong is prevented, and that virtue prevails; while the sight of wickedness and moral evil causes distress.

Such pleasures and pains as the foregoing undoubtedly, as Calderwood says, accompany a certain exercise of the intellect and the sensibility, and may be said to be concomitants of that exercise, but they *have the peculiarity of being determined according to the nature of the objects perceived*. They may, therefore, be distinguished as objectively-related, while those first mentioned are, in a special sense, subjectively-related.

13. *A third source of enjoyment and of distress* is supplementary to the two already described. It *lies in the gratification and the disappointment of desire*. Many confound this cause of experience with that which is found in the combined operation of cognition and sensibility; and some have taught that all pleasure arises from this cause. The fact seems to be that *pleasure originates at first independently of desire and either from the activity of our faculties or the apprehension of enjoyment-giving objects*. After the knowledge of good and evil is thus obtained, we seek the one and avoid the other. It is true that the very same things which originally excite pleasurable or painful feelings are also the objects of desire and aversion; but *they are primarily sought and avoided for their own sake or for the sake of their own "results in sensibility," and not in order to the satisfaction of desire*. After desire has been excited, however, the satisfaction of it upon the perceived realization of its object, is an added ground of pleasure; and the disappointment of desire is a distinct cause of grief. Desire intensifies the capacity of the soul for enjoyment and for suffering, so that great delight is experienced when some earnestly sought end has been obtained and keen anguish is felt when cherished hopes are disappointed.

Moreover, while the pleasure realized in the satisfaction of motive feeling is largely accounted for as an intensification of that originally attending the apprehension of a gratifying ob-

ject, *there is also often a relief from the distress or uneasiness of desire.* We do not say that all desire is painful. If our active dispositions be moderated sufficiently and directed only to suitable objects, the exercise of them is not disagreeable, but adds to our enjoyment. In this respect motivity obeys the same law which accompanies the exercise of our other psychical powers. What, for example, gives more satisfaction than rightly regulated benevolence or the earnest love of truth and duty? The man bent on serious aims has a vastly happier experience than the man controlled by indolence or irresolution. For this reason, among others, it has been contended that most objects of human ambition may yield more pleasure in their pursuit than in their attainment. Very often, however, human desires are distressful because of their too great eagerness; and, of course, the removal of this distress is effected by the satisfaction of the desire.

This circumstance, together with the general truth that deliverance from any suffering heightens our appreciation of a succeeding pleasure, has led many to adopt a doctrine, anciently taught by Plato, that enjoyment, in every case, is conditioned upon the removal of some pain or discomfort. No doubt enjoyment frequently arises in this way. But Aristotle adduces instances in which pleasure is not dependent on preceding pain, and so disproves the teaching of Plato. He says, "The pleasure we find in mathematical studies and even in some of the senses, is wholly unaccompanied with pain. Our gratification from the energies of hearing, smell and sight is not consequent upon any foregoing pain; in this there is no repletion of a want. Hope and the recollection of past good are pleasing; but are the pleasures from these a repletion? This cannot be maintained; for in them there is no previous want." The truth is that pleasure and pain, though opposites, may arise independently of each other; each has a positive nature of its own.

14. The principal teaching of Aristotle concerning these forms of experience is that *pleasure is the concomitant of the full or perfect "energy," or exercise, of any psychical power,* while pain is the accompaniment of the obstructed or the excessive exercise of a power or of its exercise while in a diseased condition. "Thus," says Aristotle, "when a sense is in perfect health and is presented with a suitable object of the most perfect kind, there is elicited the most perfect energy, which, at every instant, is accompanied with pleasure.

The same holds good with the exercise of imagination, reason and so on." This theory, with modifications, has been held by many. It certainly approximates the truth.

Nevertheless it is open to criticism. In the first place, *it does not sufficiently recognize objectively-related pleasures.* These, for instance, the enjoyment of being honored, or of ascertaining the truth, or of receiving some valuable present, do not arise merely from the activity of a power but from the apprehension of a good, that is, of a pleasurable fact or object. In such cases we may say that a power, that is, the susceptibility of enjoyment, is exercised about its proper object, that is, the apprehended good; and this probably was in Aristotle's mind when he speaks of a *sense* being presented with a suitable object. The Greek *αἰσθησις*, like the Latin "sensus" and the English "feeling," is a word of very wide application. But Aristotle does not distinguish the pleasure thus arising from that accompanying the exercise of our faculties. "Pleasure," he says, "finishes and completes the action. . . . It is an end which joins itself with the other qualities as bloom is joined with youth." (NIC. ETHICS, Bk. X., Ch. IV., V.) Possibly his language may be interpreted to teach that certain pleasures result from the apprehension of objective relations. In that case his doctrine would be correct, though not sufficiently explicit.

A more serious objection to the Aristotelian statement is that *it appears to enounce an absolutely universal law, whereas it gives a law which has exceptions;* and which needs to be explained by some more fundamental principle. Evidently in certain cases, as in the dissipations of the drunkard and the opium eater, the excitements of the gamester and the accumulations of the miser, pleasure accompanies an excessive and deranged exercise of our faculties, instead of their full normal exercise; while, in other cases, discomfort and suffering accompany the full natural exercise of an activity. Are not certain tastes and smells and sounds inherently disagreeable? And may not a healthy man endure exquisite bodily pain when some natural cause for it arises, as when he is burnt or tortured in any way? Fear, disappointment, despair, indignation and the sense of being wronged, grief for the loss of friends, sorrow for the distress of others, the accusations of conscience and the realization of one's own moral turpitude, are all naturally experienced by spiritual beings when the proper occasions occur; and they are

all primarily and in themselves disagreeable. Yet they are the exercises of powers native to the soul; and they are full and perfect energies, unless we should say that no energy is perfect if it be not accompanied with pleasure. This would involve a "circulus in definiendo" and could not have been Aristotle's meaning. By a "suitable object of the most perfect kind" he meant the object which has the highest fitness to excite a feeling or to employ a power; and by "the most perfect energy" (or exercise of capability) he meant the energy as fully excited and experienced.

Yet there is truth in Aristotle's theory. Probably he had in mind not pleasures simply, but pleasures as contributing to happiness. For the pleasures of unrestrained and disorderly conduct are only temporary and are followed by an excess of wretchedness, while the pains which attend the normal exercise of certain susceptibilities seem to be conditions under which alone happiness may be pursued and realized by rational beings. Aristotle's law relates to what may be considered the more primary modes of spiritual life, those which result from the more fundamental endowments of spirit. *The enjoyment derived from the full normal experience of these is a large part of happiness, while the gladness felt in the apprehension of rational good and in the satisfaction of desire makes up the remaining part.*

That the normal working of certain susceptibilities is disagreeable or painful is an exception which proves the rule. For it seems necessary in the system of human nature that certain capabilities of suffering should operate to check, to stimulate, to regulate, and to assist, those other powers which are the immediate producers of felicity; and this, perhaps, is the function of evil in the universe of spiritual existence.

These thoughts assume that the laws of happiness, and those of pleasure and pain, are rooted in that constitution of things which we call "Nature," and of which spiritual beings with their powers of action and of sensibility form the most important part. We incline to the doctrine of the Stoics that *happiness and the pleasures constituent of it arise from a life in conformity to Nature and discoverable by reason*, and that suffering and misery belong to modes of life which may be styled contrary to Nature, and which must be avoided, so far as may be, by rational beings. These teachings, however, call for considerable explanation. We may attempt to give this in some future chapter. (Chap. XXXVI.)

CHAPTER III.

THE RATIONAL PURSUIT OF GOOD.

1. The Stoic conception of "the wise man" is an ideal abstraction, but may help to define the ethical idea of happiness as an end.—
2. Reason, in the pursuit of happiness, chooses objects according to their desirability; of which four modes are recognizable.—
3. First, that of ordinary self-gratification and self-interest. Plato and Aristotle on the comparison of values.—
4. Secondly, that of personal worth, esteem and honor. Leibnitz criticized. Pride and vanity defined. Worth and worthiness distinguished.
5. Thirdly, that of social enjoyment and of altruistic affection.
6. Fourthly, that of spiritual worthiness, or of morality and righteousness. These four modes of desirability when compared, form a scale whereby objects are graded in value; and also in honor. The "summum bonum." Eudaimonics distinguished from Ethics.

1. SINCE happiness is the sum of those enjoyments which the wise man seeks wisely, and since wisdom here means the judgment of reason, the question arises, In what manner, or according to what principles, is this judgment formed?

The conception of "the wise man" was prominent in the philosophy of the Stoics and corresponds with that of "the superior man" of Confucius. It means a person so intelligent that he sees things exactly as they are and whose inner and outer life is governed by the knowledge thus obtained. The reason of such an one, being not merely speculative but motive and practical, furnishes ends and rules, and is the controlling element of his disposition.

This conception of the wise man is an ideal one. It resembles that of a machine operating without friction and accomplishing its work without any waste or wear or liability to accident. We may question whether such a man ever existed or can exist. The Stoics themselves were not sure of it. Nevertheless the idea is useful. It furnishes a standard with which the actual conduct and character of men may be compared, and it enables us to ascribe different degrees of excellence to different rules of conduct in proportion as these may exhibit more or less conformity to the standard.

Of course ordinary human wisdom only partially follows the methods of an infallible intelligence. As the world goes he must pass for a wise man who seriously endeavors to know and to observe the best rules of life. So far as one acts in that way we may say that he possesses and uses wisdom. The contention of some Stoics that no one is wise who does not perfectly obey a perfect reason, resulted from their limiting the definition of *σοφία* to that of an ideal practical intelligence. Evidently no one can be an absolutely wise man who is not an absolutely wise man. So far, too, as one does not conform to the rules of wisdom he may be said to be affected with *ἀσοφία*, or unwisdom. But for all this we must recognize an inferior reason which falls short—at times far short—of perfection, yet which has the merit of following, to a commendable extent, the guidance of truth and experience.

2. The doctrine that the speculative intellect and the intuitive are not two different faculties but two modes of the same faculty, is set forth in the PERCEPTIONALIST (Chap. XLVII.), and will be discussed later in the present treatise. We are now concerned with the rules followed by the practical intuitive reason in its conception and pursuit of happiness. These pertain to the selection and adjustment of forms of good, that is, of the modes and means of happiness. This subject has been much considered by those who call themselves Utilitarians, and who hold that the promotion of happiness and the prevention of misery constitute the one fundamental aim of duty. In ancient times, too, many philosophers identified that virtue which pursues the right with that wisdom which pursues the good. They assumed that an explanation of the latter of these as a rule of life would be a full account of the former. These subjects, however, have a natural separateness. We distinguish eudaimonics, which is the philosophy of happiness, from ethics, which is the philosophy of duty. The two systems of thought are allied; they interpenetrate each other; but each of them may and should be discussed from its own point of view and developed from its own constitutive principle. Our present inquiry relates only to the rational pursuit of happiness; we shall speak of duty hereafter.

The fundamental rule of reason in the pursuit of happiness may be thus expressed: *Forms of good are chosen according to their desirability.* The truth of this statement becomes

self-evident if we consider what is meant by *desirable*. This word ordinarily does not signify that which may be desired but rather that which *should* be desired when all circumstances which are thought of any importance have been contemplated. The desirable is the rationally attractive. In philosophy the term should be used with this meaning and also with as wide an application as possible. For anything whatever is desirable, even that which is immediately disagreeable, if it contribute to the general end of happiness.

While desirability is the basis on which reason proceeds in the pursuit of happiness, objects have this character in different forms and degrees; and the choice of things desirable also varies greatly according to the character and disposition of the agent and the development of his intelligence. "The wise man," who is both endowed with a perfect intelligence and controlled by it, seeks every attainable mode of the desirable and would realize it in the highest degree. Ordinary men pursue happiness with a less accurate and a less comprehensive exercise of the motive reason. An observation of the conduct of men, however, leads one to distinguish *four modes of the desirable* which constantly enter, separately or in combination, into their plans and aims. First of all, there is *desirability as limited by the principle of self-interest*, or, more properly, the principle of private interest—in other words, the attractiveness of any means of happiness without reference to the happiness of others or to honorable or moral conduct. Secondly, there is *desirability as effected by the principle of personality*, that is, by regard for one's own honor and dignity. Thirdly, there is *desirability as modified by the social principle*, this principle being the tendency in human beings to seek the fellowship of others and to desire their happiness. And fourthly, there is *desirability as dominated by moral principle* or the rules of right and wrong, the rational agent acting on the conviction that true happiness is inseparably connected with virtue. Let us consider these modes of desirability in turn.

3. The first is that of the Hedonist—the thoughtful, self-centered Epicurean—who would obtain for himself as much comfort and pleasure as possible, and who would avoid as far as possible all discomfort and suffering. Such a one pursues happiness rationally from his own limited point of view. He begins by recognizing that pleasures differ in kind according to the sources from which they spring, a fact

noticed by Aristotle in connection with his theory that enjoyment is the concomitant of the unobstructed and unstrained exercise of a power about its proper object. Aristotle says: "Actions which are specifically different cannot but be accompanied by pleasures which differ in kind. As the activities of thought differ from those of sense and these latter also from each other, so pleasure must also differ. For each different action there is a corresponding suitable pleasure" (NIC. ETHICS, Bk. X.). All men experience a variety of bodily enjoyments and an equal variety of those which are mental. There are gratifications in the pursuit and attainment of truth, in the contemplation of grandeur and beauty, in the acquisition and control of property, in the intercourse of society, in effective action and employment.

Moreover, different kinds of pleasure are seen to differ in *value*, that is, in *happiness-producing power*. Two experiences may equal each other in the amount of feeling evolved, while one is more enjoyable than the other and also more fitted to contribute to a lasting happiness. In estimating the worth of a sum of pleasures we must add them together as we do coins of gold and silver and copper, not by weight, but by value. And, if pleasures should be judged of in this way, much more those objects which are the means of enjoyment and of happiness should be estimated according to their value. One form of good may produce only one poor delight, while another may yield many satisfying gratifications and have an enduring efficiency. Amusements and gaities are good in their way, but they are inferior to the acquisition of knowledge and the development of character; these forms of good have great and lasting value.

Such being the case, it is evident that, in the pursuit of happiness, the less valuable pleasures should be subordinated to the more valuable. The former should be abandoned for the latter whenever both cannot be enjoyed together. Rest and recreation may be wisely sought, but only as subsidiary to higher good. When a desire for them produces indolence and self-indulgence and prevents self-improvement and a useful activity, it is an evil to be condemned. Reason also sacrifices the transitory to the permanent, and welcomes temporary sufferings for the sake of enduring good. When the benefit is great in proportion to the suffering and the expectation of it sure, the wise soul accepts the pain for the joy that is to

come. This rule was in the mind of the apostle when he said, "These light afflictions which are but for a moment, shall work out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory."

When Plato, in his Protagoras, speaks of the pursuit of happiness as a measuring art (*μετρητική τέχνη*) he refers to the comparison of values. Between two attractions of the same kind that which promises greater gratification is to be preferred, just as that cake or fruit which offers greater pleasure is chosen by a child. But only certain material goods can be quantitatively determined, as gold or silver or cloth or flour may be. And, indeed, it is to be observed that the more important comparisons of reason do not concern goods of the same kind but goods of different kinds, the values of which do not admit of arithmetical computation at all. One style of good is seen to be manifestly—immensely—superior to another, and is chosen without any attempt to measure the superiority.

It is also to be noticed that after relative values have been determined, there are further judgments of reason which are not concerned with the comparison of values. The question to be settled may be not whether one good should be preferred to another, but *whether the proper occasion has come for seeking a particular gratification or benefit*. Experience shows that every natural aim has a place in life and that it occupies this place not only without detriment, but with positive advantage to man's total experience. This thought was in the mind of the preacher when he said, "To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the sun." Wisdom must determine whether the season has come or not. Reason has also the *office of fixing the limits within which a specific kind of good should be desired and sought for*. Without reference to any conflict of pursuits every particular enjoyment has confines connected with its own nature. Aristotle says that none of the human faculties are capable of continual action, and that "pleasure has not this power any more than the others; for it is only the consequence of action." The overstrained activity of enjoyment injures our ability of appreciation and may even result in wretchedness. In like manner an evil excess may be developed from almost any kind of good. Physical exercise is a good thing and should not be neglected, but excessive athletic training produces heart disease and other

troubles. So also mental weakness and derangement result from too much study and care. An over-indulgence in food is no less injurious than insufficient nutriment. Vast wealth ordinarily yields less satisfaction than an affluent independence. The prayer of the wise is "Give me neither poverty nor riches." Moderation, also, should be shown in the exercise of all natural dispositions, however excellent, including that of love or benevolence. The maxim *μηδέν ἀγάν* (nothing to excess) is especially applicable here. Kind affection is not so subject to limitations as our other motive tendencies; within the sphere of duty it is incapable of excess. Yet it may be exercised contrary to duty, and may take the form of a foolish love or a ruinous passion.

4. The second mode of desirability has been described as that affected by the principle of personality. Here this phrase—"principle of personality"—does not indicate, as might be supposed, the consciousness of being a person, but *a motive tendency common to all rational spirits and which manifests itself under a variety of forms*. Every human being naturally desires to be held in esteem or respect by himself and by others. This sentiment is not necessarily or exclusively related to moral goodness, but is founded on the recognition or assumption of any form of personal excellence or superiority. To understand the nature of it we must distinguish moral excellence from such excellence as may be taken to justify any exercise of self-esteem. With a somewhat arbitrary use of terms the former might be designated *worthiness* and the latter *worth*, worthiness being one species of worth. The difference between these natures is obvious, but they are sometimes confounded because they are analogous to one another and because the same forms of language are applied to both.

This worth—this ground of personal esteem—is to be distinguished not only from moral excellence, but also from any value pertaining to a person as an instrument or agency of happiness. It resembles that quality on account of which things are called "good" simply as being well suited to serve some purpose. It always relates to some source of power over persons or things, but does not imply any specific purpose for which the efficiency is used, or to be used. It lies simply in the possession of the ability or power, and is realized, as an end, in the conscious possession of the power. This is that excellence which Leibnitz defines as efficacious

power—"die Kraft zu wirken"—and which, in its highest spiritual development and under the name "perfection," he wrongly identifies with the essential aim of morality.

In the above definition of "worth," the word "power" is to be understood very widely so as to cover every desirable personal quality or belonging whatever, bodily or mental, material or spiritual. Accordingly the love of personal esteem may be gratified in many ways and assumes a multitude of forms. The beautiful and accomplished woman delights in her charms and takes pains to preserve and perpetuate them. The man of genius, be he orator, poet, artist, scholar, investigator, or inventor, prizes not only his talent, but, along with that and often more than that, the consideration which it procures. Even the skill displayed in amusements is a ground of esteem. Hence the rivalry in ball games and athletic contests, in billiard playing and in chess tournaments. Ordinarily such diversions are not pursued for profit, but because they develop and exhibit a certain ability. Physical strength and prowess are valued by those who have them because they give a consciousness of power. Wealth, also, is a basis of personal estimation. A rich man, when reduced to poverty, often feels the loss of consideration and importance more than his impoverishment. So also a great man who falls from some lofty station is afflicted more by his humiliation than by the loss of favor and prestige. What Cardinal Wolsey felt most deeply when he bade a long farewell to all his greatness was the insignificance consequent upon his downfall.

Go, get thee from me, Cromwell;
I am a poor fallen man, unworthy now
To be thy lord and master.

HENRY VIII., III. 2.

In many men the passion for preeminence and honor has far exceeded the desire for riches or power or pleasure, and has led to a total disregard of safety, comfort and ease. Horatio Nelson, the English admiral, was marked with a wonderful magnanimity and with a love of glory which made him face dangers and difficulties with the utmost tranquillity and resolution. Then also this lofty ambition was combined with earnest patriotism and a generous concern for others. There have been many heroes like Nelson. On the other hand some men of talent have desired honor unwisely and with a reckless sacrifice even of honor itself. Blinded by

selfishness, they have sought promotion through mean trickery and the disparagement of rivals, through the sacrifice of great interests and the commission of atrocious crimes. These are the Catalines and the Benedict Arnolds of history.

Pride and vanity are degenerate forms of the principle of personality. The former seeks to gratify the sense of worth through an unreasonable assumption of one's own excellence, and refuses under every possible pretext to acknowledge any dependence, inferiority or weakness. It demands honor as a right. It resents any apparent want of deference or respect; and it is unwilling to accept any position except one of dignity. Pride sometimes cooperates with principle, but more frequently it conflicts both with one's duties and one's interests. Vanity is the fault of one whose opinion of his own value is not stable and who seeks support for self-esteem from the praise, and even from the flattery of others. This passion gives evidence of its weakness in boasting, ostentation and the seeking of compliments. It is one of the inconsistencies of human nature that both pride and vanity may be exhibited by the same person, though they cannot be exercised together in the same direction.

The desire for esteem is no more a selfish principle than the desire for knowledge or for society. No one of these three motivations aims at self-interest, but at an end and a gratification of its own. Each of them, too, may harmonize and cooperate with moral goodness. But the inordinate desire for knowledge, society or esteem may be selfish in the sense of seeking a particular private satisfaction to the neglect of the welfare of others. Pride is always selfish after this fashion; vanity, not always.

The desire for the consciousness of personal superiority—for self-realization, as it has been called—is a radical endowment of intelligent beings. It belongs to all, from the highest to the lowest. Even the Almighty may be supposed to have it. Theologians tell us that God made all things for his own glory, and that the manifestation of the Divine excellence is the immediate end of the creation. Assuming the truth of this statement, two aims appear to have influenced the Supreme Being. First, God sought to gratify himself in the conscious activity of his own perfections; and secondly, he planned that rational creatures should be brought into blessed fellowship with himself through an understanding of his works and ways. The second of these

aims appealed to the goodness of God; the first involved the principle of personality—the desire for a full realization of his own excellence—as an attribute of the Creator.

The Leibnitzian doctrine that the essential aim of morality is the development of spiritual worth or efficiency—or, as it is otherwise stated, the realization of the true self or of personal perfection—is widely favored at the present day. Undoubtedly inward excellence is an end of duty. Mere vigor and capability of spirit—virtue (*virtus*) in the original sense of the term—should be sought by every one. Much more that virtue which loves the right and hates the wrong should be earnestly desired. But each of these objects is only a specific aim of duty. Neither is the primary and generic aim. Moreover, while spiritual worthiness, or that virtue which is identical with righteousness, is invariably an end of duty, spiritual worth, or general inward efficiency, whether mental or practical, should be sought only as any other natural good is sought. That is, we should labor for it when no other more imperative duty intervenes. And this is true also respecting the esteem founded on the apprehension of this excellence, as well as respecting every other kind of dignity and honor. Hence we find that while the principle of personality seeks a naturally noble end, it can have an immoral as well as a moral action. The good man subjecting himself to the rule of right, strives for “glory and honor and immortality;” the reckless aspirant after greatness sacrifices justice and humanity on the altar of his ambition. The “honor” of a duelist is murderous; and pride was the sin of Satan. This was the thought of the discarded cardinal:

Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition ;
By that sin fell the angels.

HENRY VIII., *ibidem*.

While personal excellence and honor are not necessarily moral ends, the pursuit of them sometimes supplies the place of principle. The man who seeks the esteem of himself and of others has much inducement to act virtuously. He is influenced against vice because of its despicable meanness, and is attracted by the right because it is the supremely honorable. Combined with moral principle—resting on that as the highest quality of immortal beings—the love of dignity

and worth produces the hero, the noblest and strongest type of man.

At present, however, we contemplate this principle simply as a factor in the calculus of happiness and misery. The sense of satisfaction is so keen when the desire for esteem is gratified, and the hurt from humiliation or disgrace is so sore, that no scheme of life is complete which leaves out of account the principle of personality. A normally constituted man cannot be happy without honor and respect, and must be wretched if subjected to the contempt of himself and others. This is a law from the operation of which no man can permanently escape.

5. The third mode of desirability is that which takes into one's plans the welfare of others, as well as one's own. That motive principle which seeks satisfaction in the activities of society comprises two general springs of action. There is first the desire for the fellowship, love, and help of others; and, secondly, the desire for the happiness of others and a readiness to contribute to their good. These two dispositions may exist in the same person in very different degrees; it is even conceivable that the one or the other may become practically extinct. But since all mankind have a common nature, we must regard every member of our race as at least capable of both these modes of motivity. It would certainly be a ridiculous inconsistency if any member of a community should ask the sympathy and assistance of his associates while he himself was indisposed to show good will towards them. As a matter of fact every society of men is bound together by mutual ties. We are all members one of another; every normal human being takes an interest in his fellow-men and desires his fellow-men to take an interest in him.

Of the two social desires, that which seeks the welfare of others is more radical than that which looks for the favor of others. The latter of these dispositions assumes the former and would have the benefit of the exercise of it towards oneself. Both affections appear to be original endowments of our nature. Some have disputed this with respect to that principle which seeks the welfare and happiness of others—the altruistic principle, as it has been named by Herbert Spencer. But all attempts to explain love for others as a form of love for oneself have proved abortive. It is possible for one to have selfish desires through a sympathy *with* others, as when fear of peril to oneself is excited

by seeing the sufferings of others, or when one is determined to some course of conduct through the influence of example. But it is not possible to trace sympathy *for* others to any regard for oneself, nor to account for it except as an original capability of spirit. The lowest form of this motivity is the impulse of irrational creatures to provide for the comfort, sustenance and defense of their offspring and their immediate companions. In mankind altruism manifests itself in kindly feelings and conduct, in benevolence, beneficence, friendship, domestic affection, public spirit, patriotism, philanthropy.

Both the self-centered and the altruistic mode of the social principle find a place in the philosophy of happiness. Much of the enjoyment of life arises from the consciousness of being the object of kind regards and from the aid given us by others; much happiness, also, is found in loving others and in the promotion of their good. The benevolent activity, however, not only lies more within our control, but is also a nobler source of pleasure than the other. Besides, it attracts the love of others even more than direct effort after their favor does. It is the more important to be considered by those who would live wisely and well.

That happiness is largely dependent on the social principle is very evident. What experiences are more delightful than those of loving and of being loved? The sweetness of life springs from the interchange of kindness and affection. The Epicureans are justly blamed for making pleasure the end of all morality. Yet they must be honored for finding their chief enjoyment in the intercourse of friendship. Beyond question he who takes delight in the happiness of others adds greatly to his own happiness. Even the compassionate man, who is grieved for the sorrows of the unfortunate, realizes the satisfaction of a noble sentiment. The heart, indeed, must be controlled by reason, and certain extremes of feeling must be avoided. But, this being granted, a friendly, loving disposition is second only to virtue itself as a source of happiness. It gives enjoyment even in this world, where kindness often meets with unworthy objects, and where the spirit is frequently oppressed with the sight of suffering. And we are told of another world whose inhabitants, governed by reason and truth, love and goodness, are removed from all evil and enriched with every means of enjoyment; in that world the blessedness of the good must be indescribably great.

On the other hand, if there be a place from which kindness and love are excluded, and where suspicion, envy, hatred and violence reign, that must be the abode of misery. Even now the man who cares for himself only is burdened with his own meanness, and forfeits the fellowship of the virtuous and the favor of all. Nature limits the friendship that can be shown to the depraved and ill-disposed and points to a future in which all kindness towards them may be impossible. The full effect of selfishness in the destruction of the social principle may not occur during this brief earthly life, and the enormity of threatening evil may be concealed from those most in danger of being affected by it. But were the lives of human beings prolonged with an unchecked development of selfish wickedness, a society would be produced the members of which would be loveless, hopeless and unhappy, hateful and hating one another.

6. The fourth style of desirability is that modified not only by the principles of honor and kindness, but also by the principle of morality or righteousness. It arises from the fact that true happiness can be attained only through the exercise of virtue. The term "self-interest," in its broadest sense, applies to every form of the desirable, and therefore includes the benefits to be derived from honor, love, and virtue. One's best welfare requires that he should seek not merely private good and gratification, but also the satisfactions of personal esteem, of the interchanges of benevolence, and of a just and righteous life. Frequently, however, self-interest indicates a more limited view of the desirable, and one which excludes these eminently rational ends. Thus it happens that a higher self-interest subordinates a lower self-interest to principles which are really more essential to one's happiness. Those sources of comfort and enjoyment which are independent of man's social and moral nature are not to be neglected, but they should be held secondary to the aims of honor, love, and virtue. In thus speaking we do not identify these principles with the principle even of the wisest self-interest. Each of them has an end of its own wholly different from one's own happiness. But we say that one's happiness, which is the aim of self-interest, will be best realized if the aims of honor, goodness, and duty, be preferred to any private means of gratification. We add, that, *simply on the score of value*, the claims of friendship and charity are superior to those of honor, while those of duty are supreme over all.

This gradation of modes of desirability makes it possible for one to exercise different degrees of wisdom in his choice of the means of happiness. The selfish pursuit of good is rational, but only in a limited way. A decision which takes honor into account is better than one confined to self-gratification. That which embraces the welfare and the fellowship of others is superior to one dominated by the desire for honor. That which recognizes virtue as the *summum bonum* is the wisest conclusion of all. Each of these styles of judgment may be made with more or less intelligence, and so may different combinations of them. But in the perfect exercise of the practical reason all modes of desirability are given their full proper consideration.

It is also observable that the gradation of values, in which private interest, honor, goodness, and duty succeed one another, forms a basis for a scale of esteem whereby we rank actions and aims as higher and lower. We find ourselves, in the changing circumstances of life, attaching different degrees of honor—or, it may be, of dishonor—to modes of conduct and ends of pursuit. Some are regarded as noble and praiseworthy; others, as ignoble and contemptible. The ground of such judgment seems to be the relation of the objects judged to the course which honor, love, and duty would demand under the circumstances. The more our conduct and aims harmonize with that, the more they appear not only valuable and desirable, but also entitled to regard and estimation. The more they conflict with that, the more they are to be contemned. Though some identify these judgments respecting the worth or dignity of things with our perceptions of right and wrong, the two classes of judgments are quite distinguishable.

At present, however, we are directly concerned to note that reason, *on the ground, merely of self-interest*, gives the moral principle a preference over all others. Apart from its own authoritative claims virtue is the most important agency of personal happiness. It is a kind of good which can never under any circumstances be anything else than good. Personal dignity may be unduly prized and may be sought to the detriment of higher interests. The social propensities may be indulged excessively or in an injurious way. But virtue is so absolute a good that it should never be subordinated to any other end. One mode of duty may, under certain circumstances, supersede another; and a weak, imperfect form

of principle should always give way to that which is stronger and better. But moral goodness in general can never be supplanted by any superior good.

Virtue is also the most prolific source of happiness. Deep and pure satisfaction attends the exercise of it, and under its guidance every specific means of enjoyment finds its proper office and reaches its most complete efficiency. The upright man, too, being in accord with the moral order of the universe, has the assurance that all things are working together for his good. Upon such considerations as these the Stoics founded their belief that virtue is the *summum bonum*—the supreme interest—of rational beings.

Moreover, while the right-minded man is conscious of present, and looks forward to future satisfactions, the evil-minded man, as far and as soon as he becomes aware of his condition, is filled with dissatisfaction and gloomy forebodings. He is at war with the government of Heaven and with his own conscience. He is self-condemned at the bar of universal justice. If he find no means of salvation he will be overwhelmed by the force of his own sinfulness and of a despairing remorse. No miseries are so profound as those of the abandoned soul conscious of his own determined wickedness.

The foregoing account of the methods of reason in the pursuit of happiness is not offered as a complete and exact treatment of the subject. It is merely an illustrative sketch. It may, however, serve to show that eudaimonics, or the science of welfare and prosperity, is different from ethics, or the science of duty. To make that clear has been the chief object of the discussion now brought to a close. Some philosophers scarcely recognize this distinction. Indeed, if we would think clearly, we must carefully distinguish from each other four closely cognate theories—the theory of happiness and good, the theory of honor and esteem, the theory of love and benevolence, and the theory of duty and virtue. This last is the proper subject of ethics.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RIGHT AND OBLIGATORY.

1. Rightness etymologically considered.—2. Conformity to a rule really signifies participation in the character or nature which the rule sets forth.—3. Positive and negative moral rightness. Only the former is the ground of obligation.—4. Rightness, that is, positive rightness, is the essential characteristic of the moral law.—5. "The Right" is a collective or a general term for all things right and obligatory.—6. The right includes ends as well as actions.—7. Moral rightness is a conception *sui generis* and not to be confounded with any other.—8. The right may actually exist, but it is mostly a thing conceived of, or ideal.—9. The right is superior to every possible competitive end or action.—10. The right is the obligatory, though rightness and obligatoriness are not the same thing.—11. An action in one aspect or relation may be obligatory and in another obligated.—12. The term "oughtness."—13. Moral obligation, as the relation of an agent to an ideal end or action, is itself ideal: but its influence and operation are actual through the conceptions of the moral law.—14. What is meant by a "legal" relation; and by the expressions "de jure" and "de facto."—15. Like every relation moral obligation embraces two relationships. But the term may denote one of these relationships or the other, as well as the whole relation.—16. This relation exists between the right and the rational agent, is simple and *sui generis*, and should not be confounded with any other relation.—17. Perfectly holy beings recognize the legal supremacy of the right, but without any feeling of constraint.—18. The question whether moral rightness admits of analytical definition should be deferred till after a critical examination of the moral law.—19. Meanwhile the wrong may be defined as including all objects of intelligent pursuit which conflict with the right.—20. The nature of the wrong lies in opposition to the right, but the nature of the right is self-determined.

1. RIGHTNESS originally signified conformity to a rule, the word "right" being the same as the Latin "rectus." In ethics, doubtless, the term primarily indicated conformity to moral rule or to the law of duty. This primitive meaning of "right" was similar to that which now belongs to the word "correct." In order to accomplish some end or to perform some operation successfully a certain mode of procedure has been found necessary or desirable; and so a rule is

formed. Action conformable to this rule is right, or correct; action conflictive with it is incorrect, or wrong. Within the sphere of ethical thought right conduct is that which is in accord with moral law, and wrong conduct is that which is contrary to such law.

2. But we must notice that even this original meaning of the adjective "right" includes more than mere conformity to a rule. It involves participation in that character or nature which the rule sets forth, and the realization of which is the sole end and use of the rule. A right line is one which not merely conforms to a straight edge but which also is straight itself—which does not at any point change its direction. A man is right in his belief or judgment not merely because this is formed in a correct way but yet more because it is assertive of truth or fact. This implication of the word "right," by reason of which it ascribes to an object or action a certain excellence or perfection, is always a prominent part of its meaning; often it occupies the mind to the exclusion of the thought of conformity to a rule. In morals certainly an action is right not simply because it may agree with some obligatory law, but yet more because it has an inherent excellence of its own, and we frequently call it right while thinking chiefly, or only, of such excellence.

3. Now this rightness, the possession of which renders an action or aim conformable to moral law and in the service of which the law has its origin and use, may be either of a negative or of a positive character. Accordingly there are two senses, a weaker and a stronger, in which a thing may be morally right.

In the first place, a piece of conduct may be right provided only it does not violate the law. Some things we judge it to be our duty to do; others we judge it to be our duty not to do; and there are others still about which we make neither judgment and which we deem ourselves at liberty to do or not to do as we may find convenient or desirable. Conduct or purpose of this last description is often called "right" simply as having in it nothing wrong, or as being consistent with the requirements of duty. This is especially the case if it be judicious and sensible, and so, in an inferior way, be worthy of commendation. We remember a cheery old Irish gentleman who, when he saw young people enjoying themselves, used to say, "That's right; that's right; that's right; that's right." By this he did not mean that their con-

duct was meritorious as being the fulfilment of duty and obligation, but only that it was wise and innocent. The same conception of "right" is used in the discussion concerning the lawfulness of certain amusements, such as theater-going, promiscuous dancing, and card-playing. When one asks whether these diversions are right, or asserts that they are, he refers to a rightness which involves freedom from guilt, but which is not the basis of moral obligation. Such, too, is the idea expressed when one assigns, as his reason for refusing to do some deed, that it would not be "right" for him to do it.

4. The second meaning of the word "right" is seen when we say that the virtuous man seeks what is right because it is right or that a certain action should be done because it is right. This rightness is the character of that which the law prescribes and commands, and is the reason on account of which it is prescribed and commanded. This sense appears in the phrase used by President Lincoln, "Firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right," and in those verses of Scripture "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"—"Children, obey your parents in the Lord; for this is right."

This positive signification of the word is both more prominent and more important in ethics than the negative one. It is that commonly employed by writers when they mention "right actions" or "moral rightness;" and it is the only meaning attached to the expression "The Right"—this phrase always denoting that which is both right and obligatory. The importance of this second conception is that it brings before us the moral law as aiming both at the prevention of evil and at the effectuation of good, as being both prohibitory and mandatory, and then calls upon us to determine what the radical nature of the moral law and of moral conduct may be. For this law is a rule, or set of rules, setting forth things which are right and obligatory. An understanding of this obligatory rightness will reveal what logicians call the "specific difference," that is, the essential characteristic, of the law and of all its requirements. The remainder of the present discussion will be devoted exclusively to that positive conception which is expressed when we speak of "The Right and Obligatory."

5. "The Right" is a general term for all those things taken collectively which are right and obligatory. In its abstract comprehensiveness it resembles "The Good" when

this phrase is used, not for all good and virtuous beings, but for all good things, objects or ends taken collectively. Moreover as "Good" sometimes signifies the same as "The Good," so "Right" sometimes signifies the same as "The Right." Hence the poetic prophecy,

" For Right is Right since God is God ;
And Right the day shall win."

Much light will be thrown on the nature of the right if we consider some statements concerning it which embody the consensus of mankind.

6. First of all, let us note that *the right includes ends as well as actions*, and indeed includes actions only so far as these may be promotive of ends or may be ends themselves. For example, the relief of the distressed, the enlightenment of the ignorant, the peace and good order of the community, the freedom and civilization of mankind, are right ends; and a derivative rightness attaches to any conduct or effort which may be conducive to these objects. On the other hand such actions as truthful witness-bearing, the observance of freely made contracts, the payment of honest debts, obedience to parents and lawful rulers, and such inward actions as the cherishing of good will for one's neighbor, or patriotism for one's country, or reverence for God, or hatred for wrongdoing, are things right in themselves and to be practised on their own account.

Two questions concerning the right naturally arise in ethics; first, What ends are right and therefore obligatory upon us to pursue? and second, What actions are right and obligatory upon us to do? These inquiries are equally important; the former of them is the more fundamental; it must be answered clearly if we would have a satisfactory understanding of the nature of right actions.

7. Next we remark that "*the right*" and moral "*rightness*" are conceptions "*sui generis*" and not to be identified with any other of our ordinary ideas. There seems to be some confusion of thought when the right is defined to be the true, or that which conforms to fact; or when it is defined to be the beautiful, or that which is fitted to excite admiration; also even when it is defined to be the good, that is, the source or the means of happiness. This last opinion is held by many; they make no distinction between the right and the good; with them the promotion of good and hap-

piness is the whole duty of man. If we respect the common thought and language of the people no definition of the right can be accepted which does not make it different from any ordinary conception of the good. Especially we may say that the right is not the useful, nor even is it that which secures the greatest happiness to the greatest number. Such is the case even though a considerable part of our duty is to do what we can for the good of all.

We may say, in general, that no teaching can be correct which treats of one leading duty as if it comprehended all the other requirements of the moral law. While love does lead to the fulfillment of the law we cannot say that to love is the only requirement of morality, nor even that it is the radical and formative principle of what is right and obligatory. Again, neither the rational regulation of one's own life nor the realization of a high ideal of character, is the fundamental and all-comprehensive aim of duty. Such views have been held by many; that which speaks of the "ideal self" or the "ideal character" is in special favor at the present time. We cannot accept either of it or of the principle of self-regulation as a statement of the ultimate right end. Neither would be satisfactory even though one were able to define exactly the ideal to be realized or to say by what rules or conceptions the self should be governed. The realization of a noble self and of a noble life is an end which appeals to thoughtful and intelligent persons, but it is a duty of secondary development. It presupposes the apprehension of simpler and more primary ends. It is not the ultimate principle of right conduct. Nor can any definition of right be approved by the common sense of men which may not be applied, without distortion or curtailment, to every right action and to every right end.

8. Another point of interest regarding "the right" is that, *in the majority of cases, it is contemplated, not as an actual, but as an ideal, or conceived of, object*—as a thing not yet realized but to be realized. It sometimes even assumes the form of an idealized object or what we commonly call an "ideal." In these respects it resembles all other objects which are or may be the ends of intelligent pursuit. Often the right has an actual existence in which case we should rejoice in that and desire its continuance: generally moral effort is directed to that which is not yet realized. Even when engaged with an existing state of facts it aims

at the maintenance or increase of this in the future. It is right that brethren should dwell together in unity; if this happy condition of affairs does not exist already, it is our duty to seek for it; if it does exist, it should be cherished and strengthened and made enduring.

But while the objects of moral choice and pursuit are commonly things not yet realized, they always are related in nature to things already perceived and known to be. This is true even of those ideal ends of action or modes of conduct which may be more excellent than any actually observed. The mind has a power of fashioning for itself, from the materials presented by fact, things of a quality surpassing past attainments, and can use these ideals as the aims of its activity.

9. In the next place, men recognize that *the right has a superiority over any other end or action which can be brought into competition with it*. In this sense even the humblest form of duty has a supreme excellence. A course of right conduct or of virtuous living is the best course a man can pursue. Some of the duties of life are not of a very exalted or ennobling character, such, for example, as the payment of a debt by one who has an abundance of means and who has no good reason to defer payment, but, in every case, duty is the best thing that can be done in the circumstances. In the instance mentioned to keep back one's money, or to spend it for one's own benefit, would be an inferior way of doing. So, to correct and restrain an obstinately naughty child, though this may not be easy or pleasant for the parent, is better than to allow free play to its whims and passions or to pass over its disobedience with neglect. To share our spare means with destitute ones who would otherwise perish at our doors, is better than to store up that surplus for ourselves, or to spend it in beautifying our home, or in entertaining our friends, and even than to employ it in some profitable venture, or in some distant charity.

Moreover, when the right becomes difficult of accomplishment or involves much suffering or sacrifice, we admire and commend that heroic spirit who loves the right because of its excellence, and who subordinates all other ends to that supreme end. We honor him who said, "I would rather be right than President;" we applaud the sentiment which calls for "justice though the heavens fall."

10. Perhaps, however, *the most prominent conviction*

which men have about the right is that it is the obligatory. The relation in which the conscious rational agent finds himself when confronted with the right is expressed when he says, "I ought" to do this action or seek that end. This is called his "moral obligation." It might be more exactly styled his moral obligatedness; for the right, in reference to a person, is obligatory, and the person, in his relation to the right, is obligated.

11. But while this is so, it is noteworthy that *an action which in one aspect is obligatory, may, at the same time and in another aspect, be obligated.* Moreover this latter thought seems to be that primarily expressed by our language when we say of some deed that "it ought to be done." The action of a rational being may be regarded in two lights or connections. According to one of these it includes a result or promotes an end; when contemplated in this aspect by the agent it may become obligatory upon him; if he sees it to be right, he recognizes it as binding upon him because of its rightness. On the other hand the action may be viewed as part of the life and activity of the agent himself and therefore as something obligated or due to the result or end to be obtained. In this aspect the action is not obligatory, but obligated; it is included in the same obligation with the agent; we say that it is something which ought to be done. Thus the payment of a debt as the accomplishment of an end and so as being itself an end, is obligatory; while the paying of the debt as the accomplishing of the end is obligated. When the emphasis of thought is on the connection of the action with its result, the action is viewed as obligatory; when we emphasize the connection of the deed with the doer, the action is viewed as obligated.

12. The choice which the mind has of regarding a moral action either as obligatory or as obligated, and the fact that the former of these aspects is more frequently chosen, account for the employment by some authors of the term "oughtness" to signify the obligatoriness of an action or end. That word would more naturally denote the character of being owed or due. Its etymology would suggest the thought that a thing was bound to be done rather than that it was binding on us to do. However we shall not object to the use of the word "oughtness," provided only those employing it do not permit it to be the cause of obscure or confused statements.

It is important to remark that *rightness and obligatoriness*

are not the same thing, though the same thing is always both right and obligatory. Those make a mistake who say that "oughtness," meaning by this obligatoriness, is the essential or constitutive characteristic of right action. To be right, in itself, is neither to obligate nor to be obligated. Rightness is a kind of excellence which may belong to an action or end; obligatoriness is the claim which an action or end by reason of its rightness has on one's personal life and service. It might, indeed, be said that moral obligation is a part of what is right—an adjunct and ministerial part which supports all other things that are right. But, for ordinary purposes, it is better to say that it is something additional to the right—something which presupposes the right and is founded upon it. Moral obligation is not included in our ordinary conception of the right.

13. We have seen that the right, like all other ends of rational pursuit, is for the most part thought of as an ideal object, as a thing not yet realized but to be realized. This peculiarity of the right affects the relation of obligation also. In strict literality, a relation could not exist between a person who actually exists and an end or action which does not as yet actually exist. At the same time we constantly speak of one being obligated to this action or to that end. What does literally exist in the premises is a relation between the person and his conception or knowledge of the right, especially as this may be set forth to him in some moral law. Yet we commonly speak of a person being obligated, not to the law or to his conception of duty, but to that action or end which his knowledge sets forth. The significance of this mode of speech is that moral law is binding upon us not simply as a form of thought, but by reason of the nature of the ideal which it exhibits. In this case, as in others, the ordinary and practical use of language is so intelligible that it may very well be adopted by philosophers. The truth could not be expressed better.

14. In order to indicate that the subjection of one's spirit and life required in moral obligation, is not asserted as an existing fact, but is for the most part only a thing conceived of and not yet realized, but to be realized or which *should* be realized, this subjection is sometimes called a *legal relation*. By this we do not understand that moral obligation has its origin in any human law or custom, or even in legislation by the Supreme Being. Right and duty precede all institu-

tions whether human or divine, and are the sources of their morality and their authority. Such language teaches that, as law often sets forth modes of conduct which are not realized in obedience, so that subjection to the right which moral obligation calls for is primarily and commonly an ideal object—an object, too, which may remain an unfulfilled ideal. There is, of course, a relation actually existing between the law and the rational being who understands it; and this may be styled his obligation, or obligatedness, to the law. But the subjection now mentioned is conceived of as a conformity between the agent and the law, or between the agent and that which the law sets forth as right; this conformity may be entirely ideal and unrealized. If a rightful king were dethroned and in exile, we could say that he was a king *de jure* though not *de facto*; we could conceive of him as exercising power and authority and of those in rebellion against him as being his obedient subjects; and we might say that, in law or *de jure*, they were his subjects. So, in general, that subjection to the right which the law requires is primarily a relation *de jure*, a legal subjection, whether it become a relation *de facto* or not.

15. Moral obligatedness—that is, *oughtness* in the proper sense of that word—is the legal relationship correlative to obligatoriness and is the thought commonly expressed by the words “ought” and “obligation.” Conceiving of man and his life as in subjection or service to the right, it says that this state of things “ought” to be, or is a matter of “obligation”—that the man “ought” to tell the truth and to pay his debts, or that he is under “obligation” to do so. But, while such is the ordinary meaning of the word “obligation,” *this term may sometimes signify the binding force of the right rather than the condition of being bound by it.* We may speak of the obligation of the right upon us rather than of our obligation to the right. As “regulation” may mean either the act of regulating or the state of being regulated, so “obligation” may indicate sometimes the act of obligating as well as the state of being obligated. This word, too, occasionally, appears to express a comprehensive conception including both of these ideas. Just as “marriage” involves both the relatedness of husband and that of wife, and as “possession” includes both the relatedness of owner and that of property, so “obligation” may comprise both obligatoriness and obligatedness. Every relation

whatever consists of two elements, or aspects, or relationships, one of which belongs to one of the relata and the other to the other. Take things that are similar, or that are equal, or that are cause and effect, or that are greater and less, or that go before and come after—in all these cases both the *relationships*, or parts of the relation, may be thought of as a unity and as constituting the *relation*. This seems to be the case at times when we speak of moral obligation in the general.

16. In saying that obligation is the legal relation of a rational being and his life conceived of as subject to the right or to the moral law, no attempt is made at analytical definition. We only state the circumstances under which this relation arises. Many have endeavored to explain this thought of moral obligation as a special mode or development of some other, but it seems to be as simple and *sui generis* as any relation can be. It can only be defined from its peculiar properties, the chief of which is that it springs directly from the nature of the right and is not imposed on the soul by any external or personal authority.

Such being the case we reject those systems which place the first foundations of morality in the commanding influence of rulers, or of society, or of God, and also those which identify the sense of moral obligation with the realization of a necessity, or with the fear of a penalty, or with a regard for one's own future, or with a respect for the general good, or with any other natural motivity. It is something *sui generis*; it is a sense of our relation to the right as legally supreme over human life and conduct.

17. The question has been asked whether God, or any perfectly good and holy being, ever feels the sense of obligation. This inquiry may be best answered with the help of a distinction. A sense of duty may be so opposed by powerful natural inclinations that a struggle results and a feeling of constraint and difficulty. In such a case moral principle may laboriously triumph; or it may be overcome by one's lower propensities and desires, and result only in an uncomfortable conscience. Plainly no perfectly moral being can experience such half-willing or unwilling constraint. He loves the right, accepts it promptly, and pursues it cheerfully. At the same time all holy beings acknowledge the supremacy of the right over their life and conduct. They conform to its requirements as a servant would to the commands of a beloved

master, and in this absolute submission of their spirits to the rule of goodness and wisdom they find the most perfect freedom. All holy intelligences, including God Himself, conform to the right as the law of their activity and the supreme end of their existence.

18. When we say that the right is the ground of moral obligation and that it is superior to any other object or end which can come into competition with it, we distinguish the right from all other aims. Yet this is not a full and satisfactory definition. It does not tell us what the right is; it only sets forth the more prominent properties of the right. If we should accept the opinion of some that the quality of moral rightness is a thing absolutely simple and uncompounded, we could not hope for any better definition than that above given, even though it is relational or "accidental" and not analytical or "essential." But are we prepared to say that the right is incapable of analysis? To determine truly the nature of the right one should classify and compare all forms of moral actions and moral ends, and, in this way, bring before his mind clearly that character which belongs alike to all. Let us, therefore, put off any further attempt to define the right till we have scrutinized all the different parts of the moral law. Then, by a kind of induction, or principiation, we may discover the essential elements which are common to all things that are right.

19. Perhaps, however, should we assume the right to be a thing known or knowable, we need not delay to attempt a definition of the morally wrong. This seems to be that which, as an actual or possible object of one's choice, is conflictive with the right. It may be that which prevents or obstructs the realization of the right, or it may be that which destroys the right or produces the opposite of it. To withhold any or all of the price which one has agreed to pay for some property would be opposed to one's duty in a negative way; while to purloin an article from its rightful owner or to do some injury to his estate would be a more positive form of wrong.

While the wrong does not consist in the mere absence of the right, and is something which is opposed to the right, it may yet be said to have a less positive and independent nature than the right. The evil of the wrong consists in its opposition to the right; the excellence of the right consists, not simply in its antagonism to the wrong, but primarily and

principally in being what it is. In one sense right and wrong are opposed to each other as much as pleasure and pain or as sweet and bitter are; in another sense, this is not so. For the evil of pain lies not simply in its opposition to pleasure, but in its own nature yet more; and bitter is disagreeable in itself, and not simply because it conflicts with the sweet.

CHAPTER V.

THE MORAL REASON.

1. Reason is not a specific faculty but a general endowment of ability affecting all the powers of the mind.—2. In a last analysis the primary powers of intellect are Thought (mere conception) and Belief (that conviction, or mental confidence, which may or may not accompany our conceptions).—3. Attention, Acquisition, Reproduction and Association, Analysis, Syntheses, and so forth, are secondary powers because their operation modifies that of conception and conviction.—4. The conceptions (or ideas) of rational beings are vastly more comprehensive, and their perceptions vastly more penetrative, than those of brute beings.—5. Reason is exercised in two modes, the speculative, or discursive, and the intuitive, or practical.—6. Besides the ordinary “intuitions of reason” which are not absolutely simple and immediate, there are intuitions of reason in the strict literal sense.—7. The rational faculty, as dealing with the right and the wrong, is called the Moral Reason, and, as such, becomes motive as well as intellectual.—8. As intuitively exercised it is often known as “the moral sense.”—9. As judging and feeling respecting conduct, especially one’s own conduct, it is styled “conscience.”—10. The general agreement of men respecting a point of conscience has some authority but is not infallible.—11. Though the doctrine that man should live according to Right, or Moral, Reason, does not answer philosophical enquiry, it makes a start in the right direction.

1 REASON, or the Rational Faculty, as distinguished from Reasoning, or Ratiocination, is not a faculty wholly separate in nature and operation from the lower developments of intellect such as are common to mankind and the more capable of the brutes. It is rather a special endowment of ability which greatly enlarges the scope of the essential functions of mind, and so fits man for language, society, invention, industry, morality, and religion.

2. Two radical modes of action are manifested by all intelligence of whatever kind or degree. These for the most part are intimately united or combined; for which reason they have not been distinguished as they should have been.

The difference between them may be easily apprehended if it can only be clearly stated. It is that between *conception* and *conviction*, or between our mere *thought* or *idea* of a thing and our *confidence* or *belief* in its existence or non-existence. The word "conception" is here used in a very broad sense for the forming and having of ideas, leaving out of consideration any mental confidence, as to fact or truth, with which the ideas may, or may not, be accompanied. On the other hand, with a similar width of signification, *conviction*, or *belief*, as opposed to *thought* or *conception*, is that mental confidence which we exercise as to fact or truth, and which varies wonderfully from the feeble expectation of a guess or conjecture up to the assurance of highly probable opinion and the certainty of absolute knowledge. These two powers, that of *thought* or *conception* and that of *belief* or *conviction*, are the fundamental attributes of intelligence; and it is evident that both of them are employed alike by our lower faculties, such as sense-perception and memory and that simple judgment which is immediately connected with these powers, and by the rational faculty.

3. In addition to the two powers above mentioned, which might be called *primary*, because their operation is the ultimate work and function of mind, there are others, such as attention, acquisition, reproduction, analysis, synthesis, abstraction, and generalization, which may be called *secondary*, because their operation is to modify the working of the primary powers and to render it effective. The investigations of mental science show that reason has no more a monopoly of these secondary powers than it has of the primary; they, too, are exercised in the perceptions, recollections, judgments and inferences of the higher animals as well as in those of human beings.

4. We repeat, therefore, that *Reason is not a faculty wholly separate in nature from our other faculties, but rather a special endowment of ability whereby the scope and capacity of the functions of mind are vastly enlarged.* Externally, the excellence of this gift is seen in the incomparable superiority of man over all other earthly creatures. As Locke says, "Reason is that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts and wherein it is evident that he much surpasses them." Language, domestic life, social life, business occupation and useful pursuits generally, art, science, philosophy, civil government, religion, moral law and moral

conduct, are the outgrowths of this rich endowment. Internally, Reason is to be known by the wide sweep of its thought and its far-seeing discernment. The *conceptions* of a rational being are more *comprehensive* and his *perceptions* are more *penetrative* than those of a being not rationally endowed. How weak compared with the human mind is that of an intelligent animal with respect to any object of which each alike has a distinct sense-perception—as, for example, a locomotive or a printing-press! While, as for abstract thinking and the solutions of scientific thought, in which reason glories, the brute is incapable of any advancement whatever. Let then, those who would comprehend the workings of the Rational Faculty, remember that it has a common radical nature with the lower developments of mind while yet in ability it has an inexpressible superiority over them.

5. Metaphysicians mention two modes in which Reason is ordinarily exercised, the *Speculative or Discursive*, and the *Intuitive or Practical*. In the former of these the mind is conscious of every step of the process, as, for example, when one enters on the methodical investigation of some new or unfamiliar subject of study. In the latter the operation of the mind, by reason either of special ability or of acquired abbreviations and the ease produced by practice, is so rapid that the result has the appearance of being reached without a process. For this reason it is called intuitive. It is named practical because it is often noticeable in the judgments of business and of daily life. At the same time it is not confined to these, but is sometimes manifested in the instantaneous solution of complicated problems by persons of remarkable gifts.

Though each of the above described exercises of the rational faculty is marked by its own mode of procedure, both alike involve processes, and both follow the same essential laws. The movements of the intuitive reason are so spontaneous and rapid that their articulation is not easily discerned, yet investigation shows that they are to be explained and justified by those laws of the discursive reason which are treated of in Logic. Hence the general power of rational intelligence, without distinguishing its modes, is often spoken of as the “discursive faculty.”

Such being the case it is evident that both the foregoing modes of reason are opposed to “intuition” when, by this last, absolutely immediate perception is meant, or, as President McCosh says, “the perception of a fact or truth without

a process." In short, the ordinary "intuition of reason" is not intuition in the strict sense at all.

6. Some rational judgments or perceptions, however, are intuitional in the sense of being absolutely simple and immediate. Therefore, also, if we would avoid an ambiguous use of terms, we must distinguish between two sorts of rational intuition, one of which may be styled the ordinary, and the other the absolute, intuition of reason. The former is what we commonly mean when we speak of a rational intuition, though it is not strictly and properly intuitive; it is sometimes, also, called the "instinctive" exercise of reason. The other exercise of reason is a true intuition, being absolutely simple and without a process. Indeed, it is a doctrine of philosophical importance that some of our immediate perceptions are such as only reason can make. The judgment that these two straight lines parallel to each other in the same plane can never meet however they may be prolonged, can be made and understood only by a rational intelligence. In like manner, that it is right and obligatory, for those who have the means, to give aid to a needy, struggling and suffering brother, seems to be self-evidently true—a moral axiom. On the other hand the ordinary intuition of Reason takes place whenever any process of ratiocination, whether demonstrative or probable, is so easy or so habitual as to require only, as it were, a glance of the mind. Thus a person of a good mathematical turn might see instantly that, if any side of a plane triangle be produced, the exterior angle thus formed is equal to the sum of the two interior and opposite angles. In the same way a person of moral insight might see at once that, under ordinary circumstances, it is wrong to disobey a magistrate, but that, in case a civil ruler command things contrary to the law of God, it would be right to disobey him.

7. Such being the nature of Reason in the general, let us now turn to that special mode or exercise of it which is called the Moral Reason. This does not appear to be a mental power radically different from the general faculty; it is simply Reason considered so far forth as it is conversant with those ends and actions and with that life and conduct which are morally right or morally wrong.

This mode of intelligence, however, takes on peculiarities, the addition of which renders it more than a purely intellectual faculty. Because of the most important of these peculiarities Moral Reason is frequently regarded not merely as a

mental but also as a motive power. For any exercise of the intellect may become motive when it brings before the soul aims of pursuit and methods of action. This is especially true of the Moral Reason.

8. A correct use of the rational faculty about questions of interest and in matters pertaining to the conduct of life is frequently styled "good sense"; moreover, because this exercise of judgment is greatly concerned with ordinary and recurrent cases, it is often called "common sense." This expression, "common sense," however, is also used by philosophers to indicate that exercise of Reason wherein the convictions of mankind are found to harmonize in regard to things fully subjected to their perception and examination. It is, therefore, a phrase affected with ambiguity.

The word "sense" sometimes signifies the power of feeling as distinguished from that of cognition and considered separately. It may even be restricted to the power of bodily feeling, as, when we say that sensation is the exercise of the power of sense—in this statement sensation does not mean sense-perception but only that feeling which is excited in the soul by some action of the nerves, and which is the condition of sense-perception. But when the word "sense" is used variously, as above, to denote a faculty of cognition and judgment, this does not imply any identification of perception with feeling; it indicates merely that the mode of cognition or judgment named is accompanied by feeling and stimulated by it. The interest which a merchant takes in his business and his keen appreciation of the failure or of the success of every projected enterprise, develop his faculties, if he have any natural gifts, and make him a man of "good common sense."

The foregoing explanations dispel all obscurity from the phrase, "Moral Sense," which is one frequently employed by philosophical as well as by popular writers. This means the Intuitive Moral Reason, especially when considered as practical and motive. Hence we hear of this measure or of that being approved of or condemned by the moral sense of an individual or of a community, and of persons being restrained, guided or governed by their Moral Sense or their Moral Reason. The word "sense" here indicates a form of rational judgment accompanied with its appropriate feeling and motivity.

9. Another name applied to the Moral Reason in its prac-

tical relations and almost synonymous with "moral sense" is Conscience. This word, as its etymology suggests, originally designated any accompanying knowledge, especially any knowledge concomitant of one's own direct experiences. Thus, among the Romans, one conspirator could be said to have a conscience of the purposes of another, together with a knowledge of his own purposes; or two friends might have conscience of each other's secrets. Then the word came to be applied to that perception which all intelligent creatures have of their own existence, and of their own actions, thoughts and lives. This meaning is now expressed by the term "consciousness" and by the yet more explicit designation "self-consciousness." By another specific application "conscience" came to denote that perception of one's moral relations and obligations which accompanies the intelligent life of a rational being and his simple consciousness of it. Finally, because the perception of personal duty and of the character of one's conduct as right or wrong specially excites the moral feeling and tendencies, "conscience" has come to connote the sensitive and motive action of the Moral Reason even more than the intellectual. Moreover, though Conscience mostly indicates one's ethical faculty as concerned with his own actions and their relations, it is sometimes used in a wide sense for the Moral Reason in general. Thus we might say that the conscience of mankind condemned the tyranny and cruelty of the colonial government of Spain. In such a case Conscience and Moral Reason are simply synonymous.

10. The value of the intuitive moral reason of mankind as a ground of judgment in ethical science is similar to that of the "common sense" of mankind in metaphysical philosophy. The universal agreement of fair-minded men in support of some principle or law of conduct creates a strong presumption in its favor. Moreover the more enlightened a community may be the greater weight attaches to its judgments. It is to be remembered, however, that the opinions of men respecting right and wrong and their estimates of different codes of duty are more likely to be affected by causes of error than their beliefs concerning the facts and operations of the natural universe are. Selfishness, pride, vanity, the undue love of pleasure, power and earthly possessions, the overbearing influence of society and the authority of false traditional teachings, interfere with the correct exercise of the moral faculty. We should make allowance for these

causes of error, and should accept only such views as may seem to be unaffected by them.

11. A clear conception of the nature of the Moral Reason as both intellectual and motive, throws light on many points of ethical inquiry. Yet an understanding of the operation of this faculty does not of itself give the essential characteristics of the right and obligatory. Some have contented themselves with saying that morality requires of us a life according to right reason, as if this were the most fundamental truth in ethics. This doctrine is only the starting point of investigation. It would not explain duty to say simply that it is the conduct required of us by the moral law. We would have to ascertain what the requirements of the moral law are, and for what reason they are right and obligatory upon us. In the same manner when we have learned that virtue is a life in accordance with Moral Reason, we have still to determine what the teachings and guidings of that reason are, and wherein lies their excellence and the source of their authority.

NOTE.—For a more complete analysis of intellectual action whether rational or subrational, the reader is referred to "THE PERCEPTIONALIST," a text-book in Mental Science.

CHAPTER VI.

MORAL ACTIONS.

1. A word may have various meanings through additions to a fundamental signification.—2. Primarily an action is simply the operation of some power.—3. Then it may be an operation considered as effecting some result.—4. Thirdly, it may be the intentional (or intelligent) exertion of power.—5. Fourthly, it may be conceived of as springing from a given animus, or motivity.—6. Intentional and desiderative actions may be based on either the intransitive or the transitive.—7. The desiderative action is based on the intentional; and is sometimes confounded with it.—8. An action has no moral character unless it be either intentional or desiderative; a complete moral action is both.—9. Actions are right or wrong as intelligent and intentional; they are virtuous or vicious as being also desiderative, or dispositional.—10. One may intelligently perform a right action with a vicious motive or animus, but not a wrong action with a virtuous motive.—11. In a weak sense an action may be right or wrong simply as intentionable; in which case one may do wrong without any vicious motive.—12. Since only intentional action is right or wrong the judgments of reason are to be obeyed, even though they may vary from those of a perfect wisdom. They give the right and the wrong *for us*.—13. Right and wrong actions may be either practical or affectional. In the former one accomplishes an external aim. In the latter he exercises a desire, or motivity, intentionally; he cherishes the desire.

1. AMONG those uses of language which tend to confusion of thought one of the most subtle is that the same word may sometimes express an idea taken simply and at other times that same idea with some modifying addition. "Man," for example, may mean merely a human being, one of the species *homo*; as when we say, "Man is mortal"; in which case it is used simply; or it may stand for the adult male of our species, as when we say, "Marriage is the union of one man and of one woman for life;" or it may signify one who exhibits the qualities which should belong to the adult male human being, and who in the Latin language is called "*vir*;" as in the exhortation, "Be a man; show thyself a man." In like manner the term "vessel" sometimes signifies a receptacle suitable for containing liquids or solids, as when we speak of an earthen

or metal or wooden vessel, while at other times it means a structure, such as a ship or a boat, capable of carrying goods and passengers on the water. In ethics it is quite necessary to consider both the radical idea belonging to the word "*action*" and certain modifications of this idea which are expressed by the same word.

2. In the simplest use of the term, an action is *merely the operation of some power*, any effect which may be produced by the operation being excluded from the conception. An exercise of power thus conceived of is what grammarians call an intransitive action. Thus we say, "The wind blows; the sun shines; the dog barks; the child screams; the man thinks; the woman talks." In the discussions of ethics this radical idea of action must be taken in a very broad application and so as to include mere efforts as well as completed activities. For an effort is an inchoate or rudimentary action; it becomes an action in the full sense when it is rightly directed and is of sufficient vigor to overcome obstructions or counteractives. The endeavor of a paralytic to rise or of a dumb man to speak would be actions of this sort. Such efforts of themselves are not moral, though they may become so, by reason of certain additions, in the same way that successful efforts become moral; but it is not necessary to their morality that they should be successful.

3. In the next place, an action may be conceived and spoken of, not simply as an exercise of power, but as *an exercise of power accomplishing some result*. It is then what grammarians call a transitive action. The distinction, however, which we now make is more searching than that required by grammatical rules, because the science of Ethics calls for a more thorough analysis of thought than is suggested by the ordinary forms of language. Let us now style an action transitive whenever the thought of a result is included in it, even though the expression of this thought may not need a noun in the objective case. When we say, "The tree falls; the water freezes; the man dies," we speak of actions not merely as exercises of power, but also as resulting in certain conditions. For as the tree falls, so it lies; the frozen water has become hard; and the man who has died is dead. As involving a result these are as transitive actions as when we say, "The workman fells the tree; the sun melts the ice; the robber has killed the man." They would be strictly intransitive only if we could exclude from them any thought of the con-

sequence. In metaphysical and ethical discussions any action may be called transitive if regarded as productive of something different from itself either in the agent or in the object acted upon, the idea of this result being combined and incorporated with that of the exercise of power.

4. A third style of action may be designated the *intentional*. This arises whenever an agent performs any action, whether intransitive or transitive, knowingly and freely. For example, we say, "The dog defended his master; the woodman felled a tree; the student read his book; the lion roared savagely; the minstrel sang of battles; the warrior fought well;" for all these actions include the intention of doing them. This is a part of their very essence. Under this head, too, we place a class of actions which may fail of their end but yet must be ranked as intentional, because they include a design or purpose. They may be called attemptive actions. One shoots at but misses his bird; it flies away soaring and rejoicing. In ethics such a futile attempt differs little from the successful one. For certain sufficient reasons human justice does not reward the ineffectual effort to do right or to do wrong so decidedly as the effectual; Divine righteousness, however, makes no discrimination. Human laws take only a limited cognizance of the unsuccessful attempt, but we have reason to believe that no endeavor to do good fails of approbation and blessing from above and that no attempted crime fails to be recorded in a supreme judgment-book.

5. Finally, an action, whether transitive or intransitive, may be, not merely the intentional doing or attempting of something, but it may be *such a doing from a given animus, or motivity, of the spirit*. In other words, an action may be not simply the doing of a thing knowingly and with an intelligent purpose, but also the doing of it from a desire for some end to be realized either in the action or by means of it. Hence the deeds of a conqueror or usurper are said to be ambitious actions, as when Napoleon in Notre Dame placed the crown upon his own head. The doings of a philanthropist are called benevolent; such were those of Florence Nightingale in the Crimean hospitals; of Howard when he visited the jails of Europe in order to ameliorate the condition of the prisoners; such to-day are those of Miss Barton and her associates of the red cross among the Cuban reconcentrados. The occupations of an earnest business man are said to be interested actions; they may even be avaricious. We characterize deeds as selfish

or generous, noble or base, according to the character of the motive feeling which controls and governs them. As the kind of actions of which we now speak are distinguished by the animus or desire from which they proceed they may be designated *desiderative* actions. They might also be named "dispositional," not simply as arising from a disposition, or spring of action, but because they are conceived of as including the exercise of a particular disposition or motive tendency as a part of themselves. Intentional and desiderative actions may be based on either the intransitive or the transitive.

6. Thus, beginning with the radical conception of the activity of some power, we find that the term "action" may have four different meanings. It may indicate an intransitive, or a transitive, or an intentional, or a desiderative, action.

The transitive is distinguished from the intransitive because of our ways of viewing things quite as much as because of difference in the things themselves. For every exercise of power seems to be attended by some result, though in many cases this may not be prominent or noticeable; in other cases, too, actions ordinarily conceived of as transitive, if the result be neglected, may be conceived of as intransitive. Thus the transitive actions of buying and selling may be considered intransitively as the occupation of trading.

The intentional action is built upon either one of the more simple kinds, though more frequently on the transitive. It always includes an intelligence on the part of the agent, or, as we say, a knowledge of what one is doing. It includes also the aiming at an end, though this may not be an end of desire but only of intention. When William Tell sent his arrow through the apple on his boy's head, the cleft apple was the immediate end or aim of his action, but the cleaving of that apple was not the end of the desire in his heart. He shot at the apple most unwillingly. His motive thought was to obtain freedom for himself and for his son and for all Switzerland. Sometimes, indeed, an agent may be spoken of as intentionally active without any end or purpose, as when monkeys gambol among the trees or dogs frisk over the ground. In such cases, however, the activity itself is aimed at both as an intentional and as a desiderative end. For one may take a walk or a ride, or may dance or sing or swing clubs or turn summersaults, simply because he finds these exercises pleasurable in themselves.

7. The desiderative or dispositional action is founded on

the intentional; it is the intentional with an important addition. Often when we see a man doing a thing intentionally, we understand his immediate aim or end, but we do not see why he does it, or, rather, with what motive he does it. In this case we can call his action intentional, but not desiderative. But when we perceive the ultimate end—the end which the man desires—and allow this to qualify our conception, then we have the dispositional action. This is built on the intentional somewhat in the same way that the transitive is built on the intransitive. When we speak of a deed as kind or selfish, or revengeful, or generous, or public-spirited, or disinterested, or wicked, or virtuous, then we are thinking of it as a desiderative action. Such an action might also be called *movent*, because it includes the exercise of motivity as a part of its very essence.

8. We are now prepared to consider rational actions in their relations to morality. Evidently *no action is moral simply as an exertion of power or even as effectuating a result*. The blowing of the wind, the falling of a tree, the sinking of a ship, the wreck of a railroad train, are of themselves without ethical character. This is the case with all of man's actions apart from his conscious intelligence. Should one on a dark night walk over a precipice and be dashed to pieces he would not have committed suicide: or should he through mistake give deadly poison to a sick friend, as Mrs. Tyndall did to her beloved husband, he would not be guilty of murder. In either case there would be a sad accident, but nothing blameworthy or morally wrong.

Every complete moral action is both intentional and desiderative, and, as such, it is not only right or wrong, but also virtuous or vicious. In order to this completeness, however, as has been already suggested, it need not be an effectual success. There is need only that it be an intelligent and earnest attempt. The man who deliberately aims the gun and pulls the trigger with the intent to take the life of an innocent person is a murderer, even though the weapon may fail to explode or the bullet go wide of its mark. Evidently the ethical character of an action depends upon the intelligence, or the intention, and upon the desire, or animus, with which it is done. All the morality of actions lies essentially in these two things.

9. Considerable light may now be thrown upon some important terms in moral science and upon the ideas they are

used to express. We can, at least partially, explain these terms. Sometimes we speak of actions as *right* or *wrong*; at other times, we speak of them as *virtuous* or *vicious*. It is natural to ask, "Is there any difference in these two modes of characterization, and, if so, what is it?" These questions may be answered in view of the distinction which we have made between the intentional and the desiderative action.

First we say that *no action is morally right unless it be the intentional effectuation of a certain kind of end, or the intentional exercise of a certain mode of activity*—this latter, as in the case of loving one's children or honoring one's parents, being in itself an end. So also no action, strictly speaking, can be morally wrong unless it be the intentional doing of that which conflicts with what it is right and obligatory to seek or do. All this is involved in the fact that only rational actions can be right or wrong.

Here, however, it is needful to note that although a right action is always the seeking or accomplishment of some right end, it does not necessarily involve the seeking of that end for its own sake. When one obeys some moral law or does some right action his immediate intention and aim is to do that which is right; and so this may be called his immediate purpose or end. But it may be an intentional and instrumental, and not a desiderative, or ultimate, end. Thus it happens that one may do a right action, and that intentionally, without any virtuous animus or desire. He who is honest only because honesty is the best policy may be morally correct and right in his business dealings, but his conduct is entirely devoid of virtue. Knaves often do right things and intend to do them as such, though not for their own sake. Selfish and unprincipled men have been known to observe for a time the strictest rules of conduct that they might obtain the confidence of those whom they intend to swindle. The intentional doing of right is often a part of that course of conduct by which hypocritical scoundrels bring on themselves a just condemnation.

10. But, while a right action may be done with a vicious motive by one who has a full understanding of its nature, *we cannot say that a wrong action can be done with a virtuous motive by one who has a full understanding of its nature*. The mere fact that one does a right action intelligently does not enable us to determine from what spirit or desire it proceeds, but the doing of a wrong deed intelligently must pro-

ceed from an improper or immoral animus. For while every rational action must proceed from some motivity or other, any disposition, which, in full view of the right, rejects the right and pursues an opposite end, is necessarily vicious; therefore, also, the action which it animates is vicious. The intelligent intentional violation of the law of rightness cannot be done innocently. In accordance with this we find that the intelligent doing of an unlawful act is always considered a crime, as in the case of blasphemy, theft, perjury and murder. In such cases the evil animus cannot be separated from the intelligent intention.

11. Nevertheless at this point we must note an exception to the rule that actions, as morally right or wrong, are always intentional; though it is an exception which proves the rule. We must admit that there is a sense in which one may do what is right or wrong without knowing that it is right or wrong, and therefore without intending to do it. Such an action cannot properly be called intentional. A farmer who did not know the exact boundaries of his land might, through mistake, cut down trees belonging to his neighbor; a woman, who had been erroneously informed of the death of her husband, might marry another man while her husband was yet living. These persons might be said to do wrong unintentionally. In like manner if one of two assassins, on a dark night, wounded and disabled the other instead of stabbing the man they intended to attack, or if a perjured witness by mistake told the truth when he was intending to swear falsely, in either case we could say that one acted rightly without having any intention of doing so.

Even in such exceptional instances, however, an action as right or as wrong is always thought of as having a relation to rational intelligence. It has ethical character and significance as being a possible and natural object of conception and purpose. Although not intentional it is *intentionable*. Only in this light it can be spoken of as right or wrong. But this is a weak and secondary use of language. In most cases when we say that a man does what is right or what is wrong, we mean that he acts knowingly and intentionally. Moreover, in order that a deed may be virtuous or vicious it must be an intentional, and not merely an intentionable, action. An action merely intentionable, and not intended, cannot be connected with that spirit, or animus, in the exercise of which virtue and vice essentially consist.

12. The distinctions above considered throw light not only on right and wrong, virtue and vice, *but also on some questions respecting moral law and its binding effect.* As right and wrong, virtue and vice, pertain to actions only as intentional, it is plain that a rule of conduct is obligatory only on those who can understand and apply it, and only so far as they do so, according to their ability. Therefore should one be limited to a partial and imperfect apprehension of duty, he might be obligated to do that which falls short of an absolute and unobjectionable standard. This principle should be especially borne in mind if we would not judge too harshly the morality of any nation or any age. Any person, who, at any time, has earnestly and honestly desired and striven to know his duty, and who has lived according to the light obtainable by him, should be considered to have done right, and should have the praise and reward of virtue, even though he may not have lived according to an omniscient, or even an enlightened, wisdom. Were a worker in wood ordered to make a globe exactly one foot in diameter or a cube each of whose edges should be exactly a foot in length, his task would be so definite that he himself as well as others would be cognizant of any imperfection in the execution of it. Models for moral conduct have not been given after this fashion. Fallible human reason must determine for itself the principles of duty and apply them according to the varying circumstances of life. Therefore, while right and wrong may not in themselves be things of an unsettled and changeable nature, man's perception of them may be partial, imperfect and even erroneous, and may vary somewhat from time to time and from age to age.

13. Before closing this discussion we must notice a distinction of considerable importance in ethics. *It is that between practical and affectional actions.* Here, for the want of a better designation, we give the name "practical" to those actions in which we exert either bodily or mental power, because these, for the most part, when they are intentional, aim at some practical result; as, for example, when one performs a calculation, or delivers a speech, or runs a race, or does a day's work. On the other hand, by an affectional action, we mean the exercise of any of the motivities of the soul, whether it be love or hatred, ambition or avarice, generosity, domestic affection, self-interest, public spirit or any other motive tendency. Sometimes the exercise of such motive feeling is not

called an action, but is spoken of as a source or spring of action; then, in correspondence with this use of language, the word action is limited to those exercises of power which have been designated above as practical. But evidently the exercise of motivity, while being the source and cause of practical actions, can also itself be styled an action; because any activity of any power is an action, and this is the activity of a mode of psychical power. It is also clear that any motivity can be exercised either simply—that is, as excited by its proper object or end and without self-direction or self-stimulation on the part of the agent, or it can be consciously encouraged or consciously repressed by the effort of the agent himself. In other words, an affectional, no less than a practical, action either may or may not be intentional.

In accordance with what has been said *it is only as intentional that any action, whether practical or affectional, can be right or wrong or have any moral character.* One may exercise a natural affection or motivity not only intentionally but also because he desires to do right and regards that as the right and obligatory thing to do. In this case we say that his action, that is, his exercise of motivity, is virtuous; we even call the motivity, thus rightly and intentionally exercised, a virtue. We say, for example, that patriotism, parental affection, patience, and benevolence, as rightly exercised, are virtues. On the other hand the conscious cherishing of motivities which oppose themselves to right conduct, such as selfishness, or envy, or avarice, is considered an evil action; and the affection as thus cherished is called a vice.

CHAPTER VII.

ENDS OR FINAL CAUSES.

1. The word "end" has various meanings. In ethics it signifies a result, not as accomplished, but only as intended or desired.—
2. We distinguish the intentional, or proximate, from the ultimate, or desiderative, end.—
3. The latter is the end *par excellence*. It is an ideal, not a real, object.—
4. An object as an end is characterized *ab extra*.—
5. Though ends are called "final causes," it is not they but the conception of them that is causative. Even this is not an "efficient" but only an "occasional" cause. Aristotle quoted.—
6. The proximate end does not deserve the name "final cause" so fully as the ultimate end.—
7. The limited meanings of the word "cause" may be explained in connection with the complete philosophical conception of cause.—
8. Some make moral actions, others moral ends, the chief subject of their study. Both claim our attention.—
9. Some actions are right or wrong "*per se*," others "*per accidens*."—
10. The doctrine of ends is more fundamental, though it is not more important, in ethics than that of actions.

1. THAT part of an object which is last reached in some order of movement or procedure is commonly called the end; this is the primary use of that term. We speak of the end of a string or of a rod; we say that the ferule is on the end of the cane, or that in walking we have come to the end of the pathway. With a somewhat similar meaning the last part of some process or work is called the end of it. Rest is enjoyed after one's labors have come to an end; the speaker reserves some weighty thought for the end of his oration; the driving of the last spike—a gilded one—was the end of the construction of the first transcontinental railroad. Again, the term "end" is sometimes used to signify the final result of some protracted undertaking or series of operations. A house, a statue, a picture is the end accomplished by skilfully directed labors. One of the Hebrew prophets in view of wonderful events which he foresaw, asked "O my Lord, what shall be the end of these things?" that is, "what shall be the outcome of them?" and one of the apostolic writers, having referred to certain shameful sins, said, "The end of those things is death."

In ethics an end is not an accomplished result, nor is it, in any literal sense, the last of a series of things. It is conceived of as existing and operating at the beginning of a series and is considered to be in some sense a cause. Philosophers have designated it the *final cause*. It is a result considered as not yet existing but as conceived of and aimed at. It is the object which one who has a purpose seeks to realize, or which, with or without a purpose, one desires to be realized. For, in either of these cases, there is what may be called a cause.

2. At this point we must recall the distinction made in a previous discussion between what we style the intentional and the desiderative end, or, as they are sometimes called, the proximate and the ultimate. The latter of these is preeminently an end, and is what this word more commonly signifies. For when any object is an end of desire, it is sought for its own sake and not for any other object for which it may be instrumental. But a proximate or intentional end, though aimed at and labored for, being the end simply of an intention and not of a motivity, may be only the means to an end beyond itself. Though such ends are often called final causes, they deserve that name only in a secondary way.

Of course the same object may be at the same time an end of purpose and an end of desire—in other words, both an intentional and a desiderative end. Indeed an end of motivity cannot be definitely sought without its being also an end of purpose or intention. Nevertheless an object as in one of these relations can easily be distinguished even from itself as in the other of these relations; and so, with a little care, one can avoid confounding the intentional with the desiderative end.

3. In further discussion we shall refer chiefly to those ends which are desiderative, and therefore truly ultimate. Evidently such ends do not literally exist. In fact both intentional and desiderative ends are only *ideal objects*—objects not real but to be realized. When Napoleon at the beginning of his career determined to win fame and power these things were as yet non-existent; and so every object of desire exists only in the ideas of the mind—that is, it does not exist at all, but is only conceived of as having a future or possible existence. It may be said, “Do not men desire money? And does not money really exist?” Certainly we often speak in that way. But, in strict truth, the object desired is not the money simply but the money in possession; and so our wishes,

even when occupied about existing things, always are directed to some future having or enjoying which is not yet a reality.

At the same time it is to be remembered that the ideals of our desire and pursuit are fashioned by the mind from knowledge gained in experience. Therefore, though not realities, they refer to realities and are based upon them. This is the case with the ideals of the moral faculty and of the moral law as well as with all others. Although, by a refining process in the mind, they may be made more excellent than any results yet realized, they are formed from a consideration of man's circumstances in the past, and of the conduct which in those circumstances has been found necessary or desirable.

4. Another point worthy of attention is that any object, considered as an end, may be said to be characterized *ab extra*. In other words, it is viewed, not simply in itself, but in its relation to some motivity of spirit by which we naturally tend to seek that object. We must, indeed, conceive of the object with its own proper nature, but, in addition to this, we must perceive that, by reason of its nature, it is fitted to excite and to satisfy some motivity. For things are attractive, indifferent or repulsive to us according to what we believe each of them is, or rather would be if realized. There is always a relation of correspondence between the character of an end and the kind of motive feeling to which it appeals.

5. An objection to the doctrine that ends are ideal objects and have no literal existence, may now be considered. One may ask, "*Can any relation exist if one of the two relata does not exist?*" If, then, there is a relation between an end and a motivity, must not the end, as well as the motivity, have actual existence?" It must be allowed that no relation can exist with a non-entity; and certainly a non-entity cannot have any causal relation or exert any influence of any kind.

The truth is that, in speaking of ends and their attractiveness, we are using language in a secondary way. We do not mean to say that ends themselves affect motivities, but only that the *ideas* of the ends do so. Our language also intimates that the ideas exert this influence because, by means of them, we know what the ends *would be* if they were realized. Such language, though not literal but secondary, conveys this truth more conveniently than could be done by any other use of words.

This being so, we have to say that the expression "final cause" (which would mislead if interpreted to mean that

ends exist and are causative) calls attention to the truth that every desire or motivity has, in some appropriate idea, what may be styled a specific cause or excitant. For the cause whereby any motivity is excited to seek its end, is the conception of the end as apprehended by the mind. This fact influenced the thought of Aristotle when he divided causes into the material, the formal, the final and the efficient; and when he sometimes identified the final with the formal, and at other times with the efficient. According to Aristotle final causes operate not only in human life but also in the arrangements of the universe. This has been the opinion of most philosophers, though some, both in ancient and in modern times, have denied that the working of any supreme wisdom can be discovered in Nature and in the world. To us the evidence of such wisdom is overwhelming. The great events of history as well as the great operations of Nature do not appear to have been accidents nor the outcome merely of human plans and efforts; they are yet more the doings of

——“a Providence which shapes our ends
Rough-hew them as we may.”

Final causes are indispensable to any adequate explanation of the wonderful organisms and orderings of the physical universe.

6. While desiderative ends, preeminently, are called causes, intentional ends, also, may claim this title. They are conditions of the production of that which one intends to accomplish; without intention, there could be no doing, and, without doing, nothing done. Moreover, as the thing immediately to be accomplished is an intentional “end,” it may be called a “final” cause. At the same time it is less worthy than the desiderative end of the designation “final,” and it is less worthy of the designation “cause.” It resembles what Aristotle terms the “formal” cause in being a causational condition rather than what we ordinarily call a cause, and in being often instrumental to an end beyond itself. It is “formal” because it includes a conception of the result to be reached. For example, the plan of the construction of a chair or of a table is an essential part of the intention to make either of these articles. We explain, though we do not fully justify, Aristotle’s occasional identification of the formal with the final cause by reason of the close relationship which exists between the intentional and the desiderative end.

7. In order to a clear and exact understanding of this subject, we must turn from the obscure and perplexing statements of the ancient metaphysician to that simple and comprehensive definition of a cause which is given us by modern philosophy. The fundamental sense of this word, and that presupposed in all its other meanings, is that *a cause is some efficient agency or adequate power together with all the conditions necessary to its operation*. For a power or agent can accomplish nothing unless it be surrounded by circumstances suitable to excite, to guide, and to receive, its activity. Gunpowder can send a ball into a distant fort only when confined in the cannon with the ball in front of it and with the muzzle pointing in the right direction and when the cap or match has been used to start the explosion. All these conditions, together with the gunpowder itself, are included in the complete philosophical cause.

But while such is the broad meaning of the word "cause," this name is often given to that which is only part of the entire causal antecedent. For example, it often signifies the power and efficiency of the agent, or of the principal agent, in the causation; or it may denote the agent as possessing and exercising that power. In the illustration given either the gunpowder or its inherent explosive force might be called the cause. Almost as frequently this term is applied to some condition which is necessary to the causation but which yet contributes no efficiency at all. Such is the case especially when any condition may be regarded as *the only circumstance wanting to render the antecedent complete*, all other requisites being already supplied or at hand. Thus one might say that the cause of a railroad train being precipitated into a river was that the drawbridge had been carelessly left open, although this circumstance could not exert any efficiency. We are sometimes told—and told truly—that cold can produce great effects. But if cold, as scientists say, is merely the absence of heat, it can exert no power of its own and is only the opportunity needed for the operation of certain molecular agencies. In some such secondary way as this the conception of an end is called a cause; and is a cause. The idea of a desirable object and even our belief in the attainability of the object do not of themselves exert any attracting or impelling efficiency. This lies wholly in the motive nature of the spirit. Even when we say that an idea *excites* a motivity, the language is stronger than strict literality. The con-

ception of the object cannot be said to start the soul's activity in the same sense in which a spark causes powder to explode; for in this latter action there is an initial efficiency. The conception simply presents the proper natural occasion for the exercise of a motive feeling; for this reason, it belongs to a class of causes which are sometimes denominated "occasional" causes, and in that way distinguished from "efficient" causes. In short, while the conception of an end may be properly styled causative, the efficiency producing desire and volition lies, not in that conception, but in the motive nature which the conception is said to excite.

8. Some ethical writers—and especially the Intuitionist or Dogmatic school—give no fundamental place in their discussions to the doctrine of ends. They direct their attention chiefly to rational actions; they define ethics as the science of moral conduct or of the moral law. Other authors base their teachings on the consideration of ends and treat of actions only as instrumental and subordinate to ends. To this class belong those Hedonists, whose sole rule of life is to take one's ease, and to eat, drink, and be merry; and also the Utilitarians, who would live for the good of themselves and of others. A careful student of ethics must hold actions and ends in equal regard. The knowledge of ends is necessary if we would understand the true character of moral actions, which are always either intentional or desiderative; on the other hand, the pursuit of ends, except in and through right and regulated action may develop an erratic and dangerous freedom.

The whole doctrine concerning the relation of moral actions to ends may be summed up in two propositions; in the first place, *moral ends are often conceived of independently of actions, and are then regarded as the objects of dutiful desire and as results to which actions may and should be instrumental*; in the second place, *actions not only may become moral as being instrumental, or conducive, to moral ends, but are often themselves regarded as including and being moral ends*.

Nothing could be more evident than that men constantly conceive of moral ends, and recognize these as right and obligatory and as the basis of virtuous and praiseworthy conduct. That was a right end which Henry the Fourth, the good king of France, kept in view when he was determined that every peasant in the kingdom should have a chicken in

his pot on Sunday. George Peabody, the American banker who had accumulated an immense fortune in London, England, aimed at a high duty when he devoted his means to the enlightenment of four millions of African freedmen and their descendants. The public school system of the United States has for its object an intelligent self-respecting and law-abiding citizenship; and this is its claim on our support. Civil government itself is founded on natural and divine justice because it is an agency necessary for order, peace and equity between man and man, and for national freedom and independence. Moreover, when we examine the different kinds of virtue, each is found to have its own end. The aim of honesty is that every man should have what is rightfully his own. Chastity seeks for purity in thought, speech and behavior. Beneficence and benevolence strive for the good of one's fellow-creatures—for their comfort and prosperity here and for their welfare in a future world. Righteousness, or justice in general, labors for the maintenance of all human rights; while punitive justice endeavors to maintain the supremacy of law and duty by the infliction of penalty on the transgressor. Every virtue aims at some end which claims our service. Evidently, also, any action or doing which in itself is without moral character, may become right and obligatory if it be found instrumentally necessary for the effectuation of a right end.

9. We agree, therefore, with Utilitarians and others who teach that actions become moral and dutiful in this derivative way, but we do not go so far as to say that rightness can attach to actions only so far as they may be instrumental to ends beyond themselves. For certain intransitive actions, as loving, reverencing, trusting, honoring, fearing, and other exercises of the affections, have an excellence and rightfulness of their own, while transitive actions are often regarded as moral because they include the result aimed at as a very part of themselves. In either of these cases an action is right *per se*—it has the ground of its rightness in its own nature, and not in something beyond itself. It is true that love and other virtues are right because they lead to right doing, but they also have an inherent excellence and rightness of their own. Then such crimes as theft and murder are wrong in themselves, not because of results that follow them, but because of the results included in them. In like manner, the telling of truth, the payment of debt, the relief of the poor, the instruction of the young, obedience to parents and magis-

trates, are right, because these things include within themselves the realization of right ends.

The scholastic distinction between actions right or wrong *per se* and actions right or wrong *per accidens* is well founded. Few actions, except loving, doing good, hating, and doing evil, are so inherently right or wrong that they are never conceived of except as unavoidably and invariably moral; but many actions can be, and are, regarded as essentially right or wrong when they are the definite effectuation of some moral or immoral end, and are conceived of as including the realization of that end. The intentional killing of a man is not of itself a crime, but when done without just and sufficient cause it is murder. The taking of one's property by force is not always robbery; it is such only in ordinary cases and when no higher consideration of duty displaces the owner's claim. To lend assistance to the poor is a thing right and obligatory *per se*, but only when performed in such a way as not to weaken manhood or encourage idleness. In like manner, the duties of friendship, generosity, loyalty and obedience to authority, self-denial and industry, are inherently right, but only within proper limits and as being the effectuation of moral ends. These statements express the common judgment of mankind; evidently they do not support the doctrine that actions are never right or wrong *per se*; they only go to show in what manner they may become so. For any form of action so circumstanced as necessarily to effect a moral end, especially if it be of frequent recurrence, naturally comes to be conceived of as inherently right or wrong.

10. The foregoing discussion evinces that *the consideration of moral ends, though no more important than that of moral actions, is more fundamental*. Ends have a moral character apart from actions, but actions are right or wrong only as directed towards ends or as including their accomplishment.

Since every exercise of virtue and every dutiful action aims at some end, the question presents itself, "Do not all right ends have some common generic nature which can be ascertained and of which we may speak as the supreme, universal law of virtuous conduct?" This question has been much debated. Plainly, if any satisfactory answer be possible, we can hope to reach it only through a process of patient analysis and induction. For, even if the right answer were hit upon by some wise conjecture, we could not be sure that it was right, nor could we convince others of its correctness, without the methodical use of analysis and generalization.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE LOWER MOTIVITIES.

1. The word "motivity" designates every form of motive feeling or principle in an unambiguous and unrestricted way.—2. Our principal motivities are (1) instinct, appetite, propensity; (2) self-love, affection (benevolent and malevolent), public spirit; (3) self-interest, rational beneficence, moral principle. Roughly speaking the first three are our lower, the rest, our higher, motivities.—3. Instinct pursues an end of its own, but is not cognizant of the rational end which it serves.—4. It is not mere physical automatism. Neither is it the only form of psychical life in the lower animals.—5. Appetite is a craving of which we are immediately conscious for some bodily relief or gratification. Like instinct it serves a rational end without knowing that it does so.—6. The appetites of beings endowed with reason call for a regulation not needed in irrational creatures.—7. Propensities have their roots in the nature of spirit, though they find stimulus and direction in bodily life and its surroundings. They seek (1) knowledge and mental occupation; (2) power and influence; (3) freedom from annoyance along with ease and comfort; (4) activity in doing; (5) novelty and excitement; (6) congenial society; (7) the relief and comfort of companions (sympathy); (8) the esteem of others and of oneself; (9) property; (10) the reward of kindness (gratitude); (11) the punishment of injury (resentment).—8. Sympathy, the altruistic propensity, which seeks the relief and satisfaction of one's neighbor, has a peculiar office in the economy of spiritual life.—9. The love of esteem by exciting emulation stimulates other propensities. Vanity and pride are its illegitimate offspring.—10. The desire for property is a complex sentiment of secondary development.—11. Gratitude and resentment are propensities only in their rudimentary forms. In one sense the former is more "natural" than the latter.—12. Our higher motivities technically defined as "the rational."

THE term "motivity" designates every form of motive feeling or principle in an unambiguous and unrestricted way.

1. The word "motivity" is used to avoid an ambiguity in the word "motive." This latter term sometimes signifies the end which one desires and which is said to excite one's desires and to move one to a course of action; and sometimes it signifies the animus or desire by which one is influenced in

view of some object or end. "Motivity" designates the desire, or motive feeling, or inward principle of action, alone.

This word, also, has the advantage of being more unrestricted in its application than the word "desire," and even than the expression "motive feeling," as these terms are ordinarily employed. Commonly, when we speak of one as having a desire to obtain some object or to perform some action, we understand that some specific form of pleasure or gratification is sought, and is to be realized in the accomplishment of the end desired. Moreover, the terms "desire" and "feeling" ordinarily indicate more exciting and engrossing experiences than prudence, or interest, or principle, or right reason: yet all these are true motives. Unless, therefore, we should use the designations "desire" and "motive feeling" in an unusual and comprehensive sense, as, indeed, we do sometimes, we must avail ourselves of some such term as "motivity."

2. Psychologists classify motivities differently; the following plan of discussion may bring them before us in an orderly way. Let us consider, first, the instincts, the appetites, and the propensities; secondly, self-love, benevolent and malevolent affection, and public or social spirit; thirdly, self-interest, rational beneficence, and moral principle. After a study of these groupings let us also consider three factors, namely, reason, sympathy, and habit, which largely affect the motivities, and which in some cases may be said to originate motivities.

3. Instinct is more removed than any other psychical tendency from moral life. It is an inborn disposition to act in some given way, or to work in some useful manner, without rational knowledge of the end to be subserved—there being always some important reason for the instinctive action. Instinct cannot be accounted for except on the supposition that the same wisdom which, at the first, constructed the bodily organs of animals without any assistance from them, endowed their spirits also with tendencies to activities without any understanding, on the part of the animals, of the main purposes of these activities. Instinct is a device whereby the work of reason and experience is accomplished in the absence of reason and experience.

At the same time this principle, in common with other motivities, appears, in every case, to pursue an end or purpose of its own. The animal, acting from instinct, is not a

mechanical or physical automaton; it seeks an end, though not the end which reason discovers to be the origin of the instinct. A bird hatched one Spring will sit on eggs the next Spring without having any idea that she is bringing other birds into being. She knows what she is doing, but she does not know the rational purpose of her sitting. She is conscious only of the immediate comfort and satisfaction which she has in sitting on those eggs. A new swarm of bees, without previous practice or instruction, builds the comb and collects the honey with as much skill and industry as if it had been trained through a long apprenticeship. The Rocky Mountain locust, in immense clouds, flies, day after day, in a straight southeast direction, alighting towards sundown upon some feeding-ground which it leaves only after the sun has ascended to a considerable height and when the wind is favorable. After the locusts rise, if the wind be in the wrong direction, they settle down upon the fields again. Birds of passage show a wonderful instinct by reason of which they change their dwelling-place semi-annually, living in one zone of the earth during the winter and in another during the summer. The dates of their migrations are very regular, but observers say that these vary somewhat as the spots on the sun increase or diminish so as to affect the seasons. In these, and in other yet more remarkable cases, the animal seems stimulated by its bodily feelings and by its outward circumstances to a certain mode of activity and accomplishment, of which it has a definite conception, and in which it finds an immediate satisfaction.

4. Instinct is not to be confounded with a mere physical tendency controlled by an automatic action of the nerves. Sneezing and coughing and the ceaseless motions of the heart and of the digestive organs, are produced in this way. The cooperation of one limb with another in walking or in working is largely effected by nervous action without mental intention. The cerebellum and certain central lobes of the brain have been found to have much to do with the automatic actions of the body and the coordinate motion of its different parts. This tendency of the nerves may unite with instinct or with habit, but is different from both these principles. They are psychical, and have even an intellectual element; they belong to the spiritual part of animal existence; the automatism of nerves and muscles is purely material and corporeal. This automatism may be regarded as the highest

form of physical, while instinct is the lowest form of psychical and mental, activity.

In the foregoing statements the term "instinct" has been used in a limited and exact sense. Sometimes all the conscious doings of the inferior animals are said to proceed either from appetite or from instinct. According to this language instinct would include, not only that unreasoning and untaught tendency of which we have spoken, but also those powers of observation and judgment, experience and habit, which many brutes exhibit. We refer now only to the inborn ability and disposition of animals for certain useful activities the rational purpose of which is beyond their intelligence.

5. Appetite is less removed than instinct from moral principle and conduct. Though not moral in itself, it is a prominent and permanent part of human experience, and is properly subject to rational control. This is not true of instinct to any appreciable extent. Though man in his earliest infancy may act from instinct, he soon develops more intelligent tendencies and follows these instead of instinct during the remainder of his life. But he never ceases to be affected with appetite. While there is an affinity of nature between these two forms of motivity—a closer affinity, perhaps, than might at first be supposed—they are so related to each other and to us that appetite throws more light on instinct than instinct does on appetite. Both have an immediate aim and satisfaction of their own; and both are evidently designed by a formative wisdom to further useful ends in the economy of Nature. Appetite provides for the nourishment and health of the body and for the continued existence of the individual and of the species; it supplements and stimulates reason in her care for our bodily life. Instinct takes the place of reason in cases where no such intelligence exists, and its uses are more varied and generally more distant than those of appetite. While both are excited by some corporeal stimulus, this is less evident in the case of instinct. An appetite is immediately known to us as a desire for some bodily relief or gratification, while instinct is sometimes credited by us with an intelligence which it cannot possess.

Hunger is a typical appetite. Neither man nor beast in the exercise of this desire thinks of food as the means of sustaining life and strength; food is sought for its own sake, as we say, that is, for the removal of the distress of an empty

stomach, together with the pleasure of partaking of things agreeable to the taste. There is a tendency to do something knowingly, yet without consideration of the ulterior and more important ends to be served. The demands of hunger and of other appetites vary from time to time; this occurs through the operation of laws and natural causes which have been wisely instituted. When the system has received sufficient food of one kind, the desire for that disappears, and when the conditions of life call for a large supply of some peculiar nourishment, the appetite for that arises. In arctic countries men relish fats, greases and oils which would be repellent to them in a warm climate; in tropical countries they crave fruits and vegetables. The accommodation of appetite to bodily needs is seen also in the desire for sleep or rest when one is fatigued, and in the eagerness of movement and action of those who are vigorous and fresh.

The appetite of thirst, which is even a stronger motivity than hunger, has for a final end—or ulterior purpose—to supply fluidity to food in the process of digestion. Neither animal nor vegetable tissues are repaired except by matter in a state of solution.

For ethical purposes we may group with the appetites all motive feelings of any kind which are excited by a condition of the body, even though some of these may not ordinarily be called appetites. Not only weariness, sleepiness, the desires for breath and air and light and warmth, and that for bodily exercise and excitement, but also every longing to escape any disagreeable or to enjoy any pleasurable corporeal experience, are motivations of the kind which we now consider. All these belong to spirit only as embodied, and are not necessarily connected with the nature of spirit, as the propensities seem to be.

6. Now, this class of feelings, which we call appetites, has a different standing in the constitution of rational beings from that which it has in creatures not endowed with reason. In the latter it needs little or no regulation; animals, following their appetites without restraint, live happily and well. But as man, through the faculty of reason, can provide the means of injurious indulgence and can even produce in himself an excessive or depraved appetite, so he must employ his reason in the restraint and regulation of his bodily desires. Otherwise his abnormal pursuit of sensual gratifications may have ruinous results.

7. By the propensities, as a comprehensive class of motives, we mean *those desires for specific ends which spring spontaneously from the nature of spiritual beings*. The rudimentary exercise of such dispositions is observable among the more intelligent brutes; the full development of them is to be found only in human beings. For example, all men have the power of perceiving, investigating and understanding things, and, in correspondence with this, they have the desire for *knowledge and for mental occupation*. In some this may be a mere curiosity; in some it may be an earnest thoughtfulness; in others it may be a love for philosophic inquiry and for scientific attainment; but it is common to mankind. In early life it appears in the eagerness with which children listen to stories and explanations.

Again, the human soul, or spirit, is capable of exerting power and influence; accordingly, it is natural for us to desire the possession of control and sway. These things are sought not simply for their own sake, though they are an immediate source of pleasure, but also for the respect and estimation which they attract and for the means of gratification which they command. The love of power is one of the chief elements of what is known as "ambition." Another propensity is seen when one seeks for himself *freedom from injury or annoyance, together with surroundings of ease and comfort*. If one be in prosperous circumstances this desire for things agreeable to one's tastes may aspire to every convenience and elegance.

A fourth fundamental inclination of mankind is that for *the activity of our faculties* of exertion and doing. Exhausting labor is irksome, but enforced idleness also is unendurable. Some suitable employment is sought by all. Then, also, a *love of excitement* is natural to man. This frequently combines with the desire for action so as to produce the spirit of adventure, and sometimes with the desire for knowledge so as to become a craving for novelty. Developed to an excess these dispositions render one dissatisfied with ordinary occurrences and occupations; then restlessness arises, and satisfaction is sought in excessive novel-reading and play-going, in gambling and wild revelry, or in a life of lawless daring.

A sixth sort of propensity leads man to *society and to social intercourse*. Without reference to the aid which one companion may receive from another, man is by nature a social being. He sympathizes with the feelings and experiences of

his fellow-beings, and takes pleasure in doing so; and he desires that others should sympathize with him. When one is cut off from intercourse with others a sense of loneliness, sometimes amounting to desolation, is experienced, as was the case with Crusoe when he found himself the sole survivor of a shipwreck. Even those most independent in their habits of thought and life have, at times, a touch of this feeling, and are sensibly happier when placed in congenial relations with others. This social sentiment may be carried to an extreme, so that the want of company cannot be endured at all, or it may be stifled by the pressure of adverse influences; but it is a normal element of human life.

8. In the foregoing account the social "instinct" or propensity is considered as seeking one's own satisfaction in the sympathy of others and in sympathy for them. But one cannot fail to note that the sympathy mentioned—the power of entering into the experience of others and sharing in their desires for their own gratification or relief—is not a selfish sentiment. It is essentially altruistic. It is that tendency in which charity and benevolent affection have their beginnings. It is possible for this tendency to be used in a selfish way, but it is not possible to explain it as a development of selfishness, or even of self-love. It is a primitive endowment of spirit.

As a motive tendency sympathy may be defined as the altruistic motivity. It is the desire which every spirit has for the immediate and specific gratification of its companions.

This propensity plays an important part in the economy of spiritual life. It doubles the aims of spirit, since it makes those of others our own, and, in combination with the more or less rational pursuit of good, it gives birth to our benevolent affections. For this reason we shall speak of it hereafter as one of the general modifiers of motivity.

9. Another important propensity—and one which assumes various forms—is *desire for the esteem of one's self and for the esteem of others*. Emulation and the determination to excel result from the desire of self-esteem which mingles and cooperates with other motive tendencies. If one be seeking knowledge or power or comfort, employment, excitement, society, or any other aim, he naturally endeavors to obtain this more fully or more perfectly than others do that he may put a high estimate on himself and enjoy the sense of his own

superiority. This is an ingredient of ambition. Then the desire for the esteem of others manifests itself variously according to the character of different persons. It may be an honest wish to gain and keep a good name, or it may be a longing for admiration or for glory. In weak natures it becomes silly vanity and showy ostentation. Pride is an *irrational and selfish feeling of one's own excellence* and importance. No matter how insignificant a proud person may be, in talent, in character and in position, he will still find abundant reasons for a high opinion of himself and for the undue maintenance of his own claims to immunity and privilege. Though pride is easily distinguished from vanity, which seeks and delights in the admiration of others, it is not inconsistent with this latter sentiment. It tends to suppress the more immediate manifestations of vanity, but does not prevent the cherishing of the feeling itself.

10. The *desire for property* is not so simple a propensity as those already considered. It seems to be a secondary appetite and to arise from the fact that the ownership of means renders the gratification of many wishes possible and easy. The love of power, the desire for comforts and pleasures, and that for esteem and distinction, especially avail themselves of money or possessions as a means of their gratification. Through the force of habit this love of property often becomes a strong passion and is cherished to an irrational excess.

11. Our enumeration of the propensities may be concluded with the mention of two forms of motivity, which differ greatly from those already considered, and which are especially important because of their affinity with the affections. These are *gratitude*, or the feeling of good-will because of kindness received, and *resentment*, or the feeling of ill-will because of injury inflicted.

Some may say that these motivities, being directed to persons—or at least to sentient beings—rather than to things, should be classed with the affections and not with the propensities. The question pertains chiefly to the use of terms. We can distinguish desires which are conditioned on the distinct conception of a spirit to be affected, from those in whose aims the thought of the person or being to be affected has no prominence, but is, as it were, withdrawn from consideration; and we might give the name affection to every motivity of the former class. But gener-

ally this name, in its specific sense, indicates a *permanent and settled feeling of favor or of aversion towards some person or being*. With this use of language a temporary impulse of gratitude or of resentment would not properly be an affection, though it might be the beginning of one. On the other hand, it would not be a propensity, if no propensity is consciously and explicitly directed towards persons or beings. In that case we might erect a new class of motivations intermediate between the propensities and the affections, and include in it such sentiments as sympathy, or social feeling, gratitude and resentment. But for the purpose of exhibiting motivations in their relation to degrees of mental endowment or development, which is our chief aim at present, we may include with the propensities all motivations, instinct and appetite excepted, which need less intellectual penetration and persistence than the affections do. Mentally, gratitude and resentment, at least in their more simple and primary forms, are on a par with the propensities.

When we compare these two sentiments together, *the former evidently has a natural priority over the latter*. This attends the fact that gratitude seeks for and delights in the pleasure and happiness of a being, while resentment seeks to inflict pain or suffering. The former of these aims is a primary, while the latter is only a secondary, tendency of spiritual life. For it belongs to the very nature of spirit to desire enjoyment for its own sake and to shun pain or distress on its own account. This is true of every spirit not simply with reference to its own experience, but also with reference to the experience of others; sympathetic desire for the relief or the gratification of a companion is as original a motive principle as the desire for one's own enjoyment. Gratitude founds on this natural tendency, intensifies it, and gives it a specific direction. While we naturally seek the comfort and pleasure of those about us, we are particularly roused to this feeling when we are cognizant that their good-will or favor has been exercised towards us. On the other hand, desire for the pain or suffering of another being does not appear to be an original principle of the spiritual nature any more than a desire for one's own suffering would be. Though a natural principle of action it arises in a secondary and subordinate way. If one spirit never interfered with the efforts of another after enjoyment, there never would be any resentment or anger. Not even the most savage beast shows anger

except when its wishes are opposed and thwarted. But when one being perceives another contending against the comfort and pleasure of itself or its companions—and yet more when the second being is discovered to be inflicting pain or evil—then there arises an excited impulse to repel and subdue the offender by inflicting pain upon him; this we call resentment or anger. The primary aim and operation of this principle is to check and suppress injurious activity. Whether we regard the capability of such a propensity as a necessary element of spiritual existence or as implanted in finite beings by creative wisdom, or combine these views, in either case it consists with the idea that good, and not evil, is the final end of the arrangements of the universe.

If there were creatures in whom the selfish sentiment were properly balanced with the benevolent or altruistic, and who were so governed, either by instinct or by wisdom, as to allow every being his due share in the means of happiness, the resentments of such creatures would be instruments of good only. Such a result cannot be expected among those in whom selfishness predominates, and who are too much inclined to seize every means of enjoyment for their private gratification. As a matter of fact resentment in many natures develops into a morose savageness, and even forms the basis for permanent hatred. As sympathy and gratitude are the premonitions and beginnings of the benevolent, so resentment, through an irrational perversion and the power of habit, gives rise to the malevolent affections.

12. We have now considered those motivities which aim at specific gratifications and not at good or evil in the general. Each of them, except instinct, may be controlled, and most of them may be modified, by rational intelligence; they cannot therefore be called irrational. But as the essential aim of each is designated by the very constitution of spirit, and is not a presentation of the rational faculty, we may, with reference to this fact rather than to their development and exercise, style them sub-rational motivities, or the lower motivities.

Those tendencies which in a greater or less degree aim at happiness, welfare or good in the general, and which may be roughly distinguished as rational, are yet to be described. They may be divided into two classes, first those which are only partially founded on the use of the rational faculty, and which, somewhat inadequately, may be designated the

affections, and secondly, those active *principles*, whether of interest or of duty, which seem to originate in our rational operations. The investigations of discursive thought require that we should study first the one and then the other of these modes of motivity. At the same time it is to be remembered that in actual life they mingle together and modify one another, and, indeed, that the variety and complexity of man's motive experience is greater than could be represented in philosophical classifications.

CHAPTER IX.

THE HIGHER MOTIVITIES.

1. In the division of human motivations into the higher and the lower, "reason" and "propensity" are used as preponderating marks, not as characteristics excluding one another.—2. The term "affection" originally denoted passive feeling, or emotion. We now apply it to that love which emotional excitement accompanies.—3. Let it include also love for oneself. This is as natural and proper as love for others.—4. Benevolence, the altruistic affection, springs from the propensity of sympathy for sentient creatures.—5. Public spirit is a specific form of benevolent affection.—6. The derivation of altruism from selfishness is not supported by the analysis of consciousness. It belongs to a superficial and verbal kind of thought. Clifford quoted.—7. Malevolent affection, or animosity, is a development of resentment. It persistently seeks to return evil for evil.—8. It may arise upon injuries done to others as well as upon those done to oneself.—9. It is not a specific form of the disposition to promote good and prevent evil, but a supplementary natural affection.—10. Hatred, envy and jealousy are morally wrong, not because of the essential nature of animosity, but because they are extremes generated by selfishness and passion.—11. Resentment and animosity are the natural adjutants of punitive justice. But unrestrained and cherished malevolence is devilish.—12. Reason may be motive as well as intellectual.—13. Self-interest is the lowest of the purely rational motivations.—14. As we distinguish self-interest from self-love, so we distinguish rational beneficence from benevolent affection.—15. So also we distinguish merely rational from moral beneficence.—16. Benevolence and beneficence are the highest modes of natural motivity, but neither of them is moral *per se*.—17. Moral beneficence aims at good not simply as good but as a right and obligatory end. It is a specific form of moral principle.—18. Moral principle in general is that rational disposition which pursues the right as an end, and which rejects and opposes the wrong.

1. THE division of the motivations into the higher and the lower emphasizes the fact that some aims of desire and pursuit are the product of reason more than others. But we must not make too much of this division. Every end of human seeking is modified by reason, so that human pro-

propensities differ greatly in their scope and range from those of the brutes. Sometimes they are so rational that they can scarcely be called propensities. For example, were we to think more of the actual experience than of the primitive exercise of sympathy and of gratitude we should call them affections rather than propensities. Moreover, that affection which brutes have for one another, especially their extreme attachment for their young, which the Greeks call *στοργή*, may properly be called a propensity, though it originates in the same way as the natural affection of human beings. In most brutes this love disappears when it is no longer excited by the solicitations of a corporeal experience by which the animals are brought together in close relations. In mankind, under the influence of rational intelligence, it lasts for years—generally for life. Then, too, that quieter kind of motivity which follows the abstract perceptions of the reason, and which we call “principle,” not only often combines with natural sympathy and affection, but may even, through a more perfect and thorough-going apprehension of its object, become love as well as principle.

We must therefore bear in mind that our higher and lower motivations have no absolute line of demarcation between them, and that it is enough for us to say that some of our motivations have reason and others propensity for their preponderating mark.

2. Speaking now of the affections, let us acknowledge that this word originally denoted emotional rather than motive feeling. It indicated the excitement produced by the apprehension of some fact or the view of some object. Even yet it sometimes signifies this to the exclusion of any desire for or about the object or fact. When we say that one is affected by the death of a friend, we mean simply that he is agitated by grief; in this case the affection is an emotion rather than a desire. But desire and emotion constantly mingle together so as to constitute one complex state of mind, which also goes under the name “affection”; in which case the motivity often becomes the more prominent, and even the exclusive, object of our thought. When we speak of parental or filial affection, or of the affection of one friend for another, we have chiefly in mind one’s desire for the happiness of a child or a parent or a friend. At present we use the term to designate this altruistic desire, while admitting that it frequently covers other feelings and even

other desires. For, while one is sincerely wishing for the welfare of another, he may, at the same time, seek his own pleasure in the fellowship of the other and in help to be received from his companion. All ordinary love and friendship is of this complex character.

3. Moreover, let us now avail ourselves of that broad use of language according to which one may be said to have love or affection for himself; because the desire for one's own happiness is in some points radically similar to the desire for the happiness of others. Self-love and love for others may be distinguished from mere propensities and from those sympathetic desires for the specific gratifications of others which are a kind of altruistic propensities, in that the former makes some use of the general conceptions of happiness and welfare, while the latter do not: at least such is the case with those affections which we ascribe to human beings. Even these, however, are conditioned on a more or less definite knowledge of the persons who are the objects of our love.

Self-love, too, in common with our other affections, has the characteristic of being noticeably accompanied with emotional excitement. In this way it may be distinguished from cool self-interest, though both of these are often comprehended under the same name. Disappointment and grief at the failure of one's plans or the ruin of one's hopes, delight and triumph over one's successes, are feelings naturally accompanying affection for one's self.

Self-love is not an unwise or improper sentiment; it should be distinguished from selfishness, which is an excessive and exclusive regard for one's own pleasure. The selfish man cuts himself off from the happiness of loving others and of being beloved by them, and brings upon himself innumerable troubles and punishments. Though he may have a temporary prosperity, he is walking on the way to final failure. Wise care for one's self leads one to seek the good of others, and limits self-love by the cherishing of altruistic desires. It finds a great part of one's own happiness in the happiness of others.

4. Benevolence, kindness, or good-will, is *the most general form of altruistic affection*. Like rational beneficence, or philanthropy, it aims at the comfort, pleasure or relief of others, but it uses more definite conceptions of the good to be conferred and of the person or persons to be benefited. Benevolence is a development of the motive element of that

sympathy which one spirit naturally has for another or for others with whom it is brought into intimate relations. This altruistic sentiment, as well as the desire for one's own enjoyment, is manifested by the more intelligent brutes; in human beings the exercise of it is modified by rationality. But that affection is excited by particular considerations and objects is especially noticeable in the love of parents for their offspring, in the attachments which spring up between the members of the same family, and in the mutual regard of kinsmen, neighbors and acquaintances. Some natures are more prone to the exercise of these motivations than others, but all tend to experience them when the proper occasions and objects are presented.

5. Public spirit, or *the disposition to defend and promote specific forms of the welfare of the society to which one belongs*, whether it be a class or a tribe, a city, a village, or a people, calls for more intelligence than other forms of affection. It is often strongly developed in patriotism, or in lives devoted to some generous and noble enterprise. The rudiments of this sentiment appear in some of the lower animals, as when herds of cattle are defended by their more powerful members; the full development of it belongs to human life.

6. The existence of altruistic affection is so evident even to those authors who hold that the essential aim of all desire is the gratification of self, that some of them have been compelled to speak of a "tribal self," out of regard to which each member of a society seeks to protect and cherish his fellow-members. "The savage," says Prof. Clifford, "is not only hurt when anybody treads on his foot but when anybody treads on his tribe. He may lose his hut, his wife, and his opportunities of getting food. In this way the tribe becomes naturally included in that conception of self which renders remote desires possible by rendering them immediate. . . . The tribe, *qua* tribe, has to exist; and it can only exist by the conception of the tribal self in the minds of its members. Hence the natural selection of those races in which this conception is the most powerful and the most habitually predominant over immediate desires. To such an extent has this proceeded that we may fairly doubt whether the selfhood of the tribe is not earlier in point of development than that of the individual. In the process of time, it becomes a matter of hereditary transmission, and is thus fixed as a specific character in the constitution of social man. . . . In the high-

est natures the tribal self is incarnate in nothing less than humanity. Short of these heights, it places itself in the family and in the city." In reading these words one is surprised at the confidence with which Prof. Clifford asserts, as if they were known facts, that the love of others was originally developed from selfishness by means of selfishness, and how, in the process of prehistoric time, this generous unselfish selfishness became a fixed part of man's constitution. Such philosophy does not appear to be legitimately founded on facts, nor even to set forth probable conjecture. For us a "tribal self" could, at the best, be nothing more than an illustrative fiction similar to that legal fiction whereby a corporation is sometimes spoken of as a person. The literal truth is that some forms of altruistic sentiment are exercised upon limited or exclusive views of social relations, and are also more mingled with personal wishes and ambitions than others. Such is the case when one loves his family, his tribe, or his country. But these sentiments are not really selfish, nor can they be derived from selfishness, nor can they be accounted for except by assuming that altruism, no less than selfishness, is an original tendency of spiritual being.

7. *The malevolent affections, though generally accompanied with aversion or dislike, should not be identified with this latter feeling.* Such aversion arises when the presence or conduct of an agent makes a disagreeable impression upon us. Because his life, it may be without any intention on his part, interferes unpleasantly with ours, he becomes an annoyance and we desire to be freed from his influence. A person who is unduly talkative or inquisitive or restless, or coarse in his thoughts and manners, or aggressively impetuous, or lazily inefficient, or who is continually showing a selfish rudeness, may be disliked without being hated. Malevolent affection always seeks to cause pain or evil. It is a continuation or development of that anger or resentment which is excited when injury is inflicted or threatened. For when the offending agent repeats or prolongs his injurious conduct or manifests a disposition to do so, or when he is constantly thought of as the responsible doer of evil, resentment also may become prolonged, and even habitual and chronic.

8. This motivity is not exercised exclusively in view of injuries done one's self, but is often excited by the perception of injuries done to others. In other words, it is an accompaniment of altruistic no less than of selfish sentiments.

The traveler who sees some outrage committed on a weak and helpless stranger has a feeling of anger towards the perpetrator similar to what he would have if the wrong were done himself. In this way we come to cherish hostility to the enemies of our country or our race. This, too, was the spirit of the knight-errant of old when he leveled his lance to avenge the wrongs of the unprotected.

9. Again, though the desire to inflict evil on the transgressor has no rational object except the suppression of evil-doing, we cannot account for it simply as a development, or peculiar exercise, of the disposition to promote good and to counteract evil; *it seems implanted in the nature of spiritual beings as a concomitant of the desire for good and the dislike of evil*. Consciousness testifies to a radical difference between anger or resentment and the mere desire to suppress or prevent evil, and then reason suggests that the former motivity is not merely additional but also supplementary to the latter.

In this thought reason also finds the rule which should control our animosities. Resentment, or the impulse to inflict pain on evil-doers, is not always undesirable or improper. So long as violence, oppression and lawless selfishness exist in the world, the disposition to punish those guilty of these disorders cannot be condemned. But it must be exercised with care lest it degenerate into hatred; for then there would be an increase rather than a decrease of the evils to be suppressed. The rule of wisdom is that resentment should not be cherished after the soul has become fixed in the determination to put an end to evil-doing and to maintain the right. There can be no adequate excuse for protracted hatred, for permanent malevolence. This is an abnormal spiritual growth which arises under the influence of selfishness and pride; every form of it is condemned by the better judgment of mankind. Envy, the desire for the injury of another because he is enjoying a prosperity which one secretly claims for himself, meets with universal reprobation. So does jealousy, the bitter hatred for one who is seen or supposed to be a successful competitor for love or honor. And who does not condemn revenge, which seeks to punish another, not as a necessity demanded by justice, but as the gratification of a hatred engendered by a sense of injury?

10. While the malevolent affections generally have a moral character, and that a bad one, it will be noticed that *this*

arises not from the essential nature of resentment, but from that excess to which this motivity is apt to run in beings dominated by selfishness. The propensity manifested alike by men and by animals to repel and punish the transgressor is not in itself more moral than the tendency to tell the truth, the sentiment of modest shame, or the love of one's parents, children, country or kind; all of which motivities become "virtues" when they combine with moral principle and are subjected to its control. Any natural proclivity becomes moral when it is consciously exercised either in harmony with moral law or in opposition to it. But, inasmuch as right principle aims fundamentally to promote the good of beings and to prevent pain and misery, and never inflicts evil except as the necessary instrument of good, it is more likely to be antagonized by a motivity which aims immediately at evil than by any other tendency, excepting perhaps that selfishness from which malevolent affection chiefly derives its sustenance.

11. If resentment upon due provocation belongs to the very nature of spiritual being, it may be regarded as the premonition of that moral judgment which calls for the punishment of the evil-doer; and if it be implanted variously in the constitutions of finite beings by a divine wisdom, it may be considered also as designed for the better regulation of the conduct of creatures toward each other and for the stimulation of rational creatures in the maintenance of the moral law. These suppositions are not inconsistent with each other; we accept them both as probable hypotheses.

12. The last class of the motivities we call the *rational* because it is purely through an exercise of the reason that their objects are apprehended. The human mind perceives things and conceives of them not only in the specific or particular, as animals appear to do, but also in the abstract and general. The dispositions of which we now speak are excited by this latter kind of thinkings; therefore the lower orders of the creation are incapable of them. We grant that mere reason—that is, the mere abstract perception of the nature and relations of things—being a purely intellectual process cannot have the efficacy of a desire or active tendency. At the same time the human soul is of such a nature that it often acts on the abstract presentation of ends and instrumentalities. In other words, it has a power of motivity which is excited by rational perceptions. We cannot better distinguish such

motivity than by calling it rational and by speaking of the reason as a motive power, even though this should introduce a use of language different from that in which the word "reason" is primarily employed. Therefore when men are often said to be guided and controlled by reason, the term reason is used in a secondary sense, not for the mere intellectual faculty, but for the combination of that faculty with the motive tendency which it naturally excites.

13. The first and lowest form of this rational motivity one may style *self-interest*. It does not, like self-love, aim at this or that specific form of gratification or of good, nor does it strive so much for immediate comfort and enjoyment. Its effort is to procure for one's self the means of general and lasting prosperity. Comparing and combining different ends of pursuit and different agencies and instrumentalities, it follows that course which, on the whole, appears most conducive to one's welfare. For example, a young man who has not yet even chosen a profession or business occupation may devote years to education in order that he may become qualified for a successful life. He aims in the most general way at prosperity and happiness. So also if property be sought after this manner, and not for any specific end such as the immediate pleasure of getting and of having, there is an exercise of self-interest. This rational pursuit of one's personal welfare differs from self-love also, in that it is not so readily accompanied with emotional disturbance. The satisfactions and the disappointments of self-interest may be as great as those of self-love; profound feeling often attends its hopes and fears and successes and failures; but, as a rule, this feeling is of a quiet nature. The emotions of reason resemble the slow boiling of water from a depth; those of affection are like waves tossing upon the surface.

14. *Rational beneficence* may be contrasted with benevolent affection in the same way that self-interest is opposed to self-love. It arises when one engages in wide-spread schemes of good without having particular and specific knowledge of the persons to be benefited and of the good to be conferred. Such was the beneficence of that American banker already mentioned in a previous chapter, who amassed a fortune in England and who left his millions as a fund for the education of the slaves freed under the presidency of Abraham Lincoln. A similar spirit actuates those who labor for prison reforms, for tenement-house improvements, for the establishment of

hospitals and of public libraries, for the endowments of colleges and universities, and, in general, for the civilization and advancement of their fellow-men.

To some the distinction between benevolent affection and rational beneficence as modes of motivity may appear insignificant and uncalled for. It may even be said that beneficence is not a motivity to be distinguished from benevolence, but is only that practice of well-doing in which benevolence is manifested. It must be admitted that the word often has this meaning. Nevertheless we believe that beneficence often signifies a mental disposition no less than the course of conduct to which it leads; we hold also that a difference exists between the performance of kind or philanthropic deeds from principle and the doing of them from feeling or affection. The two modes of motivity thus indicated are distinguishable, although they are not only closely allied in nature but also shade into one another and may even unite in the same motivity. Our terminology designating them may have a technical savor, but it must be remembered that philosophic writers are occasionally compelled to an arbitrary employment of language. Benevolence, as here used, signifies that love, kindness or altruistic feeling, which resembles the sympathy which brutes have for one another and which in man is modified and controlled by rationality. It arises from a near or particular knowledge of other beings and their circumstances. But the beneficence of which we speak is rooted wholly in rationality and springs from that abstract perception of things of which brutes are incapable. It is goodness as originating not in affection but in principle, meaning by this simply the dictate and rule of rational intelligence. For this word "principle" often signifies a rule of procedure recommended by reason whether it be a morally obligatory rule or not. Hence we speak of the principles on which agriculture or commerce should be conducted if one would be successful in either of these pursuits.

15. Such being the case, we distinguish rational beneficence not only from benevolence or kindness, but also from what may be called *moral beneficence*, or *that principle which seeks good, not simply as good, but as a right and obligatory end*. Ordinarily rational beneficence and moral beneficence coincide and coalesce in their operation. Yet there is a difference between aiming at good simply and aiming at it as a moral end. Sometimes, even, a rational beneficence

is so limited and partial in its scope as to infringe on the rules of right. One might be so set on benefiting the poor as to be willing to rob the prosperous. Through zeal for some charity, or church, or fraternity, some persons have become neglectful of their obligations to the world at large. The man of wealth who provides generously but exclusively for his kinsfolk, and the good monarch who thinks of the welfare of his own subjects only, show a beneficence which is not conformed to true morality. In striving for good one should consider every interest which may be affected by one's course; the doing of a limited good may be positively immoral if it involve the neglect or sacrifice of some right and obligatory end. We therefore distinguish moral from merely rational beneficence, and say that the former is superior to the latter because it arises from a more absolute exercise of the reason both as intellectual and as motive.

16. The foregoing distinctions between benevolence and beneficence and between merely rational beneficence and moral beneficence are not sufficiently recognized by two classes of philosophers, namely, *those who say that the all-comprehensive aim of virtue is to love beings*, and *those who say that the all-comprehensive aim of virtue is to do good to beings*. The truth is that benevolence and beneficence are primarily natural motivities, neither of them being moral *per se*; but these motivities furnish the greater part of right living when they are subordinated to and incorporated with moral beneficence. This is so much the case that, in a supremely perfect intellectual and motive nature, these three elements of life would never be exercised separately from each other, as they often are with us, but would be united in one consummate experience of righteousness, wisdom and love. For that abstract and general consideration of things upon which we pride ourselves really results from the limitations of our humanity. If there be a powerful and searching mind whose knowledge of all things and persons is as particular as it is comprehensive and whose aims are those of the most absolute reason and goodness, we may suppose the life of such a being to be pervaded equally with principle and with affection.

17. In discussing moral beneficence we have been brought to consider that third form of rational motivity which is known as "*moral principle*," and which is the highest of man's motive dispositions. This moral beneficence, the dis-

position to do good because that is right, is a specific form of moral principle; and ordinarily it is conceived of as an altruistic motivity. Limiting it in this way we must connect with it, as a companion principle, *virtuous prudence or moral self-interest*; that is, a dutiful regard for one's own good. But both of these principles, by a generalization and an enlargement of language, may be included under the comprehensive virtue of beneficence.

18. At the present time, however, it is not our purpose to discuss specific modes of virtue. We therefore conclude our enumeration of the motivities by defining moral principle. Men commonly and correctly conceive of this principle as that disposition which pursues the right as an end, and which rejects, avoids and opposes the wrong. We call this a rational motivity because it originates in preeminently rational perceptions and convictions; only rational beings are capable of it. The great aim of Moral Science is to understand the nature and developments of this form of motivity and its bearings upon human life and character. Ethics discusses man's unmoral or natural motivities only because of their connection with the moral. Not only does a knowledge of other motivities throw light on the moral and help us to understand them, but the aims and rules of moral motivity are such as to bring our other motive tendencies into intimate relations with the moral. Natural dispositions, as objects of moral cognizance and judgment, are rightfully subordinate and subject to moral principle, and may even be so controlled by it as to coalesce with it and become entitled to the designation "virtues." Further discussion respecting this topic and others relating to the motivities may occupy another chapter, in which also the emotions may receive some consideration. For these, also, have a place in moral life.

CHAPTER X.

MODIFIERS OF MOTIVITY.

1. Emotion is not necessarily prior to motivity. It may arise from the gratification or disappointment of desire; and it may also accompany and modify desire.—2. Beside emotion, reason, sympathy, and habit, notably modify motivity.—3. Principle originates in the ordinary abstract exercise of reason, but tender affection may accompany principle when complete rational comprehension of the specific, or individual, is possible.—4. While reason has a motive action of its own, it also combines with and regulates other motivities.—5. A natural disposition consciously harmonized with moral reason is a "virtue." But when cherished in opposition to right reason it is a "vice."—6. In what way reason forms moral judgments will appear during the analytic study of the moral law.—7. Sympathy, the altruistic propensity, is the basis of benevolent affection and also of resentment for injury inflicted on others. E. D. Scott quoted.—8. Altruism whether of animals or of men is an ultimate attribute of spirit. It is not a development of self-love.—9. The word "habit" has several significations, but especially the two following, (1) a psychical tendency produced by frequent repetition; (2) the mode of action to which that tendency is related. We are chiefly concerned with the first of these.—10. As acquired tendencies controlling action habits may be divided into (1) the facilitative, or executive; (2) the motive, or incentive.—11. The action of a facilitative habit, though we may be conscious of it, is not voluntary, but automatic and self-directed.—12. Facilitative habit renders accomplishment easy and rapid.—13. It is the chief cause of the difference between the intuitive and the discursive reason.—14. Man ordinarily applies moral conceptions and rules by a kind of intellectual habit.—15. This habit serves an excellent purpose, yet we should not be absolutely governed by it. Reason may point out exceptions to her own rules.—16. A facilitative habit may be an entirely new tendency. But a motive habit is the development of some existing germ of appetency.—17. Motive habits are more immediately related to moral life than the facilitative. Character is mainly made up of such habits. Virtue is the fixed habit of loving and doing the right.—18. The law of desuetude is correlative with that of habit.

1. THE *emotions*—or the sensibilities, as they are often

called, though this latter term is sometimes given a wider application—are generally discussed prior to the desires or motivities. This order of thought would not be objectionable were it not accompanied with the view that the emotions and the phenomena of pleasure and pain are identical and co-extensive with one another and also with the doctrine that, in every case, the development of a desire is conditioned on the exercise of a preceding and corresponding emotion. Neither of these opinions is well founded. The emotions excite desire only when they are pleasurable or painful experiences; in this respect they are like other excitants of motivity. Moreover in themselves—as mental agitations produced by the perception, remembrance or conception of objects—they often mingle with our desires instead of preceding them and so are modifiers rather than originators of motivity. Frequently, too, emotions of gratification or of disappointment arise when the end of a desire is perceived to be attained or to be defeated; in which cases evidently the desire antedates the emotion and is a condition of it.

2. Before discussing these sensibilities, however, let us conclude what we have to say directly respecting desires or motive tendencies. *Reason, sympathy and habit have been mentioned as modifiers of motivity*, and as deserving special study in this relation. Let us speak of them. After that, three questions may be considered; first let us ask, “*Are specific objects ever desired without reference to the enjoyment, comfort or happiness to be obtained from them or to the pain and evil which they may prevent?*” secondly, “*Does pleasure always consist in the gratification of desire or motive tendency?*” and, thirdly, “*Is there any special form of thought, as that of the greatest apparent good, which governs the determinations of human desire?*” After treating these topics we shall be ready to inquire concerning the place of the emotions among our spiritual activities, and concerning their relations to the moral life.

3. In studying the practical side of human nature, we have found that reason is not simply an intellectual but also a motive faculty. We have also distinguished between reason and affection as two modes of motivity—the latter being more emotional and impulsive than the former. At the same time the difference between these tendencies should not be exaggerated, because reason may originate a deep and tender feeling which may be—and often is—called love or affection,

though it is founded on a more thorough intelligence and appreciation than ordinary affection.

Some define reason as the faculty of abstract and general thought; this conception sets forth *that function or aspect of reason, according to which it produces principle*, perhaps strong principle, but which does not produce tenderness of feeling. *In addition to this function reason has another of which we should not lose sight.* For that same mental ability by which man, using general notions, forms judgments applicable to innumerable like objects which he could not separately consider, qualifies him for a more penetrating and complete knowledge of such individual objects and beings as are immediately presented to him. Indeed, the abstract judgments of reason always take their start in the particular and specific perceptions of reason.

Now *affection is excited by immediate and circumstantial cognitions rather than by those which are general or abstract.* When, therefore, reason perceives the attractive or moving particulars of some case, there arises what we may style a rational affection. This may be strong and deep and tender, but it has a higher origin than that unthinking sympathetic affection of which brutes are capable. It is also more profound and abiding than ordinary love. As the large and massive ships of modern days sink more deeply into the sea and are less subject to the agitations of the winds and waves than the lighter craft of ancient times, so the affections of reason are more influential and more stable than those of sympathy, while they are equally delicate and tender.

4. The functions of reason in man's motive nature appear not only in those motivities which spring directly from the perceptions of this faculty, but also in the part which reason often takes in controlling, guiding and modifying our other motivities. *This function is so important that some conceive of it erroneously as the only motive action of reason.* Thoughtful regard for the interests of one's self or of others is a purely rational motivity; so also is a sense of duty or the love of what is right and the desire for its realization. When either of these forms of motivity controls and unites with what may be called a sub-rational desire, such as an ordinary affection or propensity, the latter, too, becomes rational, or, to express the truth more exactly, is *rationalized*, and is included within the sphere of man's higher life. After this manner most forms of human motivity may assume right moral rela-

tions and even come to be called virtues. Not only domestic affection, benevolence, generosity, self-love and prudence, anger and indignation, but also modesty, bravery, candor, curiosity, activity, promptness, carefulness, self-esteem, the love of praise and the desire for distinction, may be so controlled and so infused with principle as to be worthy of approbation and goodwill.

5. So, also, other modes of natural motivity, being regularly and consciously exercised in opposition to moral principle, become vices, and are so called. Laziness, cowardice, selfishness, recklessness, extravagance, vanity and pride, are vices. These improper dispositions are often—perhaps always—modifications of tendencies which might assume a virtuous character. As they are not conformed to reason but conflict with it they cannot well be styled rationalized; yet as they are exercised knowingly in opposition to reason and are, in that ineffectual way, accompanied by an exercise of reason, they might be called *rationated*—unless some one can propose a better term. The above illustrations of rationalized and rationated dispositions connect themselves with the moral reason; but we do not lose sight of the fact that the lower function of reason which aims at good rather than at the right may also control and modify our natural tendencies.

With respect to those exercises of motivity which take place apart from the judgment of reason and are not consciously either conformed or opposed to them, we have seen that they generally serve ends which reason approves and which must have been aimed at by the supreme intelligence, while the motivities themselves form no part of rational and moral life. Such especially are those instincts which in human beings operate only in infancy.

6. Philosophers with great unanimity ascribe the perception of obligatory ends and of the laws of duty to “right reason” or “the moral reason,” but they are not fully agreed as to the manner of this perception. Many regard the operations of reason concerning points of duty as much simpler than concerning other matters of inquiry—indeed as being strictly intuitional. We incline to the opinion that *the moral judgments of reason are neither more nor less intuitional than are its other judgments respecting practical questions*. A clear understanding of this topic cannot be expected till after our discussion of the Moral Law. This law sets forth and is composed of the aims and rules of right conduct. These can-

not be philosophically understood except in connection with the rational processes by which they are apprehended and formulated. Therefore the exact nature of the operations of the moral faculty must be expected to reveal itself during the analytic study of the aims and rules of morality.

7. Sympathy has almost as important a place as reason in man's motive constitution; it is *the fundamental element of the social nature*. In its lowest form it is a propensity common to man and the brutes. Illustrations of the care of animals for one another are scarcely needed; they abound in books on Natural History. The following is taken at random from "an account of the birds in Eastern North America," by Wm. E. D. Scott, which he entitles "Bird Studies." Speaking of mocking-birds, he says, "One that I reared in Arizona, when six weeks old, assumed the care of two other very young mocking-birds and a young oriole that were placed in the cage with him. He showed them how to kill and tear apart the grasshopper placed in the cage for food, how to moisten the fragments in the water cup, and generally fed the small birds and looked after them before attending to his own wants." The disposition of some animals to protect and foster others and especially to care for the young and helpless is often a strong, overmastering passion.

Sympathy is the basis of the benevolent affections and even of that anger or resentment which arises when we see one ill-treating our friends. It is a fundamental propensity of spirit, but differs from other propensities because of its peculiar power to double man's desires. By reason of this disposition whatever man seeks for himself he seeks for others also. That is, he would have them partake of enjoyments similar to his own.

This word "sympathy," however, is somewhat ambiguous. In the present connection it does not signify that inborn proneness which every spirit has to participate in the emotions of a companion—just as one electric disturbance is induced by a neighboring one; nor even our tendency to exercise desires or impulses in common with those about us—a tendency apparent in excited mobs, in the fashions of popular taste and favor, and even in national and public movements. The word is often applied to such experiences; this, indeed, is its original use. But now, employing a secondary though not uncommon signification, we mean by sympathy *the spontaneous desire that another or others of whose life and experience*

one is cognizant should be freed from pain or sorrow and should have that pleasure or gratification of which his or their circumstances admit.

This sympathy has been excellently named altruistic feeling or altruism, and is rightly held to be a primitive element of spiritual life. We cannot agree with those who teach that man, primarily and radically, is a wholly selfish being, and that his pity and affection for others is only an indirect way of exercising love for himself. They say that man imagines himself in the condition of another and then feels for that imaginary self. It is to be admitted that many, perhaps most, men are greatly influenced by selfishness, but we cannot explain love and pity for others as a development of that selfishness. The truth is that every spirit naturally or normally wishes kindred and neighboring spirits to have the same pleasures and comforts as itself; and this desire is essentially disinterested.

8. Animals as well as men exhibit altruism. They show an interest in the specific modes of enjoyment and of suffering of which their companions are capable. With what diligence and tenderness they care for their young! How frequently they share with each other the means of subsistence! How vigorously and even recklessly they act for their common protection and defense! But this spirit is especially shown in those modes of helpfulness and kindness observable among human beings. When one provides a good dinner for himself and his friends, when he imparts knowledge and information to others, when he shares wealth and the means of comfort with the needy, he exhibits altruism.

Possibly in some persons this tendency becomes utterly destroyed by reason of their persistent egotism and self-indulgence, yet we doubt whether any men are so depraved as to be absolutely incapable of sympathy for their fellow-beings. Self-sacrifice and generosity are a high development of altruism; but even they cannot be regarded as unnatural. What is more natural than that the life of a good mother should be a continued course of self-sacrifice?

When altruistic desires are gratified, a pleasure is experienced. *But these desires do not aim at that pleasure;* they seek the happiness of others, not one's own. That they do so is a simple ultimate psychological fact.

9. The third factor influencing the development of the motives is habit. By this we mean *that tendency to any form*

of activity which is induced by frequent repetition. That such a tendency should originate in such a way is a radical law of spiritual being. The word "habit," which anglicizes the Latin "habitus," a translation of the Greek ἔξῆς, signified primarily an acquired state or condition of more or less permanency. This meaning yet survives when men speak of a diseased or of a healthy habit either of the body or of the mind. After this, being limited to the sphere of psychical things, it came to signify *a chronic tendency induced by repetition, as also the mode of action to which such a tendency leads.* When we hear of one's acquiring the habit of tobacco-chewing, or whisky-drinking, or opium-smoking, or of telling falsehoods, or reading novels, or idling away one's time, and when we speak of the power of such habits over conduct, we refer to tendencies established and strengthened by repeated indulgence; at other times the modes of action above mentioned as related to our dispositions to do them are called habits.

While philosophers agree that habit is a psychical tendency produced by repetition, no complete statement has yet been given of the relation of habit to the motivities. Some light will be thrown on this point, as well as on the nature of habits in general, if we distinguish them into two principal classes. For some habits, which affect our motivities indirectly, may be styled *facilitative and executive*, while others, being direct modifications and developments of desire, may be styled *motive or incentive*.

10. We call the former *facilitative and executive* because they show themselves in connection with acquired dexterities and aid us in the performance of any work or action to which we have become accustomed. We do not agree with those who define habit as a facility gained by practice, but we say that one kind of habit, in the form of a tendency to act without premeditation or intention, accompanies, maintains and increases such a facility. Any one watching a skilled mechanic at his work can notice how swiftly he passes from one step of a process to the next without having to deliberate what that next should be. This kind of habit may attach itself to any physical activity, but it preeminently affects the intellect through an increase given to the power of association or suggestion. Dr. Thomas Reid is right in teaching, "That trains of thinking which, by frequent repetition, have become familiar, should spontaneously offer themselves to our fancy,

seems to require no other original quality but the power of habit." These words, indeed, do not accurately state the law of the association of ideas; therefore they fail somewhat of Reid's purpose in using them; because association may take place without any frequency of repetition. But association and habit are founded on the same principle, viz.: that the mind tends to repeat that which it has previously done. This tendency is called habit when it has been strengthened by frequency of repetition.

11. This law of habit affects every mental faculty. Under its influence, on the renewal of proper occasion, the same memory or imagination, the same judgment or inference, springs unbidden into the mind; which effect, though we are conscious of it, is not the result of our volition. It is automatic and unintentional. Moreover, if the thought thus recalled to consciousness has been previously used as a guide to conduct, it is accompanied with *a tendency to act without any consideration of the end at which the conduct originally aimed*. It is said that a thoroughly drilled veteran soldier if he suddenly hear the word of command will instinctively obey it, even though it be given by a person without authority and whose control may be immediately repudiated. In the spring of 1865, while the army of the Potomac lay before Petersburg, Virginia, the writer of this discussion, then chaplain of the Seventh New Jersey Infantry, was called to march in company with a poor fellow, who was about to be shot for desertion to the enemy, around a hollow square in which a division of the Second Army Corps had been drawn up. The man was a Hessian, and had spent many years in military service. It was noticeable that, while his mind was occupied with his impending execution, he kept step most accurately with the wailing music of the band; and, when he came to the corners, at each of which there was a short cessation of progress, his feet measured time till the onward movement was renewed. Illustrations similar to the foregoing can be gathered from our daily experience. How often, after one has vacated a house or a room for some new quarters, he finds himself turning in the familiar direction! Sometimes, too, we listen for the voices or look for the coming of those who have gone away, and who perhaps are separated from us forever!

12. Facilitative habits add greatly to the effectiveness of human effort. After a complicated process has been frequent-

ly repeated the mind tends to act again in the same way with the minimum of thought and exertion. The recent naval victories at Manila and at Santiago de Cuba are ascribed to the skill of the American gunners. Their training had been so thorough that, when the hour of battle came, they managed the huge rifles and projectiles with the utmost ease and with marvelous precision and celerity. Though under intense excitement their fighting went on with machine-like regularity. In like manner practice so develops a bent of mind in an accountant or an orator, in a musician or a swordsman, or in the mechanic, the merchant, or the professional man, that he instinctively follows his accustomed mode of working and could not change from it without special effort.

13. *Facilitative habit is the chief cause of the difference between the discursive and the intuitive reason.* On the occurrence of some exigency, intellectual or practical, some satisfactory way of reaching a conclusion or of obtaining a result has been discovered. On like occasions this mode of procedure has again and again proved successful. The rule thus formed is applied with quickness and ease. In using it the parts of the process are conceived of synthetically and simultaneously rather than analytically and successively. Hence, the action of reason is called intuitive. Then also it often happens that an antecedent has been ascertained to be necessarily and regularly followed by a consequent, not at once, but by reason of certain intervening steps, in which case the mind, no longer dwelling on these steps, immediately asserts or expects the consequent as connected with the antecedent. This logical abbreviation adds to the natural quickness of the intuitive reason, as, for example, in the different statements of the multiplication table. For each of these is first obtained by a succession of additions.

14. The synthetic rapidity and the abbreviation of thought of which we have now spoken *are especially exhibited in the practical, moral judgment of men.* It will be remembered from a previous discussion that an action is right and obligatory, not as a mere exercise of power, nor even as effectuating a result, but as an intentional effectuation or doing. Accordingly the thought of a moral action, as used by the intuitive reason, may be regarded as a kind of condensed rule setting forth a specific end and the proper method of accomplishing it; or, if the action be a wrong one, the thought of it shows the way in which a right end may be violated and which we

are bound to avoid. Conceptions such as those of theft, murder, blasphemy, perjury, or such as telling the truth, doing good, obeying one's parents, observing the Sabbath, keeping one's word, are short, practical rules through which rational habit influences human life. These conceptions assert themselves with the authority of the ends which they embody and subserve.

15. That men should be guided by this mode of moral judgment is both natural and necessary; to submit to such guidance is wise and profitable. We should cling to those rules which express the wisdom of experience. An established law of conduct should be followed even in doubtful cases. To disobey it is allowable only in circumstances in which an observance of its letter can be shown to be a disregard of its spirit and to be plainly opposed to some more fundamental principle of duty.

At the same time *we should not become the slaves of habit*. One should seek a clear understanding of the truth and should make truth when understood the master of his conduct. Reverencing accepted rules, he should interpret them according to the ends which they are designed to serve and from which they derive their authority. We do them no dishonor if we find that they admit of rare exceptions, which, after all, are not exceptions. In this mode of judgment we may sometimes imitate Him who declared that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath, and who spoke of those who in the service of the temple profaned the Sabbath and were blameless.

16. Facilitative habit affects the workings of the intellect and in this way indirectly influences the motivities. The other style of habit—the motive, or incentive—operates directly by increasing the readiness and strength of a motivity.

Through facilitative habit difficult and irksome occupations may be rendered easy and even agreeable, as certain finger movements on the piano or certain modes of conducting business, or of applying the mental faculties; and, *in this way a wholly new tendency may arise. But no motive habit appears to be an absolutely new tendency*; such a habit is always the growth—it may be the abnormal growth—of some existing germ of motivity. A principle of desire may at first be weak and unable of itself to take a leading part in the direction of one's conduct. But if, through favoring circumstances or intentional guidance, its proper excitants be frequently

presented—especially, also, if the object of it be often realized and enjoyed—it may become a strong and even dominant inclination.

After such a habit of disposition has been established the mode of action which it supports is also called a habit. In this secondary sense, which occurs quite as often as the other, a habit might be defined as a mode of action or doing which naturally yields some kind of satisfaction and for which a determinate inclination has arisen through the frequent indulgence of a desire.

17. The formation of motive habits and the power which they sometimes attain find illustration in the way that men become addicted to the use of stimulants or narcotics; what is at first a comparatively trifling pleasure is turned into an imperative necessity. But there are many such dispositions besides those which are based on bodily appetites and which are reinforced by corporeal conditions. There are ambitious habits, covetous habits, envious habits, slovenly habits, studious or diligent, humble or haughty, habits, selfish or generous habits, immoral habits, conscientious habits; in short, every cultivated disposition and the mode of conduct which it supports may be called a habit.

The importance of motive habits in practical affairs and especially in moral life needs little proof. *One's character is mainly composed of such habits.* Indeed, should we widen our conception of habit so as to include under it every permanent disposition, whether natural or acquired, which results in the frequent repetition of some mode of conduct, character might be defined as a system of motive habits. The word "habit" is occasionally used in this sense, which is quite conformable with the original meaning of *ἔξิส* and *habitus*.

Character is the fundamental factor of human destiny; no duty is more vital than to build up character through the development of good and noble habits. *Virtue itself, the fountain of spiritual prosperity and blessedness, has been well described as the fixed habit of loving and doing what is right and good.* Vice is the habitual love and practice of evil.

18. It is no detraction from the value of facilitative habits to say that their chief moral function is to excite and to regulate our motive habits through the workings of the intuitive reason. For that adds to their importance.

Having seen how our powers of doing and of desiring increase in strength and effectiveness under the operation of the

law of habit, we might also discuss the workings of the correlative law, that disused faculties and suppressed or neglected motivities become weak and impotent. We content ourselves at present with the mention of this law, although it is almost of equal importance with the law of habit.

CHAPTER XI.

MOTIVITY AS SUBJECTIVELY RELATED.

1. Every intelligent motive tendency aims at some form of good or at some form of enjoyment, avoiding also evil or suffering. Bishop Butler quoted.—2. Instinct and appetite seek immediate bodily relief or gratification.—3. The propensities are desires for pleasant spiritual experiences or for objects productive of them.—4. Self-love, benevolence, public spirit, prudence and rational good will, all aim at welfare and happiness.—5. The efforts of men for a far distant future spring partly from an altruistic sentiment.—6. Moreover their immediate satisfaction in such efforts is reinforced (1) by an acquired habit of desire, (2) by the expectation of continued personal existence.—7. Moral principle seeks the right as being a superlative and peculiar kind of good. Clearer views on this point may be hoped for after our analysis of the moral law.—8. The theory that pleasure consists in the satisfaction of desire is founded on a superficial observation, not on a thorough examination of the phenomena involved.—9. The satisfaction and the disappointment of desire are only secondary sources of pleasure and of pain.—10. It is not true that man always chooses the greatest apparent good.—11. This error is associated with two others, (1) that pleasure, (2) that happiness, is the universal aim of man's desire and pursuit.—12. Were man controlled by reason he would always choose good in preference to any inferior aim ; and were he controlled by moral reason he would always choose the right as being superior to any other good.—13. The doctrine that "virtue is knowledge," that is, the necessary result of knowledge, is inconsistent with fact. Mere instruction cannot change a depraved heart ; and vice, no less than virtue, involves knowledge of the right.—14. Right ends and the knowledge of them have no efficiency in themselves. The powers governing life are the motivities, each of which operates in connection with its own conceptions and beliefs.

1. PASSING now to the three questions which proposed themselves for consideration (Chap. X. 2.), we ask, first, "*Do we ever desire objects without reference to the enjoyment, satisfaction or happiness to be obtained from them or the suffering evil or misery which may be avoided by means of them?*"

Bishop Butler, in Sermon XI., says, "All particular appe-

tites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them." We incline to question this statement, at least if it be not greatly qualified. We think that every end of motivity includes—and that, too, as an essential part—some reference, either immediate or remote, to an agreeable or to a disagreeable, to a desirable or to an undesirable, experience.

By this we do not mean that the actual fulfilment of any desire gives pleasure while the disappointment of it is distressful. These things are so; hence all men naturally seek the pleasure of satisfaction and shun the distress of disappointment. But our doctrine is that every intelligent motive tendency, aside from any thought of success or failure, aims at some enjoyment or good, or shuns some suffering or evil; and that upon this its action as a motivity depends.

Here, of course, we exclude from motivities, or desires, tendencies to action, whether original or acquired, which are automatic and unintelligent. Such are facilitative habits and certain inborn animal dispositions, as the inclination to yawn or to sneeze, to preserve one's balance, or to recover one's self from a sudden slip. These actions do not follow but precede our thought. We have in mind only those tendencies in which some end is consciously sought and which, therefore, are properly called desires or motivities.

2. The least intellectual of these is instinct, or the disposition to do some useful work without any understanding of its nature. Instinct being excluded from man's mature life one cannot speak about it from experience. yet, so far as we can judge, the motive element in it is to remove some uneasiness or to gain some pleasure through a definite mode of action or accomplishment.

The aim of appetite can be more confidently stated. Sometimes, as in hunger or thirst, we desire to remove a distress; at other times, as when one wishes for sweetmeats or for ripened fruit, we seek bodily enjoyment. No object of appetite is ever longed for except as it may minister to our relief or our gratification. The child desires a lump of sugar because he knows the sensation which it will produce. A painted stick of wood would lose its attractions when he found that it was not a stick of candy. Food is sought by animals in order to remove hunger and gratify taste; it is no longer sought when these ends have been realized. Doubtless the object and the satisfaction obtainable from it are not conceived of separately;

but while the satisfaction is not thought of apart from the object, neither is the object thought of apart from the satisfaction.

3. The propensities are more complex and more intellectual than the appetites, but similar explanations apply to them. Information is sought partly for the pleasure of learning and knowing and partly because knowledge is the means of obtaining other satisfactions in addition to that pleasure. Power and influence are desired because the exercise of control and the sense of personal importance are things enjoyable, and also because they make other objects attainable. The propensity for property is conditioned on a sense of value; for it is of the essence of property to have value, that is, to have the power of procuring comfort and enjoyment. This motivity through undue indulgence may become a ruinous passion, but, even so, it aims at the means of gratification. Should money or any other possession be seen to have lost this character it would no longer be cared for, even by a miser; it would be tossed aside as worthless, as the sack of gold was by Crusoe on his desert island.

In like manner adventure, novelty, society, the praise and good-will of others, are all desired for the gratification which they afford. It is true, indeed, that the social feeling, so far as it is sympathetic or altruistic, does not seek one's own enjoyment. It differs from other propensities in this respect. Nevertheless it does aim at the relief, comfort and pleasure of others, and therefore comes under the general rule that gratification in some form is the end of every propensity.

4. Turning now to the affections, it is plain that a benevolent disposition, whether directed towards one's self or to others, aims at the happiness of its object. But anger, hatred and the malevolent affections seek to inflict pain and misery, and are, in this respect, exceptional among our motivities. Even they, however, at least in their primitive genetic form, have good or enjoyment as their ultimate purpose. For resentment is an impulse to repel and subdue any agent who inflicts injury or suffering by inflicting pain on him. It aims to remove or counteract the cause of evil and to leave the way open for good. Hatred is a perverse, irrational development of this disposition.

Once more, those high motivities in which one deliberately seeks his own interest or the welfare of others confessedly aim at happiness.

5. But, it may be said, "*Do not men sometimes strive for objects which can be realized only in a far distant future and in an experience in which neither they nor any other actors now living shall have any share?* Do not those endowed with genius seek for fame in the coming ages? Do not kings desire a dynasty that shall last for centuries? Do not millionaires leave fortunes that their descendants may live in grandeur for generations to come?" Such ambitions undoubtedly are a part of human life. They may be accounted for, in part, as altruistic longings. It would be by no means contrary to Nature that individuals of our race, even though they themselves should have no expectation of existence beyond the grave, might yet desire that their successors should enjoy prosperity and wealth and power and glory. The men of one period may, in this way, identify themselves with the men of a following age, or of many following ages, and thus labor disinterestedly for the prosperity and happiness of their unborn successors.

These considerations, however, do not wholly explain the phenomena. Objects in the distant future are sometimes striven for with a genuine selfishness, as when some man of genius seeks to have his own fame and influence perpetuated throughout all coming time. Alexander the Great envied Achilles because Homer heralded the exploits of this hero in eternal song; and Napoleon cherished the intense ambition that his throne and government should have permanent supremacy in Europe.

6. For the understanding of such aspirations two thoughts may prove helpful. First it is noticeable that *no objects of posthumous attainment are ever sought for except such as would confer pleasure if they were realized before one's departure from this life.* For example, power and distinction are originally sought because of the keen personal gratification expected from the possession of them. It is only when the desire for these objects has become a developed passion that it becomes directed to the distant future. Such being the case, it may be that, through the force of habit, a kind of secondary motivity is engendered by reason of which some ends come to be pursued with an irrational selfishness, the agent having no expectation of being gratified in the future at the time when his ambitions shall be realized. In short, have we not here an exceptional case, which, because of its peculiar origin, still supports the rule that enjoyment, in

some form or in the general, is the essential aim of motivity?

Secondly, we have to say that *the expectation of continued personal existence accompanies almost all, if not all, of man's hopes for the future.* In the forming of plans and aims most persons do not realize the brevity of life; they act on the supposition that they will themselves enjoy the fruit of their earnings and savings. No matter how old a successful man may be, provided only he have some health and soundness, he looks forward to a few more years of comfort and honor. Besides, the expectation of a life to come arises naturally in every rational spirit. Sometimes it is a blind instinct; sometimes a confident hope; sometimes an assured faith. This belief is based on the evident incompleteness of the present life and on man's conscious fitness for a continued existence. In ancient times, the projection of man's plans into the future was considered a token of his immortality. It was asked "Why do aged men plant trees of which they themselves shall never taste the fruit?" They do so, undoubtedly, for the enjoyment of a generation yet to come; but that only partly explains their conduct. In addition there is the hope that they themselves shall hereafter be happier in perceiving the success of their efforts to provide for the happiness of others.

7. Thus the investigation of our natural (or unmoral) motivities justifies the conclusion that objects are desired because of the pleasure, relief, comfort or good which they are capable of yielding, but that, if any object be otherwise sought it is because of a secondary propensity, a proneness of spirit, produced by habit and the association of thought.

The query now presents itself, as needful to the completion of our discussion, "Are the aims of *moral* principle analogous with those of our other motivities?" In other words, "*Does this principle, in seeking the right, seek it as being, in some specific way, promotive of the comfort, happiness and blessedness of beings?*" An affirmative answer to this question would involve—not that the right in general and the good in general are identical—but that the right is a peculiar and superlative mode of good, considered in its worthiness and as claiming the service of the soul.

We incline to some such conception of the right; but we recognize that no satisfactory definition of the right can be reached until after an analytical understanding of the moral law.

8. The second question to be considered is a kind of converse to that which we have now discussed; it is "*Does pleasure always consist in the satisfaction of desire, or motive tendency?*" Some authors assert this to be so. Plato's doctrine that pleasure is a kind of reaction from a preceding uneasiness or distress connects itself with the belief that pleasure is essentially the satisfaction of a felt want. If any motivity be cherished eagerly, it is attended with uneasiness; and the gratification arising from the attainment of the end sought for is enhanced by the removal of this uneasiness. But it is not true that desire is always attended with distress; many aspirations, especially those of a benevolent or noble character, are sources of happiness, at least if they are guided and controlled by reason. The statement that pleasure is heightened by relief from a preceding pain sets forth a specific law of limited application; it does not explain the origin of enjoyment in general. In like manner, the teaching that pleasure arises from the gratification of desire is specific and by no means the universal law of pleasure.

9. *The reason on account of which many define pleasure as the satisfaction of desire is to be found in the ordinarily observed sequences of life.* In these, evidently, desire is followed by pursuit, pursuit results in attainment, and attainment is accompanied with pleasure. This view of phenomena is not the result of analysis, but only of that observation which must precede analysis. It does not go back to the origin of desire; it does not even scrutinize the way in which the gaining of one's wish is attended with enjoyment. Discriminative investigation discloses the ultimate law of the phenomena; and gives the following account of them, in which enjoyment is placed prior to desire, and not subsequent to it, in the order of psychical development. *First*, there is a pleasure experienced in connection with the exercise of some power, or on the presentation of some fact or object, which pleasure could not have been previously desired; because it is now known only for the first time; or it may be some distress is felt for the first time and therefore before relief from it is desired. *Secondly*, on a recurrence of like circumstances, a desire arises for a repetition of that pleasure, or that relief, or for the object productive of it. *Thirdly*, the realization of the desired end gives an enjoyment of the same nature with that originally experienced, and resulting not from the mere fact that one obtains what he wishes, but from the same cause

which produced the original gratification. And *fourthly*, accompanying this enjoyment, and mingling with it, there is a peculiar pleasure which may be, and sometimes is, distinguished as *satisfaction*, because it arises upon the perceived fulfilment of one's desire. This enjoyment is conditioned on perceived success, and has its counterpart in that distress, called disappointment, which arises in view of defeat or failure. Though not often discriminated from that specifically desired pleasure which it accompanies, it clearly is something additional to that pleasure and is the only kind of gratification for which desire is a necessary prerequisite.

10. We come now to the third question to be determined, namely, "Is there any specific form of thought which governs the determinations of man's motivities?—more definitely, *Is it true that man always chooses the greatest apparent good?*" Some hold that every human desire seeks good in one form or another; *quidquid petitur petitur sub specie boni*. This is taught by those who regard happiness as the universal aim of man and by those also who say that pleasure is the invariable object of his pursuit. For the former define good, or things good, to be those objects which yield happiness, or which, it may be, relieve or prevent wretchedness, this last being the polar opposite of happiness; the latter make good to be whatever produces pleasure or which removes or prevents pain, this being the polar opposite of pleasure. Thus both say that man always desires good, that is, the production of good or the prevention of evil. Both schools, accordingly, give the same answer to the question "Why does man choose one out of several conflicting objects to the exclusion of the rest?" They say that the mind settles on that which appears to be the greatest good; hence their doctrine that man's will or choice is determined by the greatest apparent good.

11. Neither of these classes of thinkers is right, but *those are especially wrong who say that pleasure is the only good* and the only end of human pursuit. Such language shows obscure and loose conceptions concerning the higher aims of life, inasmuch as there is no proper sense in which good can be identified with pleasure and pleasure-producing objects. Sometimes, indeed, a thing is called "good" simply as giving pleasure, as when the child, tasting a sweetmeat, says it is "good." This means only that the object is enjoyable. But the noun "good" never signifies "the pleasur-

able," nor is even the adjective "good" ordinarily applied to objects simply as pleasurable. Ordinarily, "good" is that which conduces to happiness; it includes whatever provides for any part of that experience which the wise man seeks wisely. The pleasurable may be a good but is not invariably such. Pleasure sometimes conflicts with good; then it is an evil. In view of this fact it is possible for man to choose good in preference to pleasure or pleasure in preference to good. Those, therefore, who say that man always chooses good because he always chooses pleasure, are mistaken. It is not true that pleasure is always good, and it is not true that man always chooses pleasure.

On the other hand, *those also err who speak of happiness and good as being universal aims of desire.* They are right in defining good to be that which conduces to happiness, but they are wrong in saying that man always chooses good or the greatest apparent good. The truth is not rightly expressed in that saying of Jonathan Edwards, "The will is as the greatest apparent good."

12. Were man perfectly controlled by reason and never governed, as he often is, by appetite, propensity or affection, he would always choose happiness or good in preference to any inferior aim. Moreover, were man thoroughly subject to the absolute or moral reason, he would always choose the right as having a supreme excellence and as being superior to any other good. All other ends, though sought for their own sakes, would be pursued in subordination to the good and the right, and only so far as they might help to constitute these aims of the reason. Under such circumstances man would naturally be both prudent and virtuous. His failure to choose the good or the right could arise only from ignorance or want of thought. The Socratic doctrine that "virtue is knowledge" is founded on the assumption that man always chooses the good and the right when he distinctly perceives them; in other words, it teaches that virtue is the necessary result of correct information concerning one's relations and duties. Socrates appears to have been the first advocate of the doctrine that man always chooses the greatest apparent good; according to him, passion and wickedness spring from disordered and erroneous views, and consist in man's seeking that as the best which is really not the best, but fundamentally opposed to it.

13. We cannot accept this theory. We do not believe that

mere intellectual instruction can change a depraved heart into a virtuous one. Moreover, though inordinate propensities deceive the mind and distort its judgments, this does not take place to such an extent that one cannot knowingly reject the good and choose the evil. Man is a rational being; in all his moral life, whether virtuous or vicious, he acts with rational intelligence. But there is a difference between acting *with* the reason and acting *from* (or according to) the reason. To act with the reason is to act with rational intelligence; to act from the reason is to be governed by rational intelligence. The former of these things is the condition of moral responsibility; the latter is the cause of prudent and of virtuous living. In order that a man should act in a reprehensible manner it is necessary that he reject what he knows to be good for some inferior end of selfishness, of appetite, of propensity, or of passion.

14. It should be borne in mind that ends in themselves are entirely without influence. It is by a figure of speech that they are said to attract and to govern. They are not "efficient," but only "occasional," causes. The power really controlling life lies in the motivities; *in any particular instance one acts according to the strongest motivity or combination of motivities*. Each motivity has its own specific conceptions setting forth the kind of object and the form of gratification which it pursues. In every choice the spirit acts according to those thoughts which are proper to the prevailing motivity. We decide in favor of good, or of the greatest good, only when we are governed by reason. As we have said, man often acts not simply in disregard of this idea, but in opposition of it. A poor drunkard, relating his experience, said that he could give no good reason whatever for his course: the arguments in the case were, "like the handle of his jug, all on one side"—and that the wrong side for him. But he could not resist his appetite. At the time of drinking he experienced relief and satisfaction; the thought of this, too, for the moment largely occupied his mind. Yet even so he knew what he was doing, and that it was evil. He was not controlled by the conception of good, but acted knowingly in opposition to it.

CHAPTER XII.

THE EMOTIONS.

1. An emotion is a psychical agitation consequent upon the perception or the imagination of a suitable object.—2. Emotions are (1) sometimes independent of desire, (2) sometimes mingled with desire, (3) sometimes consequent upon success or failure to realize the end desired.—3. Emotions independent of desire are excited by the beautiful, the sublime, the witty, the humorous, the unexpected, the marvellous, the novel, and other objects the contemplation of which affects some "sense" or power of feeling.—4. Beauty and sublimity, defined. Wit and humor distinguished.—5. Surprise, wonder, amazement, a sense of novelty, a sense of freedom, of danger, etc., defined.—6. The mingling of emotion with desire is especially seen in the affections and passions.—7. The passion of love analyzed. It is a complex sentiment.—8. Emotion enters into anger, hatred, dislike, contempt, disdain, respect, reverence, fear, terror, hope, despair, vanity and pride.—9. Hope and fear, pride and vanity, analyzed.—10. Moral emotions resemble the æsthetic but are vastly more important. They include feelings of approbation and of disapprobation, the sense of innocence or of guilt, the happiness and the wretchedness inherent in virtuous, and in vicious living, and a consciousness of the favor or of the disfavor of the spiritual power of the universe.—11. Emotions consequent upon the exercise of desire are (1) those of satisfaction, (2) those of disappointment.—12. Their intensity arises partly from the concentration of thought and desire upon the end desired.—13. Partly because man naturally delights in success and grieves at failure, no matter what the end sought for may be. He likes "to have his own way."—14. Two practical lessons relate to the interdependence of emotion and desire. (1) If we would have gratification instead of disappointment, desires must be kept within bounds and directed to their proper objects; (2) If we would not have inordinate or irrational desires, our emotions must be controlled and regulated.

1. AN emotion is a psychical agitation which arises upon the perception, or upon the remembrance, or upon the imagination, of an object suitable to excite it. Sometimes this experience is conceived of as containing an element of desire, as when we speak of the emotion of love or of hope; and, be-

yond question, desire is often conjoined with emotion in the same experience. This is preeminently so in that form of desire which is called passion. But let us now consider emotion as a simple element of spiritual life—as an exercise of sensibility distinguishable from the exercise of motivity. The existence of such feelings is often plainly perceptible; one may be moved by the view of things sublime or beautiful; he may be amused at witty or humorous thought; he may be glad because of the happiness of others or sad at the sight of their suffering; or some moral action or sentiment may compel his admiration or awaken his contempt. Modern psychology accords to such emotions a place and a nature of their own. They often mingle with motivities and form part of the same experience with them, but they differ from motivities in being passive agitations; they are not strivings of spirit towards an end or aim; and they may take place apart from motivities.

2. The ordinary order of investigation which considers the emotions before the desires or motive tendencies, is not objectionable, provided it be not understood as teaching an order of sequence in the phenomena. We admit that our sensibilities may be excited simply by the presentation of thoughts or objects and without any antecedent exercise of desire. But this is so far from indicating the only order in which emotion and motivity are related to one another that a profitable enumeration of emotions may mention, first, *those which naturally precede desire*, then *those which for the most part are accompaniments of desire*, and, finally, *those which arise when the object of the desire is perceived either to be attained or to be defeated*, and which, therefore, are conditioned on desire. The principle of classification thus adopted may not be sufficient for a thorough-going logical division; nevertheless it will facilitate consideration of the different emotions according to their true nature and its relations.

3. Among emotions especially independent of the motivities we mention first our *admiration of the beautiful* and our *awe before the sublime*.

The beautiful comprises all objects of such a nature that the mere contemplation of them gives pleasure. This pleasure does not spring from any hope or expectation excited by the object, nor from any sense of gratified desire; it arises simply upon the perception of the object. Part of it may

come from the exercise of the bodily senses; the richness of color and the sweetness of sound are elements of beauty; but there are also elements whose operation is more intellectual. The mind loves uniformity or law in the midst of variety, and is pleased with the unity of a system of diversified parts. Order, symmetry and a regularity that is not monotonous are gratifying. The graceful, in which ease and effectiveness combine, is delightful, and so are the amiable and the noble in conduct or in character. When such objects give pleasure simply on our beholding them, and not because of any practical end to be served by them, we call them beautiful. Objects the contemplation of which has a contrary effect are styled ugly or ungainly.

After one has enjoyed the beautiful he desires to have that enjoyment again. But evidently this gratification is not conditioned on the desire for beauty; it is itself the condition of the desire. In other words, the emotion of beauty is independent of the desire for beauty and prior to it: and all emotion, so far as it is fitted to excite desire, is related to desire in this way.

The *sense of sublimity* is excited by *the presentation or the suggestion of immense power*. Some think that the sight of mere greatness or extent can produce this feeling; more likely the object must directly or indirectly give the impression of power. In the presence of the sublime man always feels small and impotent. Grandeur, in the strict sense of that term, is a lower form of sublimity. A rushing railway train is a grand sight; the Falls of Niagara are a sublime one.

4. Another species of emotion preceding desire and exciting it, is *the appreciation of wit and humor*. This involves some knowledge and understanding, but not necessarily any previous inclination. Wit, without any intention to deceive, but in mere wantonness, constructs conceptions and statements which have the appearance of being rational, but which are really sophistical and foolish. That is a witty explanation which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of the gay gentleman who, after protesting for years that he would die a bachelor, at last met his fate and became a benedict. He declared, "When I said I would die a bachelor, I never thought I would live till I were married." Here what had really been an expression of purpose is represented as having been a judgment respecting the future. The plausibility of

this explanation in connection with its evident falsity makes it amusing.

Humor, also, amuses by directing our thoughts to inconsistencies which are more or less concealed. It sets forth the weaknesses and frailties of men as these are unconsciously exhibited in their conduct. When the neighbors of Sir Roger de Coverley asked his opinion concerning a controverted question, Addison says that the good knight looked wise and replied that "a great deal might be said on both sides"; in this there was an appearance of judgment; in reality, Sir Rogers was not capable of a profound opinion on any subject. The mind, exercising its reason, delights to perceive the ingenious inconsistencies of wit and humor.

5. *Surprise* is another feeling which occurs without preceding desire, though not without preceding knowledge. It arises when an event suddenly takes place contrary to the ordinary course of nature or contrary to one's confident expectations. When we find it difficult to account for the event by any known causes, surprise gives place to *wonder*; and when the case is attended with agitating circumstances which disturb and confuse the mind, wonder becomes *amazement* or *astonishment*. After our Saviour's Sermon on the Mount in which he spake with superhuman authority and power, we are told that "the people were astonished at his doctrine"; and when he raised to life the dead daughter of the ruler of the synagogue, the Evangelists relate that the spectators "were astonished with a great astonishment."

A *sense of novelty* or strangeness has something in common with surprise, but it is a weaker experience and is not necessarily preceded by expectation. At this point let us note a considerable class of feelings not ordinarily called emotions, but which are indicated by this term "sense," and which yet we must class with emotions if we would not leave them out of consideration. Thus we hear of a sense of freedom or independence—a sense of power—a sense of danger or of safety—a sense of subjection or of dependence or of helplessness—a sense of innocence or of guilt, of right or of wrong. With a kindred meaning the word "consciousness" sometimes indicates the sentiment produced in the soul by some intimately perceived object; we speak of the consciousness of wealth or beauty, of cowardice or meanness.

The "sense" of which we have just spoken often has a motive force, so that we act "from a sense" of the impor-

tance of some business, or "from the sense" of a danger to be avoided or of an advantage to be gained. This only illustrates what has been already noticed, that motive feeling frequently combines with sensibility, as when a desire for company attends a sense of loneliness. But the two feelings are easily distinguished.

6. This brings us to consider emotions of the second class—those, namely, which are experienced *as united with some form of motive feeling*. Such exercises of sensibility are especially observable in our affections and passions; for these are spiritual movings of a composite character. In our day the words affection and passion ordinarily suggest motivity rather than sensibility; originally they set forth the influence of objects upon the spirit rather than the strivings of the spirit after objects. Etymologically, an affection is a psychical commotion excited by the view of some object; a passion is such a commotion experienced in a high degree; and, although the words now have more comprehensive meanings than these, they undoubtedly still retain these ideas as part of their significance.

7. While emotion enters into every affection and every passion, it is especially noticeable in that sentiment between man and woman which leads to the marriage relation, and which poets and novelists, historians and philosophers, recognize as a potent factor in human affairs. The experience of being "in love" is by no means a simple matter, but involves one's whole nature. The poet-philosopher tells of its complex composition when he says:

" All thoughts, all passions, all delights,
Whatever stirs this mortal frame,
All are but ministers of Love
And feed his sacred flame."

Little analysis is needed to show how compounded the tender passion is. It often includes a sense of beauty and physical comeliness, and, as frequently, the admiration of intellectual and of moral qualities. There is a delight in the companionship of the beloved one and a great longing for it. There is deep desire for sympathy and kind appreciation; and there is an exalted pleasure in receiving love for love and esteem for esteem. These feelings, together with that attraction which is sexual, unite in a compounded affection. Sometimes there is an admixture of imagination and de-

lusion whereby lovers who give way to their feelings are led into absurd extremes of conception and of statement. But, in the case of well-principled people, there is always a basis on which good sense and wisdom found a permanent attachment.

Evidently the happiness attending love arises greatly from the sense of a satisfying and agreeable companionship, from the contemplation of admired qualities, and from a sincere appreciative sympathy; in other words, it springs largely from our emotions. A similar account may be given of the pleasures of domestic affections in general and of those which accompany congenial friendship or acquaintance.

8. The malevolent affections, yet more plainly than the benevolent, partake of the emotional character. Anger and resentment always include an excitement either open or suppressed; even hatred and fixed dislike exhibit emotion as often as the thought of the obnoxious person is recalled. We remember a gentleman who lost a favorite child through the malpractice of a drunken physician; he could not pass that physician on the street without turning away his face from him.

Other feelings in which sensibility mingles with motivity are those of *contempt and disdain*, those of *respect and reverence*, those of *fear and terror*, those of *hope and of despair* and those of *vanity and of pride*.

Contempt is the sentiment with which persons are regarded who show weakness of character and who are controlled by unworthy motives. It is the feeling which we have for a lazy vagabond, a lying swindler, or an impure and profane wretch. Disdain is the decided feeling with which one rejects proposals offensive to his sense of propriety and honor. Respect is our sentiment towards one whose life and conduct are noble and honorable. In addition to this there is also an official respect, which is merely deference to the prerogatives of some authoritative position; this may be exercised when there is little or no personal esteem. Of course official and personal respect often support one another. Reverence is respect exercised in a very high degree; it is directed towards one greatly superior to others in character and position. We reverence God or a thoroughly good and wise ruler. Fear is a passion in which sensibility and motivity evidently unite. In fear we are disturbed by the apprehension of impending evil or pain, and we strive to escape from the evil.

In fright or terror the emotional element of fear predominates, and may even interfere with the proper control and use of one's faculties. Hope is the expectation of good united with the desire of obtaining it; fear is the expectation of evil united with the desire to escape from it. In despair the emotional element occupies the mind almost exclusively, because the evil appears unavoidable and overwhelming.

9. In both vanity and pride—but especially in pride—there is a determined desire to enjoy a high opinion of one's self as well as the esteem of others; but pride aims chiefly at the former and vanity chiefly at the latter. To these ends one's thoughts are turned away from all evidences of inferiority, and are made to dwell on real or fancied points of excellence, and in this way these sentiments are cherished contrary to all fact and reason. Pride includes a determination to be independent and avoids the aid of others; vanity, without any opinion or method of its own, founds self-admiration on the praise and even the flattery of neighbors. Pride is allied to the ambition to rule; vanity tends to servility. Pride, too, as distinguished from proper self-respect, is an intensely selfish sentiment, for which reason it is a more reprehensible vice than vanity. In both passions the exercise of a sensibility based on the appreciation of one's own excellence, distinction or success, is quite apparent.

10. Finally, the *mingling of passive with active feeling is noticeable in moral life*. While our hearts are moved by moral aims, our sensibilities also are excited by the perception of moral facts and objects. The virtuous man delights in the contemplation of things right and honorable, and is especially pleased to behold human conduct conformed to the rules of rectitude. He has the happy consciousness that his own life harmonizes with right principles; and he rejoices in the good-will of all other virtuous beings and of the Supreme Father and Judge of all. But the evil-minded man, while desiring and pursuing evil, is conscious of his own vileness, of the discord between his life and the moral law, of increasing degradation and of approaching ruin. Such, at least, is the experience of an awakened conscience.

The moral sensibilities as sources of happiness and of misery are of the utmost importance in ethics. The question of the *summum bonum*, or the highest form of good, cannot be answered without taking them into consideration; and this remark applies also to that broader question which

concerns the generic nature of the right and obligatory and the fundamental end of all right aims and right actions.

11. Having discussed sensibility as preceding and then as accompanying motivity, we have yet to speak of it *as arising after the objects of desire are perceived either to be realized or to be defeated*. Feelings of the class thus contemplated at once divide themselves into those attending the success and those attending the failure of our wishes, into the sensibilities of satisfaction and those of disappointment.

Emotions originating in this way differ from those preceding desire and independent of it, chiefly because they are more intense, and not because they are of another nature; they are radically of the same nature. Two reasons may be assigned for this difference.

12. In the first place, the prolonged direction of one's desires towards one object or mode of gratification results in *concentrating and accumulating emotional capability*. If a gifted person were placed unexpectedly in a position of honor which he had not sought, he certainly would be gratified; or, should he learn that such a position might have been his if he had only been informed of his opportunity, he would regret that a piece of good fortune had been missed. But how much more vivid one's feelings would be if he had earnestly struggled for the honor and had then either achieved success or encountered defeat! In short, one's experience on the outcome of any course of effort varies greatly according to the degree in which his heart has been set upon the object to be attained. The lukewarm lover is neither so overjoyed at acceptance nor so disheartened by repulse as he is who has surrendered himself entirely to the tender passion.

An illustration of the intensity of emotion consequent on the exercise of desire is to be found in the anger of one who conceives that his cherished plans or aims are being unjustly antagonized. Resentment then becomes violent, like the rage of Shylock robbed of his beloved ducats. One evil result of the excessive cultivation of any propensity is that the spirit becomes unduly sensitive and unfit to bear disappointments which must surely come. The vices of ambition, avarice, vanity and pride may occasionally yield a temporary ebullition of joy and gladness, but they finally bring about sorrow and abiding distress. The man of rightly balanced affections escapes such troubles, and indeed is prepared for any others which may come upon him.

13. The second cause of the increase of emotion upon the gratification or disappointment of desire is that mankind, altogether apart from the proper attractions of the objects towards which their efforts are directed, are *naturally delighted by success and grieved by failure*. There is pleasure simply in *having one's own way*, and pain at being crossed or thwarted. In success one enjoys a sense of power, of freedom, and of personal importance; in failure the opposite experiences are realized. The desire to accomplish what one has undertaken often becomes the basis of a strong habitual determination; then a man is said to be self-willed or to have a strong will; he is "*tenax propositi*" and is sometimes ready to sacrifice important interests for the satisfaction of victory and triumph. This determination to have our own way and our delight in having it are not without their uses. They add to the firmness of our pursuit of proper objects and they increase our enjoyment when these objects have been attained. At the same time strength of character should not be allowed to take the form of mere self-will. No disposition is more fraught with evil, and none is less worthy of our sympathy and esteem, than that of unreasoning obstinacy.

14. The double fact that emotions are frequently conditioned on desire and that desires yet more frequently are conditioned on emotions suggests a two-fold practical lesson. In the first place it is clear that *we should keep our desires within proper bounds*, and that we should direct them to *proper objects*. The wise and virtuous man controls his affections and seeks only things truly attainable and of enduring value. He alone is likely to have his desires gratified; and even though, through the uncertainty and imperfection of human affairs, he may fail in many endeavors, he is certain of the success of having lived according to his conscience, and he is sure of that high satisfaction which comes from noble living and from uprightness of heart. Secondly, while *motivities must be regulated because of the emotions for which they prepare*, our emotions also must be controlled because of their influence on *motivities*. This indeed is our principle ground of duty with respect to them. Not merely well-grounded prospects, but also the wild dreams of distinction or of love, of self-indulgence, of wealth, of power and greatness may modify one's character and determine the whole current of one's life. Motive ideas may, indeed, awaken desire without the aid of any attending emo-

tion, as when one acts purely from principle or from self-interest. But thoughts which arouse the sensibility tend to take possession of the spirit to the exclusion of other thoughts; for, while they are entertained, the emotions which they excite become a foretaste of the experience which may be had upon the realization of their objects.

Such considerations as these show how books and discourses, tales, histories and dramas, exert an influence on life. They also warn us against allowing the imagination to gloat over the prospect of dishonest gains or disgraceful pleasures. Those especially whose characters are yet unformed cannot be too careful respecting the thoughts which they entertain. For, as a man thinketh in his heart, so is

CHAPTER XIII.

ETHICAL METHODS.

1. Progress in ethical theory depends on an intelligent use of methods.—2. The fundamental and indispensable method is that of analysis and generalization, commonly called the inductive. It examines the facts to be explained in order to obtain their laws.—3. Successful induction depends on an analytic and discriminating judgment about facts.—4. There are five other methods used in philosophy, (1) the dogmatic, (2) the sentimental, (3) the critical, (4) the dialectic, (5) the derivate.—5. The dogmatic, or intuitional, method starts out with general principles as being in some way well known.—6. The sentimental, or contemplative, method applies to questions of taste and feeling.—7. The critical, or eclectic, method seeks for progress through the examination of opinions.—8. The dialectic, or controversial, method endeavors to reach conclusions by arguing for and against given doctrines and hypotheses.—9. The derivate, or deductive, method seeks to base the principles of one science upon those of another.—10. Hegel derivatively constructed a pantheistic ethics; Herbert Spenser, an evolutionistic ethics.—11. While each of the five methods has its use, they should all be employed in subordination to the analytic, or inductive, method.

1. METAPHYSICAL and psychological thinkers show a more persistent separation from each other than students of the physical sciences do. Great difficulty attends every effort to bring those of opposite schools into intellectual sympathy. The reason for this lies partly in the character of the phenomena to be explained, which, though of an abstruse nature, have a deceitful, superficial simplicity and are easy of misapprehension; but it is to be found yet more in the lack of an understanding respecting methods of inquiry. An appreciative consideration of the different modes of procedure which have been employed by investigators of moral life may tend to remove this cause of the existing divergencies of opinion.

Ethics—like every other science, physical or psychical—starts out with the recognition of certain facts. It is based on the common knowledge of mankind that certain actions

are right and obligatory to do and others wrong and obligatory not to do, as also that certain aims are right and obligatory to pursue and others wrong and obligatory to avoid. If the human mind did not have such perceptions and judgments there would be no ground for ethical inquiry.

2. As perceptions of right and wrong are the facts with which ethics starts out, so *a critical examination of these perceptions* in order to ascertain their essential elements and laws, is *the fundamental method which ethics must follow*. If this inductive work be done in an accurate, complete and systematic way, we may hope to obtain a satisfactory explanation of the facts from the analysis of the facts themselves.

This method is applicable to the investigation of every specific form of duty, but it reaches its culmination in connection with the ultimate question, "How shall we define the right? What is the nature common to every action and aim required of us by moral law?"

The inductive process cannot be expected to answer every question concerning the assertions of reason, but it ought to yield their essential content; it ought to furnish true definitions of the conceptions employed. The further inquiries, "What is the real value of these conceptions? Does the right truly have that nature and that importance which we ascribe to it?" do not relate merely to the actual operations of our minds; they involve the doctrine of the reliability of our faculties, which cannot be established simply by analysis and generalization. But a conviction of the validity of our essential moral judgments follows so closely upon a clear understanding of what they are, that, if the latter can be had, there will be little need of argument to show their truthfulness. For the judgments of reason when rightly stated have a way of maintaining their own authority.

3. The most difficult part of the method of induction is the analysis of the facts—that is, of our rational perceptions—and *the selection from them of the ideas or propositions to be generalized*. No special ability is needed for the observation with which the process begins or for the principiation with which it terminates. The success of the investigator of mind depends chiefly on the faculty of accurate critical analysis. Moreover, in the wider generalizations of phi-

losophy, no matter how great one's genius may be, he will be certain to fail if he do not guard against two sources of error. First, he must see to it that no fact is omitted from his consideration: not only every fact, but every aspect of every fact, must be brought within the sweep of his survey and under the scrutiny of his judgment. Otherwise he will formulate that for an universal law which explains only part of the phenomena. In the second place, he must not allow any fancies or unwarranted conjectures to mingle with the facts. Otherwise his theory may turn out merely an ingenious delusion.

Then, after a theory has been elaborated in this way, it must be submitted to a process of verification; it must be applied to every case, or form of fact, which it is intended to explain. It must be fully tested. If it do not yield a complete and satisfactory account of the phenomena, it must be reconsidered, and the work begun *de novo*.

The above described process of investigation is as available for mental and moral as it is for physical phenomena. The limitation which some make of the sphere of observation and experiment to the exercise of the bodily senses and the use of mechanical instruments is absurd. But, inasmuch as the success of induction in psychical inquiries depends chiefly on the discriminating judgment preceding the generalization, the inductive method is sometimes spoken of by philosophers as the analytic. These names, however, do not indicate two methods. The analytic and the inductive method are the same.

In addition to the method of analysis and induction other modes of procedure have been found useful in philosophical investigation. These may be enumerated as the *dogmatic* or *intuitional*, the *sentimental* or *contemplative*, the *critical* or *historical*, the *dialectic* or *controversial*, and the *derivate* or *deductive*. Few authors can be said to confine themselves to any one of these methods, yet the influence of each is traceable in metaphysical and ethical writings. Most of these methods would be profitless in the construction of physical science; they are available principally in those investigations which seek an understanding of man's rational life and which are related more or less immediately to wise and sensible doing. But, even in these, they should be made supplementary to the analytic method. Followed independently they do not lead to satisfactory progress.

5. We have designated the first mentioned method the "*dogmatic*" because it starts out with asserting general principles without adducing any form of proof. But we added the alternative term "*intuitional*" because those using this method claim that the principles asserted do not need proof but are self-evident, being supported by some form of "intuition." In former times this method was in high esteem; it was commonly taught that all philosophy and science should rest on certain general assumptions of the reason called "*precognita*." But since Lord Bacon's day it has lost its preeminence.

Mediaeval thinkers were not unacquainted with the inductive method. They called it the "regressive" and that of deduction from general principles the "progressive." But in this use of terms they set forth the false principle that scientific progress is chiefly from the general to the particular. The fact is that there are only two cases in which a dogmatic assertion of principles may contribute to advancement in knowledge. *First*, we may immediately enunciate some mathematical and metaphysical and some moral axioms. This, however, is only because these truths are obtained by a kind of spontaneous analysis from individual perceptions. For the only sense in which any general truth is self-evident is that it is the product of a very simple and unconscious principiation. *Secondly*, many principles of greater or less complexity may be asserted by that intuition which is not really immediate but only the rapid, habitual, and it may be, abbreviated exercise of the reason. These may be held with great confidence. They are the teachings of experience and of common sense. They have often been tried and found reliable and have won the confidence of those who have had constant occasion to use them. Hence they are used as arguments in practical affairs and also have a certain weight in theoretic thought.

6. The *sentimental*, or *contemplative*, method at first sight appears utterly unphilosophical, and fit only for dreamers. For the man who accepts views simply because they harmonize with his sensibilities will be certain to adopt an imaginative creed. The strange superstitions of the heathen world and the yet stranger delusions—such as theosophy and the so-called Christian Science—which find some adherents in the midst of a high civilization, have their strength, not from reason, but from sentiment and feeling.

Nevertheless there are questions on which the wisest conclusions are not gained by the unassisted intellect and on which the heart should be consulted as well as the head. Such questions arise whenever either the sensibilities themselves or the objects which naturally excite them become the subjects of our investigation. A man with no more appreciation of beauty than an ox would be as incapable as an ox of criticizing a landscape or a work of art. In like manner a person of weak moral and religious feeling finds difficulty in understanding ethical and theistic truth. Those take an extreme position who say that belief on moral subjects is entirely the product of one's will and disposition, but it must be admitted that such belief is greatly modified by our susceptibility to right sentiments and by his willingness or his unwillingness to obey the suggestions of duty. Hence the necessity of candor, of humility and of a sincere love of goodness, on the part of those who would comprehend the laws of virtue. Hence, too, the success of some writers on practical subjects, whose intellects are rather brilliant than logical. Their essays do not present any profound and thorough-going philosophy, yet they are replete with point and force. The man whose chief dependence is a delicate ethical sensibility is like one who uses a magnet in the neighborhood of valuable ore. While such an one may not be able to locate the deposits exactly he may direct the investigations of others towards a discovery more perfect than his own.

7. The *critical*, or *selective*, method of philosophy is one of which Aristotle made use and which should be employed by every original thinker. Strength and manliness of mind are not shown by a neglect of the teachings of our predecessors, but by a careful study of them with the desire to see and to accept all that they contain of good, the unreasonable only being rejected. Many influential writers have obtained their principal doctrines in this way and then have added to these others of more or less importance. Such was the case with the Neo-Platonists in ancient times, and, in modern times, with the Neo-Kantians.

Men of well-trained judgment and good common sense but without special metaphysical ability should not despise the eclectic plan. By means of it they may construct a respectable doctrinal system. No real progress, however, can be expected from eclecticism unless it be united with Aristotelian keenness and penetration. Even then the brilliant teachings of the

man of genius should be allowed only provisional authority till they have been found consonant with the results of observation and analysis.

This critical method—which has also been called the historical—deals with opinions, not with phenomena directly. For this reason it tends too much to follow the leadership of others. Nevertheless the careful thinker prizes its suggestions.

8. The *dialectic*, or *controversial*, method is akin to the critical and sometimes develops out of it. It endeavors to establish general principles by argumentation for and against and about authoritative statements. It delights in fine discriminations, not between things, but between propositions, and in refutations and the *reductio ad absurdum*. One theory after another respecting some phenomenon is discussed till finally one is found more or less acceptable. Then perhaps one interpretation after another of that theory is shown to be unsatisfactory. At last a specific form of statement is adopted as the best. This method is a favorite with some writers who are skilled in the use of argument; it is seldom pleasing to those who are simply seeking the truth. One is wearied with endless disputations about doctrines and hypotheses, while the phenomena to be investigated receive only a secondary consideration.

The dialectic method contributes to the rejection of error and the systematization of truth. But it fails to provide for philosophic progress, and sometimes it leads men into a state of wise incompetence. Learned lecturers, who can tell the merits and demerits of different systems, are found to have no doctrines of their own. We once questioned a student who had graduated with honor in a famous institution respecting certain instructions given there. The young man was eloquent in the praise of the lectures that he had heard and of the masterly way in which the views of all the schools had been handled. He gave the professor's criticisms on this system and on that. But, when requested to tell what the professor's own views might be, the young man suddenly found himself at a loss. After several efforts at recollection he confessed himself unable to recall any positive teaching.

9. The last method to be mentioned is the *derivative*, or *deductive*. We give it these names not simply because it uses deduction, but because it endeavors to deduce or derive ethics

from the principles of some other science or sciences. This method is serviceable with respect to some subordinate truths; indeed it is not possible to construct moral science without consulting the teachings of psychology and of the science of mind. An understanding of moral life involves a general knowledge of spiritual life and its relations. At the same time it is not to be expected that the essential ideas of ethics can be derived from other sciences, and it is certain that no theory, however formed, can be satisfactory which fails to differentiate the moral from the natural, and which robs the moral of its peculiar characteristics. To say that virtue is a wise regard for one's own interests, or that it is sympathetic concern for the interests of others, is weak and insufficient, because it obliterates the distinction between moral principle and a regard for interests. We cannot in advance of examination assert that the peculiar principles of ethics are simple and underived, but, whether they be simple or compounded, they are *sui generis*; they are distinctively moral.

These considerations show how unlikely those are to reach the truth who hold that ethics is wholly or chiefly a derivative science. Neglecting direct analysis, attempting to educe the moral from the unmoral, they land in imperfect and impotent conclusions.

10. This is especially the case with those whose fundamental philosophy has no natural affinity for moral principle. Hegel made all forms of entity the development of thought—and all thought the development of the thought of Being. Like the ancient Eleatics, identifying Being with Unity,—the Existent with the One—he taught Pantheism. In this system man is a specific activity of the universal intelligence. Accordingly, with Hegel the aim of all morality is self-realization. In order to give this statement ethical character, it is arbitrarily assumed that the divine in man, the essence of man's being, is the good,—man's "better self"—and so, by this addition to pantheism, we have an ethics as fanciful and as unfounded as the philosophy on which it is based.

Herbert Spencer accounts for all life, physical and psychical, as the development of molecular action. Thoughts and cognitions, feelings and desires, are exceedingly complex and delicate commotions of the nervous system. This implies that moral experience also is an evolution of the corporeal. And Spencer attempts to show that this is so. Assuming that all pleasures and pains consist in certain sensations and

refined reproductions of sensations (all of these being identical with complex molecular activities) and recognizing that the wise man seeks the pleasurable and avoids the painful for himself and others, he constructs a plausible sensationalistic utilitarianism. But his ethics is as unsatisfactory as Hegel's, because it attempts to educe the moral from the unmoral, instead of seeking explanations from the analysis of moral life itself. Both authors use some of the facts of consciousness; they could not do otherwise; but their false fundamental principles invalidate their theorizing. The derivate method cannot be of service when its deductions are made from erroneous assumptions.

11. Such are the five subordinate modes of ethical research, which may be employed as auxiliaries to the analytical method. But no one of these alone is adequate for philosophic progress, and all of them together would not suffice without the direct analysis of moral perceptions and judgments.

Some authors, looking at this subject in their own way, have mentioned the psychological, the metaphysical, and the evolutionistic methods. These terms—primarily, at least—designate different sources of ideas and grounds of argument rather than different modes of mental work. They call attention to the fact that a system of ethics may be controlled by a psychological or a metaphysical or an evolutionistic theory. They might also be used to indicate specific applications of the derivate method of inquiry. But our present object does not call for further distinctions. If we bear in mind the paramount importance of the analytic method and the limitations attending the subordinate modes of procedure, we shall have a kind of ethical methodology, according to which the value of various systems may be estimated. For the strength or the weakness of any doctrine becomes apparent when we see to what extent it has been constructed in accordance with the special logic of the science to which it belongs.

NOTE.—The next seven chapters (XIV–XX) discuss conflicting theories and may be read either before or after the subsequent part of the treatise. Those who have not already given some attention to ethics may advantageously defer the reading of these chapters till after they have studied the direct analysis of the Moral Law—Chapters XXI–XXVII.

CHAPTER XIV.

UTILITARIANISM.

1. Ethical systems should be studied.—2. As influenced by dominant ideas they may be classified as follows: (1) Happiness Ethics; (2) Perfection Ethics; (3) Motivity Ethics; (4) Authority Ethics; (5) Duty Ethics.—3. Hedonism, taught by the Atomists, is the crudest form of Happiness ethics. It makes pleasure the end of life.—4. Eudæmonism, the doctrine of Aristotle, makes active and prosperous employment the end.—5. Utilitarianism advocates “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” or the welfare in general, of all concerned.—6. Utilitarians recognize moral life to be both egoistic and altruistic, though some would make altruism a development of egoism.—7. The charge that Utilitarianism sets aside the accepted rules of morality cannot be sustained. It is denied by Mill and Spencer. Spencer quoted.—8. Utilitarianism does not sufficiently distinguish between seeking happiness or good for its own sake and seeking the right for its own sake.—9. Nor between actions as naturally good and bad and as morally good and bad.—10. Utilitarianism gives an inadequate account of moral obligation. Bentham, Bain, Mill, Spencer, Darwin, and Sidgwick, quoted.—11. This system neglects the internal and spiritual, and does not provide high ideals of duty.

1. BEFORE attempting a difficult work it is well to consider what has already been done in the field of proposed labor. One should study both the failures and the successes of his predecessors, and should seek to understand how these have been brought about. To neglect this source of aid does not exhibit independence of mind, but stupidity and conceit.

2. The various philosophies of morality devised by thoughtful men are fundamentally influenced by diverse conceptions of the essential aim of right living; and they may be classified accordingly. Certain theories make welfare and happiness the ultimate end of duty; they may be termed collectively the *Happiness ethics*. Others teach that virtue consists in seeking an ideal excellence, a certain perfection of character and life; these may be named the *Perfection ethics*.

Others say that the regulation of one's motive tendencies by conscience or reason is the all-comprehensive requirement of the law; these may be designated the *Motivity ethics*. Others hold that obedience to the will of a superior, enforced by law or habit, is the foundation of morality; these may be styled *Authority ethics*. Others assert that the aim of moral desire and action is to realize the right or to perform one's duty, this end being distinguishable from any of those above mentioned; these may be spoken of as *Duty ethics*. Other schemes of life and conduct might be added to the foregoing list, but we cannot think of any that are worthy to be called ethical.

Some of the philosophies of moral life may not at first seem to employ any of the five ideas now presented, but we believe that the ethical significance of every system will be found to arise in connection with the use of one of these ideas, or, it may be, from the use, first of one and then of another of them. Indeed it is scarcely conceivable that any life should be called moral unless it aim either at the promotion and conservation of welfare and happiness—or at perfection or excellence of life and character—or at a wise regulation of our affections and desires—or at obedience to authority and to the commands of God—or at the realization of those ends in general which are right and dutiful.

3. Sometimes the Happiness ethics is given the name *Hedonism*, because the crudest form of this doctrine makes *ἡδονή*, or pleasure, the great end of existence. But a more intelligible statement of views can be presented if we restrict the term Hedonism to the earliest and least developed form of the Happiness theory, and say that, in addition to this, there are two other forms, *Eudæmonism* and *Utilitarianism*.

That pleasure is the proper aim of rational beings was taught by those primitive Grecian philosophers who were called Atomists, and who lived in Ionia in the fifth century before Christ. Democritus and Leucippus were the founders of this school. Asserting that the universe and all objects contained in it result from the interaction of exceedingly minute and indivisible particles, they were the forerunners of our modern materialists. Those writers of our day who say that all organic and all psychic life have sprung from the operation of powers originally inherent in inorganic matter, and who call themselves Evolutionists (though this name may also indicate adherence to a form of theistic theory),

have done little more than to elaborate the ideas of the ancient Atomists. In morals the tendency of such philosophy is to inculcate the duty of getting the greatest possible satisfaction out of this present life. Since personal experience terminates when body and brain are resolved into their chemical constituents, the dictate of Atomistic wisdom is, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

We must not, however, suppose that the Hedonist philosophers advocated low sensuality; probably this was never done by any honest and earnest thinker. But Aristippus of Cyrene (B. C. 400), and after him Epicurus (B. C. 300), taught that refined pleasures, the principal of which were to be intellectual and social, were the wisest aims of human pursuit. They approved of bountiful repasts at which guests crowned with flowers and cheered with sweet music, dismissed the cares of life and indulged in songs and gaiety. At the same time wise thoughts and noble sentiments—"the feast of reason and the flow of soul"—must ever be the chief attraction of the festival; else it would be unworthy of the dignity of man.

4. The moral theory of Aristotle is distinguished from Hedonism because his conception of the *summum bonum*—τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθόν——the chief good of life—is *not that of ease and enjoyment, but of the greatest attainable εὐδαιμονία or prosperity*. Hence his doctrine has been styled Eudæmonism. According to Aristotle the principal part of happiness is to be found, not in passive experiences, but in active employments. Man's highest good lies in *εὐπραξία*, or well-doing, that is, in the suitable employment of his faculties about their proper objects. The dispositions of the human spirit to various ends and modes of activity become virtues when they are properly exercised; for which purpose the discreet man (ὁ φρόνιμος) must avoid extremes and follow the middle course. This teaching of Aristotle about the *μεσότης*, or middle, is regarded by some as giving his definitions of the right and of virtue, but it is rather a useful direction concerning the regulation of our natural dispositions. Virtue consists essentially in that *φρόνησις*, or wisdom, which chooses and seeks the highest good; and the right is the good thus chosen.

The superiority of Aristotle to the Atomists is apparent. He was not a materialist; he presents a nobler ideal of life than is cognate to materialism. Yet he fails to distinguish

sufficiently between prudence and virtue—between the pursuit of one's own best interests and the loving service of the right for its own sake. These things, though closely related, are not identical.

5. Utilitarianism is the modern form of the Happiness ethics. Jeremy Bentham, the father of it, taught that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the end by which the rightness of actions is determined. Later this theory was developed by Mr. J. S. Mill as a system of universal beneficence. At the present time Professor Sidgwick, another advocate of Utilitarianism, defines it as "the ethical theory that the conduct which, under given circumstances, is ethically right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose interests are affected by the conduct." Bentham's method is dogmatic and looks towards the application of ethics to legislative and social problems; Mill's is deductive, being influenced by his psychology; Sidgwick's, though using postulates and axioms, is very dialectic, so that sometimes amid his keen discussion of doctrines, his own views are obscured.

6. Some have distinguished between egoistic and altruistic Utilitarianism, the former setting forth one's own happiness as the end of life, the latter the happiness of others; but *neither of these views is thoroughly and consistently advocated by any author of the present day.* Egoism, the doctrine of principled selfishness, is not taught now as it was in former times. It is the natural product of materialism and sensationalism; for, according to these doctrines, all human desire arises in view of pleasant feelings (or agreeable nervous commotions) and seeks a reproduction of them. We have a pleasure, it has been said, in seeing others happy and then we seek the happiness of others, not on its own account, but in order to realize that pleasure. In opposition to this Utilitarians now hold that, in addition to desiring his own satisfaction, man has a disinterested desire that others should be gratified. Whether this be an original and primitive endowment (which seems the better opinion) or an acquired disposition—in either case it is held to be truly altruistic. Even Herbert Spencer seems to recognize this truth. "Goodness," he says, "is the conduct of one who aids the sick in re-acquiring normal vitality, assists the unfortunate to recover the means of maintaining themselves, defends those who are

threatened with harm in person, property or reputation, and aids whatever promises to improve the living of all his fellows." We cannot suppose Mr. Spencer to believe that the goodness which he describes seeks only its own satisfaction in the alleviation of suffering, and not the alleviation of the suffering itself.

At the same time *we know of no author who advocates exclusively altruistic Utilitarianism*. The utmost that can be said is that the best Utilitarianism contains a strong altruistic element. It calls upon every man to do what in him lies not only for his own welfare but also for the welfare of others. In this teaching the modern Happiness ethics far excels the ancient, chiefly owing to the enlightenment of the moral faculty under the influence of Christianity. While the philosophers of antiquity honored the virtue of beneficence, they were scarcely conscious of its fundamental importance. The merit of Utilitarianism is that it insists upon the duty of doing good to man as man; for which reason it is to be regretted that the title given this doctrine by its advocates is but weakly expressive of its spirit. The term Utilitarianism appears to elevate the useful above that which is essential to man's deepest needs, and the conveniences and comforts of life above its fundamental interests. These suggestions are unjust. Utilitarianism seeks happiness as the all-comprehending good and antagonizes misery as the all-comprehending evil. It is almost identical with humanitarianism, because it makes beneficence the source of all virtue. It aims at the welfare of every sentient being, and therefore should be called "Bonitarianism," or some other name indicative of goodness.

7. Nevertheless several objections have been made to this system. First, it is said that Utilitarianism *sets aside the common and accepted rules of morality* and substitutes for these a calculation of results in each particular instance. Undoubtedly some advocates of this doctrine underestimate the value of the practical moral reason of men, and so leave their statements open to this objection. But J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and other careful utilitarians allow the authority of the dictates of the "moral sense," and assert that the speculative reason does not set these aside, but only confirms and supplements them. Holding that the regulations of morality are the judgments of long experience respecting beneficial modes of conduct, they teach that one

should conscientiously observe such rules, and that we should resort to "moral arithmetic" only in cases in which there is ground to question the proper applicability of the rule. Spencer says: "The business of moral science is to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kind of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness and what tends to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to, irrespective of a direct estimate of happiness or misery."

8. Another allegation against Utilitarianism is that *it makes no distinction between the seeking of happiness or good for its own sake and the seeking of the right for its own sake*. As these things appear to be different, this objection has considerable force. Utilitarians define happiness as the sum of the pleasures of which man is capable, and misery, which is the opposite of happiness, as the sum of the pains. With these conceptions Mill says, "Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." In other words, an action is right or wrong according to its fitness to advance or to retard the happiness of those concerned. This language, and the thought conveyed by it, give no basis for distinguishing the right and the wrong from the desirable and the undesirable.

These last two words, as commonly used relate to those enjoyments which a man in the exercise of ordinary wisdom may seek for himself and others, and the sum of which is happiness as ordinarily conceived; and, in the general, a thing is "desirable" or "undesirable" just as tending to advance or to retard this enjoyable experience. This being so, Utilitarianism teaches that the right and wrong do not differ from the desirable and the undesirable, unless indeed we should say that the right and wrong are the desirable and undesirable as viewed from a general and impersonal point of view. But the common judgment of mankind does not make moral rightness merely a species of desirableness; it distinguishes it from, and raises it above, desirableness viewed from any point of view. It assigns to the right—and also to the wrong—a nature and place of its own.

9. This same criticism of Utilitarianism may be expressed in connection with a familiar ambiguity in the use of the

two words "good" and "bad." With regard to most objects, "good" indicates a conduciveness to what we ordinarily mean by welfare—in other words, a fitness to promote comfort and happiness; as when we speak of a good house, a good business, a good farm, a good horse. But sometimes in relation to persons or personal actions the words have an ethical signification, as when we speak of a good man or a bad one, a good deed or a bad one. In this moral application "good" and "bad" mean "right" and "wrong," or, it may be, "virtuous" and "vicious."

Thus, so far as proposed actions and aims are concerned, there is one kind of good which we may call natural, and which is the same as the desirable, and there is another which we may call moral, and which is identical with the right; and, in like manner, there are two kinds of badness. Utilitarianism scarcely recognizes the difference.

10. A further objection to this system of doctrine—which, however, is but the logical consequence of that which has just been considered—is that *Utilitarianism provides no adequate conception of moral obligation*—that, instead of explaining, it really explains away the obligation or "oughtness" of the right. After identifying the right with that which is conducive to happiness (the greatest happiness of the greatest number or the greatest happiness of all concerned) Utilitarians identify the "oughtness" of the right with the supreme desirability or importance of the right as an end. According to this conception obligation is not an absolute or categorical imperative; it is only that felt liability to loss or evil which attends the misuse of the means of happiness. The constraint of duty is a sense of the pressing importance of that threatened loss or evil.

In order to emphasize this thought, Mr. Bentham, in the opening discussion of his Deontology, altogether rejects moral obligation as an ethical idea, as if it were only an irrational bugbear. "It is, in fact," he says, "very idle to talk about duties; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive. . . . The talisman of arrogance, indolence and ignorance is to be found in a single word, an authoritative imposture. . . . it is the word 'ought.' . . . If the use of the word be admissible at all, it 'ought' to be banished from the vocabulary of morals." These statements, however, do not mean that the word "ought" has absolutely no place in morals. They only denounce it as expressing an imperative.

Bentham regards the requirement which conscience makes in favor of the right as a support attached to the right by superstition, or by the habit of obedience to authority. He rejects that "categorical imperative" which Kant declares to be an immediate utterance of the reason.

Notwithstanding his condemnation of the imperative "ought," Bentham afterwards uses the word to indicate that rational demand which happiness and good make upon us to seek them for their own sake. "Every pleasure," he says, "is *prima facie* good, and ought to be pursued; every pain is a *prima facie* evil, and ought to be avoided." And again, "if there is no 'ought' there is no morality; therefore no rights of man." Here "ought" expresses the demand which the rules of well-being as distinguished from the principles of morality make on every intelligent being. Beyond question the word is often employed in this sense. With reference only to desirable success we may say that a poem "ought" to be written, that a speech "ought" to be delivered, that a business "ought" to be conducted, in such or such a manner. So Bentham holds that, for the best interests of one's self and others, one "ought" to act in accordance with practical wisdom. In fact he abolishes moral principle by making it nothing more than a serious regard for the general welfare, and with this he also abolishes moral obligation as the categorical imperative.

Prof. Bain, who derives all moral relations from the effect of social forces, obtains the idea of obligation from that of external authority and restricts it to "the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment." Although of the same class of thinkers with Bentham, he includes this idea within the sphere of morality. Bain defines conscience as "an imitation within ourselves of the government about us."

John Stuart Mill, Bentham's distinguished disciple, makes the "internal sanction of duty"—"its binding force"—to be "a feeling in our own mind, a pain more or less intense, attendant on the violation of duty." He says, "The ultimate sanction of all morality is a subjective feeling in our mind." Thus he teaches that the pursuit of happiness comes to be regarded as dutiful, because a contemplation of the contrary conduct produces pain. In basing the idea of obligation on an internal feeling of pain rather than on a sense of outward authority, Mill agrees with Bentham and differs from Bain. For the "good," in connection with which Bentham says the

"ought" is perceived, is the ground of pain if it be not realized, or if evil take its place.

The weakest possible account of moral obligation is that given by Charles Darwin in his "Descent of Man." He says, "The imperious word 'ought' seems merely to imply the consciousness of a persistent instinct..... We hardly use the word in a metaphorical sense when we say hounds ought to hunt, pointers to point, and retrievers to retrieve their game." Nothing could show less psychological discrimination than this identification of the motive action of reason with that of a "persistent instinct, either natural or acquired." The more one scrutinizes one's sense of moral obligation the more he is convinced that the authority of duty cannot be explained as the demand of an unreasoning instinct, or of a subjective feeling, or of an external influence, or even of the rational perception of good and happiness in general. It is something *sui generis*. It is the claim asserted by the right as such. It is the demand of good only when, and so far as, good may have the character of the right.

In view of this fact Professor Henry Sidgwick, who calls himself an Intuitional Utilitarian, must be granted a pre-eminence over all others who make happiness the end of morality. "I find," says the Professor, "that I undoubtedly seem to perceive as clearly and certainly as I see any axiom in Arithmetic or Geometry that it is right and reasonable and the dictate of reason, and my duty, to treat every man as I should think I myself ought to be treated in precisely similar circumstances." Here, along with the teaching that the essential aim of the moral reason is the good or the "felicific," Sedgwick asserts that right, duty and obligation are the objects of a rational intuition, and evidently distinguishes these from lower motive perceptions. This doctrine has much merit; it does not explain away the idea of moral obligation.

11. Finally, Utilitarianism has been blamed *for not providing high ideals of duty and for favoring practical to the exclusion of spiritual aims*. It is said that the greatest of all duties is the development of virtue and moral character, and that Utilitarianism, neglecting this, demands only the promotion of happiness or welfare. There is some foundation for this accusation. If the question were whether spiritual improvement or practical benevolence should be the exclusive

aim of life, we believe that wisdom should decide for the benevolence, not that it is intrinsically of more importance than moral well-being, but because a choice of this latter aim to the exclusion of the former would render both impossible of attainment, whereas a moral growth must attend wise philanthropic effort, whether that growth is consciously desired or not. This, however, is not the problem for our decision; and those who wish to avoid the danger of seeking the spiritual in separation from less elevated aims should guard against the opposite extreme of concentrating all one's attention on practical duties alone.

Evidently this latter error will be a natural one for those who make good and happiness, as opposed to right and virtue, the essential objects of moral effort. This, however, seems to be the position of Utilitarians. The better thinkers of this school do, indeed, recognize virtue as a good, and even as the highest good, the *summum bonum*. But in qualification of this it may be said that their conception of good, even the highest, being subordinated to their conception of happiness, which they define as the possible attainable sum of pleasures, they are forced to regard virtue as having value only as the greatest means of enjoyment. The thoughtful student demands a doctrine by which the right may be truly differentiated from all other forms of good, and in which virtue or moral excellence shall be set forth as the transcendent aim of rational desire.

CHAPTER XV.

PERFECTIONISM.

1. An ethical system may mention more aims of moral life than one, but generally one is fundamental.—2. Perfectionism was originated by Leibnitz. Is widely taught at present. Janet, Mackenzie, Hickok, and Bowne, quoted.—3. Also Spencer, Alexander, and Leslie Stephen, though they are not true perfectionists.—4. This doctrine makes excellence of character or being the essential aim of morality.—5. No doubt personal perfection is a high moral end.—6. The duty of seeking it involves no impossibility.—7. Perfectionism teaches that moral rightness belongs to external conduct not as being excellent in itself but only as the expression of spiritual excellence. Janet, Mackenzie.—8. Moral perfection is an inward excellence which shows itself in outward disposals and doings.—9. As an ultimate end it is not necessarily simple and indefinable. Hickock, Janet, Mackenzie, Bowne.—10. Perfectionism is not a selfish doctrine. It is neither egoistic nor altruistic. Janet criticized.—11. Notwithstanding its plausibility this doctrine is inconsistent with fact; and is self-contradictory.—12. Though virtue is the supreme moral end, it is an end of secondary development. It implies the existence of other and more primary moral ends.—13. Besides, perfectionism does not identify perfection with virtue. It can give no satisfactory definition of perfection.—14. The sense of moral dignity, or worthiness, is not the same as the sense of the morally right.—15. Spiritual perfection defined. But in order to perfect this definition the rightness of ends and actions should also be defined. Des Cartes quoted.

1. THE arrangement of systems according to the explanation which each gives of the fundamental or generic aim of morality is not intended to teach that every system sets forth an aim distinctly, or that it mentions only one aim. There would be no inconsistency should the same person at the same time seek to promote happiness, to realize an ideal, to regulate his inward life, to fulfil the will of a superior and to satisfy his own sense of duty. In like manner an ethical theory may refer to more than one aim, or may use some combination of aims. Nevertheless it is true that in every system

some one principle is given a preponderance, even where it may not be granted the absolute control, over all the rest.

2. The doctrine that *excellence of spiritual character is the essential aim of morality may be named "Perfectionism."* It was held anciently by Plato and others. During the early days of modern philosophy it was advocated by Leibnitz and by his able disciple Wolf. Through the writings of Wolf it became extensively current during the first half of the eighteenth century. After that it suffered a decline for about one hundred years, being antagonized by the teachings of Kant, Bentham and others. During the latter part of this nineteenth century it has again become prevalent. It is attractive to many who cannot accept pleasure or happiness as the end of duty, and who are not satisfied with dogmatic statements respecting the right and the obligatory.

Professor Paul Janet, in his "Theory of Morals," says: "According to my view moral obligation is based upon the following principle: *Every being owes it to himself that he should attain to the highest degree of excellence and of perfection of which his nature is capable.*" To the same effect Prof. John S. Mackenzie, in his "Manual of Ethics," having discussed "the standard as law" (in other words, as the right and obligatory) and then "the standard as happiness," says, "We see, in fact, that the end must consist in some form of self-realization, that is, in some form of the development of character; that the end, in short, ought to be described rather as *perfection* than as *happiness.*" A similar doctrine is taught by Dr. Laurens P. Hickok in his "System of Moral Science." "We may," he says, "call this (the objective rule of right) the imperative of reason, the constraint of conscience, or the voice of God within; but, by whatever terms expressed, the real meaning will be that every man has consciously the bond upon him to do that, and that only, which is due to his spiritual excellency. The motive to this is not any gratification of a want, not any satisfying of a craving; and thus to be done for a price in happiness; it is solely *that one may be just what the excellency of his own spirit demands that he should be.* . . . The highest good, the *summum bonum*, is worthiness of spiritual approbation. That this is ultimate intuitively appears in many ways."

These views of Hickok, as well as those of Janet and Mackenzie, are connected with the Hegelian teaching of the immanence of God in all men, and represent all duty as call-

ing for the recognition and development of the indwelling divine nature. This principle is advocated also by two distinguished Hegelians, Professor T. H. Green, in his "Prolegomena to Ethics," and Prof. F. H. Bradley, in "Ethical Studies."

Professor Borden T. Bowne, in his chapter on subjective ethics, advocates a composite doctrine. Allowing that the *objective* rule of conduct requires the "good-will" (i. e. goodness), and the seeking of happiness, he claims that this rule is insufficient without another drawn from within. He says, "The impossibility of solving the ethical problem by general notions about the good, pleasure and happiness, has abundantly appeared. When we make any of these basal, we at once find ourselves compelled to appeal to some ideal conception or inner law, which shall interpret to us the permissible meaning of our terms. . . . If, then, we are told that the law of love is the only basal moral law, we assent to this extent: the law of love is the only . . . *social* law for human beings, but it presupposes a law for the human being *himself* which determines the form of its application. A complete law of duty for us must include both a human ideal and also a law of social interaction. There is, then, in human morality, even supposing it perfect, a double element. One is a universal factor which we must view as valid for all moral beings whatever: the other is related to humanity and has reference to *human perfection*."

Probably Professor Bowne would allow that other rational beings than man are bound to consult ideals, only ideals to be found in *their* nature and not in ours. Be this as it may, he teaches that the rule of perfection given by the human reason is not an infallible guide, but is subject to variation and growth. At the same time he asserts that it is not derived from the contemplation of the results of conduct, but from a study of human nature; and also that it is the more fundamental element of moral law. "Our morality," he says, "involves not merely the law of love, but also an ideal of humanity. If we desire to make either primary, the ideal is basal and the law of love is the implication. In morals being is deeper than doing."

3. Strange as it may appear, Herbert Spencer, also, holds a kind of perfectionism, though in a way which does not make him a true perfectionist. For he does not consider perfection but happiness to be the end of morality. He says, "*The*

moral law, properly so-called, is the law of the perfect man—is the formula of ideal conduct.” This statement is related to Spencer’s definition of life as “the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations”; by which probably we are to understand the self-adaptation of an organism to its environment. While such adaptation may be admitted as a condition of the continuance of life, we question whether it be life itself. Nevertheless Spencer makes the highest form of life to be the perfect adjustment of rational beings to their surroundings, and, on this basis, he conceives of “an ideal man as existing in the ideal social state.” Of course every man, to the extent of his ability, should conform to this ideal. Other evolutionists, as Professor Alexander, in “Moral Order and Progress,” and Leslie Stephens, in his “Science of Ethics,” explain moral ideals as relating *not to an ideal state, but to the existing condition* of things. The ideal plan is that according to which “society, in the conditions in which it is placed, can, with this ideal, so live that no part of it shall encroach upon the rest.” With a change in the social state a change in the ideal may be necessary. This position is not really antagonistic to Spencer’s. Evolutionistic perfection may for the present be dismissed from further consideration.

4. Collating now the statements of Perfectionism proper, it will be seen that *they set forth excellence of character as the essential aim of moral effort.*

The “ideal” referred to in these statements means more than that the object of moral pursuit is only a thing conceived of and not yet realized. Those who do not accept Perfectionism, as well as those who do, hold that every end of dutiful desire, until it may be realized, has this latter style of ideality. *The ideal now mentioned is the highest form of excellence of which the mind can conceive.* It sets forth the ethical end, not merely as unrealized, but as “perfect.” Indeed most perfectionists say that they speak of an ideal which in some sense actually exists.

Moreover the ideal is *not that of some particular, nor of any generic, mode of conduct or doing; it is that of the perfect man or being.* As Professor Bowne says, the perfection aimed at is “subjective.” It belongs primarily and essentially to the agent. Conduct is right or wrong only as concordant with or as opposed to this inward excellence. The Perfectionists teach that what renders a desire virtuous and

dutiful is that it seeks perfection and excellence of character, and that conduct is desired as right only as connected with and consequent upon the effort after spiritual perfection.

There might be a doctrine of Perfectionism other than this. One might teach that perfection resides primarily in certain ends and actions, because of their own nature and operation, and that character is perfect only as favoring excellent aims and excellent conduct. Such perfectionism would be the opposite of that now considered. It would make the perfection of ends and actions—not that of character—the initial principle of morality. Mill, Spencer and their associates would say that the conception of the perfect man is consequent upon that of perfect conduct; but the other authorities quoted make internal excellence the primary aim. They “base duty upon *the dignity of the moral personality* and upon *the worth of man regarded as an end unto himself.*”

5. This theory of Perfectionism could not be accepted by so many able men if it did not have some affiliations with the truth. It behooves those who may not be satisfied with it to consider carefully such statements as can be made in its defense. First of all, it is clear that *personal perfection is one of the highest moral ends*. Those who advocate spiritual development as the end of rational existence present a phase of truth which is apt to be neglected by those who speak of the moral law as dealing exclusively with conduct. They remind us that being as well as doing is obligatory upon us and that being is the more vital obligation. Their teachings agree with that Scriptural injunction, “Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life,” and with that command of the Almighty, “Be ye perfect, for I, the Lord your God, am perfect.”

6. In the next place, it cannot properly be objected to this doctrine that *it prescribes for us and expects from us an impossibility*. Divine perfection is unattainable by man. The human mind cannot even form an absolutely faultless spiritual ideal; nor could it fully comprehend such an ideal should it be presented. The best of men, during this earthly life, are willing to confess that they know only in part, and that they must look to a future state of existence for knowledge unmingled with error. Perfectionists do speak of “an absolute ideal type,” but they add “perhaps such a type can never be perfectly understood by humanity.” The per-

fection which mortals conceive of and attempt to realize is only an approximation to that type. Hence Janet and others use the alternative term "excellence," and represent the perfection which duty seeks as admitting of degrees. In short, the end proposed is that of the highest excellence conceivable by the moral agent. This is called perfection because every man in developing for himself the conception of it must be content with nothing less than the best development possible for him. The ultimate goal is absolute perfection; if the standard followed fall short of this, it must nevertheless be the nearest approach to perfection within our power. So it is perfection for us.

7. In the third place, it is to be noticed that while the ideal advocated is that of character or condition, and not that of doing, *the thought of doing is by no means excluded from the conception*. Excellence of character has its importance in qualifying for action, or, at least, is manifested in activity. Hence Janet says, "The idea of perfection involves not only the idea of activity, but also that of order, of harmony, of regular and proportionate relations": that is, it shows itself in an orderly, harmonious and well-proportioned activity. And, when he says, "Each one of us according to his circumstances and according to the different conditions in which he is placed is under obligation to raise himself to the highest possible degree of perfection and to be a saint or a hero according as the nature of things may require," he evidently means one to be a saint or a hero in the doing of saintly or heroic deeds. Perfection of inward state is set forth as the essential end; one is reminded that accomplishment apart from personality would be as meritless as the action of an automaton. Yet it is also taught that doing is the necessary outcome of being; that being reaches its perfection only in activity.

In a like spirit Mackenzie, after saying that "the end at which we are to aim is the realization of the self or the development of character," explains that this end is to be attained by living within the "universe," or sphere, of the moral reason. We must endeavor "to understand completely the world in which we live and our relations to it and to act constantly in the light of that understanding. . . . So to live is to be truly *ourselves*."

8. Fourthly; it is almost superfluous to say that while moral perfection exhibits an adaptation of one's spirit to the

requirements of his station, *it does not consist merely in a relation, but is rather that condition or habit upon which the relation is founded.* This remark refers to that definition which makes perfection the adjustment of one's life to one's environment. Plainly, in order to such an adjustment, the life must have a given character and be exercised in a given way. When a man is a good neighbor, he not only does those things which an honest friendship suggests, but has also a heart in which faithful kindness dwells; so, in general, he who is virtuous is not only rightly related to others but is also rightly disposed within.

This thought may be expressed by saying that moral perfection is an inward excellence which shows itself in outward disposals and doings. The description of perfection as an adjustment in which an ideal is realized, resembles the definition that rightness is conformity to the moral law. As that which is right not only conforms to a rule, but, yet more, participates in the nature which the rule sets forth, so the perfect, in realizing the ideal, embodies in itself the excellence of the ideal.

9. Again, and in the fifth place, *it is not essential to a theory of morals that the conception of the ultimate aim should be simple* or that it should be complex, but only that it should be *intelligible and correct.* Were the question whether, in some analysis of thought, we had come to an ultimate *idea*, this could not be answered affirmatively unless the idea were uncompounded. But, in comparing the ends of some department of motivity, that aim must be considered ultimate which imparts the common character to all the specific ends—which is generic to the others—whether it be an absolutely simple idea or not. For of two cognate ends, both ultimate to the practical reason, if one be generic to the other, it is, in a sense, ulterior to the other, and therefore preeminently ultimate; it is the explanatory end; and as such ultimate in the philosophy of motivity.

Some perfectionists hold that this ultimate or explanatory end of moral life is simple. Dr. Hickok says, "In all possible cases of obligation *the ultimate right vests in the excellency of rational spirit itself.* . . . With this precise intuition of the ultimate right it is important that we apprehend some of the attributes which it possesses. First, it is *simple.* By this is meant that it is wholly uncompounded and thus incapable of any analysis." Then he adds that it is *im-*

mutable and that it is *universal*. On the other hand, Professor Janet says, "While I admit that perfection, like every other primitive idea, is very difficult to define, it may be explained and analyzed in such a way as to remove some of the indefiniteness which it has at first." He then describes perfection as composed of two elements "(1) an activity whose excellence is in proportion to its intensity; (2) the harmony, or agreement, of the elements or parts of which the being is composed." Subsequent discussions lead one to interpret this vague language to mean that moral perfection is the activity of the reason controlling the powers of the spirit and correlating their operations. The perfection thus produced is identified with a kind of "good," but this is not "good" in the ordinary sense. The professor calls it "an absolute good, a good in itself, superior to all relative goods." Though this perfection, or that excellence which approaches it, is the most prolific cause of happiness and the indispensable source of lasting felicity, it is not the highest form of good on this account; nor is it to be sought primarily on this account, but simply because of its own nature as the out-working of absolute and eternal reason. (Compare Chap II.)

Professor Mackenzie defines perfection more simply than Professor Janet; he calls it *self-realization*. But, when his explanations are considered, we find that Janet and Mackenzie hold the same view. For the self to be realized is the "rational or higher self," in other words, one's life as governed by reason and as connected with the divine and universal in man. Professor Bowne, also, speaks of the end as self-realization; and he add that human beings have no determinate conception of it. "If," he says, "the moral ideal were clearly defined or sharply conceived, the ethical problem would be a simple one: and it is conceivable that there should be moral beings for whom this should be the case. . . . Unfortunately this is not the case with men. . . . The ideal exists in any given circumstances chiefly in a perception of the direction in which human worth and dignity lie. . . . For the authority of this ideal there is no warrant but the soul itself."

Such definitions as those above considered have some complexity, but this does not show that perfection cannot be an ultimate end. Absolute simplicity is not necessary to an ultimate end, though it is to an ultimate idea.

10. In the sixth place, Perfectionism *cannot be justly condemned as a selfish doctrine*. Aristotle raises a question bear-

ing on this point. "If," he says, "a man should seek only to acquire justice, wisdom, or some other virtue . . . it would be impossible to call him an egotist and to blame him. Nevertheless is he not, in a certain sense, more egotistical than other men, since he desires for himself the best and most beautiful things, and since he enjoys the most exalted part of his being? . . . But this noble egotism is as much superior to common egotism as reason is to passion, or as the good is to the merely useful." In the same spirit Janet writes, "If we understand by happiness, not pleasure in general, but, like Aristotle, Des Cartes and Leibnitz, regard it as the feeling of our own perfection and excellence, it is clear that it may be an end for us. For why should it not be an end to seek our own perfection? And how, if we have attained it, could we help enjoying it?"

At first glance these statements seem tinged with the doctrine that virtue consists in seeking our own excellence for the sake of our own happiness. That, however, would not be a just judgment; certainly not in the case of Professor Janet. He would say that a good man seeks justice, wisdom, temperance, charity and all other forms of moral perfection, simply *for their own sake, for their own excellence*; and that then, after that, finding true happiness to arise from these virtues, he may properly desire them on that account. While recognizing that the original desire for perfection must relate to our own virtue the professor holds that this is free from self-love because not happiness but excellence is sought. Janet adds that one may desire the virtue of others and strive for their perfection as well as for his own. But this movement, although in one sense altruistic, does not include altruism in the ordinary sense, that is, a desire for the happiness of others. Both our own virtue and that of others are to be sought primarily for their own sake simply; after that, and in addition to that, they may be sought from self-love and from benevolence. Such is Janet's doctrine. But his language is somewhat rhetorical when he says, "The two ideas of perfection and of happiness . . . are really but one and the same idea considered under two different aspects." What his writings teach is that moral excellence and true happiness are indissolubly united, are two inseparable developments of the one virtuous life.

11. The strength of Perfectionism lies in the truth that virtue is the supreme moral end and in the consideration that

the realization of this end would secure the realization of all other moral ends. In these positions it has the support of common sense. The weakness of this doctrine is that *its fundamental assertion is inconsistent with fact and even contains within itself an element of self-contradiction.*

We must bear in mind that the problem before us is not respecting the supreme excellence of virtue but respecting the essential aim of moral activity. *We wish to know what is the end sought for in all dutiful desire.* The perfectionists say that the end is excellence of being or of character. This answer is incorrect if there are other aims besides inward perfection that are right and obligatory. Is it not evident that there are? Beyond question the virtues of benevolence and beneficence, of honesty, veracity, fidelity and justice, should be cultivated as excellencies of character, but do not they themselves have right ends of their own other than spiritual perfection? They seek to help the needy wisely, to cherish proper regard for one's neighbor, to pay one's debts, to speak the truth, to observe contracts, to give to every man his due; and, in every case, they may be exercised without any thought of one's spiritual improvement.

12. This last may be a moral end of superior dignity to the others, but *it is an end of secondary development.* It is an aim which could not come into existence till after the more primary aims were appreciated and pursued; nor could it continue in existence if the primary aims were to be abandoned. To cultivate virtues, if there were no virtues to cultivate, would be an absurdity. To cherish moral excellencies involves that moral excellencies can exist, each with its own right aim. In like manner to seek virtue in general as a right end involves that virtue can primarily exist as the disposition to seek and do what is right and obligatory.

It may be said that he who promotes virtue seeks all right ends; since virtue ensures the fulfilment of the law. This, however, is true only in a secondary way, because the promotion of virtue is conditioned on the direct operation of specific virtues, and because the promoter of virtue immediately seeks not the primary ends but only those dispositions which immediately seek them. The dutiful seeking of virtue therefore is not only consistent with the existence of other right ends than virtue, but assumes the existence of them.

There are other forms of material wealth than money. Yet, because money is easily exchangeable for diverse worldly

goods, "the making of money" is sometimes identified with the acquisition of riches. This does not mean that money is the only form of wealth; there are other and more directly enjoyable valuables than money. In a somewhat similar manner moral excellence is not the only right end.

13. Let us now, digressing a little from our main contention, contemplate spiritual excellence as a moral end, and let us inquire *whether perfection ethics gives any satisfactory explanation of what this end is.*

Perfection in general is the highest excellence of which the nature of a thing admits. Excellence is that quality whereby an object is highly fitted to gratify some desire natural to rational beings or to yield some natural satisfaction to such beings. Wealth, power, truth, beauty, order, law, peace, comfort, friendship, love, are excellent things. The goodness or excellence of material things exists, not in themselves alone, but in their adaptation in some way to the nature and needs of spirit. We are now concerned with moral perfection. What can this be but the complete adaptation of a person to seek the ends and to realize the requirements of moral life? A man would be morally perfect if he wholly desired and wholly accomplished all things that are right and dutiful. This statement seems plain enough. But it is not satisfactory to the perfectionists.

And it is not possible for them, because *they define the rightness of conduct from the relation of conduct to inward perfection and do not define the inward perfection by its relation to right conduct.* They say that perfection is a combination of activity with harmony—the realization of the true self—a conformity to the type, model or standard of humanity—the development of personality—that worth which renders the soul fit for moral approbation—a participation in the Thought, the Idea, the Essence, the Unity, which exists in Nature—the conjunction or union of one's being with the Absolute, the Eternal, the Divine. For us these fine phrases, and others like them, are valueless as definitions. Some of them may indicate a direction in which the nature of moral excellence is to be discovered, but none of them give any clear idea of what moral excellence is. As definitions they are philosophical vacuities.

Moreover, being coupled with the doctrine that perfection is immediately perceived as an attribute of the essence of the soul, and is primarily understood apart from the consideration

of right doing, these statements prohibit one from attempting any definition of a less metaphysical character.

The best of the definitions quoted is that of President Hickok, who says that the right end to be sought is "worthiness of spiritual approbation." This points in the true direction, because nothing but moral excellence has spiritual worthiness. Desert of approbation, however, is a property—it is not the essence—of moral perfection. That essence is to be found in the fact that it is the nature of the perfect man to desire and to do those things which are right and good. But Dr. Hickok forbids this conception of perfection. He says, "In all possible cases of obligation *the ultimate right* vests in the excellency of the rational spirit itself."

14. Here, also, let us consider an error into which those naturally fall who make perfection the ultimate aim of morality. *They identify the sense of right and duty with the sense of moral worth and dignity.* Janet says, "The Scotch philosopher Hutcheson, who maintained the doctrine of the moral sense, recognized also another sense which he called the sense of dignity, and which he distinguished from the former. It is this sense according to him by which we recognize the decency or dignity of actions. In my view the moral sense is identical with the sense of dignity." Probably Hutcheson (the able founder of Scotch philosophy) would not deny that the appreciation of a kind of dignity and worth is a frequent product of the moral faculty, but doubtless he would distinguish this from that exercise of the moral sense in which right and wrong are apprehended.

The practical, as opposed to the merely speculative, reason has two forms, the non-moral and the moral, and *each of these, in addition to its intellectual action, has two developments, the motive and the sensitive.* Non-moral reason, as motive, conceives of interests and ordinary forms of welfare and pursues these according to methods of its own discovery and device. And this same reason, as sensitive, not only approves of what is good and valuable and feels its worth, but also exercises respect for personal beings as capable of good or as the actual or possible agents of good. Thus there arises a non-moral sense of dignity, a natural respect for things as important and for persons so far as they are identified with the desirable and good. In like manner *the moral reason*, as motive, contemplates and seeks those things which are right and good in the most absolute sense. In this exercise of

reason all virtue dwells. And this same moral reason, as sensitive, not only approves of things right and good as worthy of esteem, but also originates feelings of approbation regarding the character and life of men as virtuous and as vicious. The sense of dignity and worth thus arising is moral because it is an exercise of the moral faculty as sensitive, and because it is directed towards things as right or wrong, and towards persons as moral agents. Yet it is not virtuous *per se*; it becomes virtuous as controlled by and united with the motive action of the moral sense. For the very essence of virtue is to desire that which is right and good. If all this be so, it is clear that the sense of dignity is a kind of adjunct to that which is commonly known as the moral sense.

15. In summing up let us say that spiritual perfection is a moral end, but that it cannot be the ultimate moral end because *any satisfactory definition of it presupposes other moral ends on which it is conditioned*. In order to define virtue or spiritual excellence in general, we should adopt the method of Socrates, who determined the nature of any single virtue by considering individual cases and specific forms of it. We must compare different moral perfections so that their common character may be ascertained. In this way we may form a correct conception of that general and comprehensive virtue, which—though it is not, philosophically speaking, the ultimate end of morality—is yet the supreme good, the *summum bonum*, of rational existence. For, as Des Cartes says, “The supreme good consists in the exercise of virtue, or, what is equivalent to the same thing, in the possession of all the perfections whose acquisition depends on our free-will.”

What, then, are moral perfections but honesty, veracity, beneficence, charity, justice, temperance, industry, prudence, purity, loyalty, reverence, piety, each of which has for its immediate and proper aim the realization of some form of right and duty? Such being the case, virtue in general is that disposition which loves and seeks every form of the right and good. But this statement presupposes right ends as the conditions of virtue; which thereafter becomes the supreme right end.

It may be said that the foregoing definition of virtue will be lacking in completeness unless it be made clear wherein that rightness consists on account of which the specific aims

of duty are attractive and obligatory. This may be conceded. Exhaustive ethical inquiry should either establish the absolute simplicity of the idea of moral rightness or should furnish an analytical definition of it. We shall endeavor to give such a definition at the proper time. But even if this attempt should fail, it would still be true that spiritual perfection is not the essential and universal end of morality.

CHAPTER XVI.

MOTIVITY ETHICS.

1. Motivity and Perfection ethics may be classed together as subjective systems.—2. Motivity Ethics includes Butlerism and Edvardianism, the former advocated of late by Martineau, the latter by Hopkins. Butler quoted.—3. Martineau's doctrine stated and discussed, especially his view of moral rightness and of the functions of the moral reason.—4. Hopkins adopts the Edvardian definition of "moral love"; it is supreme regard for the happiness of beings. Hopkins and Martineau compared.—5. Motivity ethics is more intelligible and defensible than Perfection ethics.—6. But its conception of duty is too exclusively subjective.—7. It does not recognize the motive power of the moral reason.—8. It incorrectly explains the function of that reason.—9. And it is confused in its teachings concerning moral rightness.—10. Professors Seth and Muirhead criticized.

1. It may be assumed that every earnest student of philosophical questions sees something of the truth, and that no doctrine which has commended itself to many thinkers can be devoid of value. Believing this to be so we should endeavor to ascertain the points of excellence in every hypothesis, and should use these in the upbuilding of our own belief. Such a course is more pleasant and more profitable than one which aims chiefly at the exposure of error. But even were one bent on the refutation of a mistaken theory, he could not serve his purpose better than by showing wherein, and how far, it may conform to fact and reason. In this way the falsely assumed principle of the theory can be separated from those verities upon which the falsehood rests for acceptance, and can be presented in its own insufficiency. We may add that the controversial spirit, whose whole effort is to discover defects and inconsistencies, contributes very little to philosophical progress.

The perfection ethics, which we have discussed, and the motivity ethics which we are about to discuss, may be classed

together as *subjective* systems, because *both direct moral effort towards something in the agent himself*, while utilitarianism and the systems which make either obedience to authority or devotion to right and duty the essence of morality, might be called *objective* since part of their aim, at least, is outside of the subject, or moral agent. Perfection ethics, however, is, in a way, more subjective than motivity ethics, inasmuch as the former declares the end of duty to be the realization of a character which is to find expression in active duty, while the latter asserts that the end is the regulated exercise of the desires, and that the office of conscience or the moral reason is to provide that regulation. Moreover, motivity ethics regards our internal dispositions not simply as perfections to be cherished on their own account, but as activities seeking ends external to the agent. Thus President Hopkins, rejecting President Hickok's doctrine respecting "worthiness of spiritual approbation," says, "Man was not made to find the ultimate ground of his action in any subjective state of his own of whatever kind. He was made to promote the good of others as well as his own; and the apprehension of that good furnishes an immediate ground of obligation to promote it." At the same time Hopkins makes the immediate end of all duty to be the subjection of one's affections and desires to the control of "rational love"; so that his system is subjective.

2. Two forms of motivity ethics are to be distinguished. *According to one of these Conscience, according to the other Love, is the prominent and formative element of moral life.* The first of these modes of doctrine might be designated "Butlerism," because of its advocacy by Bishop Joseph Butler, the author of "The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature." In certain sermons and essays Butler asserted the legal supremacy of conscience over all our other motive principles. A low Epicurean morality prevailed in his day; the theory was advocated that man is essentially a selfish being. Butler contended that benevolence, no less than self-love, is an inherent part of human nature. He taught that man has "an inward frame, . . . a system or constitution, whose several parts are united, not by a physical principle of individuation, but by the respects they have to each other, the chief of which is the subjection which the appetites, passions and particular affections have to the one supreme principle of reflection or conscience." By

this principle every man "distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart as well as his external actions. This principle, by which we survey and either approve or disapprove our own heart temper and actions, is not only to be considered as what is, in its turn, to have some influence (which may be said of every passion, of the lowest appetites) but likewise as being superior, as, from its very nature, manifestly claiming superiority over all others; insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength as it has right—had it power as it has manifest authority—it would absolutely govern the world." (Sermon II.)

Thus Butler, appealing to common sense, and using the dogmatic or intuitional method, lays down, as the first principle of ethics, the supremacy of conscience over all our passions and affections. His aim, however, was more practical than theoretical.

3. In our own day Dr. James Martineau, a good man, who has just died, full of years and full of honors, has more thoroughly developed the doctrine of a subjectively directed moral aim. The system advocated in his "Types of Ethical Theory" is based on several characteristic positions.

First, having premised that "the broad fact of which we have to find the interpretation is this; that, distinctively as men, we have an irresistible tendency to approve and disapprove, to pass judgment of right and wrong," he says, "*What we judge is always the inner spring of action as distinguished from its outer operation.*" On a subsequent page he repeats this statement, saying, "That in which we discern the moral quality is the inner spring of action. And, at the close of his explanations, he recapitulates as follows: "This completes what I have to say about the objects of our moral judgment. They are originally our own inner principles of self-conscious activity as freely preferred or excluded by our will." Dr. Martineau, as might be expected, rejects the opinion of Professor Sidgwick that, "both in the individual and in the race, moral judgments are first passed on the outward acts, and that motives do not come to be considered till later; just as external perceptions of physical objects precede introspection." Martineau's doctrine may also be contrasted with that

of Whewell, who says, "Rightness and wrongness are the moral qualities of actions."

Secondly, Dr. Martineau teaches that *reason obtains the law of moral conduct by intuitively apprehending the relative worth of "the springs of action."* "Immediately on the juxtaposition of impulses," he says, "we intuitively discern the higher quality of one than another, giving it a divine and authoritative preference. . . . We are now prepared for an exact definition of right and wrong: every action is RIGHT *which in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher*; every action is WRONG *which in presence of a higher principle follows a lower*. Thus the act attributed to Regulus, in returning back to death at Carthage, was right because the reverence for veracity whence it sprung is a higher principle than any fear or personal affection which might have suggested a different course, and which we tacitly conceive as competing with the former. And the act of St. Peter in denying Christ was wrong, because the fear to which he yielded was lower than the personal affection and reverence for truth which he disobeyed."

Thirdly, Prof. Martineau *tabulates principles of action according to the order of their excellence*, and claims that our moral judgments naturally support such an arrangement. "The whole ground of ethical procedure," he declares, "consists in this: that we are sensible of a graduated scale of excellence among our natural principles, quite distinct from the order of their intensity and irrespective of the range of their external effects." His table of springs of action, from the lowest to the highest, is as follows: (1) Censoriousness, vindictiveness, suspiciousness; (2) Love of ease and sensual pleasure; (3) Appetites; (4) Spontaneous (animal) activity; (5) Love of gain; (6) Sentimentally sympathetic feelings; (7) Antipathy, fear, resentment; (8) Love of power, or ambition; Love of liberty; (9) Love of culture; (10) Wonder and admiration; (11) Parental and social affections; generosity; gratitude; (12) Compassion; (13) Reverence.

Fourthly, as corollary to the foregoing, Martineau holds that *moral judgment and action cannot take place till at least two springs of action compete with each other*. For then only the conscience can decide that one principle is superior to another. Moral rightness lies in that superiority as appealing to the rational agent; moral wrongness in the opposition of the lower to the higher principle. He says, "All our moral

judgments are preferential; two terms must always be present as the objects of the comparison. . . . It is not till two incompatible impulses appear in our consciousness and contest the field, that we are made aware of their difference and made to judge between them. But the moment this condition is realized, we are sensible of a contrast between them other than that of mere intensity or of qualitative variety, . . . that one is *higher, worthier*, than the other, and, in comparison with it, has the clear *right* to us. This apprehension is no mediate discovery of ours of which we can give an account; but is immediately inherent in the very experience of the principles themselves. . . . By simply entering the stage together and catching the inner eye, they disclose their respective worth and credentials. . . . There is no analysis or research required; it is a choice of Hercules, only without the reasoning and the rhetoric; their claims are decided by a glance. We cannot follow both; and we cannot doubt the rights and place of either. Their *moral valuation* results from their simultaneous appearance."

In the fifth place, the function of reason, or conscience, as understood by Martineau, is partly presented in his assertion "*I do not admit reason to be a spring of action at all.*" But to understand this denial we must consider the following explanation: "By springs of action (in the exact sense required for theory) I mean an impulse towards any unselected form of activity, that is, any which might instinctively arise though there were no other possible to the same nature, or, at all events, present at the same time." So conscience or the moral reason, according to Martineau, is not an original spring of action. Yet this faculty is not wholly denied motive influence, for it urges the person to choose the better motivity and its end. The professor says, "Throw the two springs together; here steps in a new factor which gets rid of suspense and gives the act its determinate direction. What are we to call this intruder? Is it a third spring? Does it earn that name by possessing the defining characteristics of the other two? Not so; for each of them is unconditioned by the presence of the other, whereas here is something impossible without them both. They have no selective function; it has nothing else. They are blind to their own resulting experiences; it consists in seeing and measuring them. It is, therefore, not a fresh impulse but a preference between two given ones." In one of his discussions (Vol. II., page 227) Mar-

tineau makes conscience a mere faculty of judgment without any motive force, but this position becomes a mere verbal one when united with the subsequent teaching that moral reason gives rise to reverence or the love of right. The actual doctrine of Professor Martineau is that conscience is not an independent, but only a preferential, spring of action.

But while reason exerts an influence, we are told that the choice of one mode of activity in preference to another is determined neither by the reason, nor by the more primary springs of action, nor by their joint operation, *but by the personality or the will*. The springs of action occupy places, as it were, in front of the will, each with its own solicitation or insistence; reason stands behind the will, and gives wise counsel; but the determination to one course or to another comes from the "personality." Martineau says, "Moral judgment postulates moral freedom. By this we mean not the absence of foreign constraint but the presence of a personal power of preference in relation to the inner suggestions and springs of action that present their claims. . . . Either free-will is a fact or moral judgment is a delusion. . . . We evidently feel the solicitations which visit us to be mere phenomena brought before a personality that is more than a phenomenon—a fair and judicial ego able to deal with the problem offered and decide between the claimants that have entered our court."

Such a teaching regarding freedom is not peculiar to motivity ethics; indeed the doctrine of the voluntary self-determination, or free-agency, of rational beings belongs to all ethics. But the limitation of the function of reason to that of a judge between contending motivities is a distinctive characteristic of the system now considered.

Another noticeable feature of the motivity school is that *it identifies the rightness of an action with its moral worth or dignity*. Dr. Martineau writes: "In treating as ultimate and essential the attribute which these words designate—dutyfulness, rightness, morality—I support myself on the judgment of Professor Sidgwick, who regards it 'as a clear result of reflection that the notions of right and wrong, as peculiar to moral cognition, are unique and unanalyzable'"; then he adds, "Of the several words available for naming this quality, *moral worth* seems the most eligible." No distinction is made in Martineau's writings between a right action and a virtuous one, or between a wrong action and one that is wicked and blameworthy. According to him an action is

right or wrong, worthy or unworthy, as proceeding from a virtuous or from a vicious animus in the personal agent.

4. The *second phase of motivity ethics* makes Love the all-controlling duty. It might be called Edvardianism, because Jonathan Edwards, the distinguished New England divine, brought it into prominence. His "Treatise on the Nature of Virtue" teaches that the essence of virtue and duty consists in the love of Being according to the degree of its capacity and worthiness of good. This love, however, is more than sentimental good-will or affection; it is the wisely exercised desire for the happiness of sentient existences. Moreover, it includes a desire for one's own happiness as well as for that of others. "A man," says Edwards, "may love himself as much as one can, and may be in the exercise of a high degree of love to his own happiness, ceaselessly longing for it, and yet he may so place that happiness that, in the very act of seeking for it, he may be in the highest exercise of love to God; as, for example, when the happiness that he longs for is to glorify God or to behold his glory or to hold communion with him." Edwards teaches also that, because God is the greatest and best of spirits, "the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, must consist principally of love to himself." This self-love of God is consistent with an infinite love for his creatures, and with an especial love for those who, like himself, are rational and righteous. Only hopeless and perverse depravity forfeits the divine good-will.

The ideas of Edwards have widely influenced New England thought. Of late years they have been developed by President Mark Hopkins of Williams College. In his treatise, "The Law of Love and Love as a Law," Hopkins says: "The law of love and of obligation or duty are coincident. The reason is that love is that which the law requires and with which, if love be perfect, it is satisfied." The first part of the book presents a theory of morals as "the law of love"; the second part, "love as a law," discusses the rules of morality under love as the universal principle. The statement that love "is that which the law requires" does not mean that love is the only requirement of duty, but that it is the supreme requirement to which all others are subordinate and ministerial, and from which all others derive their moral character. Love is the principle by which all motive life is to be regulated. We are, indeed, to obey reason and duty, but reason affirms that

the fundamental and all-pervading duty is to conform ourselves to the law of love.

With the exception of this teaching respecting love, the ideas of Hopkins closely conform to those of Martineau, as will be evident from the following statements taken here and there from the book of President Hopkins. He says, "Obligation is primarily obligation to choose and it always demands the choice of the higher principle of action and of the higher good.—Obligation is primarily obligation to choose, and choice must always be between two objects regarded as good, or between two principles of action regarded as productive of a good.—The law of obligation respects principles of action as higher and lower, and good as varying in its quality and as greater or less. Its precept is, 'Choose for yourselves and for others the higher principle of action and the nobler and greater good.' These, taken together, are the moral law as derived from the moral nature. . . . When moral law, in either form of it as presented above, is placed before an unperverted moral being capable of understanding it, obligation to obey it is intuitively and necessarily affirmed. The moral nature, as affirming obligation, is not an active principle having its own object, but it acts directly upon the will, or rather upon the man himself, to determine him in his choice between two or more active principles or ends. If there were not principles of action besides itself between which the man might choose, the conscience would have no scope.—No action can have moral quality in itself. The only meaning that can be attached to that phraseology is that the person doing the act is praiseworthy or blameworthy. . . . Not in the action, but in the doer of it, do we find moral quality, and him it is that we reward and punish. In him we find righteousness or unrighteousness, goodness or wickedness." Elsewhere—in a letter to Dr. McCosh—Dr. Hopkins denies that "the moral quality of an action can be its end," that is, its designed result, "or that the quality of an action may be the ground of obligation to do that action." In other words, the only moral quality of actions comes from the animus in which they originate and is identical with the righteousness or unrighteousness of the agent.

Evidently Hopkins, as well as Martineau, advocates motivity ethics. The former, indeed, more decidedly than the latter, allows that duty may take the form of obligation to choose the higher *good* instead of the form of obligation to

choose the higher principle of action. If this means that the moral agent can choose good simply without choosing the principle within him that seeks it, then the theory of Hopkins would not be purely subjective, but partly objective. In this case the teachings of Hopkins and Sidgwick would intersect each other and extend over a common utilitarian ground. For, though utilitarianism is objective, Sidgwick says, "The question of duty is never raised except when we are conscious of a conflict of impulses and wish to know which to follow." Probably, however, Hopkins would hold that the choice of the higher good and of the higher principle of action are inseparable, and that, in morals at least, they are one and the same thing. In the closing part of his discussion, in a chapter concerning "Alternatives and Law," he gives a table of active principles like that of Martineau and places all duty in choosing between such principles.

The only important difference between these authors relates to the law according to which reason seeks to regulate the action of our motivities. Martineau derives it from an immediate intuition of their relative worth as compared with each other; Hopkins from an intuition of their worthiness as related to love, the supreme principle. This love, however, is that mentioned by President Edwards, and is more intellectually comprehensive than intelligent affection, or even than ordinary benevolence. It is "the choice of the good of conscious being impartially and for its own sake." As such it "includes self-love as well as love to others." This wise love calls upon each motivity to operate only in the service of "the good of conscious being"; thus it becomes the supreme law of morals.

Martineau gives reverence the same position that Hopkins gives to love. He defines reverence as "the love of right or of virtue," highly developed; and he places it at "the very apex of human motives." At first the action of the reason, in deciding between two motivities, is "judicial, not dynamic, not executive; to find the motive (*i. e.*, the motivity) you must go to the impulses on which the conscience pronounces; to find the determining agent you must go to the subsequent will." But, as the mind becomes accustomed to the order of preference assigned to the principles of action, and admires those beings by whom that order is observed, the love of right or virtue arises; this is reverence. "For," says Martineau,

"reverence is nothing but the supreme form of the love of right."

5. Comparing motivity ethics with perfectionism, we find the statements of the former regarding the moral end more intelligible and more in accord with ordinary thought and speech. We can understand a doctrine which gives a legal supremacy either to rational beneficence or to a reverential regard for virtue, and which would subordinate the exercise of every motivity to that of the supreme principle. This is better than that inconceivable excellence which produces aims and actions, but which is not to be defined as the love of what is right and good.

It is also to be allowed that *the rules even of practical duty are often expressed subjectively*. Frequently we are told not to act honestly, but to be honest; not to speak the truth, but to be truthful; not to obey, but to be obedient; not to do right and seek the welfare of others, but to be virtuous and good. Such language does not justify the conclusion that there is no difference between practical and affectional duty, but it indicates how practical duty may lose its place in a theory of morals.

Moreover, no one can question that *self-regulation is a most comprehensive requirement of the moral law*, and that this regulation is sometimes effected by making goodness, sometimes by making righteousness, supreme over other motive tendencies. So far as internal duty is concerned, either plan is an excellent one, though perhaps a system in which reverence for right should be united with impartial and rational love in the supreme authority would have much merit. For that love which seeks only what is absolutely good is indissolubly connected with that conscientiousness which seeks only the absolutely right.

Motivity ethics calls attention to the importance of the inner life and to the duty of caring for that life. It enforces a phase of morals apt to be neglected by those who adopt utilitarian views, or who look to the dictates of authority, or who simply feel bound to do what is right. Moreover, it furnishes a basis not only for self-culture, but also for the general direction of conduct. The advocates of this theory show much moral insight; they develop views of a pure and lofty excellence. Nor do they neglect the practical and outward side of duty; they give wise instructions respecting every part of human life.

6. Nevertheless, *as a philosophy*, motivity ethics fails to satisfy inquiry in several respects. In the first place, *its conception of duty is not sufficiently objective*.

Dr. Hopkins insists that whatever is right and good to seek is so sought because it either is, or causes, or conditions, some form of sentient experience. This teaching may be accepted as describing correctly every end of motivity, whether moral or unmoral. At the same time it is clear that the personal agent often aims at objects outside of his own present experience, and that, for this reason, some of his desires may be said to be objectively, while others are subjectively, directed. After this same fashion some of the ends of duty may be styled objective and others subjective.

It is not true, in any literal sense, that the control of our own motivities or the cherishing of our inner dispositions is the only requirement of moral law. We are, indeed, bound to control our appetites and passions and to cultivate love and reverence and every virtue. But the doing of good, the telling of truth, the payment of debts, the instruction of the ignorant, the assistance of the needy, the relief of the suffering, the strengthening of the weak, are things right, obligatory and incumbent upon us, not simply as the consequence and expression of spiritual activities, but by reason of their own nature. Indeed the activities which aim at these things have their moral character because the things aimed at are in themselves right and obligatory. Such being the case, the regulation of motivity is not the only, nor even the primary, end of morality.

7. This point will become plainer if we consider a second objection to motivity ethics, viz., that *it does not recognize the moral reason as an original spring of action*. We do not now refer to the teaching that conscience is a purely intellectual faculty and without motive power, for this position is not consistently maintained; we find a fundamental error in the doctrine that moral principle does not aim at any ends originally its own, but only at the proper exercise of our other motivities. This error may be accounted for partly from an imperfect understanding of the conceptional action of the moral reason and partly from a one-sided view of the right as the object of moral pursuit.

We grant that the end conceived of and sought for by right reason does not exist separately from other ends which we desire, and that it is constituted by a peculiar selection and

arrangement of elements. Nevertheless it is a distinct object and not to be confounded with any other. As some ideal paradise whose elements have been drawn from many beautiful scenes may be distinguished from each of them and from all of those scenes together, so the end aimed at by the moral nature cannot be identified with any specific end nor with all specific ends collectively; it has a nature and constitution of its own. It is, moreover, pursued by means of a conception formed by the moral reason; as becomes especially apparent when we speak of it in the general. For as the idea of ordinary good, or interest, formed by the practical reason, is not that of any particular source of gratification nor of all such sources taken collectively, so the idea of right, formed by the moral reason, is distinct and *sui generis*. If this be so, conscience, in seeking the right, primarily pursues its own ends and not those of other motivations. After that its secondary action stimulates our natural tendencies to pursue their own proper aims so far as these may be contemporaneous with the right.

But the motivity school say that the idea of rightness offers no object of rational pursuit—that it is “empty of content,” because rightness is nothing but conformity to a rule, and because conformity to a rule can give no direction unless we can know what that is which the rule requires. This reasoning is good, but it is founded on a one-sided conception of the right. Moral rightness is not mere conformity to a rule; *it is that quality in an action or end on which conformity to the rule depends*. It is an excellence inhering in the action or end. Conformity to rule is not the essence, but only a property, of rightness. If such be the case, there is no absurdity in saying that reason seeks right things directly and simply because they are right.

8. A third fault of motivity ethics, closely connected with its failure to recognize reason as an original spring of action, is *its inadequate account of the function of reason in her attempt to regulate our other motivations*. We are told that, just as soon as two impulses come into conflict with each other, they are intuitively distinguished as “higher and lower,” or as more or less “worthy,” and that then conscience affirms, “follow the one; disregard the other.” But this alleged intuition does not result in axioms like those of mathematics and metaphysics, nor does it show any other mark of the immediate perception of necessary truth. The

tabulations of Hopkins and Martineau agree with the general fact that our natural "springs of action," considered as habitual and cherished dispositions, have different degrees of dignity, or are rationally held in different degrees of esteem. But they scarcely go farther than that. They are somewhat arbitrary in their details. No one could use either table as a rule for giving greater honor to one of two closely related motivities. And, *as laws for determining the right and wrong of action*, they are extremely insufficient.

For example, Martineau places reverence far above appetite in point of dignity; in which judgment he is undoubtedly correct. But are there not cases in which reverence should give place to appetite? A starving man should not be exhorted to pray till after he has partaken of food. It may be said that the necessities of the case call for this inverted order of preference. This is true, but this also shows that appetite and reverence do not settle the question of duty "merely by their juxtaposition"; though the question of dignity may be settled that way. Again, Martineau places "vindictiveness, or the cherishing of resentment," at the bottom of his scale, and compassion, immediately next to reverence, at the top. Thus he expresses condemnation for habitual malice and honors the spirit of tender kindness. But, in a case of atrocious crime, is it not our duty to restrain our pity and to maintain a sort of determined resentment till the crime is punished and suppressed?

In a previous part of the present treatise (Chap. VIII.) the motivities were considered (in the order of their dignity) as *instincts, appetites, propensities, affections, rational beneficence* (or the wise seeking of good, including one's own good), and *moral principle*. This list, which resembles those of Martineau and Hopkins, does not yield any universal law of morality, nor even sufficient direction for the regulation of our "springs of action." It does, however, place moral principle at the head of our motivities; and it recalls the doctrine of Bishop Butler respecting "the subjection which the appetites, passions and particular affections have to the one supreme principle of reflection or conscience." It suggests also the simple practical rule that the judgment of reason must govern in the inner as well as in the outer life. This is the rule followed in the actual experience of good men; and it works as follows: In the *first place* reason favors those exercises of motivity which harmonize and co-operate with her own

conception and pursuit of right ends and actions; and she condemns those by which these are antagonized. Hence not only particular experiences become right and dutiful, but various modes of natural disposition, blending with moral principle, become "virtues," while others of an opposite character are called vices. But no natural disposition, except as thus combined with moral principle, or as conflictive with it, is either a virtue or a vice. In the *second place*, reason finds given exercises of natural feeling to be things right and good in themselves—simply as matters of immediate internal experience—and so dutifully cultivates them on their own account, each in its proper sphere.

Indeed even the gradation of principles as higher and lower, as more or less worthy, is determined quite as much by their relation to reason as by their relation to each other. It is noticeable that malicious censoriousness, vindictiveness and suspiciousness, which Dr. Martineau grades as the lowest of all motivities, are not simple springs of action, but modifications of sentiments *which he places in the center of his list*, and calls "the primary passions of antipathy, resentment and fear." These modifications fall to the lowest rank simply because they are inherently immoral—because they are conceived of as conflicting with moral principle.

9. Finally, the motivity ethics shows both *confusion and error respecting the nature of moral rightness*. This nature cannot be scientifically defined till the moral law has been analyzed, but some points respecting it have already been made clear. In an earlier chapter a distinction was noticed, which reason naturally makes, between actions as *intentional* and actions as *desiderative*. Both these modes of activity pursue an end intelligently, but the former includes only the intellectual and executive activity, while the latter embraces also the specific desire for the end for its own sake. As a rule these actions have not been carefully distinguished by philosophers, so that we hear only of "the intentional action." We now oppose the one to the other; we contrast the intentional with the desiderative. The importance of this distinction is that actions are right or wrong simply as intentional—or as, at least, intentionable—while they are virtuous or vicious and meritorious or blameworthy only as desiderative. Thus rational conduct has two modes of morality, one of which in thought conditions the other, yet which are so related that the one can exist without the other. A man

may *do a right action as such*—that is, intentionally, and knowing it to be right—but if he does not *do it for its own sake* it is not virtuous; it may even be vicious. And, though one cannot virtuously do a wrong action intentionally—knowing it to be wrong—he may do it virtuously with a mistaken intelligence, supposing it to be right; in which case the action is wrong, not as intended, but only as *intentionable*, that is, as it must appear if fully understood. Thus we suppose Socrates showed sincere piety while worshiping false gods.

This distinction which opposes the right and the wrong on the one hand to the virtuous and the vicious on the other, has eluded the motivity moralists. They identify the rightness of an action with its virtuousness or its merit, and the wrongness of an action with its wickedness or its demerit. Of course, after doing that, they are compelled to say that rightness attaches only to “the inner spring of action.”

This school argues from the fact that moral quality can exist only in relation to the rational person, but it fails to note that a proposed action or end may be related to a person in two ways; first, as suitable or unsuitable for his adoption and pursuit; and, secondly, as desideratively accepted and attempted by him. Rightness belongs to the first of these relations; virtuousness, or righteousness, to the other.

Motivity ethics contains high instruction, yet is not theoretically satisfactory. It does not perceive that outward actions and aims are in themselves right and obligatory upon us. It denies that reason, as motive, pursues ends originally its own. It gives no usable law or rule for the regulation of the inner life. And it confounds the rightness of actions and ends with the virtuousness, or worthiness, which belongs to the animus with which duty is performed or to the person as loving and doing what is right.

For additional criticism of the motivity school see Sidgwick's “Methods of Ethics,” Book III., Chap. XII.

10. In connection with Martineau and Hopkins some remarks may be added respecting Professor James Seth. In his well-written work, “A Study of Ethical Principles,” the radical conception of Motivity ethics is combined with that of Perfectionism. Prof. Seth profoundly admires Hegel; he says, “It is Hegel, who, of all philosophers, has given most adequate expression to the essential principles of the Ethical Life.” The perfectionism of Seth, and some metaphysical ideas connected with it, are decidedly Hegelian.

"In ethics as in metaphysics," continues the professor, "Hegel finds the universal in the particular, the rational in the sensible. In the evolution of the moral, as of the intellectual life, he discovers the dialectical movement of affirmation through negation, of life through death. * * It is of the essence of his pantheistic metaphysic to sink the personality of man in the universal life of God, and to conceive of human life as ultimately modal and impersonal rather than as substantive and personal. Yet Hegel does much for the conception of personality both in the intellectual and in the moral reference ; and, even if we disregard his final metaphysical construction, we shall find in his philosophy as striking and adequate ethical statements as are to be found anywhere. Take, for example, this statement of the distinction between the individual and the person : ' In personality, indeed, it lies that I, as on all sides of me, in inward desire, need, greed and appetite, and in direct outward existence, this perfectly limited and finite *individual*, am yet as *person*, infinite, universal, and free, and know myself, even in my finitude, as such.' " (page 220.)

This peculiar description of the person may have meaning for those who believe that Thought and Being are one and that the Universe is the dialectical self-development of the " Idea " ; for us it is valuable chiefly as illustrating the derivative method of philosophizing. Hegelianism is the product of a venerable style of thinking such as was practised by good old Parmenides. The discussion of it belongs to mental rather than to moral science, and cannot be undertaken here. It would involve an estimate of ancient " Realism." (See a chapter in " THE PERCEPTIONALIST " on this topic).

It would, however, be unjust to suppose that Professor Seth's book is devoted to paradoxical profundities. On the contrary, his general teaching is quite intelligible, and is derived, not from Hegel and Plato, but from Butler and Aristotle. He names his own theory. " Eudaemonism," to indicate its affinity to the Peripatetic ethic, but, on examination, it really seems to be more nearly that of Butler. Having defined the words " person " and " self " in a peculiar Hegelian sense, to signify, not what we ordinarily mean by these terms (the self-conscious rational agent) but *that agent as controlled by right reason*, he says that the fundamental duty of man is to " be a person," or to " realize the self." What is this but the doctrine that reason and conscience should be supreme in man's motive life ? The professor insists that reason does not, and cannot, operate independently of the rest of man's nature, but should superintend the healthful exercise of our natural tendencies and sensibilities ; and he claims that, in his teaching, Eudæmonism is

superior to some other systems to which he gives the collective designation "Rationalism." He thinks that these latter do not sufficiently recognize that synthesis in which all our motive tendencies should be united in one perfectly rationalized life. It may be questioned, however, whether either the ancient Stoics or the modern "Intuitionists," would seriously differ with Professor Seth regarding the function of the moral faculty.

The doctrine of Professor Seth concerning the dependence of the virtuous life on reason is quite true. Nevertheless, as a solution of "The Ethical Problem," it is totally inadequate. Even though our main desire were to investigate "the nature of virtue," rather than the nature of the right and obligatory, it would yet be insufficient to say that virtue consists in the government of our lives by reason. The questions would yet remain. "What rules does the moral reason follow and what ends does it seek? And what is that universal principle which sets forth the fundamental end?" A philosophical understanding of virtue is conditioned on a philosophical understanding of the right. To say that we must be governed, both internally and externally, by reason, and not by selfishness, affection or passion, is a true and useful doctrine. But it is more practical than theoretical. It is not the ultimate explanation of morality.

Some remarks might be added respecting Professor Muirhead's able "Manual" of Ethics. But his views, being practically the same with those of Professor Seth, scarcely need a separate discussion.

CHAPTER XVII.

AUTHORITY ETHICS (STATED).

1. Ethics abounds in linguistic perplexities. The words "duty" and "obligation" have sometimes a restricted meaning, according to which a man in acting rightly and nobly may do more than he is bound to do.—2. But ordinarily these terms are co-extensive with every possibility of virtuous conduct.—3. The Authority school of ethics employs the broad conception of obligation and defines it in a peculiar way.—4. The word "duty" sometimes signifies the right and obligatory. But obligatoriness is a property, rather than the essence, of the right. The verb "ought."—5. Authority ethics is either anthropic or theistic. Hobbes, Darwin, and Spencer, quoted.—6. Kirchmann and Janet, quoted.—7. The theistic theory of obligation. William of Occam, Bishop Cumberland, Bishop Warburton, Dr. Paley, Richard Hooker, and Stephen Charnock, quoted.—8. Also John Locke and Charles Hodge.

1. No study is more affected with linguistic obscurities than theoretical morals. The principal terms used in it have several ethical significations, besides others that are non-ethical. The nouns *right*, *good*, *duty*, *interest*, *obligation*, *virtue*, *sense*, *reason*, *justice*, and diverse verbs and adjectives as well, seek every opportunity to give doubtful directions to the inquiring mind. The apparent innocence of these terms and their intelligibility in practical statements induce an easy confidence in many with respect to a somewhat difficult undertaking. Unwary persons are apt to meet with an experience like that of the European traveler who is charmed with the unaffected courtesy of some Oriental merchants. If one does not wish to make a bad bargain in ethics, he will find it a safe rule to expect some kind of subtle deceit in every statement offered for his acceptance. Above all he must resolve not to be satisfied with words, but to deal only with thoughts and the objects of thought.

At present we call attention to a specific use of the terms *duty* and *obligation*, the confusion of which with a wider use

has occasioned some controversy. Sometimes when one, either through the operation of law or the pledges of a contract, is bound to a certain amount of service, he may voluntarily give more than that amount, in which case we say that he is doing more than duty or obligation calls for, and that he merits honor for his liberality or beneficence. So also a civil or religious ruler may lay positive injunctions upon those subject to his authority, adding only advice regarding matters which should be left to one's own determination. Magistrates enforce the payment of taxes and the fulfilment of contracts, but leave it largely to the citizen's own pleasure to say how far he shall participate in patriotic and philanthropic movements. The Apostle Paul absolutely condemned those Christians of his day who went to law with one another, before unbelievers, saying: "Now, therefore, there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law one with another." But, with respect to marriage during those troublous times, he merely used dissuasion; for he added, "If thou marry, thou hast not sinned; and if a virgin marry, she hath not sinned."

In an analogous manner, with reference to the conduct of life in general, we sometimes say that certain things are required of us by strict duty, while other things may be good and excellent, yet are not absolutely obligatory. We are bound to pay our debts, to be faithful to our word, to aid the poor and to show some benevolence, but we are not under obligation to devote the greater part of our means to Christian charities or the greater part of our time and strength to philanthropic labors. Some persons, making a practical rule out of such ideas, carefully observe what they consider to be the requirements of justice and duty, but, after that, hold themselves at liberty to pursue their own pleasure in doing or not doing. If they show liberality and beneficence they claim special credit for this; they do not include such things within their bounden duty. Others fashion these views into a theory and say that the field of duty or obligation is less extensive than the field of virtue or goodness. They compare these fields to two circles with a common center, but with the circumference of one much wider than that of the other. The inner circle contains the right and good things which are required of us; the outer embraces also excellent aims which are worthy of our pursuit, but which we are not strictly bound to adopt.

2. This theory cannot be accepted as a full account of moral obligation. Duty, in the ordinary wide conception of it, covers all the possibilities of human achievement. We are under obligation to make the very best of ourselves and of our opportunities, and to advance every good cause to the extent of our means and abilities. Yet a distinction must be admitted between two modes of duty or obligation. This may be stated by saying that some duties are definite and mandatory in their scope, while others are indefinite and commendatory; it has, also, in less exact speech, been expressed by speaking of certain legal developments of right conduct as "duty" and of other higher and nobler exercises of moral principle as "virtue." Language like this appears in the following statement of our Saviour, taken from St. Luke's gospel: "So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, 'We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it was our duty to do.'" These words imply that one would be a profitable servant and worthy of commendation, if he should do more than was commanded—more than it was his duty to do.

We must note, however, that the limited, as distinguished from the comprehensive, conception of duty, includes not merely conduct definitely commanded, but all conduct so definitely known to be obligatory that it cannot be disregarded without a protest from one's conscience. The neglect of such duty is necessarily accompanied with self-condemnation. But when duties are not exactly defined, for example, when they are suggestions for those only who may find themselves qualified for them, and who must determine in what form the suggestion is to be carried out, it is possible to exclude them from conscientious consideration and to treat them as if they were not duties at all. The same thought applies to conduct not imperatively prescribed by the accepted code of the society to which an individual belongs, and which, for that reason or for any other, has not been definitely brought home to one's conscience. More intelligence and more principle would be needed for the undertaking of such duty than for a service expected from one by himself and by his associates.

These remarks show that the point at which the conduct of "duty" passes up into that of "virtue" is not a fixed one, but varies, at different times and in different persons, according to the development and the standard of morality

to which it is related. We only can place under "duty" whatever one must do from "a sense of duty"—from the constraint of obligation—even while he may have no great love for the right, and under "virtue" what calls for a more earnest and progressive spirit. With this understanding the words of the French author, M. Ad. Franck, may be accepted, not as defining duty in general, but as expressing a truth. "Duty," he says, "is the limit below which we may not descend without losing in the moral world our standing as men." But it is evident that the lower demands of morality, as well as the higher, may be complied with from an absorbing love of right; as it is conceivable, also, that highly meritorious deeds may be performed by a well-informed person from a mere "sense of duty."

3. Ordinarily in ethical discussions the conception of obligation is not the limited one above described, but that setting forth the relation of rational beings to every form and degree of the right and good. This idea was used in the heading of a former chapter which discussed "The Right and Obligatory"; for these words were not intended to present two objects, but only two aspects or characteristics of one object. They were designed to teach that *whatever has the nature of the right is also by consequence of that nature obligatory upon the rational agent*. The French say, "*La noblesse oblige*," that is, nobility of rank binds the possessor of it to act nobly. In a similar way right obligates the rational agent to act rightly. This is a property of the right, a universal and inseparable characteristic. Such is the common idea of moral obligation, and such is the conception of it to be borne in mind in our discussion of Authority Ethics. For the essential point of this form of theory is that the sense of duty or obligation is in all cases a recognition of external authority, or else a feeling engendered through subjection to such authority.

When we compare this hypothesis with the four from which it has been distinguished, we see that it relates primarily to the obligatoriness of the right, while each of the other theories is more concerned with the nature of that which is obligatory; whether it be the pursuit of happiness, or the realization of the self, or the regulation of one's motivations, or simply the right as undefined and as dogmatically conceived and asserted.

The question may now be asked, "*Does authority ethics*

have a conception of the right peculiar to itself, or does it simply attach its own explanation of obligation now to this and now to that conception borrowed from one of the other theories?" Of these alternatives the second seems to state the truth. Nevertheless we have to add that any of the foregoing conceptions of the right may be so modified by an addition as to be specially acceptable to the advocates of authority ethics. For they naturally think of ethics as the science of duty. To explain this statement we must say something respecting conceptions and the definition of them, and must refer to another ambiguity of the term "duty."

4. When, in our perceptions of fact, a number of elements are found in systematic union, the synthetic thought then produced is an ordinary conception; and a statement of the elements of the system in their relations to it and to each other is a definition of the conception, or of its object. A selection, however, commonly takes place in the synthetic contemplation of elements. Some elements, though constantly and necessarily present with others, are regarded not as parts, but only as adjuncts, of the system, and so are excluded from the essence or definition of the object. In this way a distinction arises in logic between *attributes*, which are the component parts of the essence, and *properties*, which are only its necessary adjuncts. Inasmuch, however, as a property is always present with the system or nature to which it belongs, it is possible for the mind, when any purpose is to be served thereby, to enlarge its conception of the essence by taking in some inseparable adjunct; which thereupon ceases to be "property" and becomes "attribute." This modification of a conception has been commented on in a logical treatise as follows: "Property being inseparable from essence, our conception of an essence may easily be enlarged by incorporating with it that of some property. . . . For this reason, and because our conceptions vary in comprehensiveness, it may sometimes be difficult to say whether some necessarily ascript be a property or an attribute. . . . The only way to determine whether a necessary characteristic be a property, is to ascertain whether it be something additional to our conception of the object." (THE MODALIST, page 56.) These considerations explain how obligatoriness, which is commonly only a property of the right, sometimes is regarded as an attribute, that is, as part of its very essence.

This brings before us that use of the word "duty" in which it is employed as equivalent to "the right," and also that definition which declares ethics to be "the science of duty," or of "what ought to be done." Primarily duty signifies that which is owed, or due; it applies to *desire and conduct as obligated*. This conception arises when the law is conceived of as demanding from us *conduct corresponding to its own contents*. But, as this very same conduct may be contemplated *not as the realization of ideals, but as ideals to be realized*, that is, as the contents of the law, the term duty often signifies that form of conduct which *obligates, or is obligatory*.

A corresponding doubleness of use attaches to the verb "ought." "The truth ought to be told" signifies either that truth-telling is due as the realization of an ideal, or that truth-telling as an ideal is obligatory upon us.

As each of these meanings of "duty" involves the other, either might serve in a working definition of moral science. Commonly, however, with ethical writers, "the science of duty" signifies "the science of the obligatory"; and this is the better use of terms, since it brings before us the right as an end and as obligatory upon us. Even with this understanding the fact is somewhat obscured that ends as well as actions are binding upon us. Nevertheless this fact is introduced indirectly in connection with those ends at which intentional actions aim, and so the definitions "science of duty" and "science of the right" are really synonymous, the only difference being that in the former the obligatory power of rightness is made prominent and is given an essential place.

But while recognizing a use of the word "duty" in which it may designate the essential aim of morality, we can by no means allow—what many seem to teach—that rightness and oughtness are precisely the same thing or that the term duty, as used above, denotes merely the obligatory. For although, as we have seen, obligatoriness, by an enlargement of conception, may become a constituent characteristic of rightness, it never is all of rightness, nor is it even the more fundamental part. And whether our conception of rightness includes, or whether it excludes, that of obligatoriness, it will still be true that rightness and obligatoriness are distinguishable and that the former of these is the condition and ground of the latter. To do good and to act justly are obligatory; but they are obligatory because they are right.

5. As already stated, the peculiar teachings of authority ethics are related immediately to moral obligation rather than to moral rightness. These teachings may be roughly divided into two classes, the *anthropic* and the *theistic*. While all advocates of this doctrine treat obligation as a sort of relation to an authority external to the moral agent, some make that authority mostly human, while others make it mostly divine. It cannot be said that the anthropic moralists make no use of divine authority in explaining the sense of obligation or that the theistic moralists make no use of human authority. There is a variety of opinion between two extremes. But generally those who make human authority prominent bring in the divine only as a superstition, while those who base on divine authority adduce the human only as an expression and consequence of the divine.

The identification of the sense of obligation with the sense of authority has always commended itself to materialistic philosophers. In this way man's natural selfishness developed from a life of mere bodily sensation is supposed to have been refined and made conformable to social rules. Thomas Hobbes, a thinker of this school, in his "*Leviathan*" (A. D. 1651), contended that the presocial state of mankind was one of war in which every man fought for his own interests, and that this state of things was terminated by a compact or covenant whereby civil government was instituted to care for the welfare of all. The rules of morality are those of the sovereign power; they are excellent in themselves but are obligatory only as enacted and enforced by governmental authority. "Before the names of just and unjust can have place," says Hobbes, "there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefits they expect by the breach of their covenant, and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon. And such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth." Bentham and others were much influenced by Hobbes.

At the present day the anthropic doctrine is chiefly advocated by that materialistic and sensationalistic school who call themselves agnostics, and who hold that the Universe and its forms have self-evolved from an infinity of atoms without any creative interference or superintendency.

Charles Darwin, the founder of Evolutionism, accounts for conscience as the outgrowth of a social instinct whereby one seeks the society and good-will of his fellows, and of a natural sympathy whereby he desires their comfort and satisfaction. He says, "Any animal whatever endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well or nearly as well developed as in man. . . . The social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform services for them. The services may be of a definite and evidently instinctive character; or there may be only a wish and readiness, as with most of the higher animals, to aid their fellows in certain general ways. But these feelings and services are by no means extended to all the individuals of the same species—only to those of the same association. . . . After the power of language had been acquired and the wishes of the community could be expressed, the common opinion how each member ought to act for the public good would naturally become in a paramount degree the guide to action." Thus Darwin derives conscience from social sympathy and the instinct to aid one's associates, but he unites with this deference to the opinion of the community and desire for its good-will.

Herbert Spencer, who believes that the only really moral motive is the advancement of happiness and the prevention of misery, regards "the sense of duty or obligation" as an adventitious sentiment of fear which will disappear after men have become more enlightened. He says (DATA OF ETHICS, Chap. VII.): "The element of coerciveness (in conscience) originates from experience of those several forms of restraint that have established themselves in the course of civilization—the political, religious and social. . . . For since the political, religious and social restraints are mainly formed of represented future results, and since the moral restraining motive is mainly formed of represented future results, it happens that, the representations having much in common and being often aroused at the same time, *the fear joined with three sets of them* becomes by association joined with the fourth. Thinking of the *extrinsic* effects of a forbidden act excites a dread which continues present while the *intrinsic* effects of the act are thought of, and being thus

linked with these intrinsic effects causes a vague sense of moral compulsion. Emerging but slowly from among the political, religious and social motives, the moral motive long participates in that consciousness of subordination to some external agency which is joined with them; and only as it becomes distinct and predominant does it lose this associated consciousness—only then does the feeling of obligation fade.” As a conclusion from these premises Spencer holds that “the sense of duty or obligation is transitory and will diminish as fast as moralization increases.” Evidently Spencer is like-minded with Darwin, yet perhaps he gives external authority a larger share than Darwin does in the production of the sense of obligation.

6. Mr. Kirchmann, a German author quoted by Janet, states the authority theory very succinctly. According to him “morality originates in the sentiment of respect (*Achtung*) which man feels in the presence of a power which he feels to be immeasurably stronger than himself. This power becomes for him an *authority* whose commands constitute the moral law. These authorities may be reduced to four—that of God, of the prince, of the people, and of the father of the family. All morality is positive, and is based on the will of some authority.” (*DIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DES RECHTS*, 1869.)

M. Janet rejects the doctrine which derives moral obligation from the constraint exercised by parental, tribal, civil and religious authority, but he very clearly states the argument in favor of this opinion; and we shall quote his statement at length. Having premised that “Some attempt to show that the idea of duty is developed in a purely historical way,” he continues: “Mankind, they say, began by yielding to their senses and their appetites; but no long time was needed to teach them, as it does even animals, that certain things are injurious, although agreeable to the senses, while others are useful, though they are painful and disagreeable. Moreover, men have a natural sympathy which inclines them toward one another; and they spontaneously obey the instinct of kindness and of pity.

“*From this two-fold source—from interest and sympathy—morals were born.* Men became accustomed to abstain from certain actions, to try to perform others, to approve and to blame, according as these actions were in conformity with, or were contrary to, sympathy or interest. . . . Thus men

formed maxims which grew more and more abstract and general; and these rules, losing more and more the personal and individual character which they had at first, took the form of laws, of universal and impersonal principles. These principles were transmitted by tradition as self-evident truths; and, as the new generation were not conscious of having formed these maxims for themselves, from their own personal experience, they were regarded as absolute and necessary verities—in a word, as innate truths, because their historical origin had been lost sight of in the night of time.” So far the argument is utilitarian; it makes moral principle the outgrowth of interest and sympathy. But what follows belongs to authority ethics.

“When men had formed the general laws of which we speak for their own personal benefit, they were led to impart them to one another. Now men are either equal or unequal. If they are equal they give each other *counsels*, but if they are unequal they give each other *orders*. Thus, for example, parents wishing to see their children escape all the trials and miseries through which they had passed themselves, gave them beforehand a synopsis of the rules of experience; and these they presented in the form of orders—as the expression of an imperative necessity which it was impossible to escape. In the same way the chiefs of peoples, whether legislators, priests, or warriors, having an interest in the preservation of the society of which they were the rulers, either for self-interest or for humanity’s sake, prescribed, under the form of orders and laws, everything that experience had taught to them and to their fathers as to the means of preserving life and making it happy.

“Doubtless to these maxims of general interest the princes of the people may have added others which concerned only their own individual interests and which were even directly opposed to the interest of their subjects. But whatever share selfishness and oppression may have had in the first human legislation, the fact that these societies were permanent proves that the greater number of these primitive laws were really useful to the people; for they could have endured only through certain conservative principles; and these are the principles which afterwards formed the basis of moral science.

“Finally, at the same time that these rules of wisdom were enjoined upon the family by domestic, and in the state by

political authority, they were also enjoined by religious authority, which, in those early days, was not distinct from the political power; so that everything which man holds most sacred—the father, the prince, the priest, and God—commanded the same things at the same time. Moral laws do not, then, present themselves merely as general and speculative truth, but as commands, and they always emanate from some will, either sacred or secular.

“We understand very well to-day what power the association of impressions and of ideas has over human beliefs. These rules, always accompanied by orders, assumed the character of necessary and obligatory laws. Now that we have forgotten the wills which at first commanded them, we still continue to regard them as commands; and, as they are really in close conformity with reason, since they are the result of a long and unanimous experience, it is quite natural that we should regard them as having been dictated *a priori* by reason itself—as the work of an internal legislation without any legislator.” These words of Janet may be taken as a fair statement of the doctrine of Professor Paulsen of Berlin, who defines conscience as the inherited consciousness of customs enforced by the authority of parents, teachers and magistrates, and by the fear of the gods.

It will be noticed that anthropic moralists acknowledge that conscience and the right are apparently obligatory of themselves; but they explain this as a delusion consequent upon an association of ideas in a prehistoric experience.

7. The theistic theory of obligation has always been attractive to the more devout thinkers of the world. Anciently the conceptions of “*fas*” and “*nefas*” set forth the requirements and the prohibitions of a supreme will. But Christian theologians, especially, have maintained this doctrine, supposing it to be involved in the absolute sovereignty of the divine Being. William of Occam, the Nominalist schoolman, said, “*Nullus est actus malus nisi quatenus a Deo prohibitus est et qui non potest fieri bonus si a Deo præcipiatur; et e converso. Ea est boni et mali natura ut, cum a liberrima Dei voluntate sancita sit ac definita, ab eadem facile possit emoveri et refigi, adeo ut, mutata ea voluntate, quod sanctum et justum est, possit evadere injustum.*” (Lib. II., qu. 19.) This may be rendered “No act is evil except so far as it is forbidden of God; and there is no act which cannot be made good if it be enjoined by God. The nature of good and evil

is such that after it has been made obligatory and definite by the most free will of God, it can easily be altered in its status and relation so that, by a change in that will, what is obligated and just can become unjust."

Bishop Cumberland and some others who have based morality on "the nature of things," have, at the same time, taught that it depends on the will of God, because, say they, the nature of things depends on God's will. Bishop Warburton held that law implies a law-giver, "obligation an obliger." He says that Shaftesbury, Clark and Wollaston are "wrong in making obligation arise from this or that property of virtue, such as its beauty, its fitness, or its truth, . . . in making it arise from an abstract idea at all, *or, indeed, from anything but personality and the will of another different and distinct from the person obliged.*" (LETTERS, p. 57.) Dr. Paley, who is sometimes denounced as an egoistic utilitarian, really taught that the divine will is the foundation of right and duty. He says, "Since moral obligation depends on the will of God, right, which is correlative to it, must depend on the same. Right, therefore, signifies consistency with the will of God." (MOR. AND POL. PHIL., Bk. II., Ch. IX.) Other great English theologians have dissented from these views. Richard Hooker writes, "They err who think that of the will of God to do this or that, there is no reason besides his own will. . . . The being of God is a kind of law to his working; for that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to that he doeth." (ECCLES. POL., Bk. I., section 2.) Stephen Charnock (ON THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD) says, "The moral law is not properly a mere act of God's will considered in itself, or a tyrannical edict like those of which it may be said, *Stat pro ratione voluntas.*" But it commands those things which are good in their own nature and prohibits those things which are in their nature evil."

8. Among philosophers the teaching of Locke on this subject is peculiar. He says, "*Moral* good and evil is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary action to some law whereby good and evil are chosen as from the will and power of the lawmaker; which good or evil, attending our observance or breach of the Law by the decree of the lawmaker, is what we call reward or punishment." (ESSAY, Bk. II., Ch. 26.) He says further that there are three laws to which men refer their actions, the divine law, the civil law,

and the law of opinion or reputation, and that the first of these "is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude." According to these statements one would take Locke to be an authority moralist, but elsewhere he allows that there is a law or light of nature distinct from the three laws above mentioned. By "moral good and evil," as opposed to good and evil in the general, Locke means virtue and vice.

Theistic ethics, as held at the present day, is stated as follows by Dr. Charles Hodge, in his "Systematic Theology." (Vol. I., page 406.) "The common doctrine of Christians is that the will of God is the ultimate ground of moral obligation to all rational creatures. No higher reason can be assigned why anything is right than that God commands it. This means (1) that the divine will is the only rule for deciding what is right and what is wrong; (2) that his will is that which binds us, or that to which we are bound to be conformed." Then Dr. Hodge adds, "By the word 'will' is not meant any arbitrary purpose or that it were conceivable that God should will right to be wrong or wrong right. The will of God is the expression or revelation of his nature or is determined by it; so that his will as revealed makes known to us what infinite wisdom and goodness demand. Sometimes things are right simply because God has commanded them; as circumcision and other ritual institutions were to the Jews. Other things are right because of the present constitution of things which God has ordained; such as the duties relating to property and the permanent relations of society. Others, again, are right because they are demanded by the immutable excellence of God. In all cases, however, so far as we are concerned, it is his will that binds us and constitutes the difference between right and wrong; *his will, that is, as the expression of his infinite perfection. So that the ultimate foundation of moral obligation is the nature of God.*"

CHAPTER XVIII.

AUTHORITY ETHICS (DISCUSSED).

1. The phrase "legal obligation" is ambiguous. We distinguish obligation which is merely coercive and governmental from that which is conscientious and moral.—2. The obligation of compulsion and that also of duty are sometimes called necessities. This language is metonymical and does not express a true necessity. It refers to the necessary voluntary action of the perfectly discreet or perfectly virtuous man under given circumstances.—3. Non-moral and moral obligation frequently coalesce.—4. Authority often signifies the power to impose coercive obligation, but often, also, this power as rightfully possessed.—5. Just authority exists in order to maintain and promote the right, and derives its own rightness from that end. But while fulfilling this function it sometimes confers a new rightness on things commanded by it.—6. Even properly constituted authority should be disobeyed if it require what is contrary to right and conscience.—7. Just authority presupposes moral rightness and moral obligation. It is not the first foundation of these things. Even God who is subject to no authority recognizes the supremacy of the right over every other possible aim.—8. The views of Herbert Spencer, considered.—9. Also those of Dr. Charles Hodge.

1. A FAIR estimate of authority ethics could scarcely be comprised in a single statement. But we may attempt it in a series of remarks.

Our criticisms, too, may be more intelligible if we bear in mind the views of Mr. Herbert Spencer and of Dr. Charles Hodge as two eminent though widely separated advocates of the Authority hypothesis.

In our discussion we shall endeavor to substantiate the following points: (1) there is a difference between legal and moral obligation; (2) though both legal and moral obligation are often expressed in terms of necessity, this language is not strictly and literally true, but metonymical; (3) legal and moral obligation frequently operate

together, for which reason they are sometimes confounded, as if they were essentially the same; (4) two conceptions of authority, one generic and primary, the other secondary and specific, should be distinguished from each other; and (5) moral obligation, or "oughtness," is a relation *sui generis*, which arises between a rational being and the morally right, whenever this latter offers itself as an end of desire and effort.

The word "legal" sometimes indicates that which the law conceives of and demands whether it be realized or not. One might be the legal owner of some property of which some one else is the actual possessor; liberty is the legal right of a man unjustly imprisoned. This style of legality often implies that a thing is just—or, as we say, lawful and right—because governmental institutions generally aim to enforce the right. But sometimes laws are unjust and wrong; in that case a claim under them might be legal without being right.

In the present connection the word denotes that which the law actually effects or which is in actual accordance with the law. This sense of the term appears when one speaks of the legal difficulties in the way of the purchase of some property or of the legal settlement of a dispute. To say that one is under legal obligation to do this or that ordinarily means merely that the law puts him under constraint to follow its directions. Such obligation is simply the condition of a subject of government as being under compulsory inducement to do or not to do. Beyond question such an obligation arises under those influences—political, social and religious—of which Spencer speaks. But we must deny that this is the same as moral obligation.

Mr. Spencer sees no difference between these things. He says, "Since, with the restraints thus generated, is always joined the thought of external coercion, there arises the notion of obligation;" then he identifies this notion with "the sense of duty or moral obligation," and, on the strength of this identification, declares the latter to be "transitory." (See the quotations in Chapter XVII.)

That coercive and governmental is distinguishable from conscientious and moral obligation is evident. The subjects of an established tyranny under which cruel punishment follows the refusal of taxes or services feel themselves obliged to comply with iniquitous exactions, and, as time goes on, this their sense of obligation becomes habitual. Under these cir-

cumstances the payment of taxes and the rendering of services are done from fear, not from duty. So the member of a social organization, a lodge, or club, or fraternity, in which a man of strict principle cannot be popular or even avoid being obnoxious, feels himself bound, unless he be a very strong character, to comply with the expectations of his companions. Sometimes this social constraint has coerced the adherents of conspiracy into the commission of atrocious crimes. Or, should one profess some creed or adopt some mode of life, as prerequisite to an eternal salvation, he would act from a sense of religious, but not from a sense of moral, obligation. In each of the above cases the relation mentioned is that of compulsory inducement,—or of practical necessity, as it is often called—to do this or that.

This obligation, legal in the sense of being imposed by established dominion or authority, is essentially similar to that compulsion which, in the absence of authority, results from the foresight of impersonal causation. If one's path led directly over a precipice, he would find himself under a necessity to turn to the right hand or to the left. If your life depended on taking an offensive drug or on submitting to a severe operation, you would feel obliged to accept the means of cure. When there is a prospect of great loss or suffering, a sensible person is bound to do what he can to prevent it. The compulsory element in such cases is precisely the same as in the penalties prescribed by authority. And the obligation mentioned by Spencer is of this nature; he says, "*The fear joined with three sets of representations becomes, by association, joined with the fourth.*" All such obligation is different from that of duty because the latter appeals, not to fear nor to interest, but to one's respect for the right. It does not operate through a dread of threatened evil, but through a sense of the absolute superiority of the right over every competitive end. While rewards and punishments add their weight, the right obligates of itself and altogether aside from governmental inducements.

2. That obligation which results from external power and its threats of penalty or evil is, as we have said, often spoken of as "practical necessity." It is allied to the compulsory of which Aristotle speaks as a mode of the necessary; for compulsory obedience results from a sense of this kind of obligation. Then, too, that obligation which arises upon the

contemplation of right ends and actions is occasionally described as a *moral* necessity, and it is said that every human being is under a necessity to obey the moral law. The fact also is cited that men in view of considerations of interest or of duty frequently say, "I must do so; I cannot do otherwise."

Notwithstanding this use of terms there seems to be no true and absolute necessity either in non-moral or in moral obligation. Falstaff correctly held that it was not necessary for him to give a reason on compulsion. A man if he chose might walk over a precipice without turning to the right hand or to the left. Patients seriously ill might reject the indispensable means of cure. Fools have despised necessary precautions and brought ruin on themselves. Desperadoes have defied officers of justice and been shot down. Patriots and martyrs have accepted the stake and the rack rather than betray their country or their faith. So also one may clearly understand the requirements of duty or of God's law, and yet deliberately disregard them. Why, in such cases, do we speak of the agent being under a necessity to do this or that when the event shows that no necessity exists?

We answer this question by saying that all obligation, whether non-moral or moral, is immediately related to a true motive necessity the language of which it borrows. The necessity thus referred to is not that connecting any external consequent with its antecedent. For example, it is not the necessity whereby death would certainly follow the fall over the precipice or the defiance of the officers of justice, or whereby self-condemnation and wretchedness will result from violating the moral law. These necessities are closely connected with that now to be considered; they are conditions of it, but yet are to be distinguished from it. Our thought is now directed, not to the necessity of the result of one's action or inaction, but to *the necessity operating in the agent himself by reason of his foresight of that result.* This necessity affects voluntary action, rendering it inevitable and certain. The well-trained pilot, knowing that neglect of duty may lose the ship, is necessarily careful. The intelligent merchant, aware of the requirements of his customers, necessarily keeps a proper stock of goods. Even the prudent man of pleasure, through this voluntary necessity, is certain to avoid excesses because he sees that otherwise his health will be destroyed. So the virtuous man necessarily obeys the

moral law, because he is governed by the love of righteousness and a hatred of evil. In like manner the conduct of the divine being is inevitably holy and just and good.

• The necessity now mentioned is not referred to in our judgments respecting obligation as actually existing, but, according to a very common mode of thought, as a thing conceived of—it is an hypothetical necessity. In the case of the non-moral voluntary necessity the inducements are supposed to be addressed to a person who will certainly act according to the dictates of prudence and interest; in other words the ordinary operation of reason and fear is taken for granted. The assertion is that man, acting under that operation, cannot but comply with given requirements of power or of exigency. The necessity of moral conduct differs from the foregoing only because it arises from different inducements and operates through a different part of man's nature. A certain action is seen to be right and the opposite of it wrong, whereupon it is necessarily performed by "the wise man," the man of principle. The agent, being by supposition not merely a moral being but also controlled by his moral disposition, is so inclined that he inevitably seeks the right. Here again we have a true hypothetical necessity. As the man of prudence must act according to his apprehended interests, so the man of principle must act according to his sense of duty. (Respecting the nature of necessity, real and hypothetical, see THE PERCEPTIONALIST, Chap. XX.)

Now the "practical necessity" of which men speak, meaning by this phrase a compulsory inducement, is quite different from the above mentioned necessities. In the first place it is not an hypothetical but a real relation; it is the position of one who is under the actual pressure of strong inducements. In the second place it is not a *true* necessity, because the antecedent or ground of it is left doubtful and unperfected. It is a case in which a true necessity might be asserted if we knew that the agent would be governed by ordinary prudence or fear of consequences. But we do not know this. When we say that he *must* do so and so we assert only that he is naturally bound, or obligated, or placed under compulsory inducement, to do so and so, but we do this by referring to the hypothetical action of a rational being and by using language relating to that hypothesis. We find Mr. A. building a house on a defective plan; we tell him that he must change his plan. This means only that a better plan, which

a wise man could not but accept, imperatively appeals to Mr. A.

In like manner the moral necessity of which we hear sometimes, and which is discussed by ethical writers, is not a true necessity, but is only an aspect under which moral obligation may be viewed. Mr. B. is reluctant to keep a contract; we tell him he must keep it—that he is absolutely bound to keep it. This simply signifies that a duty, which a virtuous man could by no means neglect, puts forth its claim on Mr. B.

If the foregoing statements be correct, it is plain that obligation is not necessity nor necessity obligation, although, under a given hypothesis, obligation, whether non-moral or moral, is the ground of a necessity. And that being so, while necessity may be used to state, it cannot be used to explain, obligation. For the obligation precedes and explains the necessity.

Non-moral obligation is the position of one who is under compulsory inducement; moral obligation is the position of one who is under moral inducement. Both are wholly peculiar personal relations.

Moreover, although moral obligation is properly set forth by saying that it is our duty to be conformed to the hypothetical action of the man of principle, this asserts obligation only in a secondary way. Assuming that the ideal man is necessarily and absolutely governed by duty, it says that we should follow his example. Therefore terms relating to necessity seem not to be so immediate expressions of our relation to the right as those derived from indebtedness, such as "oughtness" or "duty," or even as those originally denoting the "proper," the "becoming," the "suitable," or the "worthy."

To some the foregoing explanation of that language in which obligation, whether non-moral or moral, is spoken of in terms of necessity, may appear needlessly complex. We would gladly consider any simpler explanation that may be suggested. But, on the basis above given, it is clear that moral obligation in no sense arises from subjection to authority. Not even all non-moral obligation has this origin, but only that which results from governmental compulsion. Moral obligation is founded on the inherent excellence and superiority of the right.

3. While non-moral and moral obligation are radically different, it is important to remark that these two modes of

inducement frequently coalesce. To this fact we ascribe it that some fail to perceive the distinction between them. But, as already remarked, the two modes of motive do not always coincide. Rulers and even laws may be unjust; and this injustice may become inveterate and last for generations. The people through their sense of legal obligation continue to obey till some insufferable excess of tyranny excites violence and revolution. In addition to iniquitous exactions civil rulers may command their subjects to do things wrong and wicked, and in this case, especially, non-moral and moral obligation do not co-operate, but conflict, with one another. At the same time, perhaps in the majority of cases, civil government, social customs and religious doctrines, call for the same conduct which the moral sense approves. This conduct may be far from ideal perfection, yet it is believed to be right and respected as such. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the sentiment of duty should occasionally be confounded with those other sentiments which mingle with it and give it their support. This confusion is promoted by the analogy which exists between legal and moral obligation and by the fact that the language of the latter is largely taken from that of the former. But it arises chiefly because the two modes of motive are so generally coincident in operation. This will be better understood if we consider what is meant by the word "authority," and in what ways authority is related to the right and obligatory.

4. This word is used in two distinguishable senses, one generic and primary, the other secondary and specific. According to the primary and fundamental sense it signifies the power of one person to place another under coercive, or legal, obligation. This authority includes that of decrees, ordinances and statutes; for these are the expression of the authority of persons. Now this authority—this power to place others under coercive inducement—is not necessarily a thing right and obligatory. It is simply the function of issuing commands disobedience to which renders one liable to threatened penalty. The leader of a predatory band who levies tribute from some village or district exercises this kind of authority. So does the political boss, in a city or in a state, who compels office-holders and office-seekers to pay their party assessments. In such cases the demand is met, not because it is rightful, but because it is compulsory—because compliance is essential to one's interests. But in

other cases, for example, in the payment of taxes or in military service, obedience is rendered not simply because of the compulsory authority, but in recognition of the rightfulness of the demand, and, it may be, because of the rightfulness of the authority. This brings before us the secondary sense of the word.

By authority we often mean *rightful authority*—the right of one person to have and exercise the power of placing another under coercive obligation. Such is the condition of human beings that they need to be compelled and constrained all their lives to do that which is right; for which reason certain modes of government whose prevalent operation is to promote the right and to suppress the wrong, become themselves right and obligatory. Hence the duty of obedience to parents, to civil rulers, to official superiors and to all properly constituted authorities. Frequently, in ordinary speech, our thoughts confine themselves to this rightful authority, and so we condemn *disobedience to authority*, and we conceive of an illegal act as *unlawful*, as *illegitimate*, as *wrong*—which it commonly is.

5. In certain cases, however, the commands even of rightful rulers are to be disobeyed and fought against. Mary, Queen of Scots, reproached John Knox because he rejected her authority in religious matters. Referring to the primitive Christians she said, "None of these men raised the sword against their princes." Knox answered, "God, Madam, gave them not the power and the means." "Think you," said the Queen, "that subjects, having the power, may resist their princes?" The reformer replied, "If princes exceed their bounds, Madam, they may be resisted, even by power."

It is important to observe that authority—that is, rightful authority—bears three relations to the right. First, it is founded on the right—not merely on the possession of power; secondly, its office is to maintain and promote the right; and thirdly, it confers a new rightness on things rightfully commanded by it. The first of these relations is founded on the second, since the only reason on account of which any government can justly demand obedience is that it is to be the instrument of right and justice; the second rests on the fact that government is needed to enforce the right (for any properly administered form of government is more promotive of the right than anarchy would be); the third is a corollary

from the other two, because it must be a duty to do what is rightly commanded.

The statement that authority confers rightness and obligatoriness on its commands is the important one for us at present. An understanding of it calls for a definition of that province within which authority may be rightfully exercised. First, then, we say—positively—that authority may not only enforce what is already dutiful, but, in some cases, may make an action dutiful which was not obligatory prior to the command. Part of the office of rulers is to determine the methods in which public and private affairs may be conducted without disorder and for the best interests of all. Often to this end it is not so necessary that any particular method should be adopted as that some one method should be prescribed. English law requires that vehicles passing each other on the road should each turn to the left hand; American law that they should turn to the right. Many of the requirements of the common law are simply modes of doing to which immemorial usage has given a preference. Many imperative rules of pleading and of court procedure have for their object only the orderly conduct of business. Regulations laid down by the proper authority must be obeyed. Moreover it is the function of government to devise or adopt measures for the general welfare; and it is the duty of citizens to co-operate in such measures. Commonly, too, authority must designate by whom and under whose direction the service of the public is to be accomplished; just as a general selects the troops and officers for some military enterprise. Thus, in many cases, duty is imposed by authority. In all cases, however, authority does not originate the right and obligatory end, but only the manner and agency of its pursuit. Nor can authority be exercised rightfully except so far as it may be needed for a right end.

6. Therefore we say in the second place,—and negatively—that circumstances may arise under which it becomes dutiful to disobey the commands even of properly constituted authority. The right of revolution exists when government becomes tyranny. When rulers, instead of striving for the general good, use their authority to enslave and rob their subjects, they forfeit all allegiance and should be driven from power. Plainly, however, no revolution should be attempted without a fair prospect of obtaining the ends desired. The overthrow of a wicked government, or even active resistance to it, is a

duty only for those to whom God has given "the power and the means."

Sometimes, when there is no prospect of effectual resistance, one may refuse obedience to an unjust law in order to make an emphatic protest and to bring the matter before the bar of public opinion. But if the demands of authority be not only unjust, but such that the compliance with them would involve the violation of conscience, one has no option but to disobey. If it were possible for the Divine Being to require what one knew to be wrong and wicked, it would be one's duty to refuse. Such a supposition is absurd; God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth he any man. If we can know beyond a doubt what he would have us do, we may be sure that obedience will be just and right. Nevertheless the above suppositional judgment correctly sets forth our duty to disregard any authority whatever that commands wrongdoing.

7. If these things be so, rightness is not founded on authority. On the contrary, authority is legitimate only so far as it has the realization of right for its end; and it is obligatory only while it is exercised within certain proper boundaries. The limits are determined by the nature of the case rationally considered, or by the law, understanding or appointment, under which the authority exists. When rulers transgress these bounds, obedience is no longer a duty; and when they command iniquity, it is our duty to disobey. Clearly, also, although authority may have a rightfulness, and may confer rightfulness upon its commands, this character is not originally its own, but is derived from the right which authority is designed to serve. If an agent, acting upon his instructions, contract a debt for a principal, the principal is bound. Yet the origin of the obligation is not in the act of the agent, but in his appointment by the principal. So authority may bind, morally, but the origin of this obligation is not in the authority, but in that obligatory right of which authority is the minister and instrument.

Once more; the nature of moral obligation may be more clearly perceived if we consider it apart from authority and from legal obligation. It may be impossible to find any instance in which the moral agent is not subject to some authority, but cases are at least conceivable in which one may act dutifully without reference to authority and simply

from regard for the right as obligatory. Should the captain of a ship at sea discover another vessel about to founder and carry all on board down to a watery grave, his sense of duty would lead him to succor the perishing, whether this were included in his sailing instructions or not. In like manner the social reformer and the philanthropist who devote themselves to the service of mankind, act from a sense of duty rather than from obedience to authority. One may say that in such cases the authority of conscience and duty is respected. That is true, but only metaphorically. The "authority" mentioned is simply the force of moral obligation, and is wholly distinct from external control.

Were one to attend more to words than to thoughts an argument of some force might be made for the derivation of morality from authority. All terms expressive of the relations of duty appear to have been originally suggestive of coercive inducement, and to have been applied to moral as reinforced by non-moral obligation. The nouns *duty*, *obligation*, *imperative*, *necessity*, *requirement*, the verbs *must*, *should*, *ought*, *bind*, *constrain*, *compel*, have unmoral as well as moral meanings. But while these meanings often combine they are also often separated, and sometimes they are opposed to one another. The closing words of Luther's speech before Charles the Fifth expressed loyalty to truth and principle in opposition to the requirements of authority—"Hier stehe ich; ich kann nicht anders."

The question has been asked, "Is God governed by a sense of duty?" We believe he is, though of course he is not influenced by external authority. In planning for his creatures he chooses the best, and feels that he cannot do otherwise. He recognizes the supremacy of the right over every other possible aim. This is implied in our conception of a righteous God.

Moral obligation, therefore, is a relation between the rational agent and the right; it is not a relation between the rational agent and authority.

8. Recurring now to Mr. Spencer, let us credit him with as good a conception of moral obligation as could be formed from the materials to which he felt himself restricted. He is not chargeable with all the confusions which gather themselves about the word "authority." Doubtless he would allow that no allegiance is due to an unprincipled usurper, and that even a rightful ruler should be disobeyed if he command what is wrong and wicked. But, contemplating the

rightful operation of rightful authority, he teaches that moral obligation is the result of habitual subjection to this specific exercise of power—that it is the position of one who realizes this subjection. This doctrine is quite intelligible. But the term “rightful” used in our statement of it, refers to the utilitarian conception of morality, and therefore designates merely that which contributes to human welfare. In his letter to Mr. Mill, Spencer, speaking of “certain fundamental moral intuitions,”—says that “these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of utility gradually organized and inherited.” More explicitly he says, “I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility.”

Some, who would like some evidence for the statements even of great philosophers, would respectfully inquire how Mr. Spencer knows what has occurred throughout all past generations, and on what ground he asserts the transmutation of “nervous modifications” into “faculties of moral intuition.” But, passing by these queries, the pressing question with us is, “Does Spencer’s theory harmonize with the consciousness of those rational beings who are now alive?” We think it does not, and that, from this point of view, it is defective in two respects. First, its conception of the right as composed of “consolidated experiences of utility,” is low and inadequate; and, secondly, its conception of moral obligation fails to note that the right is obligatory of itself, apart from authority, and indeed that the obligatoriness of authority, so far as it is moral, arises from the obligatoriness of the right.

Mr. Spencer uses the deductive or derivate mode of philosophizing. Holding that spiritual life is identical with nervous energy and that thought and feeling are the refinement and reproduction of nervous activity, he derives the sentient from the insentient, the immaterial from the material, and the moral from the unmoral. His conclusions are so repugnant to the analysis of consciousness as to suggest that the hypotheses with which they are connected should be abandoned. For our part, we know of no good reason to believe

that man is the product of molecular evolution or even that he was changed in some prehistoric period from an unmoral to a moral being. The weight of evidence and of argument is against these suppositions. But if an irrational savage brute ever was developed into a man, it must have been through the acquisition of a new faculty and not through an habitual dread of punishment.

9. In estimating the statements of Dr. Hodge, let us remember that his aim is theological rather than ethical, and that what might be ultimate for a teacher of religion may fall short of the ultimate for a philosopher. Addressing those who believe in God and in a supernatural revelation, Dr. Hodge declares that the will of God is the supreme rule, and the law of God an absolute standard, of human conduct. This position cannot be disputed. But it sets forth an absolute rule of judgment rather than a fundamental principle of science. That "the will of God is the ultimate ground of moral obligation" is a final statement only as terminating quest and argument respecting any matter on which God has given a command. It is not an explanation of the nature of duty.

This is evident because, as Bishop Butler says, "God cannot approve of anything but what is in itself right, fit, just. All should worship and endeavor to obey Him with this consciousness in view." In other words, God's authority should be obeyed as upholding the right, as defining and determining the right, and as being therefore itself right and obligatory, but not as creating the right. Indeed, those sacred Scriptures, revered by Dr. Hodge as the expression of the divine will, urge men to pursue virtue according to their own perceptions of what is right and dutiful, and not merely as being what God's will requires. In the following words an inspired man expresses the general teaching of the prophets and apostles: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things." Even should we adopt that extreme view which regards reason as God's voice and law within us (and not merely a fallible faculty whereby we distinguish between right and wrong) this would not make the inward instruction the origin of duty but only our guide to the knowledge of it.

Dr. Hodge uses stronger language than merely philosophical aims necessitate. He says that God's will is "the only rule" for moral decision, and that "in all cases, so far as we are concerned, it is His will that binds us and constitutes the difference between right and wrong." This language can only mean that the divine will is the only external authority absolutely determining questions of duty for the conscience. Dr. Hodge certainly would not deny that men are bound by their own convictions of right—that every man, morally, is a law unto himself—and that the common knowledge of duty is a law to all. He simply means that God's will, when known, must be implicitly obeyed, and that this is the only external rule which is of absolute moral obligation. Moreover, Dr. Hodge rests the rightfulness of God's will on the fact that it is the expression of "infinite wisdom and goodness." This implies that the supremacy of the Divine authority arises from its complete identification with what is right and good.

Then, too, the concluding statement of Dr. Hodge that "the ultimate foundation of moral obligation is the nature of God" brings up the question, "What is the nature of God?" What is his "immutable excellence"—his "infinite perfection?" For us—and we believe for Dr. Hodge himself—these phrases can mean only the perfect wisdom, goodness and holiness of God as revealed in his moral law. So we return to the ethical problem, which is to determine the essence and contents of right moral conduct.

While rejecting the doctrine that the will of God is the first origin of moral distinctions, we do not question the supreme importance of the divine authority, both as determining duty and as a source of the knowledge of duty. We say also that no ethical system is complete without a reverent recognition of the Supreme Being. Not only have the principles of right dwelt eternally in the divine bosom, but our relations to God, the creator and preserver of all, the loving father of spirits, the righteous ruler of the universe, enter as necessary elements into the perfected moral life. Morality may exist without religion, but the complete development of ethical experience includes loving, sympathetic loyalty to that Spirit in whom we live and move and have our being. This truth is well expressed by Bishop Martensen at the beginning of his "Christian Ethics." "Morality and religion," he says, "are not all one and the same thing, but

they are indissolubly associated; and, so long as man remains in this temporal sphere, so long must he live his life under these two forms. . . . A godliness from which the ethical factor is in every respect excluded can only become a mystic absorption in God. . . . A morality, on the other hand, without religion is a false self-dependence, a free-will lacking foundation, and therefore, also, resting on an inner self-contradiction."

CHAPTER XIX.

DUTY ETHICS.

1. "The Ethical problem" is to determine the supreme law, or the universal end, of duty. The language of Mackenzie and of Sidgwick criticized. Whewell quoted.—2. The Duty school includes all who without analyzing the right teach that it is inherently obligatory. It might be called the Dogmatic, or Intuitionist, school.—3. Membership in this school depends on the character of one's teachings, not on his terminology.—4. The formula "duty for duty's sake" belongs to the duty school only "*par eminence*."—5. Plato, the Stoics, Cicero, and the schoolmen taught duty ethics.—6. Also Des Cartes, Père Malebranche, Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clark, John Locke, Francis Wayland, and others.—7. The views of Kant. His ethical formula or dictum.—8. This was not intended to give the universal end of morality, but only to be a criterion of moral judgment.—9. We reject this dictum because it assumes that every moral rule is binding on all men, whereas many rules of duty apply only to limited classes of men.—10. Because most moral rules have exceptions even within the sphere of their applicability.—11. Because a call of duty may be so exceptional in character as not naturally to suggest any general rule, not to speak of a universal rule. 12. And because Kant's criterion might consist with the adoption of an immoral rule.—13. The Kantian dictum is a premature and incorrect generalization. It differs from Adam Smith's excellent criterion of "the disinterested and benevolent spectator."—14. The Duty school includes (1) *a priori* intuitionists, such as Plato, Des Cartes, Cudworth and Kant, (2) *a posteriori* intuitionists such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Reid, Price and Stewart. The latter are less assumptive than the former, but are wanting in analysis.—15. Reid, Whewell, Haven and many others assert the absolute simplicity of moral rightness.—16. Adam Smith compared with Immanuel Kant.

1. "THE ethical problem" is a phrase sometimes used at the present day. For instance, it is the title of the first chapter of Seth's "Ethical Principles," though we are not told expressly in what sense the professor employs the phrase. For us the ethical problem is to define the right and obligatory, in other words, to determine what character is common

to every right action and to every right end. Evidently this must be some generic aim of rational desire and effort. That philosophers are striving to solve this problem is abundantly manifest from their discussions, though it cannot always be inferred from their terminology. For example, some profess to seek a "standard" to which all conduct should conform. Professor Mackenzie, in successive chapters, speaks of the "standard as law," "the standard as happiness," "the standard as perfection;" and then he concludes by saying, "We see, in fact, that the end must consist in some form of self-realization, . . . that the end, in short, ought to be described as perfection rather than as happiness."

Properly speaking, a standard is not an end of pursuit but an object through comparison with which degrees of quantity or of quality may be determined. The yard-stick in the tower of London is a standard of length; so is every yard-stick made like it and employed for the same purpose. An alloy, ten parts of gold and one of silver, or any coin of that composition, is a standard of the purity required in an American ten-dollar piece. When we wish to measure excellence or to determine whether a certain degree of excellence has been reached, either a perfect object or one possessing the quality in question in a high degree, is generally selected as a standard. In short, a standard is a measure by which an object is tested as having or not having a given degree of quantity or quality; it is not the type to which the object must conform if it possess a certain character. The use of the term in this latter sense is an innovation.

There is also an infelicity in calling happiness and perfection "standards" of right conduct. A satisfaction or an excellence realized under given conditions might be a standard of happiness or of excellence experienced under conditions somewhat similar; even that would not be a standard of moral life. Possibly the pursuit of happiness or of perfection, if it involved some definite degree of virtue, might be a moral standard; but we are not now considering degrees of virtue. Utilitarianism makes the pursuit of happiness, and perfectionism the pursuit of excellence, necessary to any virtue at all. The use of the word "standard" to signify "the end at which we are to aim" can scarcely be defended.

The word "criterion" has also been employed in this signification. But it has too wide an applicability. A cri-

terion is not necessarily a part of the essence; it may be anything inseparably connected with the essence. The ting-ing of the litmus paper is only a property of the acid or the alkali; it is not ordinarily a part of our conception of either one of these agents.

Not much objection can be made to the words "law" and "rule" as names applicable to the fundamental ethical idea. For the supreme *rule* must set forth the ultimate *end* of right conduct. As Whewell says, "With regard to the supreme rule the question 'why' admits of no further answer." Every moral theory can be characterized by the law which it makes fundamental—as, *Do good, Be perfect, Regulate your affections, Obey authority, Realize the right*. But this law is always the ultimate law. The standard of right living is the entire moral law, to every part of which we must conform; the end of morality is the supreme rule only. Strictly speaking even this law prescribes the seeking of the end of duty; it does not merely state the end; so that there is a metonymy.

A peculiar use of language is that of Prof. Henry Sidgwick. One would suppose that "methods of ethics" meant modes of investigation. He really uses the phrase to signify methods of judgment. His treatise discusses those principles which different systems assume as the bases of moral assertion. It says little concerning processes of inquiry.

Perhaps the best—certainly the most literal—designation for the fundamental thought in ethics is *the moral end*; by which, of course, we mean the ultimate and universal moral end. But even this phrase may mislead unless we remember that actions are often conceived of as including ends and as being ends themselves. We accept the doctrine that an action may be right and obligatory *per se*. (Chap. VI.)

2. Having considered four general schools of doctrine, we pass to the fifth, which contains a greater variety of authors and of views than any of the others. This school includes all those who, either directly or indirectly, teach the obligation of the right without giving any analysis of the right. Some of these writers hold the right to be simple and incapable of analysis, but none of them define it. All of them—to use the language of Mackenzie—teach that the "standard" (in other words, the moral end) is "law." In one sense we might say that every theory of morals is a theory of law. Both Utilitarianism and Perfectionism for-

mulate supreme laws; the one requires the seeking of good, the other the seeking of perfection; and they mention other laws subordinate to these. But Mackenzie, excluding these systems, limits his thought to those which present moral rules without any explanation of that rightness which makes them moral. For in such systems the conception of law is given a peculiar prominence.

At first one might suppose that theories which make "the standard law" were those which found morality on external authority. That is not the professor's meaning. He refers to a law which binds by reason of its own nature; he scarcely mentions the governmental view of moral obligation.

For ourselves, were we to use the word "law" in designating specific theories, not only Utilitarianism and Perfectionism, but also Authority and Motivity Ethics, must be excluded from those systems which make "law" the end. For in each of these four theories a definition of the morally right very sensibly engrosses the attention.

The name "Duty Ethics," however, seems better to express the character of the systems now to be considered than any other designation; although it is to be confessed that duty, no less than law, has a place in every theory of morals. Here according to a use of terms already explained (Chap. XVI. 4), "duty" is tantamount to "right," the right being always dutiful in the sense of being obligatory. Originally these words did not have the same signification; and often still, as correlatives of one another, they are contrasted in meaning, "the right" being that which is obligatory, "duty" that which is obligated. "Duty," too, sometimes signifies, attributively, not the action which is obligated but the obligation (or obligatedness) of the person to do it; as when we say that one is under duty to do this or that.

But, in rational conduct, the very same deed may in one aspect be right and obligatory, and in another duty and obligated. Considered in relation to the end to be realized and as the accomplishment of the end, an action is right. Considered in relation to the moral agent and as his accomplishing of the end, it is due to the right; it is duty. And so it happens that because the terms "right" and "duty," in their contrasted meanings, not only imply one another, but are constantly applied to the same objects, they are frequently used interchangeably and as equivalent to each other. Then the right signifies the dutiful and the dutiful the right. For

example, when we speak of the *claims* of duty, or say that duty has *claims upon us*, we are speaking of the right as obligatory—not of duty as obligated. Such language somewhat justifies those who say that “ought” means to “oblige”; it may occasionally do so. When ethics is defined as “the Science of Duty,” and when, as now, those teachings which hold the right, considered without analysis, to be the aim of virtue, are classed as “Duty Ethics,” duty signifies the right as the end of moral purpose and desire. For moral rightness rather than moral obligation is the basal idea of ethical science. The phrase “right ethics” might be employed as synonymous with “duty ethics,” but it would not be so easily understood.

3. No department of philosophy contains more verbal difficulties than ethics. In this study one must look through the obscurities of language to the thoughts of the mind, or rather to those phenomena which are the true subjects of our consideration. In the present characterization of schools, if we regard agreement in sentiment more than diversity in the expression of it, some philosophers must be counted as teachers of duty ethics who do not maintain this style of doctrine explicitly. For other terms have been used to express the same idea as the words “right” and “dutiful” indicate more properly—for example, the words “good” and “fair.” The good deed which shines so far “in a naughty world” is not a beneficent or benevolent action merely, but one that is virtuous and right. “Fair dealing” is not merely that which appears well, but that which conscience can approve. In like manner truth, reason, equity, justice, besides their specific meanings, often signify a general conformity to the moral law. Among the Greeks the right was as often called τὸ καλόν, τ'αγαθόν, τὸ πρεπόν (the fair, the good, the befitting) as τὸ δέον, τὸ δίκαιόν, τὸ ὀρθόν. (the due, the right, the correct). The Romans, also, called right things in general *honesta*, *recta*, *bona*, *justa*, *pulchra*, *officiosa*. No matter what language one uses, if he maintain that certain actions and aims are obligatory because of a peculiar and inherent excellence, and if he give no analysis of that excellence, he may be quoted as supporting duty ethics. Nor does it make any difference whether he teach this doctrine of the right simply, or whether he add to it some explanation regarding the way in which duty is perceived by reason, conscience, intuition, the moral sense, or any other faculty.

4. Some characterize duty ethics as the teaching of "duty for duty's sake." But it cannot be fairly said that this formula is the exclusive property of any one school. A writer might analytically define the moral end and still consistently maintain that duty should be pursued for its own sake. Those, indeed, who reject definitions may assert that the definers do not advocate duty for its own sake but something else than duty for the sake of that something else. But in this they only state what they themselves believe. They could not reasonably—and they do not—expect that others will recognize them as the only friends of duty.

At the same time it may be admitted that the dogmatic or intuitionist school—as it may be called—present the claims of duty in an emphatic way. Their assertion of the undefined right has that force which all the utterances of the practical reason have, and which at first is lessened, though it may afterwards be increased, by analytic intelligence. Moreover, it is to be remembered that even the correct articulations of the speculative reason cannot take the place of that sense of duty which the practical reason gives. The aim of theoretic morals should not be to supplant the habitual ethical judgment but to render this more informed and accurate. Those therefore who regard the practical reason as our only source of understanding respecting the right, may be said to teach duty ethics in a special sense.

5. In ancient times this form of doctrine was taught principally by the Stoics, though Plato and his followers might also be said to favor it. Plato, as a perfectionist, sought participation in the divine, but, along with this, as a more immediate aim, he sought conformity to ideals of conduct which constituted for him a moral law. Were it possible to regard these ideals as specific forms of "the Idea," Plato would be simply a perfectionist, after his own mystical fashion. But he advocates wisdom, courage, temperance and justice without defining the nature common to them all. They are all virtues; each of them in a specific way pursues τὸ ἀνθρώπινον καὶ ἀγαθόν—that is, the right. Plato's doctrine is that of those who say that every virtue seeks what is right and good. In his philosophy one finds the unity of lofty sentiment but not the unity of analytic thought.

The Stoics inculcated duty ethics unequivocally yet with some indirectness. The "Nature" to which they said we must conform ourselves was chiefly the nature within us,

and which is of divine origin. Their essential rule was that we must live according to reason; and thus, without defining duty, they told how duty may be discovered and determined. This instruction is reproduced by those moderns who say that man should live according to "right reason." The right is preeminently the "reasonable"; it is the end proposed by the most absolute exercise of practical intelligence. Conduct conformed to reason the Stoics called *κατ' ὁρθότητα*—that is, the right, the correct, the *recte factum*.

Cicero, though by no means a Stoic, was yet the Stoic philosopher of the Romans. His "De Finibus" does not treat of the right, but of virtue as the *summum bonum*—the supreme good—a doctrine of which Perfectionism is a misinterpretation. For, though moral excellence is superior to every other good and the pure fountain of blessedness, it is not the all-comprehensive aim of duty. Nor does Cicero's other ethical treatise, the "De Officiis," define any such aim. This work discusses the general forms, rather than the generic nature, of duty. Having premised that *officium* seeks what is right and what is useful, the *honestum* and the *utile* (the *utile* as a rational end being the beneficial or expedient and a part of the *honestum* considered in a broad sense), Cicero makes the fourfold division of duty common among the ancients. Thereupon he advocates (1) the search for truth and the love of truth, (2) the observance of justice or social duty, including *beneficentia*, (3) the maintenance of moderation in desires and deeds, and (4) the exercise of courage and magnanimity in every exigency and under every variation of fortune. The closing part of the treatise is devoted to questions arising from the conflict of duties.

The Schoolmen did not analyze the moral end. They added little to the ethics of the ancients except to render it more theological. For example, St. Thomas of Aquin, in his *Summa Theologica* (Quæstio LV.), defines virtue as a good quality or habit by which one lives rightly and ill-uses no one, and which is operated in us by the power of God—*Virtus est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur et nemo male utitur, et quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur*. After that he discusses different modes of virtue and the duties corresponding to them. In his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, he follows Aristotle closely, but, adhering to the subjective point of view and mentioning virtues more than duties, he gives no definition of the right. With him the four prin-

cial or "cardinal" virtues are the same as those discussed by Plato and by Cicero—wisdom, justice, temperance and courage. Those who view morality from the subjective more than from the objective point of view, seldom attempt an analysis of the moral end. They are satisfied with an analysis of virtue and with the doctrine that virtue is the *summum bonum*.

6. The modern advocates of duty ethics agree that man has a power of immediately distinguishing between right and wrong, but they give different names to this faculty and explain the operation of it in different ways. Des Cartes (1596--1650) started the modern philosophical movement when he discarded scholastic dogmatism and justified fundamental convictions by a great inward clearness of apprehension. He held that certain truths shine in their own light, which is the light of nature (*lumen naturæ*) and so introduced the doctrine of "innate ideas." He himself dwelt little on the theory of right and wrong, but his disciple, Père Malebranche (1638--1715) founded morality on necessary truths given by the universal reason. The learned Cudworth combined Cartesian views with a kind of Platonism. Opposing the sensationalism of Hobbes, he contended that the idea of a "natural immutable and eternal justice" arises, not from experience, but from "the innate activity of the mind itself." Dr. Samuel Clarke (1675--1724) taught that reason perceives the "eternal and necessary differences of things," including the difference between right and wrong. He held that rightness is a "fitness" of the conduct of rational beings to the relations in which they exist, and wrongness an unfitness. But this doctrine is not a definition of right and wrong; it is only the statement of an analogy. Its chief significance lies in the implication that the moral qualities of actions are perceived by the reason just as fitness and unfitness are. Locke (1632--1705), a senior contemporary of Clarke, believed that the science of ethics might be developed, like that of mathematics, "from self-evident propositions concerning God and rational beings." Some authors of our own day, as Dr. Francis Wayland, teach, somewhat indefinitely, that right and wrong arise from the relations of persons to each other and to things, and that the moral qualities of actions are an undefinable fitness and unfitness.

7. Every system of philosophy is more or less affected by the view entertained by its author concerning the action of rational intelligence. The moral philosophy of Kant was

greatly influenced by his theory of mind. His "Pure Reason" was a faculty furnishing categories (or general forms of thought), the application of which by the judgment to the products of the sensibility result in knowledge or cognition. Finding this faculty inadequate to support faith in God, immortality and duty, Kant devised the "Practical Reason," by the assertions of which man is impelled to belief in the Infinite and to the recognition of the right. The Kantian system, though distressingly obscure for those who would find in it an explanation of mental phenomena, is essentially simple. It is the dual dogmatism of one who was unable to make a true and unifying analysis of the operations of the intellect.

In ethics Kant does not give categories, as he does in metaphysics. He contents himself with a formula by which we may be guided in the formation or adoption of moral rules. He says, "*Act only on that maxim or principle which thou canst at the same time will to become a universal law.*" This statement, Kant says, is not a new law of duty but only a formula to which every law of duty must conform. It is to be the Rule of Rules. "Who would think," he asks, "of introducing a new principle of all morality, just as if the whole world before him were ignorant of what duty was? But whoever knows of what importance a mathematical formula is, will not undervalue my formula." (PREFACE TO CRITIQUE OF THE PRACTICAL REASON.) As, in mathematics, a formula indicates a method of reaching a correct result, so this formula is to indicate how we may reach rules that are right and obligatory. Kant illustrates this point by showing, to his own satisfaction, that the telling of truth, the keeping of contracts and the preservation of one's own life, are seen, on the application of his formula, to be universally obligatory. But his argument does not convince one of the value of his formula. The laws mentioned as to truth telling and so on are, in a sense, both obligatory and universal, but these things depend on the nature of the laws themselves as applicable to men in general; they are not deductions from the principle that every law of duty is universal.

8. It has been objected to the Kantian dictum that it is empty of content—that it does not tell, even in a general way, what duty is—that it cannot be more than a direction whereby reason may perfect her judgments. This certainly is true of the formula considered by itself. We do not know whether Kant was aware of this emptiness or not. But his

writings show that he valued his formula rather as a rule of ethical judgment than as a statement of moral truth. His idea is that rightness is intuitively perceptible in different modes of conduct, but that we may form mistaken judgments of duty if we allow our minds to be influenced by non-essential considerations. Innate ideas may be self-evident, but the apprehension and application of them calls for care; else they may be mingled with error. That such is Kant's position is evident from his doctrine of "the good will" (*der gute Wille*). He says, "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will." But the will thus mentioned is not a benevolent disposition—a fixed determination to promote the welfare and happiness of beings. The "good" which it seeks is not happiness, but the right. It is the will determined by respect for duty. "The preeminent good," says Kant, "which we call moral, can consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself—which certainly is only possible in a rational being—in so far as this conception, *and not the expected effect*, determines the will." Kant rejects and opposes Eudæmonism; and there is no doubt that he intended by means of his formula to exclude from the moral judgment every consideration which might obscure our perception of the right—or of law, as he called it.

9. We do not condemn the Kantian principle because it is supplementary and ministerial. Yet, even in this light, it is of doubtful value; several objections have been brought against it. First, it is said that *most moral rules do not require the same conduct of all men*, and that, therefore, it would be impossible for us in every dutiful action to employ a maxim which we may will all men to follow. A few duties—as those of love, of beneficence, of veracity, of order and peace, of promoting knowledge and virtue, of respect for the worthy and good—arise from relations universally existing; and therefore apply universally. But most rules apply to men in special relations; and some rules prescribe duties which some men are never called to perform. The duties of the soldier differ from those of the civilian. Civilization and barbarism have laws peculiar to each, and unsuitable for both. Persons of the wealthy class have burdens from which the poor are free. The aged and the young, the strong and the weak, the intelligent and the ignorant, the master and the servant, the husband and the wife, the father and

the child, have each his peculiar obligations. To say that one's mode of action in every instance of duty may be a rule for every human being is an unfounded exaggeration. Yet such a doctrine might be inferred from Kant's language.

Let us suppose, however, that his thought is different from this—that the universality of which he speaks means that a moral law, though it may not apply to all men at all times and may never apply to some men—is yet a mode of conduct for an existing class who fall within its operations, and that, as such, it is *absolutely without exception*; that it is a “categorical imperative,” not merely in the sense of being inherently obligatory, but also in the sense that it cannot, under any circumstances, be superseded or set aside in the judgment of the moral reason. This statement would probably be accepted by Kant as exactly expressive of his thought; but it is the basis of a second objection to his dictum. It is said that *most moral laws are not universal, even within their proper spheres, but have exceptions*; and that, therefore, we cannot expect to act only on maxims which we may will to be without exceptions.

10. Most laws under which men act dutifully are not of unrestricted application. Ordinarily men are bound not to take but to preserve human life; not to appropriate but to protect another's property; not to say that which is false but only that which is true; not to disobey but to fulfil the commands of rightful authority. Yet, in extreme cases, these rules give way to a more fundamental righteousness. Mackenzie states the truth forcibly when he says: “The moral sense of the best men seems to say that there is no commandment, however sacred,—unless it be the commandment of love—that does not under certain circumstances release its claims.” The principle that man should always obey his conscience seems to have been interpreted by Kant to mean, first, that conscience never makes a mistake, and, secondly, that the imperatives of conscience are absolutely universal rules. Neither of these positions can be maintained. Jacobi is justified in his attack on the “rigor” of Kant.

11. A third objection to the dictum is one which would apply to any precept instructing us to act always in a way which is or might be a general rule; that is, a rule applicable to a known class of persons or of cases whether it be a rule admitting of exception or not. It is argued that *extraordinary circumstances call for duties which are obligatory only under*

those circumstances, and that no one could reasonably wish the duties thus incumbent on individuals, or in individual cases, to be universal. This statement recognizes the fact that the Practical Reason often forms a rule for some class of existing persons or of recurrent cases, and then regards some other persons or cases as exceptional, and as calling for a treatment different from that which the rule prescribes. Or a case or cases may be considered as very peculiar and not sufficiently numerous or frequent to support a general rule. Ordinarily a man is not obligated to a life of celibacy or of voluntary indigence; though some persons may be. Not every one should visit smallpox hospitals, or enter burning buildings, or head a forlorn hope; such duties fall to a few. Not every man should seek to be a foreign missionary, or a political reformer, or a philosopher, or an orator, or a congressman, or an emperor, or the president of a republic. Some of these cases conflict with general rules; others simply lie without them. But in every such instance one is not expected to follow a rule but to be guided by the requirements of the case. It is to be allowed that the conduct found suitable in some singular conjuncture may be generalized, and that a new rule may be formed in this way; but such a rule would not, in practical language, be a general, much less a universal, law. We would naturally think of it as having restricted applicability—as being a *special* rule. It would not deserve the name *universal*; nor would it be a rule which one should wish to be universal.

12. A fourth objection to the Kantian formula is that *it provides no real safeguard against the adoption of an immoral rule*. As we have just said, every mode of action can be generalized. After that it would be practically universalized if it were accepted by the agent as a satisfactory law for an existing class of similar cases. Now, for all that we can see, this might happen without securing conformity to the law of right. Kant assumes that conscience gives rules for our obedience. His dictum would assist us in the understanding and adoption of these rules. The agent is to ask what maxim he himself would like to be universal, and then is to act on that. Recognizing “moral good,” that is, the right, as the aim of morality, Kant asserts that this will be realized under any rule which the agent can desire to be observed in all similar cases. He thinks that if this direction were strictly followed one would be determined to the right, no matter what

his inclinations might be. But would this effect necessarily follow if the agent were a selfish being and careless of the right? Might not the hereditary aristocrat approve of the rule of caste according to which he and his fellows should have the honors of life while these are withheld from all others? Might not the sharp-witted scoundrel wish the law to protect him and his like in their evil practices and ill-gotten gains? Would not the powerful bully choose the law that might makes the right and that all mankind should be divided into masters and slaves? In every such case the agent might desire the law to be universal, that is, to be rigorously carried out; but that would not prove it to be a righteous law.

If the formula were that one should follow that rule which conscience and right reason would approve in all similar cases, the direction, though weak, would not be exactly valueless; it would favor simplicity and disinterestedness of moral judgment. But the only requirement is that the agent shall follow a rule which he can will to be universal. An egoistic hedonist could meet that requirement without difficulty; and so could the adherent of any evil system; Kant's fundamental error lies in his doctrine that the "practical reason" furnishes an unreasoned rule of right. According to him "the law" has no reference either to motives or to consequences. It is an absolute command—or system of commands—which admits of no explanation beyond its own, "*sic jubeo*." This law, indeed, is the right, but with Kant it relates to actions rather than to ends. Moreover, not perceiving that the law as a form of doing is subsidiary to the right as an end, and is obligatory only because it embraces the right, he first identifies right with law, then confuses moral law with law in general, and after that asserts that any rule adopted for universal use must be right. He assumes that the mind cannot formulate clearly any practical law except the law of duty. Nothing could be more unsatisfactory than the Kantian mode of philosophizing. It is the extreme of fanciful, dialectic dogmatism, and is removed as far as possible from the patient analysis of facts. Those professors who require of their students long courses in Kant should be prosecuted for wasting the precious time and energies of the young.

The dogmatism of Kant arose partly from a lofty earnestness. This also at times led him into exaggerated statements, such as the doctrine, already mentioned, that moral law admits of no exceptions. We account in this way for his appar-

ent contention that an action in order to be virtuous, must proceed from the "good will" exclusively, that is, from moral principle without any mingling of natural impulse. Schiller ridicules this teaching as if it required us to repress every affection and to find duty only in self-sacrifice. Probably Kant meant merely that a deed is virtuous only so far as it proceeds from principle, and that a man is not truly good in whom natural feeling is stronger than the sense of duty. He nowhere denies that principle may, and should, be accompanied by affection. It is clear also that virtue becomes specially manifest in cases of necessary self-sacrifice.

13. While Kant's formula yields little assistance, some aid might be given the moral judgment by the direction to *act in a way that should be satisfactory*—that is, acceptable as right—to all rational beings to be affected by it. This resembles the Kantian dictum superficially, but is essentially different. It means simply that a moral rule must be founded on a comprehensive consideration of the results included in, or flowing from, a mode of action, and in the desire that every one of these should be what right requires. Without defining duty, it would help in the perception of duty.

This law of judgment might be used with any ethical theory. It is a general, practical injunction rather than a fundamental principle. Mr. J. S. Mill, after saying, "The Utilitarian criterion is not the happiness of the agent but that of all interested parties," continues, "Utilitarianism requires that, as between his good and that of others, the agent should be as strictly impartial as a benevolent and disinterested spectator would be." Here the benevolent spectator is the morally "wise man"—the man of principle: mere sentimental benevolence does not always judge aright. The same practical law is embodied in that noble command, "Therefore, all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." This precept requires that one person should accord that treatment to another person which he might reasonably—that is, rightly—claim from the other in case their relations to each other were reversed. In short, divine wisdom directs selfishness to become unselfish and to transform itself into the law of love.

14. All the advocates of duty ethics pursue radically the same style of thought; they are more dogmatic than analytic. Yet, with reference to a superficial difference, they may be divided into the Rationalists and the Intuitionists, or,

should we take the word "intuition" to signify any perception held to be immediate, they might be classified as "A Priori" and "Common Sense" Intuitionists. The former, as Des Cartes, Cudworth and Kant, speak of reason as a primary source of ideas and truths—as the mother of principles which are to be received as her gift. The latter dwell on the irresistible conviction with which many of our ordinary perceptions are attended, and they ascribe this conviction to a power of immediate cognition, which they called at first "common sense," and afterwards "intuition." This second class of writers show a commendable willingness to base philosophy on the scrutiny of fact. Among them we reckon Lord Shaftesbury (1670--1713) and Prof. Francis Hutcheson (1694--1746), disciples of Locke, who taught that we perceive the right and the wrong somewhat as the beautiful and the homely or the agreeable and the disagreeable are seen; and who called the faculty of doing this "the moral sense." Their doctrine does not identify cognition with feeling, as sensationalism does, but asserts that the perception of the moral qualities of actions and of persons, is accompanied and influenced by feeling. Shaftesbury unduly exalts the function of feeling, as if moral cognition might be reduced to mere sentiment or taste, yet he makes the moral faculty a mode of the "understanding." Hutcheson taught that ethical judgments "do not possess moral quality as right and wrong, but intellectual quality; and that they are as liable to error as other judgments."

Following these authors, the "Common Sense" school, Reid (1710--1795), Price (1723--1791), and Stewart (1753--1828)—the Intuitionists proper—not only adopt the right as the fundamental element in morals, but insist also that it is absolutely simple, an indefinable peculiarity common to various ends and modes of action. Price says, "The ideas of right and wrong are simple ideas and must, therefore, be ascribed to some power of immediate perception." Dr. Reid assigns two offices to reason, "the first, to judge of things self-evident; the second, to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are." He adds, "The first of these is the province—and the sole province—of common sense." Truths perceived by this faculty he calls "first principles, principles of common sense, common notions, self-evident truths," and among them are "first principles in morals." For, he says, there is "an original power or faculty

in man," called "the moral sense, the moral faculty, conscience"; and "truths immediately testified to by our moral faculty are the first principles of all moral reasoning; from which all our knowledge of duty must be deduced."

Reid distinguishes three classes of "first principles in morals"; (1) those relating to "virtue in general"; (2) those relating to "particular branches of virtue"; and (3) those "by which, when there seems to be an opposition between the actions that different virtues lead to, we determine to which the preference is due." The first class includes such principles as these:—"*Some things in human conduct merit approbation and praise, others blame and punishment; and different degrees either of approbation or of blame are due to different actions.—What is done from unavoidable necessity may be agreeable or disagreeable, useful or hurtful, but cannot be the object either of blame or of moral approbation.—Men may be culpable in omitting what they ought to have done as well as in doing what they ought not.—We ought to use the best means to be informed of our duty.*" The second class contains such laws as these:—"*We ought to prefer a greater good, though more distant, to a less; and a less evil to a greater.—As far as the intention of nature appears in the constitution of man, we ought to comply with that intention, and act agreeably to it.—No man is born for himself only. In every case we ought to act that part towards another which we would judge to be right in him to act towards us, if we were in his circumstances, and he in ours. To every man who believes the existence, the perfection and the providence of God, the veneration and the submission we owe to him are self-evident.*" The third class is composed of directions such as these:—"*Generosity should yield to gratitude, and both to justice.—Beneficence to those who are at ease should yield to compassion to the miserable; and external acts of piety to works of mercy.*" This list of Reid's sets forth self-evident truths, but the most of them are not so simple as to deserve the rank of "first principles." This list is a collection of maxims formulated by the good sense of thoughtful men; it is without philosophical verification, simplification and systematization. No one has taken the "first principles" of Reid seriously, or as anything more than primary statements on which ethical investigation may be based.

15. Many, however, agree with him that the right is a quality so simple that it admits of no explanation except that

it is the right. Prof. Whewell asserts that the rightness of actions is a supreme rule, and an absolutely ultimate end. It is ultimate, not merely practically, but intellectually. He says: "There is a supreme rule of human action. That which is conformable to the supreme rule is absolutely right, and is called right simply, without relation to a special end. With regard to the supreme rule the question, 'Why?' admits of no further answer. Why must I do what is right? Because it is right. Why should I do what I ought? Because I *ought*. The supreme rule supplies a rule for that which it commands by being the supreme rule." He says that the end which this rule has in view is the "ultimate or supreme good, the *summum bonum*"; but this end, with Whewell, is not happiness; it is "moral good," or the right. More explicitly than Whewell President Haven says: "The term *right* expresses a simple and ultimate idea; it is, therefore, incapable of analysis and definition. . . . Right and wrong are distinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of things." Statements like these might be quoted from other philosophers and from theologians. But we desire simply to illustrate a general style of ethical theory; and this has been done sufficiently.

16. Some remarks, however, may be added respecting Adam Smith, who stands related to the Intuitionist form of duty ethics very much as Kant does to the Rationalist. His thought is even more confused than that of Kant, especially in relation to the moral end; yet he gives better help than Kant for the right exercise of the moral judgment. Smith assumes that "passions," or feelings, are the primary objects of approval and disapproval and that actions have moral quality only as proceeding from them. His doctrine is that when one person declares the passion of another person to be right, he means merely that he sympathizes with that passion, and when he says that it is wrong he means that he is displeased with it. Thus a first person judges, and forms rules of judgment, by reason of the harmony or the dissonance of his feelings with those displayed by a second person, or by second persons. Afterwards the first person applies these rules to his own passions; and so conscience arises. "To approve of the passions of another as suitable to their objects," says Smith, "is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such is the same thing as to observe that we do not

entirely sympathize with them." With respect to judgments concerning one's self, he says, "When I endeavor to examine my own conduct, when I endeavor to pass sentence upon it and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of."

Smith does not distinguish clearly between the approbation or disapprobation of actions as virtuous or vicious and the approval or disapproval of them as right or wrong. But his fundamental error lies in failing to perceive that our sympathy with the passions of others or of ourselves is not identical with the judgment that the passions are "just and proper" and "suitable to their objects"—in other words, morally right; and that our displeasure with the passions of others and ourselves is not the same with the judgment that they are unjust, improper, unsuitable and wrong; but that, on the contrary, our sympathy and displeasure *spring from the judgment and accompany it*. Smith's theory does not explain the moral judgment, but takes it for granted. It does not show on what the judgment is founded nor even the essential conditions of its formation. It only brings before us the truth that, in order to a correct opinion concerning ourselves, we should judge about ourselves just as we should about other people. Inculcating this principle, Smith is a better counselor than Kant.

Moreover, while both authors vainly attempt to explain the moral end by theorizing respecting the manner of our apprehending it, both appear to have been indistinctly conscious that they were merely offering directions to the moral judgment. The initial "axiom" of Kant is, "There is an absolute end prescribed by reason to every one, which can be arrived at by excluding all empirical and limited ends." And while Smith teaches that the idea of right originates in the sympathies of one who observes first the conduct of others and then his own, this observer is to be "an impartial and well-informed spectator." In short, he is the "wise man." We are not to conform ourselves to what others think about us, but to what they ought to think. "We suppose ourselves," says Smith, "the spectators of our own behavior and endeavor to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. . . . If, in this view, it pleases us, we are tol-

erably satisfied: we can be more indifferent about the applause and in some measure despise the censure of the world—secure that, however misunderstood or misrepresented, we are *the natural and proper objects of approbation.*” The “spectator” of Smith is an imaginary yet useful friend who counsels men to honest judgment, even though the whole world—yes, and their selfish selves, also—were to differ from them. An appeal, says Smith, lies from the opinions of mankind “to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of their own consciences, to that of the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to that of the man within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of their conduct.” This inward monitor sympathizes, but he judges first. Then he has a conscientious sympathy with the right.

CHAPTER XX.

IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

1. The strength of duty ethics lies in its appeal to common-sense. Its weakness is to forget that common sense is only the beginning of philosophy.—2. It asserts correctly that moral rightness is the aim of duty.—3. But it neither gives an analytical definition of the morally right nor shows that the morally right is so simple as to be incapable of such a definition.—4. The doctrine of immutable and eternal morality, though sometimes extravagantly stated, calls our attention to three permanent necessities.—5. First, rational beings always have existed, and always must exist, under certain fundamental moral laws.—6. Secondly, morality has an unchangeable support in the nature and will of God.—7. And thirdly, moral life must appear in any developed universe. This last statement might be dispensed with, but has its value.—8. The doctrine that moral distinctions belong to “the nature of things” has been advocated imperfectly by Des Cartes, Cudworth, Clarke, and Kant.—9. The true foundation and significance of this doctrine. Intuitional and experiential perception distinguished. Certain moral relations have a kind of ontological necessity.

1. THE strength of duty ethics lies in its appeal to “common sense”—that is, to the practical reason of mankind as exercised about matters which fall within the immediate observation and scrutiny of all. Universal convictions which have been formed in this way are of the utmost authority. But we cannot agree with Reid that all the assertions of common sense are “first principles,” or absolutely simple truths. All men distinguish between right and wrong and consider these things not as mere conformity and non-conformity to a rule, but as qualities characterizing ends and actions. But men generally neither think nor say that right and wrong are absolutely simple things. This point does not fall within the province of common sense, but must be settled by the speculative reason. All men have definite knowledge of air and water and of the more prominent sensible qualities of these “elements.” But whether air or water

is a simple substance or not, and, if not, of what more simple substances it is composed, are questions beyond the scope of common knowledge. Questions of analysis do not fall under the ordinary scrutiny and investigation of men; nor are the facilities for determining such questions within the reach of men generally. Common sense supports duty ethics only in the assertion that explanations which do not adequately explain the moral qualities of actions should be rejected, and that it would be better to leave right and wrong unexplained than to explain them erroneously or to explain them away.

2. Some object to duty ethics that it makes an abstraction the end of moral purpose. It is allowed that rightness may be a quality of actions, but it is said that an abstract quality cannot be an object of pursuit. This objection would have some force if the "abstract quality" were something which can exist apart from the object to which it belongs. But there is no such something. The abstraction mentioned pertains entirely to our style of thought and speech—not at all to the thing spoken of. To say that one is influenced by the rightness of an end or action means only that he is influenced by the action or end as right. This language is similar to that used when we say that men are attracted by the lusciousness of fruit, or the coolness of spring water, or the value of gold, or the beauty and brilliancy of a gem. Every one understands that it is the quality as existing in the object, or the object as having the quality, that attracts.

3. The one radical defect of duty ethics is that *it leaves the fundamental problem of morality unsolved*. It neither gives any definition of the moral end nor does it show by thorough analytic thought that a definition is unnecessary and impossible. Whatever aid the common convictions of the race may give to philosophy, they cannot be accepted as ultimate doctrinal declarations. Duty ethics has the weakness of those systems whose chief reliance is the dogmatic or intuitional method. No one has the right to assert that a nature is simple till after analytic scrutiny of the various instances in which that nature is found. An examination of this kind renders a conception determinate, and then, as a result, we have either a synthetic definition, if the nature be complex, or, if it be simple, a definition giving clear knowledge through the use of distinguishing relations.

4. The main position of duty ethics, which is, in the words

of Prof. Sidgwick, that the idea of right "is to be taken as ultimate and unanalyzable," need not now be further considered. But another doctrine often taught in connection with it deserves attention. It is asserted that our perception of the fundamental forms of right and wrong resembles our perception of mathematical and metaphysical relations; that it is a necessary cognition—or rather a cognition of the necessary; and that by means of it we can discover laws that are immutable and eternal. Subjectively every judgment takes place necessarily, at least when evidence is properly considered. But some perceptions are called necessary because they assert that their objects exist necessarily, or in necessary relations. When judgments of this latter description are immediate, many distinguish them by the name *intuitions*. They might be called *necessitudinal* judgments, if this adjective were used in a wide sense and so as to cover assertions of possibility as well as those of necessity. The cognition of possibility, no less than that of necessity, is dependent on necessary relations (necessity is inferred from a necessitating antecedent, possibility from a necessary condition); and these two modes of perception with their combinations producing contingency and probability, are naturally contrasted with mere historical cognition, that is, with the simple perception of fact aside from its logical relations.

The doctrine of an abiding and changeless morality—of principles of duty which always have been and always shall be—has commended itself to thinking men. It is opposed to the opinion that there are no fixed moral laws the knowledge of which enters as a necessary factor into all rational life, and that right and wrong are merely the creations of custom and usage. But this doctrine, though a reasonable one, has suffered from an advocacy which has made use of extravagant language and of unfounded theories. Let us attempt first a statement of this doctrine, and, after that, an explanation of its philosophical basis.

5. The essential point in it is that a few rules of morality—as those supporting love and beneficence, order and justice, veracity and fidelity, and those opposing selfishness, hatred, violence and deceit—inseparably connect themselves with the nature of sentient rationality, and must always have been binding upon agents capable of understanding them. This proposition does not imply that men or creatures of equal or greater intelligence have always existed, nor that man

always has been a rational and moral agent; though, in our view, this latter position is much more reasonable than the opposite of it. It is only asserted that all rational beings who ever have existed or shall ever exist, have been and shall be moral agents. As a corollary of the necessary connection of the moral with the rational it follows that morality is possible wherever rational life is possible. We can conceive of a period when no rational beings existed; when there was only empty space and unoccupied time, or when, at least, the universe contained only material substances and their qualities. Moral law would have no place under such conditions. Yet, even at that period, on the supposition that rational beings existed, morality would be not only possible but necessary. We admit that this last-mentioned necessity is only hypothetical, and that it arises not from the "nature of things" in general, but from the nature of the beings supposed. Yet it is analogous with the immutable necessity of geometrical truth. For this does not merely mean that the content of any existing cube can be found by taking the length of one of its edges three times as a factor, but also that this would be true respecting any cube supposed to exist where there is now only empty space.

6. Further, if we grant that there is an omnipresent and self-existent spirit, the wise and mighty author of the universe, we must admit that moral ideas and relations have been always present to his mind, and that thus, in a very literal sense, there has been an "eternal and immutable morality." Theists also hold that the supreme governor of the universe lives and acts in accordance with right principles; though this is an additional doctrine to that just stated, and rests on somewhat different grounds. The immutability of the essential principles of morality is seen to be most absolute because of its relations to the power of God. The Almighty might make a sphere out of a cube, that is, out of the matter composing a cube, but he could not make a spherical cube nor give to the cube, while remaining such, the specific properties of a sphere. So, if the rationality of a spirit were destroyed, the spirit would be no longer subject to moral law; but, so long as he is rational, he is bound to the right. No power can change the radical principles of morality.

7. Finally it is contended that morality pertains, not merely to the nature of intelligent beings, but also to the "nature of things," so that it must exist if things exist at

all and must have a place in any system of being. This position has been maintained by those who hold that the knowledge of God is given to us in the same way as that of Space and Time; for then, evidently, the laws of righteousness would have dwelt eternally in the breast of the divine being. But we seem able to conceive of the non-existence of God and of a space and a time uninhabited by aught, unless it might be chaos. In reasonings of this metaphysical kind we must proceed on certain ascertained principles and claim no more than these allow. Right and wrong could not be said to pertain to a chaotic universe. If, however, the "nature of things" be taken to signify not the lowest conceivable system of being, but that form which any *κοσμος*, or developed universe, must assume; that form which reason necessarily anticipates and expects; an argument may be made to show that morality must have place in such a system.

This argument starts with the assumption that the fundamental forms of entity and their mutual relations have been learnt from the analysis of individual cognitions; in other words, it presupposes a knowledge of *space*, *time*, *quantity*, *substance* (that is, metaphysical substance, with its two genera, *spirit* and *matter*), *power*, *action* (including passive operation), *change* and *relations*. This list may be shortened by leaving out quantity as a distinct element and distributing it among the rest, since all entities are *quanta*, or somethings. Then the course of thought proceeds as follows:—Space and Time belong to the "nature of things" because (no matter what some philosophers say) nothing can exist except in space and in time. Substance is ontologically necessary because, were there no substance, there would be nothing but empty space and unrecorded time. Power, which resides only in substance, is necessary, because, without power, any world would be a dead, motionless mass. Again, this power must operate in some way according to law, else the changes produced by it would be unintelligible and unusable, and we would have nothing but a chaotic confusion and mixture of things. Then, if the universe is to be of worth or value, it must contain the means of happiness and beings capable of enjoying them. Moreover, since the realization of this end cannot come by chance, there must be all-controlling power, skill, wisdom and benevolence. Once more, in order to the experience of the highest form of happiness, which is blessedness, there must be rational spirits who can understand the

laws of well-being, who can co-operate in works of goodness, and who are capable of loving and worthy of being loved. And such beings, if they are to attain the end of their existence, must live according to the law of reason, that is, according to the law of right, which reason prescribes.

The foregoing argument justifies the assertion that, in a peculiar sense, moral rightness pertains to the "nature of things," and is ontologically necessary. But the necessity thus referred to is not causative; it does not produce a universe nor any part of one. It is that logical or metaphysical necessity which governs the progressive production and the constitution of any system of being. Moreover, as it pertains not merely to the present but to any supposable universe, it is preeminently hypothetical. While it is a law of existing things and in that light is actualistic, it does not imply that things do or must actually exist, but only that, if they exist at all, they must exist in a certain way, and that a complete cosmos (which is what reason naturally looks for) must include certain forms of entity in their appropriate relations. To some this unproductive necessity may seem unimportant; yet it is that expressed by mathematical axioms; and it is the only necessity assumed in the doctrine that the first principles of morals are immutable.

As already remarked, this doctrine has suffered from an imperfect advocacy. Some have taught that every dictate of conscience is infallible and equal in certainty and authority to every other. This is a manifest absurdity. Others have committed a more philosophical error in basing the knowledge of immutable truth—that is, of necessary and unalterable relations—on a power of intelligence which immediately apprehends this truth in the form of "innate ideas." This doctrine was advocated by Des Cartes and was applied to ethics by Cudworth in his treatise, "*De Aeternis et Immutabilibus Justi et Honesti Notionibus*." Cudworth does not claim immutability for the specific judgments of conscience, but only for the fundamental conceptions of "moral good and evil, right and wrong"—*Bonum et malum morale, justum et injustum*; and his whole argument is based on his theory of rational intelligence. He says that this intelligence does not consider things without the mind but the notions of the mind itself; he adopts the Cartesian criterion of intuitive knowledge that whatever is conceived of and understood clearly, must be absolutely true; and he explains the nature and

source of "immutable things" by saying there is an eternal mind from which all created intelligences continually receive ideas—" *Intelligentia proprie non res extra mentem versantes considerat, verum mentis ipsius notions. . . Quodcumque clare concipitur et intelligitur, id absolute verum est. L L L Est eterna quædam mens ex qua omnes intelligentiæ creatæ notiones perpetuo accipiunt.*" (Read the last two chapters of the "De Aeternis.")

Kant, taking up this theory of the intellect, destroyed its simplicity by the addition of his arbitrary and confused "categories"; properly enough, too, he carried it out to a skepticism of which his predecessors did not dream. The doctrine of an innate and necessary knowledge of moral good and evil was also adopted by Dr. Samuel Clarke, who says, "That eternal rule of right which I have been describing ought as indispensably to govern men's actions as it cannot but necessarily determine their assent."

All such philosophy, though well meant, is worse than simple dogmatism. Truth is injured when false theories are used in its support. The "intelligence" which apprehends "innate ideas," like the "pure reason" of Kant, is a mythical faculty—a needless theoretical assumption; Cudworth's saying that "knowledge does not begin with individuals but ends with them," is the reverse of truth; all human knowledge can be shown to originate in particular perceptions, and all general principles can be explained as the products of generalization. The empiricist, using—or rather misusing—these premises, asserts, as Mill and Spencer do, that our only reason for believing in abstract truth, whether metaphysical or moral, is that the frequent recurrence of some idea in connection with an antecedent idea has resulted in a habit of thought difficult and even impossible to resist. Then he adds that there is no such thing as unchangeable truth, though men may be deluded into believing that there is. Thus doubt and skepticism are introduced.

9. Those who are content with the dogmatic assertion of necessary truth and who find no difficulty in determining what fundamental truth is, may care little to know how truth is first obtained. But there are others who would confirm their faith in immutable principles by an understanding of the intellectual operations through which these principles are apprehended. For their sake we shall attempt a brief statement of the philosophical basis of necessary truth. This

statement can scarcely be made without using several words in an arbitrary and technical way. For example, the terms *experience* and *intuition* must be employed in special significations. Experience sometimes signifies *all of man's inward life so far as he is distinctly conscious of it*; as when we speak of a long and happy experience. Again, this word may indicate *our perception of present objects and relations, both external and internal*; as when we say that memory is a record of experience. In this sense experience signifies *presentational cognition in general*. At other times this term denotes *knowledge gained in immediate perception considered as accompanied by inductive judgment*; as when we speak of the lessons of experience. Let us now use the word for *the perception of mere fact* as contrasted with the perception of the necessary or logical relations of fact, or of fact as having these relations. With this conception in mind a single act of this mode of cognition might be called an experiential or empirical judgment. The knowledge obtained through such experience is expressed by the indicative mood of verbs in its primary use as the simple statement of observed or historical fact.

The term *intuition* occasionally denotes *any form of immediate cognition*. President McCosh says, "By intuition I mean that power which the mind has of perceiving objects and truths at once and without a process." In this sense all the modes of experience mentioned above, except one, would be forms of presentational intuition. Again, intuition may signify *a process of intellectual apprehension so rapid as to be apparently immediate*. In this sense the "intuition of reason" is opposed to the "discourse of reason." At present let us understand by intuition *the immediate perception of the necessary or (necessitudinal) relations of things, or of things as necessarily related*. To see that, as a matter of fact and measurement, three angles are equal to one another would be an experiential judgment, but to perceive that two of them being each equal to the third must be equal to each other, would be an intuition.

It is a peculiarity of such judgments that they take place quite as well in the absence as in the presence of their objects; for which reason they may be divided into the actualistic and the hypothetical. With reference to this peculiarity they have been called the "intuitions of the mind." A merely supposed event, as an explosion, could be as positively referred to

a sufficient imaginary cause as a real explosion would be referred to a real cause. The judgment that two parallel lines will never meet, however prolonged, holds good whether the lines actually exist or are only imagined to exist. Moreover, such judgments appear to be original and independent of all previous judgments. Of course merely mental or suppositional intuition does not produce actualistic but only hypothetical conviction; yet it is important as giving us a knowledge of "the nature of things."

The primary form of intuition is the perception of necessary relations between objects both (or all) of which are immediately present or given. But the most noted use of intuition is the inference of one object from another—of a consequent from an antecedent. For whenever an object exists in a necessary relation, *not only the relation but also the correlate must exist also*. For instance, since action is necessarily related to agent, we can say that, if an action take place, there must be an agent. All inference, and every step of reasoning, can be accounted for in this way.

The convictional force of every intuition lies in the implicit or explicit recognition of an absolutely necessary form of existential connection, or of what we may call an ontological necessity. But our primary intuitions and most of those occurring in daily thought contain specific matter with which the ontological element is clothed and *on which the convictional force of the judgment does not depend*. And so, though all intuitions are truly ontological, there are some which pre-eminently deserve that name; and we may divide intuitions into the ontological and the cosmological, if we limit the former designation to those judgments which use only that thought on which the necessity of sequence depends. Throwing salt into water we see experientially, as a mere fact, that it is dissolved, and also, intuitionally, that this takes place necessarily by reason of a power in the water to act in that way. This intuition is not that of a cause and an effect simply as such, but of a particular cause producing a particular effect. Nevertheless it contains implicitly the simple, or pure, cognition of cause and effect. In like manner, that a thread of silk or cotton or a wire of platinum or of gold extends farther when stretched to straightness than when bent or curved, embodies the mathematical conviction that the straight line is the shortest between two points. In short, cosmological embraces ontological intuition much as a variegated landscape

includes figures, positions, directions and distances, as distinguishable from colors and shades. Ontological intuition takes place originally in this concealed way; after which it acquires separate existence by abstraction; and is yet farther removed from fact by generalization; by which axioms and postulates arise. These last have only the authority of the judgments from which they are derived; the criterion of intuition is not the clearness with which first principles may be conceived, but that absolute irresistible conviction which attends the cognition of individual cases of necessity.

The law according to which universal truth is obtained from particular perceptions pertains to entity in general, and may be called the homologic law. It is that *like logical antecedents are accompanied by like consequents*. The knowledge of it arises in the same way as that of any other axiom; that is, it is abstracted from particular intuitions respecting similar cases of logical sequence.

The foregoing statement regarding the perception of necessary truth might be enlarged by showing how this intuition discerns possibility and contingency as well as necessity and impossibility, and how the ontologically contingent is that which may and may not have place in any constitution of things, while the cosmologically contingent is that which may and may not have place in the existing cosmos. A thing might be ontologically contingent which is cosmologically either necessary or impossible; because the specific laws of the universe could be changed by the power that made them and their necessity depends on that power, while the necessary laws of being are not alterable by any power whatever. But these matters, and indeed this whole subject, belong to metaphysics rather than to ethics. Those interested in the philosophy of necessitudinal thought will find it pretty thoroughly discussed in the *PERCEPTIONALIST*, and in the *MODALIST*. Our aim at present has been to state, rather than to advocate, the doctrinal basis on which right and wrong are said to be perceived intuitively—to be the self-evident properties of certain ends and actions—to be absolutely necessary relations—to be immutable and eternal—to pertain to the very “nature of things.” The essential point of these teachings is that the distinction of right and wrong—or, more simply, the idea of moral rightness—is asserted, hypothetically, in an intuition of ontological necessity. The original cognition of moral qualities takes place in connection with the actual conduct of

ourselves and others, but, perceiving these qualities to be necessarily inherent in rational conduct, we say that wherever and whenever rational beings exist, their conduct must have moral character, and that this necessity is one which no power can alter or destroy: in this sense it is absolute and ontological. It belongs, of course, to the existing universe, but it is not merely cosmological. For no power whatever could make it other than right that rational beings should love each other and care for each other's welfare, should observe truth and justice in their dealings with one another, and should cultivate virtue and hate vice; nor could the opposite of these things be made anything else than wrong. The eternal immutability of moral principle means that, on the supposition of rational beings existing at any period or place whatever, there and at that time the claims of morality must have existed too.

But little more than the foregoing is implied when right and wrong are ascribed to the necessary "nature" or "constitution" of things. This doctrine views entity collectively and as composed of related elements; and it asserts that no universe could be complete without rational beings and their morality. The conclusion thus presented is not an immediate intuition, but rather a deduction from intuitions. Nor is it so important as the truth that right and wrong are necessarily connected with rationality.

The question whether there is any immutable basis of morality is merely collateral to the inquiries, "What are the principles of morality, what is their essential nature, and what is the ground of their obligatoriness and value?" Moreover these inquiries should be pursued by a direct examination of the moral judgments of men rather than through metaphysical discussions. But the doctrine of immutability has importance; it is opposed to the error that right and wrong are the arbitrary distinctions of custom or of authority.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE MORAL LAW.

1. In the original and limited use of the term a law is either a general command or the mode of conduct for a recurrent case prescribed by such a command. In a wider sense a law is a mode of action or of being consequent upon some antecedent; in other words a general mode of sequence. 2. Under this broad acceptation laws are either causational, logical, or practical. A causational law has a productive antecedent. The antecedent of a logical law involves connection of existence, but exerts no power. A practical law has an end for its antecedent, and, for its consequent, the means which one must employ if he desire to obtain the end.—3. Rules prescribed by authority are practical laws even though the only end to be gained is the avoidance of threatened penalty. But generally they have other ends than this. Most practical laws are not dictated by authority at all but only by wisdom and experience. Primarily the moral law attracts and obligates, not by reason of any command or penalty, but by reason of its own rightness. Cicero quoted.—4. The essence of the moral law lies in its generic end, its rightness. To determine what rightness is we must group moral requirements according to their radical similarities, and, after that, obtain their common quality by a process of analysis and generalization. Existing classifications are too pragmatical for this purpose.—5. A fourfold classification proposed. Its terminology. Moral Goodness, Moral Esteem, Regulative Righteousness, and Causative Righteousness, defined.—6. The duty of Moral Goodness is divisible into doing good and loving beings. So also Moral Esteem and Regulative Righteousness have both practical and affectional requirements.—7. Often the same term designates both a virtue (or motive moral principle) and the action at which it aims. It may contribute to clearness to apply the terms “practive” and “commotive” to the virtues and “practical.” and “affectional” to the duties. For example, Practive and Commotive Moral Goodness may be contrasted with Practical and Affectional Moral Goodness. Commonly, however, the context shows whether the moral principle or the moral action is intended.—8. Causative Righteousness may be subdivided into the Rudimentary, or Incipient; the Instructional, or Educative; and the Rectoral or Retributive.—9. Rectoral Righteousness seeks to promote virtue and to suppress vice by means of governmental power, and especially by the use of rewards and pun-

ishments. Punitive Justice is the most prominent development of it. The animus of this justice is to be distinguished from anger, which, of itself, is not a moral but a natural motivity.

1. THE term "law" is sometimes used objectively to signify a prescribed or established mode of action or sequence, and sometimes subjectively to indicate a form of thought or of statement, setting forth the mode of action or sequence.—This second meaning appears when law is said to be written, proclaimed or stated. It is wholly subordinate to the first, since the mental or verbal formula has value only as presenting a mode of doing or being. Apart from that it would not be a law, but merely a thought. This subjective sense is so closely related to the objective that many make no distinction between the two. But there is a difference. We shall now employ the word in its objective signification, using the subjective chiefly or only as an indirect expression of the other.

Etymologists derive the word "law" from the Anglo-Saxon verb signifying to lay; they compare it with the German "*Gesetz*," which is derived from the verb "*setzen*," to place. Originally, therefore, the word indicated a rule laid down by authority and then the conduct required by the rule. It still retains these significations; when we speak of "the law of the land," or say that "jurisprudence is the science of positive or municipal law," we have in mind rules or modes of doing prescribed and enforced by civil government. Because of certain analogies, however, the word, especially in philosophic and scientific writings, has come to express other conceptions. We speak of the laws of physics and of mechanics, of mathematics and metaphysics, of art and of duty. In these cases a law is a mode of operation or of being, but it is no longer a mode of action prescribed by authority. Nevertheless one definition is applicable to all forms of law and sets forth a radical nature common to them all. We may say, "Law is a general mode of sequence in which some consequent is conceived of as accompanying or following some antecedent."

A single case of sequence would not be a law, neither would any number of individual cases. A law is essentially a general object—a "universal," if we may use the old scholastic term. That universals do not exist at all, while yet, because of the applicability of the general to the individual, we think and speak of them as if they did exist, is the assertion of

mental science. All general assertions resemble hypothetical assertions in that they are made regarding non-existing objects and yet are capable of expressing truth in relation to existing objects. (See the PERCEPTIONALIST, Chap. XXVIII.) Using thought and language in this way we say that laws in general are divisible into three comprehensive classes, the *causational*, the *logical*, and the *practical*.

2. In causational law adequate power to produce an effect is always part of the antecedent. That is what is meant when we call the antecedent a cause. Such an antecedent is always prior in time to its consequent; which is not the case with other antecedents. Since we constantly infer from cause to effect, even while we have no wish to use the cause instrumentally and are simply inquiring concerning fact, causational law may be considered a species of the logical. But causational sequence, because of its peculiar and aggressive operation, is contrasted with other laws that can be used in inference, and is naturally separated from them in classification. It might be said that a law of cause and effect is not in itself a law of inference, and that its logical use is a consequence of its metaphysical nature. Every logical law, however, is primarily a law of entity or being—a metaphysical law, or at least one that derives its strength from some ontological principle. The peculiarity of causational law is that it proceeds from cause to effect. Other laws enable us to say that, if an antecedent be granted, the consequent must follow certainly or probably or contingently, but these laws do not set forth a producing necessity and do not admit of an instrumental use. They are distinguished as logical because they are preeminently logical—because reason has no use for them except for purposes of knowledge. Such are the principles of geometry and of mathematical science, and those universal laws of conviction discussed in pure logic. That mode of sequence, also, according to which an adequate cause may be inferred from an effect, may be ranked as logical.

Practical laws are those which set forth some form of action or conduct as needed or required for the attainment of some end. The proposed end is the antecedent; the action necessary for its attainment is the consequent. The law is, "If that end is to be realized, this action must be performed." Practical laws differ from the causational because they do not proceed from cause to effect, but from a conceived and desirable result to the means of bringing it about. They are

founded on that logical law whereby an appropriate cause is inferred from a given effect. But this is done merely hypothetically, and not with any aim of ascertaining fact, but for the purpose of influencing the will.

In logical law the antecedent justifies the inference that the consequent exists if the antecedent does; in practical law the antecedent does not support such a conclusion; for it is not complete either as a causational or as a logical antecedent. In order that it may become such we must know whether or not the agent is determined to realize the end. With that information we can infer causationally (and logically) that the action will, or will not, be performed. In that case the practical law receives an addition and is employed in a new way; in other words, it becomes causational when united with will and desire on the part of the agent. This combination causes action; and, through action, the desired result is realized. With reference to this fact the antecedent of a practical law—the end or aim which it sets forth—has been called a “final cause,” although it is not at all causative of itself. It is only a causal condition which may become effectual when adopted and sought for by some intelligent and voluntary agent.

The doctrine that every law, whether causational, logical or practical, is a mode of sequence, is imperfectly stated by those who say that every law is a mode of action or being. Thus the laws of physics, chemistry, botany and zoology, the axioms of mathematics, metaphysics and logic, and the rules of success in commerce, social intercourse, art, civil government, and industrial occupations, are said to set forth modes of action or of being. For example, in physics we learn of attractions and repulsions, which are modes of action; in mathematics of equalities and inequalities, which are modes of being; in commerce of honesty, and in art of conformity to nature, which are modes both of being and of doing. So it is asserted that every law is a mode of operation or of existence. This statement only partially expresses the truth. A mode of action or being is not of itself a law but only the most prominent element in the law. There is always a sequence or connection whereby the mode of action or being is attached to an appropriate antecedent. The essence of causational law is that the effect should follow a productive antecedent. Every mathematical law sets forth a consequence; not simply, for example, the fact that two

lines are parallel, but that they must be parallel because they are both parallel to a third; and so with every ontological principle. Practical laws, likewise, set forth not modes of doing simply, but those modes of doing which must (or should) be adopted in order to gain certain ends. This is a kind of sequence in which the "final cause" is antecedent and the needful instrument or method the consequent. Every law, therefore, is a general mode of sequence.

3. As already seen the word *law* was not applied at first to causational or logical sequences, nor even to practical methods or procedures, in general, but only to rules or modes of action prescribed by authority. In these last the end prominently set forth is freedom from penalty and the good-will of persons in power. But, in all likelihood, the original conception of law contemplated other reasons for conduct than the influence of external authority. Even in the simplest stages of society both rulers and ruled were not beasts animated only by passion and fear, but rational beings. We are of the opinion that the earliest laws were ordained and were respected as setting forth modes of conduct necessary to human welfare and demanded by right and justice. We believe that authority itself was originally obeyed by many, not so much from a dread of punishment as from a sense of loyalty to a just and necessary institution. In short, primitive law embodied the requirements of propriety and of duty no less than the demands of power. Afterwards, when either duty or interest or any other aim required some form of doing, the words *rule* and *law* came to be applied to the mode of procedure promotive of the end, whether it was prescribed by authority or not. Hence we have the laws of art, which are those rules according to which objects of taste and beauty may be produced; and those of rhetoric, which are the rules in compliance with which spoken or written discourse may be made pleasing and persuasive or convincing. And so war, commerce, agriculture, education, navigation—every form of human pursuit—has its laws, or principles of procedure.

In like manner moral law in general, and every moral law in particular, sets forth some mode of action for the realization of the right or for the prevention of the wrong. Frequently such law is enforced by penalties and rewards, but this is not the essential part of it; it is only a supplementary addition. After certain conduct is seen to be right

and obligatory it is also seen that men may be induced by governmental measures to consider and to adopt this conduct. In this way authority becomes a moral agency. But the mere demand of threatening power is without moral quality. Sometimes, indeed, using language figuratively, we say that the law, not as laid down by any judge or ruler, but simply as setting forth the right, has authority. This means simply that the morally right is of itself morally obligatory. Therefore we find no fault with Cicero's language in defining law, that is, moral law. He says that it is the supreme rule implanted in us by nature, which commands those things which ought to be done and prohibits the contrary. —*Lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt prohibetque contraria.*

4. Such being the case, it is plain that the nature of moral law is to be understood from those ends which it urges upon our adoption, and which are the foundation of its obligatoriness. A practical rule ordained by external authority has an additional force to that of the end proposed by the rule itself, and, in case this end does not appeal in any way to the agent, the only force of the rule is that of the outward compulsion. But those practical laws which arise simply from the perceived necessity of some work or doing for the effectuation of an end, have all their life and importance from the end as naturally appealing to the rational spirit. This evidently is the case with moral law. Hence every rule of duty is to be understood through a study of its end; and the moral law in general is to be understood through a definition of the right as the generic aim of morality.

In order to determine this conception according to the analytic method all forms and modes of duty must be brought before the mind in some comprehensive classification. Such an arrangement of duties should include all things moral and exclude all that are non-moral, but its chief aim must be to co-ordinate duties with reference to the most comprehensive aims of morality. The ancient four-fold division of virtues will not answer our purpose here, chiefly because it does not follow this principle of classification. "Wisdom, justice, fortitude and temperance," would be sufficiently inclusive and exclusive only if we should understand by wisdom that moral prudence which seeks to know the right; by justice, righteousness in general, including dutiful beneficence and benevolence; and by fortitude and temperance, two natural disposi-

tions which must be exercised according to principle and in support of principle. Even so this division would relate more to the development of moral life as experienced by the ancients than to the fundamental aims of duty.

The scholastic classification of virtues into the intellectual, the moral and the theological, is also unadapted to our purpose. According to St. Thomas the "*virtutes intellectuales*" (wisdom, judgment and intuition) are virtues merely in the sense of furnishing a power of well-doing, and not in the sense of causing a right use of the power. That is, they are virtues only according to that ancient acceptation whereby the word virtue may be applied to excellent gifts as well as to right dispositions.—*Cum habitus intellectuales speculativi partem appetitivam non perficiant sed solam intellectivam, hactenus tantum virtutes dici possunt, quod bene operandi facultatem faciant, non autem quod faciant potentia seu habitu bene uti.* But, says Aquinas, the "*virtutes morales*" have an ethical quality of themselves because they pertain to the "appetitive," or, as we would say, to the motive, part of our nature.—*Quævis virtus humana est vel intellectualis, quæ ad intellectum, vel moralis, quæ ad appetitum, spectat.* For this reason they are the "principal" or "cardinal" virtues; that is, they alone are virtues in that strictly ethical sense which the term has at the present day.—*Morales virtutes, cum appetitus rectitudinem solæ contineant, solæ cardinales seu principales dicuntur.* These virtues are four in number, "*prudentia, scilicet, justitia, temperantia et fortitudo.*" The theological virtues are of the same general nature as the moral; they are given a separate place, however, because they are specially developed in man's spiritual and eternal life. They are three in number—faith, hope and charity. (SUMMA MORALIS, quæstiones LVII., LVII., LXI., LXII.)

Modern writers seldom attempt any arrangement of duties except in connection with applied ethics. Then they generally make a division based on the personal relations of the agent. We hear of duties to one's self, to one's neighbor, to one's family, to society, to the state and to God; or of duties pertaining to man as a physical, a psychical, a social, a political and a religious being. In theoretical morals most authors advocate some universal principle of duty without giving any generic classification of duties. To this rule Professor Whewell is an exception. Rejecting the ancient four-fold

division as of little value, he offers a new list of cardinal virtues. "We have," he says, "five ideas, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order, which may be considered as the elements of the central idea of morality, or as the Cardinal Points of the Supreme Rule of human action." (ELEMENTS OF MORALITY, Bk. III., Ch. II.)

This list has some advantages over the ancient and mediæval enumerations. It gives proper prominence to benevolence, and it denies a cardinal place to virtues which are chiefly supplementary to others. Every one of the five virtues mentioned seeks a right and obligatory end of its own—a principle of classification which theoretic ethics calls for. Nevertheless Whewell's list seems lacking in completeness. It would be difficult to say under what heads to put prudence, reverence, esteem for the good, faith, hope, fortitude, self-restraint, and other virtues. This classification would not serve for a comprehensive survey of morality without considerable explanation and modification. Instead of attempting that we shall venture upon an arrangement of our own, not far removed from ordinary thought—perhaps nothing more than a formulation of such thought; and shall endeavor in this way to present the whole moral law for critical examination.

5. All duties, we believe, may be divided into those of MORAL GOODNESS, MORAL ESTEEM, REGULATIVE RIGHTEOUSNESS, and CAUSATIVE RIGHTEOUSNESS.

The terms used in this statement are primarily indicative not of duties but of virtues; while, of course, we are aiming to understand duties. Inasmuch however, as the classification of duties corresponds with that of the virtuous dispositions which seek to perform them, it is possible for us to express the one in the terms of the other. There is a necessity in our modern languages to use words in this way, because there is a scarcity of separate designations for duties, and because, as Whewell remarks, the same term—as beneficence, righteousness, justice or purity—is often used both for the moral disposition and for the conduct to which it leads. Only let it be remembered that our present object is not to study virtue but duty.

The duties of Moral Goodness are to promote the welfare of sentient beings and to love them. Those of Moral Esteem are to treat rational beings in the manner which their moral character renders right and proper and to feel towards them

according to their worthiness or unworthiness of our affection. Those of Regulative Righteousness are to observe the different rules of right doing, and to exercise rightly our natural dispositions. Causative Righteousness aims to develop and further every form of virtue in ourselves and in others; it is a reflex exercise of principle; and is called causative by way of preeminence. For while all virtue is an efficient cause, this virtue seeks to cause virtue itself and so becomes a cause of the cause of doing what is right and good.

We shall understand more clearly hereafter how Moral Esteem is a modification of Moral Goodness and how Causative Righteousness has a radical community of nature with Regulative Righteousness, and how, therefore, all morality might be divided into Goodness and Righteousness. Indeed, under a yet higher generalization, Goodness (that is, Moral Goodness) and Righteousness (or *Justitia Generalis*) might be identified. This would agree with Whewell's use of "Moral Goodness" as the all-comprehensive designation of virtue, and also with the ancient and mediæval inclusion of benevolence (or goodness in the more limited sense) under righteousness in general. But we now employ terms, as men commonly do, to express certain specific and contrasted conceptions. According to these Moral Goodness and Moral Esteem deal directly with persons and with the treatment and consideration of persons, while Regulative and Causative Righteousness are directly concerned with methods and measures. The distinction thus presented is not very fundamental, because all duty deals with conduct and with conduct only as affecting persons; still it is a natural distinction, and it may be helpful in our search after the radical nature of the moral law.

6. In an early discussion of the present treatise (Chap. VI.) it was seen that the conception of an action in morals is very broad and covers the intentional exercise of affection or desire as well as the intentional use of power for some outward result. For example, benevolence, gratitude, reverence, courage, humility, considered as consciously cherished feelings, are dutiful actions, although outside of morals—in psychology, for instance—they might pass simply as modes of feeling. In ethics every intentional mode of life comes under the head of conduct, and we say that two modes of action may be right or wrong, the practical and the affectional. Now it is noticeable that both these forms of conduct

are prominently present in each of the first three generic forms of duty and constitute their natural subdivisions. In Moral Goodness we distinguish at once the duty of doing good and that of cherishing love or benevolence. In Moral Esteem the duty of showing special favor to the upright is accompanied by that of cultivating special good-will towards them: corresponding proprieties also justify the withholding of favor, whether practical or affectional, from the wicked. In Regulative Righteousness we both observe the rules of right doing because of their rightness and exercise natural dispositions (gratitude, awe, fear, courage, candor, modesty) in the degree and manner which the nature of the case requires. Causative Righteousness, also, since it fosters every kind of virtue, may be said to aim at both practical and affectional duty. This Righteousness, however, differs from other forms of virtue in that its immediate aim is neither external conduct nor the regulation of natural affection, but the conservation and advancement of moral principle. Its importance arises from the various ways in which it contributes to this end; therefore, also, its natural logical subdivision is different from that of the other departments of morality.

Moral Goodness and Regulative Righteousness are the more fundamental forms of virtue, because each of these is presupposed in Moral Esteem and in Causative Righteousness. Moreover, Moral Goodness, because of the simplicity of its aims, claims our attention in advance of Regulative Righteousness. We shall therefore begin the analysis of the moral law with the study of Moral Goodness, and, next after that, we shall discuss Regulative Righteousness. Again, dividing each of these according to its immediate aims, we shall consider Practical Moral Goodness, and Affectional Moral Goodness; and also Practical Regulative Righteousness, and Affectional Regulative Righteousness.

7. These designations here indicate different forms of virtue or moral principle. They are, however, affected with an ambiguity inasmuch as they may be used to signify not the virtues but the modes of conduct at which the virtues aim. Ordinarily the context will show which signification is intended. But were a terminology desired for the formulation of a distinction, which should always be borne in mind, that virtuous principle which aims at doing good or at doing right might be distinguished as *practive* virtue, while that

which aims at the right exercise of benevolence or any other natural disposition might be distinguished as *commotive* virtue. Then the terms *practical* and *affectional* might be reserved for the modes of conduct at which the virtues aim. With this terminology we might speak of Practive and Commotive Moral Goodness as forms of moral principle, and of Practical and Affectional Moral Goodness as modes of right conduct. In like manner we might speak of Practive and Commotive Righteousness and of Practical and Affectional Righteousness.

The word "commotive" is adopted because, as will appear more fully hereafter, moral principle strives to make the exercise of our natural feelings consentaneous and co-operative with the practical requirements of the moral law.

Here, also, it is to be noticed that natural feelings, even while exercised as duties under the control of commotive virtue, are themselves called virtues—a use of language probably due to the fact that commotive virtue mingles with the sentiments which it superintends and regulates. But neither this nor the ambiguity affecting the terms Moral Goodness and Regulative Righteousness, need trouble those who do not take words for thoughts, and who study the very phenomena, or facts, which are the subjects of investigation.

8. This preliminary survey of the moral law may be concluded by mentioning the specific modes of causative righteousness. These may be enumerated as three: the Rudimentary, or Incipient; the Instructional, or Educative; and the Rectoral, or Retributive. They are easily distinguishable from each other, yet may, and often do, unite in operation. The rudimentary or incipient form of causative righteousness may be seen in those efforts which one makes incidentally, and without the deliberate use of methods or agencies, for the stimulation of virtue in himself and others. A man may not only be conscious of a right will and of good intentions, but may also be desirous to continue and to progress in virtue. With this end in view while faithfully performing duty, he may designedly turn his thoughts away from inducements to evil and direct them to reasons showing the importance, the excellence and the attractiveness of right conduct. When cases of this kind occur there is a reflex exercise of principle more immediate than that of causative virtue in general. The agent uses a self-determining power in connection with the specific pursuit of duty, and this self-regulation aims

principally at the same ends which are being dutifully sought at the time. Thus while all causative virtue is in a sense reflexive, this incipient form of it is particularly so. In like manner if a man were associated with another upon whom some duty immediately devolved—especially if it were a duty common to them both, he might counsel and influence that other as a soldier might encourage a comrade in battle. And this, too, would be a rudimentary exercise of causative righteousness.

The more developed modes of this disposition arise when general conceptions of virtue as moral good and of vice as moral evil are entertained. Then it is seen that every proper effort should be made to promote the one and to repress the other. These ends are of such supreme importance that they excel all other ends in life; they seem to be the supreme ends in the Universe. Without them many points in the providential treatment of mankind are quite inexplicable.

The most obvious mode of developed causative righteousness is that which seeks to inform the mind respecting the principles of duty and to train the spirit to habits of correct conduct. On this account it has been characterized as instructional and educative. Every one should seek moral enlightenment and should cultivate in himself all virtuous dispositions. Therefore the good man delights in the law of the Lord and meditates on its precepts day and night. He separates himself from the counsels of the wicked, and joins himself to the society of the righteous. He reads good books and sacred writings, waits upon the ministry of consecrated men, and fills his mind with lofty ideals and examples. Through prayer and in the public and private worship of the Almighty he hopes for spiritual progress.

He labors also for the improvement of others, whether old or young. Hence the kind admonitions of parents and employers; hence Sabbath-schools and churches, Christian endeavor societies, missionary organizations, and every agency for the suppression of vice and for the moral elevation of the people. One of the chief aims in any system of public education should be the dissemination of right principles and the creation of noble character.

9. Another development of causative righteousness, and perhaps the most philosophically important, is that which supports the moral law by the employment of rewards, and punishments. We have called it *rectoral* because it devolves

especially upon official judges and rulers, but it should affect the conduct of all wise persons who find themselves entrusted with the control of others. The duties of this virtue differ from those of moral esteem in that the latter do not aim at the promotion of morality, but are simply the becoming treatment of men according to their moral character. Evidently, however, the same act may be inspired by both these principles of duty. The end of Rectoral Righteousness is to uphold and honor the law through a certain bestowal of good and infliction of evil. It is called *retributive* because retribution in the wide sense includes both the rewarding of well-doers and the punishment of transgressors. The infliction of penalties is so prominent in human experience that it almost monopolizes the phrase "retributive justice." This, however, applies to the righteousness which rewards as well as to that which punishes. Strictly speaking, Punitive Justice is a species of Retributive Justice.

When one person is conscious of receiving harm or pain from another, anger or resentment arises, including a desire to repel the assailant by inflicting suffering on him, and causing a satisfaction in his suffering. This anger is not a moral but a natural motivity; it may be cherished in a way that is irrational, immoral and wrong. Only when it unites its animus with the spirit of punitive justice, it becomes righteous indignation. But, even in that case, Punitive Justice is to be distinguished from resentment in that it is a rational motivity and seeks a rational end. It strives to maintain the law and advance the cause of righteousness through the infliction of threatened evil upon the sinner.

CHAPTER XXII.

MORAL GOODNESS.

1. The duties of beneficence and benevolence illustrated and defined. They include care and affection for oneself. Confucius, Meng-tseu, and Moses, quoted.—2. Practive moral goodness, or principled beneficence, distinguished (1) from commotive moral goodness and (2) from morally exercised benevolence or sympathy. It is sometimes unaccompanied with affection. It aims at good as a right end.—3. This good is not “moral good,” or virtue (which is the aim of Causative Righteousness) but simply whatever promotes happiness or prevents misery.—4. And it is not private (or privatively related) good, but all the good of which the case admits, or any part of that total.—5. We call this Absolute Good, using the word “absolute,” not in any peculiar philosophic sense, but to indicate the unrestricted completeness of the good—all the relations of one’s action having been considered.—6. Men seek absolute good in a great variety of ways ; and are often more sensible of its value than of its absoluteness.—7. Right loving is equally important with right doing, but it is a duty of secondary development. The immediate aim of Commotive Goodness is to cherish natural affection consensually with the aim and operation of Practive Goodness.—8. But Commotive, no less than Practive Goodness, finds its ultimate law in absolute good as an end. Because right affection (1) is a necessary concomitant of right doing, (2) adds to the motive force of beneficent principle, and (3) is itself a noble source of happiness.—9. The study of other forms of duty will throw light on the laws of Moral Goodness.

1. BENEFICENCE and benevolence, which are the duties of Moral Goodness, appeal to all men, though they are disregarded by many. The sentiment of the Roman writer, “*Homo sum; humanum nihil a me alienum puto*,” is approved by every thinking heart. A yet wider virtuous sympathy was expressed by the Christian poet, who wrote, “I would not number on my list of friends the man who needlessly sets foot upon a worm.” Confucius taught that “the chief of all the virtues is humanity,” that “one should love all mankind with all the strength and compass of one’s affec-

tion," and that "the superior man is he who feels the same kindness towards all." His disciple, Meng-tseu, declared, "The doctrine of our Master consists solely in having uprightness of heart and loving our neighbor as ourselves." "To act towards men as we wish that they should act toward us, this is the doctrine of humanity." In the Hebrew Scriptures we read, "Trust in the Lord and do good; so shalt thou dwell in the land, and verily thou shalt be fed": and in the New Testament it is written, "To do good and to communicate forget not; for with such sacrifices God is well pleased." We are also given this "commandment," that "he who loveth God love his brother also; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God, whom he hath not seen?" Supreme moral excellence is set forth in the assertion, "God is love"; and the ethical importance of right affection is inculcated in the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind; this is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets."

These last statements, quoted by our Saviour from Moses, are noticeable on account of their comprehensiveness. We are to love God supremely because he is the great spirit, and because of his infinite worthiness and goodness. And we are to love our fellow-man, not to the exclusion of ourselves, but as we love ourselves. This agrees with the doctrine that we should love all beings capable of being loved and do good to all beings capable of receiving good. Beneficence and benevolence often signify forms of good-will towards others. We must now use these terms in a wide sense so as to include affection for one's self and a rational regard for one's own welfare. The scope of these virtues is unlimited.

2. The conceptions of Scripture and those of common life, being products of the practical rather than of the speculative intellect, cannot be expected to yield complete answers to philosophic questions. They enable us to distinguish the duties of Moral Goodness into loving beings and doing good, but they do not enable us to determine how these duties are related to one another. At first it might be supposed that the whole virtue of Moral Goodness lay in loving and that the whole duty of Moral Goodness lay in doing good. This would be a defective statement. Right affection is a duty

which may be required of us; and the doing of good, if it be not merely an intentional but also a desiderative or dispositional action (Chap. VI.), may be an exercise of the virtue of beneficence. There is need here of the distinction which recognizes Practive and Commotive Goodness, as two forms of virtuous principle, and Practical and Affectional Goodness, as the two modes of conduct aimed at by the two forms of principle respectively. We do not know that Commotive Moral Goodness has heretofore been given a name by any writers, but some have designated Practive Moral Goodness by the phrase "Rational Love." This virtue commingles with commotive goodness and with dutiful affection and is assisted in the production of good deeds by the co-operation of these motivities. It is, nevertheless, distinguishable from love in the ordinary sense of the word. It is simply the disposition to do good because that doing is right and dutiful.

Some might say that in Practive Moral Goodness we aim only at what is right as such and not at good. That would be an inexact assertion. Consciousness testifies that we aim at good *as being good and as being right*. Hence while one might question whether Practive Moral Goodness aims at good for its own sake, it certainly does aim at it as such; and the wonder is that when one aims thus at good he does not also always desire it with affection and tenderness. The question arises, Why is not right love or benevolence (which is the immediate aim of Commotive Goodness) an invariable concomitant of the exercise of Practive Goodness? For Practive Goodness—Principled Beneficence—especially if it be put forth on a grand scale and with distant results in view (as in movements for political reform and the administration of public charities) does not necessarily involve what we ordinarily mean by love or affection.

This possible separation of affection from that virtue which seeks the good of beings may be accounted for by the difference between those motivities which spring from our abstract thinkings and those which originate from our more immediate and direct cognitions. (Chap. IX.) The former, though spiritual tendencies as truly as the latter, are not commonly spoken of as such but as active "principles"; for example, we speak of the principle of self-interest or of duty; while the latter, even while they may be accompanied, guided and regulated by rational thought, retain their peculiar character as affections, inclinations, sympathies and so forth. They are

more restricted and more definitely personal in their regards than the rational principles of action; and they are more emotional and impulsive.

Practive Moral Goodness, as a motivity independent of affection and as the simplest form of moral activity, naturally claims our attention before Commotive Moral Goodness. It consists in the *ex animo* observance of the law of doing good to beings, and should be studied with reference to the end at which it aims and to that exercise of reason whereby the end is apprehended. In saying "we ought to do good to beings," plainly the emphatic word is "good." The labor, or the doing (which is labor intentionally employed so as to effect a desired end) would be a thing indifferent were it not a laboring for, or a doing of, *good*. The whole moral force of the law lies in the end which it sets before us; and which, by reason of its very nature, is right and obligatory. Therefore, to understand the law of Practive Goodness, we must understand the nature of that good which it seeks to realize.

3. First, then, let us note that the good now spoken of is not moral good or virtuous excellence. The function of seeking moral excellence for ourselves and others belongs specifically to Causative Righteousness and not to Moral Goodness. The end at which this goodness aims is simply the pleasure, comfort and happiness of sentient beings and their deliverance from suffering and sorrow. For men give the name "good" to anything which invariably or essentially is productive of happiness or preventive of misery, and which, therefore, may be said causally or conditionally to contain happiness. (Chap. II.) "Good" is the same idea generalized. How far moral and natural good have a community of nature will be considered hereafter. We are now thinking only of natural good.

4. In the next place, it is evident that Practive Moral Principle, while striving for this good, does not seek any private, or personal, or particular end, or interest, as such. For if, in any case, we should aim at private good, or some special interest or interests, to the neglect of other interests involved, we might find ourselves doing more harm than good, or, at the least, we might be guilty of leaving good undone. Either of these results would be contrary to right principle. Practive Moral Goodness seeks that good which, all things considered, will be not merely a good but also

all the good of which the case admits: and this good can be considered either as a whole or in any part or parts of it as related to the whole. To express this, the generic aim of dutiful goodness, we can think of no better name than the phrase, "absolute good" or "the absolutely good," applying these words very widely to the means and conditions of happiness, but otherwise in their ordinary signification. Absolute Good, or 'The Absolutely Good,' is the total good possible to be realized in any case—that is, in any conjunction of agencies and circumstances affecting interests; or any element of that total considered as a part of it. This latter is the form of the notion which presents itself most frequently. We perceive that the prosecution of some particular interest or the attainment of some particular good is both good in the ordinary sense and also falls in with the total of good possible in the case; and so we seek it dutifully as unexceptionably and absolutely good. We do this not with any mathematical exactitude of thought; for that seldom enters into the sphere of moral life; but with a probable and practical judgment.

5. The word "absolute" as employed above has a different meaning from that given to it by some philosophers who say that the absolute is the "unconditioned and the infinite," and that it is "unrelated" and "inconceivable"—incomprehensible and unintelligible. The illogical pretentious agnosticism connected with this futile conception has brought the word "absolute" into disrepute. We would have preferred some other term in the present discussion if a suitable one could have been found.

Again, the good now contemplated is not to be confounded with that "absolute good" which Janet makes the end aimed at in moral life. At least, if it be the same thing, it is not conceived of and defined in the same way. Janet's "*Le Bien Absolu*" is an ideal metaphysical perfection immediately discernible by reason, and which, without any reference to happiness, is the guiding star of conduct. Though happiness results from devotion to this high aim, the end sought is not happiness but perfection. The professor advocates this doctrine eloquently in the last chapter of the first book of his treatise. His thought is argumentative and eclectic without being analytic; and gives no clear conception either of the moral end in general or of any specific moral end.

The good of which we now speak is absolute, not because

the conception of it is a simple inexplicable and unchangeable gift of the reason; nor yet because it is without conditions or limitations. The idea of it is constructed from our knowledge of the causes of happiness and of suffering. Like all good of which we can have any conception this good is conditioned and limited. But *it is without any save necessary limitations*. The variety of its specific forms corresponds with the numberless capacities of pain or pleasure belonging to sentient beings; its sources are the multiplied means of happiness which can be rationally employed; it is distributed impartially among all persons whom it can affect according to their just claims; the time for its realization is that dictated by wisdom and which is neither to be unduly hastened nor unduly delayed; its duration may be that of the passing hour, or of a lifetime, or of ages to come; the degree, the kind, the relative proportion, of its components, are determined only by the law of its own fullness. In every respect it is as absolute as good can be.

6. In ancient times when a weaver had completed a piece of cloth by filling up all the length of his warp, he loosened his work from the loom and spoke of it as *absolutum*, or finished. His product had then been fully wrought, and could not be further improved by him. In like manner, should a moral agent accomplish all the good of which the case admits, the result of his effort would be absolute or complete; and he should aim at this result. In the application of this principle any action is deemed good which either produces enjoyment unattended with evil, or which brings about a considerable enjoyment or avoids some great misery at the expense of relatively inconsiderable suffering or loss. But although this absoluteness always characterizes the end of moral goodness, men do not make it a prominent object of thought unless some question arise as to whether the good be absolute or not. They think first and chiefly of the good and feel dutifully bound to that course which promises the greatest good as an ultimate result. With this end in view they perform a wonderful variety of actions, some of slight and ephemeral, others of profound and lasting, consequence. Duty forbids the muzzling of the ox that treadeth out the corn and gives the cup of water to the fainting wayfarer. It feeds the hungry and clothes the naked. It provides a Christmas dinner for the street Arabs and a midsummer excursion for the children of the poor. It erects

fountains by the roadside, and seats where the weary rest. It builds schools and churches, homes for the aged and indigent, refuges for the lost, asylums for the orphan, hospitals for the sick and the insane. Duty calls upon every man to find in every other man a brother, and points to the example of Him who went about continually doing good.

The variety of the ends sought by moral goodness may be illustrated by the provisions which every parent, to the extent of his ability, should make for his child. Suitable pleasures and recreations should be furnished; bodily health and comfort should be cared for; fit companionship should be selected; parental love and sympathy should be shown; a good education should be secured, especially a right moral and religious training; and every preparation should be made for the future prosperity and happiness of one's offspring. The ends aimed at have a wide range from the passing pleasure of the hour to the blessedness of eternity; but they are all desired by moral goodness; moreover they are all sought in harmony with each other. What is called "the conflict of duties" seldom troubles him whose heart is bent on beneficence. In ordinary cases the good man has little difficulty in determining what course to follow. The proper action is either manifestly and purely beneficial, or it clearly promises a deliverance from evil and a great surplus of gain for comparatively little loss. For the most part men neglect the requirements of moral goodness not because of inability to perceive them but from the lack of a disposition to perform them. But what if difficulty is sometimes experienced in determining whether some particular course will, absolutely considered, be productive of good? This is consistent with the fact that a considerable part of virtue is what we have explained moral goodness to be. And is it not intuitively evident that, in every case, we should seek all the good of which the case admits? Occasional perplexity in the application of this principle cannot invalidate the principle itself. Moreover, as already said, perplexity seldom arises. Even in complicated cases the practical reason easily solves questions of personal duty, while generally the speculative reason, following some proper method, also reaches a satisfactory understanding.

7. Thus we find the end and law of Practive Moral Goodness in that good which is perceived by the absolute and impartial exercise of reason; in other words, in *absolute good*.

Doubtless the law of Commotive Moral Goodness is in some way connected with this, the duty of loving being closely associated with the duty of doing good. Those who, with President Edwards and President Hopkins, make no distinction between the virtues of beneficence and benevolence and regard the one of these as only a different aspect of the other, will be content with one law of moral goodness. Defining virtuous love as the rational and conscientious desire of doing good, they identify it with practive moral goodness. They recognize the fact of natural affection, but do not find for this a place in moral life distinct from that of rational beneficence. In this they differ from the common thought of men which distinguishes the virtuous disposition to do good from the virtuous exercise of affection, and which regards the latter as no less important than the former.

Right loving is of equal importance with right doing and in some respects of greater importance; nevertheless *it must be recognized by philosophy as a duty of secondary development*. Love—that is, benevolence, or kind feeling—is of itself merely a natural affection. It originates in that sympathy by which one sentient being desires that another or others should escape from distress and should participate in comforts and pleasures. This feeling is called “love” when it is exercised earnestly and continuously. It takes such forms as family affection, friendly regard, and charitable kindness. Moreover, in the generalizations of ethics we must enlarge the conception of benevolence so as to include love for one’s self and to unite under one thought the egoistic and the altruistic developments of affection. This benevolent motive feeling always aims at some form of good, yet with a limited range of reference. Hence the good sought for may not only be of a private or particular description, but it may even conflict with the total of good possible in the case, and may, therefore, from the absolute point of view, be an evil and not a good. When that occurs, as it often does, through human weakness or narrowness, love is not virtuous but is opposed to virtue. Evidently, therefore, *affection is virtuous and right only when exercised in a manner consentaneous with the aim of PRACTICE MORAL GOODNESS*.

8. Hence, too, it is plain that Commotive Moral Goodness, though less directly than PRACTICE MORAL GOODNESS, yet as really and as truly, finds its law in the idea of absolute good. For affection, as consentaneous with principle, is dutiful and

virtuous for the following reasons. First of all, *the disposition to do good in a right way is accompanied with right loving by a kind of natural necessity.* We do not mean that benevolent affection always attends the exercise of principled beneficence, but only that it frequently does so, as a matter of course, and through the spontaneous operation of human nature. Whenever the needs and capacities of those whom we seek to benefit are brought distinctly before us, it is impossible for us to exercise principle without a concomitant experience of affection; for the same objects appeal to both motivities; nor would it be possible to repress the affection without at the same time weakening the more rational disposition. In this way right loving is involved in the dutiful doing of good.

Next, it is evident that when love acts in harmony with practive goodness *a great addition is made to the motive force of moral conduct.* The man whose affectional side is weak and who acts chiefly from principle, may accomplish much, but he is surpassed in efficiency by the man of deep and noble feeling. His character lacks vital vigor; his conduct, spirit and force; and his influence over his fellow-men is weak. Without sympathy for others it is impossible to win either their assent or their co-operation in matters of principle.

Finally, *right loving is in itself an absolute good.* There is no purer source of enjoyment than to love and to be loved. Next to moral principle wisely exercised affection is the most permanent and widely operative means of happiness with which rational creatures are endowed; even as this same natural affection, if wrongly directed, may occasion great misery. The friendly fellowship of the virtuous is a principal source of earthly happiness; the perfect communion of the glorified is a chief element of the blessedness of heaven.

9. Thus both modes of Moral Goodness find their law in the idea of absolute good. At the same time it is to be observed that no form of virtue works independently of others, and that the law of moral goodness cannot be fully understood except in connection with those of Regulative Righteousness, Causative Righteousness and Moral Esteem. The different modes of duty interpenetrate each other, so that while seeking good and loving beings we must also obey the rules of righteousness, promote every form of virtue, and

conduct ourselves towards beings as their merit or demerit may require. These aims of duty never displace the law of moral goodness, but they modify its operations.

Moreover, it is clear that all the laws of duty must be considered before any statement can be made of the universal principle of morality.

CHAPTER XXIII.

REGULATIVE RIGHTEOUSNESS.

1. The word "righteousness" has both a subjective and an objective signification.—2. And also both a general, or comprehensive, and a restricted, or specific, meaning. Its general use covers all virtue and right conduct whatever; just as a wide conception of moral goodness sometimes does.—3. The Latin "justitia" is identical in sense and use with the English "righteousness." Justinian, Cicero, the Schoolmen, and Mackenzie, quoted.—4. In modern thought righteousness and justice are the same, except only that righteousness is sometimes conceived of (1) as more strenuous than justice, and (2) as less directly concerned with the "rights" or "jura" of individuals.—5. The terms "jus" and "right" are exactly equivalent to each other; and they have two distinct significations.—6. Righteousness in the restricted sense is that form of virtue and duty which we have called Regulative Righteousness. The ends and rules of (this) righteousness are specifically different from those of love and goodness.—7. The Mosaic decalogue, reviewed.—8. The requirements of righteousness under modern civilization.—9. In which our duties towards God are included. Thomas Aquinas quoted respecting the ethics of natural dispositions.—10. Righteousness differs from goodness in that it does not embrace love, or affection.—11. Also because it makes rules more prominent than ends. (Kant's doctrine that Moral law admits of no exception, criticized.)—12. Also in having defensive and conservative rather than progressive aims.—13. But this righteousness, or justice, agrees with moral goodness in that it mingles affectional with practical duty, and makes the former of these conformable to the latter. Every natural disposition is bound to work harmoniously with practive virtue.—14. Aristotle's doctrine of the *μεσότης*, stated and discussed.—15. Finally, Righteousness agrees with Goodness in having absolute good for its generic end; for every rule of justice cares in some way for the absolute welfare of beings.—16. This is true whether we regard practical or affectional duty. Bishop Butler quoted.

1. THE word "righteousness" has both a subjective and an objective signification. It may denote either an habitual disposition of the spirit or that course of conduct at which this disposition aims; and by which it is manifested. These

significations imply each other, and may blend into one. When we are told that "righteousness exalteth a nation while sin is a reproach to any people," both that virtue which seeks to observe the rules of right living and that course of action which the virtue produces are set forth; and it is difficult to say which of the two elements is the more prominent in our conception. Evidently, however, while we are analyzing the moral law, the word righteousness will be employed chiefly in its objective signification.

2. This word, also, is given different meanings in connection with the extent of its application. In its unlimited scope righteousness includes, objectively, every mode of the discharge of duty, and, subjectively, every form of the disposition which loves and seeks the right. Every befitting moral action, whether practical or affectional (Chap. VI.), and every exercise of virtue, whether practive or commotive, is embraced under righteousness. Under this general signification that moral goodness which we have already discussed, would be a development of righteousness; and so would moral esteem and causative righteousness. The idea is all-inclusive; it sets forth virtue in general as a conformity to the moral law and a pursuit of the right.

This same universality of application appears sometimes in the conception of moral goodness. The good man is thought of not only as dutifully beneficent but also as desirous to do right in every way; as being identical with the righteous man. When the ideas of goodness and of righteousness are thus used broadly, the only difference between them is that the one emphasizes the good as an end while the other emphasizes the right, there being, at the same time, an implication that these ends are, in some way, identical. For the good is not sought simply as being good but also as being right; and the right, also, is sought not as something separable from the good but as being, in its own nature, both right and good. The ground for this community between these conceptions will become apparent hereafter.

3. The Latin word corresponding to the English "righteousness" is "*justitia*," or justice. This term, also, is employed both subjectively and objectively, and with both an unrestricted and a restricted application. The subjective use is to be seen in the well-known definition of Justinian, "*Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi*"; which may be rendered, "Justice is the firm and

abiding disposition to give to every one what belongs to him of right." The objective use, however, is more frequent than the subjective, and is the ordinary meaning of it in modern times. When we speak of "loving justice," or of "promoting justice between man and man," the justice referred to is the observance of right and the fulfilment of obligations. Cicero's definition, "*quod dat suum cuique*," is so general as to cover both the disposition and the conduct.

The unrestricted application of the term "justice" is that employed by the schoolmen when they speak of "*justitia tota*," or "*justitia generalis*," and by moralists who oppose this general righteousness to "civil or legal" justice, to "distributive and commutative" justice, and to "remunerative and punitive" justice—all these being limited or specific forms of duty. Sometimes, too, justice is divided simply into the distributive and the punitive; in which case distributive justice is made to include all righteousness but that of inflicting punishment—the distributive being the giving to each person what rightfully belongs to him, excepting penalties only. In this broad sense distributive justice, no less than justice in general, includes moral goodness as a specific form. Prof. Mackenzie had this conception of justice in his mind when he wrote (Book III., Ch. 4): "We commonly say that generosity is expected as well as justice, and, in Christian communities, love also is required. In a sense, however, we may say that *all this ought to be included in our idea of justice*. For it is a part of what is due from one individual to another that the latter should be treated . . . as a person. . . . The thoroughly just man . . . will be glad when the external relations of mere contract can be transmuted into the relations of friendship or Christian love." In their unrestricted use the terms "justice," "righteousness" and "moral goodness" are all designations of the same thing. The just man, the righteous man and the good man are one and the same person. Under this general conception we read that the path of the just is as a shining light; that the memory of the just is blessed; and that the Lord sendeth rain on the fields of the just and of the unjust.

4. Possibly, however, a shade of difference should sometimes be recognized in the use of the terms "justice" and "righteousness," even in their broad significations. As beneficence is prominent in our conception of the good man,

so the righteous man is thought of as more energetically, though not more truly devoted to right doing than the just man. This discrimination is not always made, and, when made, sets forth a variation too slight to be a difference of nature. But another distinction—and one of greater importance—may be stated in connection with the words of Justinian and of Cicero. Their "*sum cuique*" (to each his own) teaches that justice does not simply aim at "the right"—in other words, at right ends and modes of conduct—but also *assigns different "rights" to different persons*. These rights are *interests* (that is, specific means or conditions of prosperity, such as life, liberty, wages, property, knowledge of fact, reputation, respect, affection and care, fulfilment of contracts, payment of debts, prescribed obedience or service) considered so far as they rightfully belong to this or that individual or body of individuals. On the other hand, righteousness, as opposed to justice, seeks to do whatever is right and obligatory *whether the persons for whom it is to be done and their shares in the good to be accomplished be definitely distinguished or not*. For although interests—and therefore rightful interests—always pertain to persons, they may be thought of simply as good, or as forms of good, to be maintained or realized, and without emphasizing the distribution of the good among persons. Righteousness and justice are often contrasted in this way. Under this contrast, justice is a more concrete mode of principle than righteousness, and may be defined as righteousness dealing with distributed or personalized interests.

5. The distinction thus made between two forms of virtue which are essentially identical, may become clearer if we dwell for a moment on the exact coincidence in the expression of ethical thought between the Latin noun "*jus*" and the English noun "right," and if we consider two ideas which each of these terms with equal freedom is used to convey. "*Jus*" seems cognate with the verb "*jubeo*," to command, as if the Romans designated the right from the fact that it was enforced by authority. The Greeks named the right *δίκη*, which lexicographers treat as an original root, but which may be etymologically akin to the Latin "*dico*," to say. This suggests that the right was distinguished as that which some competent judge found and declared to be obligatory. The English "right," without referring either to command or to judgment, sets forth duty as what is con-

formed to a rule, and which therefore has the excellence of the rule. This mode of conception appears, also, to have originated the German "Recht" and the French "droit."

Whatever be their etymology, the nouns "jus" and "right" agree in having two principal significations. First, they indicate "The Right" or "that which is right" *simply as right and obligatory upon us*. In this sense the word "right" is often used in the general, as when we say, "For Right is Right since God is God." The same thought is expressed by the word justice used objectively; as in the sentence, "Let justice triumph though the heavens fall." The phrases, "Sit jus," "Fiat jus," mean simply, Let the right, or that which is right, be done.

The second signification of jus and right is quite different from the first, though closely related to it, and derived from it. It is that of *an interest rightfully belonging to one or more definitely conceived of persons*, and which, therefore, may be claimed for him or them. By an "interest" here we do not mean the share which one may have in some enterprise or business, but any particular privilege or advantage which one may possess, and which he can use for his own good or that of others. An interest is a means of welfare belonging to some one. In this sense we hear of a person caring for his own interests or for the interests of the public. When we speak of a right or of rights—of a *jus* or of *jura*—we have in mind some personal interest or interests. Thus, as already stated, life, liberty, wages, stipulated services, the peaceful possession of property, are the rights of those to whom these things rightfully belong. The just claim to any one of these things, also, is called a right.

Now when righteousness and justice are contrasted with one another, the difference between them is that *justice always considers those personalized interests which we call rights or jura while righteousness is not confined to these conceptions but may and often does aim simply at what is right without giving weight to the claims of individuals as such*. It is influenced only by that absolute and general interest which is the good of all. For example, one may tell the truth, or deal honestly, or observe law and order, or relieve the destitute, or cultivate purity, or support schemes of beneficence, simply as things right and obligatory and in obedience to the claims of duty rather than in compliance with the claims of persons. Such is the distinction between our conceptions of righteous-

ness and of justice; though each conception is often employed as identical with the other.

6. So far we have been studying that unrestricted use of these ideas according to which they may be applied to every form of virtue and duty. Let us now turn to that limited scope of thought according to which righteousness—or justice—is contrasted with other forms of morality, and especially with moral goodness. This righteousness, which we have distinguished as *regulative*, may be described as a form of moral principle which does not involve the exercise of love, and which, without aiming at the advancement of happiness, seeks a variety of ends, and obeys a variety of laws, as right and obligatory. That a considerable development of virtue answers to this description will be evident if we contemplate, first, the Mosaic decalogue as the code of morality which has exerted the greatest influence in the world, and, after that, the principal laws of righteousness as these are now formulated in the consciences of civilized people. Without attempting to obtain from either of these studies an exhaustive statement of the laws of duty we shall hope that the two together may yield a correct conception of the general character of those laws. The Mosaic code begins with duties towards God and is presented as a series of divine commands. It represents that morality which allies itself with religious sentiment, and which may be styled theocentric. On the other hand the morality of our day thinks first of man's duties towards his fellow-man, and, after that, of the divine claims; it may, therefore, be styled anthropocentric. This difference, however, pertains more to the order of thought and statement than to the principles involved.

7. The first command of the decalogue prohibits the adoration and service of any but Jehovah, the self-existent and ever-living God. It was directed against that polytheism which had originated in the devotional personifications of the powers of nature. The second command forbids idolatry, or the worship of God through the use of sensible emblems. This practice had been found to encourage superstitions and a degrading formalism. The third warns against the irreverent use of God's name, and, by implication, requires respect for all the institutions of religion. The fourth calls for the remembrance of the seventh day of the week as a day of re-

ligious rest, the principle being that one set day out of the seven should be kept holy unto the Lord. The fifth commandment is the first respecting duties to our fellow-men. It enjoins honor for one's father and one's mother, including in this all due service and obedience. Parents here typify those generally who are one's rightful superiors. The sixth commandment prohibits murder, the unlawful taking of human life. The seventh forbids sexual intercourse except as provided for in marriage. The eighth prohibits the taking of another's property without some justifying reason; the ninth, the telling of falsehood to another's injury; the tenth, the inordinate desire for any of the goods or possessions of another.

This brief code of laws does not cover all the duties of life, yet it was fitted to bring all before the thoughtful Israelite. Directing attention to the leading ethical relations of man, it was cherished by the conscientious Hebrew as a fountain of unfailing wisdom. He obtained from it support for positive as well as for negative virtue, and direction for the inner as well as for the outer life. For, in prohibiting covetousness and in requiring respect for parents, affectional duty is explicitly required; while every command implicitly calls for sentiments corresponding with the line of action it enjoins. Hence our Saviour, interpreting the law this way, declares that he who hateth his brother is a murderer, and that he who looketh upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. Rightly accepted the commandment of the Lord is "exceeding broad."

8. The moral rules of the present time do not differ radically from those of Moses. Setting aside beneficence and benevolence as laws of moral goodness, the requirements of righteousness are such as the following. We feel bound not only to do no murder but also to protect ourselves and others against bodily harm, and, so far as may be, to provide against disease and wretchedness. We acknowledge a stricter marriage relation than that enforced by Moses, making marriage the union of one man with one woman. The right of property is to be respected whether as regards a man's own honest acquisitions, the product of industry and thrift, or as regards what one may have received by gift or inheritance. This right, however, like every personal privilege, is subject to such conditions and limitations as respect for public and private good may necessitate. Under similar restrictions we guard every man's freedom, that is, his right

to spend his life and employ his means according to his own choice and judgment; and we condemn every form of slavery and oppression. We recognize the obligation of contracts as voluntary arrangements limiting the rights of property and of freedom; because without such understandings and the observance of them the co-operation of men would be impossible. For a like reason truth is to be maintained between man and man. We are not bound always to give asked-for information, but, unless the right to correct information has been forfeited or destroyed, which happens only in rare and extreme cases, one should tell the truth, if he says anything at all. In all social and public relations peace and order are to be preserved and upheld; for violence, or the threat of violence, and disobedience to the just regulations of authority, interfere ruinously with the progress of life. Then, also, various relations between persons give rise to specific duties. Not only are magistrates, parents, teachers and other natural or official superiors to be obeyed, but children and other dependents are to be supported; the weak are to be protected; the vicious restrained; the ignorant instructed; the destitute relieved; the struggling assisted; while courtesy and consideration are to be shown to all. Finally, the character and reputation of others and of one's self must be defended from harm; because no greater wrong can be done than to corrupt and debauch either old or young; and an injury to one's reputation is harder to be borne than the theft of valuable property.

Who steals my purse steals trash : . . .
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed."

OTHELLO, III., III.

Such are the practical demands of righteousness from the human or earthly point of view. In addition to these many affectional requirements may be mentioned; for duty demands that our whole nature should act in harmony and in co-operation with practive principle. All men feel obligated to cultivate properly such sentiments as courage, caution, compassion, self-restraint, self-respect and respect for others, prudence, modesty, independence, loyalty, candor, cheerfulness, willingness, promptitude, and, in general, every natural disposition which may contribute to upright living. So far as mundane life is concerned, this inward regulation of

self does not occupy so large a place in men's thoughts as practical duties do; yet it is distinctly pursued as dutiful.

9. On the other hand, when our relations to the divine being are seriously considered, affectional duties receive the greater prominence. After love towards God the chief requirements of religion are those of reverence, faith, submission, and devotion. Reverence for God is that supreme respect, mingled with awe, which is naturally felt towards the infinitely mighty and holy ruler of the universe. It is not servile dread of punishment but rather a sense of the unspeakable solemnity of the divine government. It is that fear of the Lord which the Scriptures declare to be the beginning of wisdom, and which is so consistent with trust and affection as to be ascribed by the author of the Hebrews to our Saviour. (HEB. 5: 7.) Faith is confidence in God as a gracious being who never forgets his promises, and who will bless all that fear him and keep his commandments. Submission is the unreserved acquiescence of the human in the divine will and a hearty acceptance of God's dealings with us as just and good. It is a natural concomitant of faith. Devotion is the spirit of worship; it is the adoration and service of God as the object of our deepest reverence, confidence and affection.

Along with these inward duties we owe God such outward duties as obedience to his commands, observance of his ordinances, prayer for his help and guidance, and labor for the promotion of his kingdom. But these practical duties are felt to be without spiritual value except as proceeding from the affectional. The reason for this may be that practical services may contribute to the welfare of human beings, whether they be accompanied with affection or not, whereas God is independent of our doings and can be pleased only by the worship of pure and noble hearts.

The doctrine that natural dispositions become dutiful and virtuous only through their co-operation with moral principle has long been taught by philosophers; in proof of which the following may be quoted from St. Thomas: "There is no virtue," he says, "in resentment and desire, so far as they are sensitive motive tendencies. But, when they are subordinated to reason, there is necessarily some virtue in each. And this virtue is a certain habitual conformity of them to reason itself."—*In irascibili et concupiscibili, ut sunt potestates appetitus sensitivi, nulla virtus est. Sed, ut subordi-*

nantur rationi, necesse est in utraque aliquam virtutem esse. Quæ quædam est illarum ad rationem ipsam habitualis conformitas. (SUMMA THEOL., Ques. 56, Art. 4.)

10. When we review the different modes of right living, we find that none of them can be rationally separated from the principles of moral goodness, as if the two had nothing in common; while, at the same time, the great majority of them are distinguishable from love and beneficence, and form a body of conduct which men contrast with goodness and call righteousness or justice. Let us examine this contrast.

First, it is evident that *this righteousness does not include love or affection as goodness does.* Those who place all morality in benevolence encounter difficulty when they would discover love in the conscientious doing of what is just and right. Doubtless every duty should be accompanied with good-will towards all affected by it, but, in many cases, not even microscopic vision could discern love in the dutiful performance of obligations. What affection is there in discharging one's debt to some wealthy corporation, in paying taxes and rendering obedience to the civil authorities, in abstention from murder and adultery, in telling the truth on the witness-stand, in refraining from abusive slander, in the prevention of crime and the defense of the right? Those who have no theory to support see plainly that men do many things on principle and without thought that they are putting forth affection in so doing. Then, too, different natural dispositions, which are virtuously exercised, are easily distinguished from benevolence or good-will. There is no benevolence in courage, self-restraint, modesty, respect, reverence, candor, independence, faith, humility, submission. Yet it is our duty to exercise each of these whenever the proper occasion for it may arise.

Some argue that all duty is a putting forth of benevolence, because all duty aims at good in some form or another. But this reasoning is not conclusive even though the premise stated may be true. For men often seek good merely as a matter of principle, without the exercise of affection. (Chap. IX.) Besides, benevolence is never content with the mere conservation of interests, while this is the end of justice.

11. In the next place, *righteousness gives more prominence to rules, and less prominence to ends, than goodness does.* We cannot say that righteousness does not pursue ends, or

that moral goodness does not use rules; but righteousness finds its end in the very conformity to rule, each rule of itself being accepted as right and obligatory, while moral goodness, though following the law of absoluteness of good, seeks good as an end with little consciousness of obedience to a law. Goodness apprehends definitely its ultimate aims, while righteousness is devoted to various modes of duty without complete and explicit understanding of the reasons for them. Murder, theft, lying, and disorderly conduct are avoided as evil, honesty, fidelity, obedience and loyalty are chosen as good, with simply a general reference to the ways in which these things operate for good or evil. A rule of righteousness, too, seldom stands purely on its own merits but is observed as a teaching of past experience, as supported by the judgment of the wise, as approved by the moral sense of the community and as enforced by authority. Hence, sometimes, the ultimate purpose of the rule is not accurately apprehended; even while the rule is right, and is accepted as right by the practical reason.

Another difference between righteousness and goodness, closely allied to that just mentioned, yet distinguishable from it, is that *the former lays stress on law as the embodiment of right and duty, while the latter does not do so*. Law of itself is merely a prescribed or established mode of conduct and is not necessarily right and obligatory. It may even require what is wrong and immoral, as has often happened under bad governments or in barbarous and heathenish countries. But a great presumption exists in favor of the righteousness of any law which has been enacted by duly constituted authority, or which is a solemn custom of the community, or which has been long and habitually acknowledged by the practical reason. Law thus formulated and supported appeals strongly to the conscience. It is accepted as the exponent and representative of the right; we feel that it must be obeyed unless we can show, in some extreme and exceptional case, that wrong and evil would result from obedience. Thus moral reason makes conformity to law an end of duty.

Indeed, since all duty can be expressed in rules, many, like Kant and the Intuitionists, make conformity to law the essence—the vital principle—of virtuous living. In this they commit the error of treating what is secondary as if it were primary. For morality consists in seeking right ends whether they present themselves in rules or not.

Kant also taught that moral law admits of no exception. This merely reproduces a *popular mistake deduced fallaciously from the doctrine of the supremacy of conscience*. It is true that the essential and universal principle of morality admits of no exception. It cannot be superseded by any other principle. Nor can any law or duty be subordinate to a law that is not a law of duty. At the same time that body of rules which men conscientiously obey, and which we call the moral law, admits of many exceptions. Any rule of duty is no longer binding when it conflicts with some more fundamental principle of morality. But, as already said, exceptions to the laws of righteousness are rare. When they occur, unless the reasons for them be very clear, they give trouble to the conscientious mind. Even then an accepted rule is departed from with great reluctance. The good man does not willingly kill the assassin even in self-defense; and he is loth to seize even that property which may be needed to save the perishing from death.

12. A final distinction between righteousness and goodness—and the most important of all—may be thus stated: *the former is a conservative while the latter is a progressive kind of virtue*. While moral goodness seeks the removal of suffering and misery and the greatest possible increase of happiness, regulative righteousness, or justice, is content with the prevention of evil and the conservation of good. One evidence of this is that the requirements of righteousness are often expressed in the form of prohibitions. "Thou shalt not" appears in each of the ten commandments except the fifth. This enjoins honor to father and mother, and is supported by a promise of long life and prosperity. The fourth commandment begins positively, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy," but is mainly devoted to the prohibition, "In it thou shalt do no work."

It would, however, be incorrect to say that righteousness is occupied only with prohibitions, or that the decalogue was intended to inculcate a merely negative morality. Every injunction of the Mosaic code suggests positive duty to be performed when the evil conduct is to be avoided. The prohibitory form originated probably in the conviction that, while the utterances of authority accomplish much for the prevention of wrong-doing, the fruitful efforts of beneficence can be looked for only through instruction and training, through the influence of good example and of loving sym-

pathy, and through an expectation of the rewards of virtue. It is significant that the only command free from prohibition and calling for activity in well-doing is the one attended with the promise. But, when we read the Scriptures and become acquainted with the spirit of the ancient dispensation, we see clearly that every command is connected with a positive principle of duty.

At the same time it is to be noted that *even the positive requirements of righteousness are protective rather than progressive*. Righteousness as a specific form of virtue—justice, as it is commonly called—exists, of course, independently of any code of morals. It arises because the present nature of man and the uses of earthly life compel a distinction between those duties which constantly press upon the conscience, inasmuch as evil and misery manifestly ensue from disregarding them, and those the observance of which looks to a clear increase of good or happiness. *Righteousness, therefore, may be defined as defensive and conservative morality*. While the requirements of it favor different forms of good, they fall short of the progressive aims of beneficence. Justice protects the lives of men and even provides necessary subsistence and some opportunity for self-advancement. But it aims at prosperity only so far as this may be safeguarded and promoted by these preliminary measures. Justice does not attempt to provide happy homes and affectionate families, but it endeavors to prevent the wretchedness and ruin of dissolute conduct. It does not engage to increase the wealth of the individual or the community, but it recognizes honestly obtained ownership and enforces rightful claims to property. It defends against slavery and oppression and even delivers from them, yet it does not actively assist one who may be striving to improve his place in life. It compels men to tell the truth, but does not undertake to make them well-informed. It maintains peace and order, but commits public progress to the wisdom and virtue of the citizens. It requires various specific duties according to the relations in which persons stand to one another, but only so far as the neglect of these duties involves evil and disaster. Moreover, as we have already seen, those natural dispositions which men feel bound to exercise in connection with the works of righteousness, and which may be called affectional righteousness, do not include benevolence or beneficence, but only certain “minor virtues” which co-operate with conservative conscientiousness.

While these things are so, it is to be acknowledged that developed moral character is not content with mere righteousness, but adds to it a more progressive form of virtue. The good man, too, accompanies even the duties of justice with the spirit of love and kindness. It may even be conjectured that, in some higher sphere of life than the present, the contrast between righteousness and goodness will lose its importance and fade from sight. Such considerations, however, do not justify a disregard of the distinction which men naturally make between these modes of morality.

Righteousness and goodness differ from one another. At the same time, it is not to be forgotten that they are *both modes of virtue, and have a common nature*. Let us conclude this discussion by considering some characteristics in which they agree. First of all, *in each of them affectional mingles with practical duty*. This is more thoroughly the case in goodness than in righteousness. While dutiful benevolence not only mingles but coalesces with the virtue of beneficence, the practical doings of justice are of so distinct an operation that we commonly conceive of them independently of the natural dispositions with which they may be accompanied. We do, however, often think of these dispositions, and find it to be our duty to exercise them in a particular way.

This introduces a second point of agreement. The rule of duty for *our natural motive tendencies* is that they *must work harmoniously with that conscientious disposition which aims directly at right doing*. The law of commotive regulative righteousness is precisely analogous to that of commotive moral goodness. A natural motivity and the conduct to which it leads have no moral excellence of their own. They become virtuous and dutiful only as consciously co-ordinated with the pursuit of what is right. Indeed, a disposition otherwise innocent, when cherished in opposition to principle, is vicious and wrong.

“ For even love, by difference nice,
Is now a virtue, now a vice.”

14. Aristotle's doctrine of the *μεσότης*—that virtue is the pursuit of a middle course between extremes—could scarcely have been intended as an essential or general definition. His *το μέσον* evidently relates to that phase of virtue which seeks to regulate our natural dispositions and the conduct to which these lead. In other words, it pertains to com-

motive regulative righteousness. Possibly all right conduct is producible by this commotive virtue; inasmuch as there is no good action to which some natural disposition might not prompt. That, however, would account for right doing by a secondary mode or phase of virtue. The regulation of motivations not in themselves moral can become moral only through its conformity with some more primary principle of duty. Therefore, though all right conduct were producible by commotive virtue, this would not explain the essential nature of morality but would render that explanation more requisite than ever. We must not abandon that primary virtue which directly seeks the right because we have found it to be reinforced and supported by a secondary virtue.

Moreover, it is not satisfactory to say that this secondary and commotive righteousness aims at a middle course. *It seeks the conformity of the natural with the moral and a union of the two.* In this work, as a matter of fact, it often falls upon a middle between extremes. But it does not aim at that middle always or for its own sake. When an archer is practising for his amusement, he commonly, though not invariably, aims at the center of a target or other object, not because it is the center but because the mark is there which he desires to hit. But when he shoots to kill he aims, not at the center, but at the vulnerable or vital part whether it be in the center or not. So, if one desires only his own pleasure or happiness, he may find it a good rule to be active and alive while avoiding the extremes of exertion or of passion. But if his heart be set on the realization of the right, he will not be controlled by such a rule. Frequently he may find himself in a middle course, but sometimes, in a crisis, righteousness may demand great self-sacrifice or the unreserved expenditure of energies. There are cases of duty which call for the utmost possible courage, application, perseverance, self-reliance, faith, submission, devotion. Moreover, there are other cases in which a natural disposition and the conduct resulting from it may be censurable without going to any extreme at all. One may put forth just the daring needful for victory while he is fighting for a bad cause. The gratitude of an unprincipled man may not be excessive, yet it may cause him to promise his benefactor what he has no right to promise. One may show admirable determination and magnanimity in the service of a destructive ambition. Industry and energy may be devoted to the prosecution of an evil business. In

these cases one's spirit and conduct are wrong, not because they are defective or excessive in energy, but simply because they are wrongly directed. The only satisfactory rule for one's natural life is that it be made conformable and consensaneous with the aims of practive virtue.

15. *A third quality common to goodness and righteousness*—and the most essential characteristic of both—is *that each, in its own way, strives after absolute good*. Righteousness labors for the protection and conservation of this good; goodness, for its increase and advancement. While moral principle says, positively, "Have regard for interests absolutely considered; do good and remove evil," it says also negatively, "*Do not permit harm or loss to interests absolutely considered*"; and this is ever the animus of righteousness. We have seen how absolute good is the end of moral goodness. (Ch. XXII.) That it is the end of righteousness, also, will become apparent if we examine the practical workings of this virtue, especially when, in the name of justice, it accords to every one "his rights." For although a right is an interest, or form of good, to which a person or a body of persons is entitled, it is noteworthy that no right belongs to any one *except so far as it may form part of the total of good of which the case admits*.

The authority of parents, magistrates, ship captains, military commanders and the dignitaries of church and state pertains to them personally, yet more for the good of others than for their own. The institution of property exists not solely for the benefit of owners, but quite as much in order that the resources of life may be husbanded, and for the encouragement of thrift and industry. Even one's life and liberty are not absolutely private privileges; for no man liveth to himself alone, and, morally, we are free, not for selfishness and wrong, but for the seeking and doing of good. The honor of woman is to be guarded, not merely that she herself may be saved from ruin, but also that family life may prosper, and that society may not be honeycombed with rottenness. Truth must be told and contracts kept, not for the sake of those alone who are immediately intersted, but also that they, in turn, may fulfil their engagements, and may inform others. In this way men are united in mutual helpfulness. Then, also, the claims of the destitute to be relieved, of the ignorant to be instructed, of the good and wise to be respected, of the capable and faithful to be honorably employed, are promotive

of general as well as of individual good. In short the lawful interests of every one are for the benefit of all. Even the rights of God himself are correlated with the welfare of his creatures. He sits upon his throne that righteousness and goodness may prevail throughout the Universe. And, when it is said that God does all things for his own glory, as his supreme end, this does not mean that he does them for his own selfish gratification. The glory of God is that wide-spread appreciation of his perfections, whereby rational beings not only render him his most worthy praise, but also themselves become partakers of the divine nobility and blessedness. Plainly personal rights are parts of absolute good, and are justified by the moral reason as having that character.

This truth is yet more evident from the fact that *when any right becomes obstructive to total and absolute good, it ceases to be a right*, and may be neglected or overruled. Ordinarily one is entitled to life, liberty, property, to truthful statements, to the keeping of agreements, to considerate and courteous treatment, and to the unimpeded use of the means of happiness. But any of these claims may be superseded by that of absolute good; this is ever the supreme right. Men are sometimes said to have certain inalienable rights. These are inalienable only in the sense that they cannot be abrogated by the arbitrary exercise even of the most exalted authority. They do not exist so absolutely that they may not, in exceptional cases, disappear under the operation of that principle in which all rights are rooted. They are, indeed, fundamental and stable interests. Belonging to individuals not merely as such but as members of a universal family, they are parts of that general and absolute good which righteousness protects and maintains. Yet they are not so fixed that they cannot, under any circumstances, be displaced. Life, for instance, is the natural right of every human being. But, in certain cases, life must be risked and even sacrificed, for the prevention of great evil and the accomplishment of great good. Sometimes it is expedient that one man—or even that many men—should die for the people, so that the whole nation perish not. This supercession of personal right by “the right” in general is especially noticeable when the sacrifice is demanded by the “moral good” of the individual or of the community. The suppression of vice and the maintenance of virtue are very dominant ends of duty. But this particular

involution of law will be considered hereafter in connection with causative righteousness.

16. Turning from the practical to the affectional duties of regulative righteousness, we find that the latter also aim at absolute good, though not so directly as the former. Reverence, gratitude, fortitude, courage, pity or compassion, self-restraint, modesty, candor, the love of knowledge and of truth, habits of independence, sobriety and industry, are virtuous only so far as they are consciously harmonized with the practical efforts of righteousness. Thus exercised they are absolutely good, just as rightly regulated benevolence is.

The excellence of these dispositions is to be seen *partly in the assistance which they give to virtuous doing*. In creatures constituted as we are, these secondary "virtues" not only accompany practive principle by a kind of necessity, but they are almost essential to its success. This may be illustrated by some remarks of Bishop Butler concerning the moral uses of compassion. "Since in many cases," he says, "it is very much in our power to alleviate the miseries of each other—and benevolence, though natural to man, yet is in a very low degree kept down by interest and competition—and men are, for the most part, so engaged in the business and pleasures of the world as to overlook and turn away from objects of misery, which are plainly considered as interruptions to them in their way, as intruders upon their business, their gaiety and mirth; compassion is an advocate within us in their behalf, to gain the unhappy admittance and access, to make their case attended to. . . . And if men would only resolve to allow thus much to it (let it bring before their view, the view of their mind, the miseries of their fellow-creatures; let it gain for them that their case be considered), I am persuaded it would not fail of gaining more; and that very few real objects of charity would pass unrelieved." (Sermon VI.).

Every natural disposition may, after this fashion, lend its aid to dutiful activity; and should be encouraged and guided to do so. When life is conducted under this rule, man becomes a noble creature and an effectual worker of good.

Moreover, aside from its workings in conduct, *a character composed of rightly ordered dispositions is of itself a source of happiness*. It gives pleasure to its possessor, and is a delight to every virtuous being with whom he may be associated. So long as one is governed by selfishness or passion he experiences unrest and dissatisfaction. The motivities of his

nature contend against one another; as the Scriptures say, there is war in our members. The rule of principle introduces peace and harmony. Then one has the comfort of knowing that all the energies of his life are devoted to the high service of duty instead of being spent for unworthy aims. He enters also on the blessed fellowship of the good, feeling himself to be the object of their friendship and favor, and making them the objects of his affections. Thus, in various ways, rightly regulated dispositions are sources of unmixed good, and the beginnings of an endless felicity.



CHAPTER XXIV.

MORAL ESTEEM AND CAUSATIVE RIGHTEOUSNESS.

1. Esteem, in its primary meaning, is a judgment recognizing personal excellence and accompanied by an appropriate feeling. The excellence is often, though not always, moral.—2. Moral esteem is that form of virtue which regulates our consideration and treatment of persons according to their moral character.—3. This virtue modifies the operations but does not interfere with the aims of Moral Goodness.—4. Moral Esteem, though less directly than Moral Goodness, finds the ground of its rightness and obligatoriness in the absolute good of beings.—5. Causative Righteousness and its aims explained.—6. The Reflex exercise of Moral Principle ; or Incipient Causative Virtue. This is conditioned on a faculty of intentional self-regulation.—7. This self-regulation is implied also in commotive virtue, but not in practice, or primary, virtue.—8. Developed, or Methodical Causative Righteousness, defined. It seeks virtue, or moral good, as an end, more definitely than Incipient Causative Righteousness does. Its principal forms are the Instructoral and the Rectoral.—9. The ends of Causative Righteousness being first, virtue, and then the ends which virtue seeks, are all of necessity things absolutely good.—10. That absolute good is the ultimate and obligatory end of Causative Righteousness seems evident. Yet two objections to this doctrine should be considered.

1. THE words "esteem" and "estimation" are sometimes used synonymously. But, generally, the first expresses a judgment respecting persons, and the latter a judgment respecting things. Esteem is a recognition of personal excellence accompanied with a feeling of respect and good-will. The excellence perceived is not necessarily moral, but may be any form of efficiency or of desirable endowment. (Chap. III.) A man may be esteemed as a philosopher or as a statesman, as an orator or as a poet, as an artist or as a workman, without being esteemed for virtue and goodness. Commonly, however, it is understood that, when we esteem any one, we respect him for his moral excellence—that he is the object of moral esteem.

2. According to the terminology of the present treatise

moral esteem is a department of duty which resembles moral goodness in being both practical and affectional and in being concerned with loving beings and with doing good. But it differs from goodness in that its treatment of persons is determined by a regard for their moral character, and not simply in view of their capacities and needs as sentient beings. We all acknowledge that a virtuous person has a special right to our good-will and our assistance; while vice lessens one's claim to love and consideration, and may even destroy it altogether. Christians love God and desire his pleasure and blessedness, not simply because he is the greatest, but yet more because he is the best, of beings. They also accept the precept to do good to all men, but especially to those who are of the household of faith; and they feel in duty bound not merely to value the servants of God because of the work they do, but to esteem them very highly in love for their work's sake, that is, for their devotion to their work. Other things being equal, we give the preference to a good man, and this, too, simply because of his goodness. We also feel justified in withdrawing our regard from the unworthy. It is conceivable that beings wholly and hopelessly set on evil may lose all right to consideration. One is not bound to love devils. Thus the law of moral esteem modifies the operation of the law of moral goodness.

3. At the same time the former of these laws never really conflicts with the latter. It requires neither the neglect of any absolute interest nor the withdrawal of love from any being fit and possible to be loved.

Examining the *practical* working of the law of esteem, we find that it does not propose the injury of one class for the benefit of another, but only such special favor for the good as may consist with the best welfare of beings in general. A *special favor is not necessarily a robbing of the common store, but often falls in with our utmost endeavor for the general prosperity.* Moral esteem does not demand for the righteous any privileges which may be injurious to others. Moreover, no law, so far as we can see, requires the ill-treatment of the wicked simply because they are wicked. On the contrary, we are bound to strive for the good of the wicked as long as they are capable of good, and in all cases in which a benefit done them may not be productive of evil greater than itself, and may, therefore, be consistent with absoluteness of good. We cannot believe that the infliction of puni-

tive evil is an exception to this rule; but this point will be considered hereafter. At present we say that duty sometimes requires the denial of favors to the wicked—favors such as moral goodness could cheerfully and safely grant to those who had not transgressed—but even this only as a reproof and check of wickedness. The practical operation of moral esteem, as distinguished from that severer righteousness which we call punitive justice, would not go further than we have now stated: and this certainly is not inconsistent with the aims of moral goodness.

In like manner the *affectional* operation of the law of moral esteem consists with that of moral goodness. The latter requires us to exercise love for beings in a manner consensual with the aims of practive goodness. We cannot love beings too much in this way. *But an increase of love for the morally good does not interfere with the putting forth of dutiful benevolence.* Special love to the good—for example, love to God—brings us into more perfect sympathy with them and enlarges the heart for the virtuous love of mankind. Moreover, we need scarcely say that the hatred of beings has no place within the domain of duty. Moral esteem leaves untouched the law of goodness that we should love all beings so far as we *can*—and so far as we can consistently—while aiming at absolute good.

But this duty of esteem brings to view three grounds of limitation to the exercise of virtuous benevolence; which may operate singly or together. In the first place, love for the wicked, if not specially restrained, might lead us to favor them unduly more frequently than love for any other class would lead us to favor them unduly. It is, therefore, peculiarly obligatory not to love the immoral in a way discordant with that practive virtue which seeks the general and absolute good of beings. Secondly, it is evident that we should subordinate our love for wicked persons to the claims of punitive justice. A love which would prevent or neglect the punishment of the guilty when they ought to be punished would be an improper love. How far the ultimate principle of this limitation may be identified with that of the first limitation will appear subsequently. In the third place, we are not under obligation to love the wicked when, by reason of their hopeless and determined depravity, they have ceased to be the possible objects of our affection. In this last case a natural law determines the limit of duty in some such way as fol-

lows. Two spirits, placed in company and made to understand each other's experience, would naturally have benevolent affection for each other,—the simple sympathy of sentient souls. Various causes might then tend to strengthen or to weaken this affection. In particular, moral goodness in each being would strengthen his natural affection and would make him more attractive to the affection of the other. In this way the goodness of both beings would become a bond of mutual attachment, capable, we believe, of being stronger than any other. But, if one of the beings were morally bad, that is, in any degree opposed to what is right, the other, though morally good, would of necessity love him less, in proportion to his wickedness, than he would were it possible for him to regard that other being without any reference to moral character. Nevertheless his goodness, if perfect, would lead him to love that other so long as he was an object possible to be loved, as also it would lead him to labor for the good of the wicked person so long as there might be any hope of doing him good. But in case that immoral spirit became so purely and thoroughly evil that love for him should be no longer possible, or in case through his wickedness he became so hopelessly lost as to be no longer susceptible of good, an end of duty would be reached. We need not now discuss whether these cases always accompany each other, but it is plain that, in either case or in their conjuncture, considerations connected with moral character would be determinative of duty and would justify a discontinuance of practical or affectional regard. But clearly no one of the limitations mentioned, neither that directly from respect for absolute good, nor that from punitive justice, nor that from a sort of necessity of nature, is inconsistent with the law of moral goodness.

4. In thus showing that the duties of moral esteem and consideration do not conflict with the essential principle of goodness, we have prepared ourselves to show how they originate from that principle. That the duties in question arise from their relation to absolute good, may be argued as follows: First of all, so far as practical consideration of persons because of their moral excellence is a doing of good to a class without injury to others, it is a direct application of the primary law of morals; it is a seeking of absolute good. We all know that favor and assistance can be given to the morally good in many cases in which it cannot be wisely or safely

given to others. Take, for example, circumstances in which confidence in character or the honoring of right principles is needed, or may be a determining consideration. In the next place, it is clear that special regard for the good may be justified on higher ground than mere non-interference with the general welfare, or with the rights of others. Favor shown them as being good is succor and assistance given to the cause of virtue. Of this ground of duty we shall speak more fully under the head of causative righteousness. Then, as to our *affectional* esteem, we have seen that, owing to spiritual affinity, the good must needs love the good. Special affection for the good is as inseparably bound with simple moral goodness as general benevolence is. Just in proportion as we have rational desire for the right, or the absolutely good as being right, we also have personal love for those in whom this principle is prevalent and powerful. The former motive tendency generates the latter, and imparts to it a moral character. Finally, love for the good is itself an absolute good, and should therefore be cultivated as being in itself a right end. This pure and high affection is a principal source of that blessedness which is diffused throughout the society of Heaven.

5. Causative Righteousness is that species of virtue which aims at the maintenance and promotion of virtue in every form. It also seeks the suppression of vice, that is, of every form and degree of disposition in rational beings which conflicts with virtue. It is conditioned on the fact that a rational and moral being is able to regard himself and others as rational and moral, and is able to exert influence on himself and on others, either favorably or adversely, to the exercise of virtue. When he uses power or influence favorably to virtue, and does so because he feels it to be right and dutiful to do so, then the animus of his conduct is what we have termed causative virtue.

Clearly this animus may exist where one may not himself be able to do anything toward that particular promotion of virtue which he desires. A poor bed-ridden man might earnestly desire that the gospel should be preached to the heathen, without being able to do anything towards the realization of his desire. True, he could use the influence of prayer. But, without thinking of this indirect efficiency, and regarding him as wholly impotent, we would yet consider his earnest desire a virtue. In other words, causative

righteousness is so called, not because it always causes virtue, though it frequently does, but because it desires the causation of virtue, and because, whenever it has the power to promote virtue, it uses this power to that end.

There is no species or form of virtue which causative righteousness does not desire to perfect and promote. Moral goodness and regulative righteousness, in their various developments, and that moral esteem which assumes the presence or the absence of these virtues, and even causative virtue itself, are all objects of the care of causative virtue. This last thought does not imply that any one act of causative virtue can aim at itself, but only that one exercise of causative virtue may aim at another. For example, Christians may encourage and sustain each other in evangelical labors. But in all cases, what is immediately aimed at is virtue, that is, the effective exercise of moral principle, or of the disposition to regard and seek what is right.

As we may have recurring occasion to speak of virtue as aimed at by causative righteousness, we may sometimes, when viewing it in that relation, call it *object-virtue*.

6. An understanding of causative, like that of practive and of commotive, virtue—and indeed of every motivity of spirit—must be sought from an investigation of the ends which it keeps in view. Before proceeding with this investigation, however, we may notice what might be called Incipient Causative Righteousness, or the Reflex Exercise of Moral Principle; the latter expression being perhaps less adequate than the former. This mode of causative virtue is more subtle than any other. The exercise of it mingles in our bosoms with the virtue which it promotes. Special study is needed in order to understand its operation.

The exercise of such virtue is conditioned on the possession of a faculty of self-regulation by which man may guide and control his own virtue as well as his other motivities. Beyond doubt, we have such a faculty. For, first of all, the soul has a power of reflection whereby it takes cognizance of its own states, tendencies and acts, and of their true nature and relations. This power is a part of reason: it differs from mere consciousness, which even brutes may have, in that it is attentive and discriminating. By it reason can take cognizance of all those operations in which she herself participates, and especially of man's moral thinkings and movements. That is, one mode of reason observes and judges of

all the operations of man's rational life. In the next place, man can exercise desire or motive feeling concerning his own understood experiences and motivities, as well as concerning other objects of thought. Accordingly men, in fact, often exhibit the desire to be virtuous; they wish to be willing to do what is right. Sometimes they desire virtue only as personally advantageous to themselves; in which case their desire is not of the nature of virtue. But sometimes, also, they desire virtue because it is, in effect, an accomplishing of right ends, and also for its own sake, as we say, that is, as being in itself something absolutely good and right to be desired: and, if they desire virtue for either of these reasons, their desire is itself of the nature of virtue. Thus a Christian virtuously desires that he himself, and others, may grow in grace. Finally, the soul, as reflectively intelligent, has a faculty of intentionally directing and developing its own motivities, and, in particular, its own moral dispositions. This faculty depends on the power which one has of fixing and guiding the motive regards of his own mind. Thus a man, in the intervals of the actual performance of some practical or affectional duty—perhaps even while engaged in it—may encourage or dissuade himself concerning its performance. Now, should he, in the exercise of this self-regulation, purposely strive to be virtuous, this would be a rudimental form of causative righteousness. He would thus be doubly virtuous, first as simply seeking what is right for its own sake, and then again as desiring and striving to do so. In the first instance his purpose would be simply to do what is right; in the second his purpose would be to have and exercise the disposition of virtue.

The principal aim and animus of this incipient and internally directed causative righteousness are precisely the same with those of the object-virtue which it promotes. Therefore we may say that the chief element of it is a reflex exercise of moral principle. For a man may consciously desire and strive to be honest that he may do honest things, which is also the aim of honesty; and he may desire and strive to be truthful in order that he may speak the truth as he ought to speak it, which is the aim of veracity. In such cases the causative virtue is a reflex exercise of the virtue caused. It is the moral disposition of some species of virtue seeking to establish and perfect itself so as better to accomplish its proper aim. At the same time it seems true that even incipient

causative righteousness often—perhaps generally—agrees with the more deliberate form of causative virtue in regarding virtue as an end in itself, and not merely as leading to the special ends aimed at by the form of object-virtue promoted.

7. There is a resemblance between incipient causative righteousness and commotive virtue. Both aim at the regulation and guidance of motive feelings or tendencies, and this, too, within the personality of the one moral agent. But they differ in respect to the motivities with which they deal and as to their aims, or laws. The one would make natural disposition consentaneous with moral; the other would give to moral disposition its own right developments. Each, also, works in its own way. To stimulate and strengthen the dull or weak conscience, to inform and correct the unstable or eccentric conscience, and, as there may be need, to modify and conform to truth those dispositional habits into which even the moral reason falls—these are the methods of virtuous reflection.

The reflex exercise of principle is of some importance in connection with the theory of virtue in general. Many who have found two forms of virtue, the promoted and the promoting, constantly connected in our experience, have spoken as if all virtue were essentially reflective or self-regulative. But primary or practive virtue consists simply in the seeking of absolute good—that is, the absolute of natural good—as being right, and not in the regulation of moral principle by itself. The reflex exercise of principle is not an essential or necessary part of beneficence, honesty, or veracity. These involve only the objective exercise of reason and rational tendency. In like manner affectional or secondary virtue, such as reverence, courage and love, does not involve the intentional regulation of the moral principle which it includes. It consists in the promoted and sustained consentaneity of natural affection with primary virtue.

8. The more pronounced and methodical forms of causative virtue are those in the exercise of which one uses outward means for his own moral improvement and rectitude of life (as, for example, the ordinances of religion or the society of the good), and those, also, in which he endeavors, in any way, to maintain and promote righteousness and goodness among men.

The virtue thus developed contains the same elements which we have found in its incipency; but they are combined

in a different proportion. In incipient or subjective causative virtue, though the immediate effort is to promote some form of righteousness, this righteousness is regarded chiefly as an effectual means for the realization of the end which it seeks, and which is prominently before the mind. We see that what it is right and obligatory to do, it is also right and obligatory to cause to be done. We do not think so much of the righteousness itself as a right end. But in developed causative virtue, though one may have the right things to be accomplished by the object-virtue more or less in view, we generally aim chiefly at the object-virtue, or at object-virtue in general, as good in itself and right to be sought, without any separate notion of the results to proceed from it. The end thus conceived of and sought after is quite different from the ends aimed at by object-virtue. Virtue itself is regarded as a great, comprehensive and excelling end, and is distinguished under this aspect as *moral good*.

Methodical causative virtue may be divided into two species according to the mode of its operation. One of these may be styled *instructoral* righteousness, because it seeks for one's self and for others the improvement of character and life through an effective knowledge of duty, and therefore employs every direct means of moral instruction and edification. The other may be styled *rectoral* righteousness, not because it is exclusively a virtue of rulers, but because rulers are specially bound to exercise this virtue. It aims to suppress moral evil and to promote moral good through the employment of power and especially through the bestowal of rewards and the infliction of punishments. Its principal forms, therefore, are those of *remunerative* and *punitive* righteousness. The latter of these, which is commonly called punitive justice, is a very striking development of morality, because of the severity of its methods and their excitement of our fears. For mankind are more influenced morally by the fear of punishment than by the hope of reward.

9. It seems clear that, in every form of causative righteousness, whether the incipient, the instructoral or the rectoral, two aims are consciously pursued, first, *the realization of the end of object-virtue through that virtue as an instrument*, and, second, *the promotion of object-virtue itself*. We have now to add that, in each of these seekings, *causative virtue aims at absolute good*. This need not be argued in relation to the first aim. We have already seen that the ends of ob-

ject-virtue—of moral goodness, regulative righteousness and moral esteem—are things absolutely good. That being the case, object-virtue itself as favoring these ends must be absolutely good. And this virtue is admirably excellent also in other directions. It gives satisfaction to its possessor; it secures for him the favor of the good; it conforms his life to the conditions of an enduring prosperity and places it under the protection of Heaven; it unites the virtuous in harmony and love; it is the foundation of an everlasting blessedness.

It is not to be denied that adherence to duty may be accompanied with immediate trouble and suffering. The righteous man is rather to expect trials; sometimes he is called to be faithful even unto death. Nevertheless, from the absolute point of view, virtue must be declared a good. For no sacrifices are expected of any one except such as may contribute to the highest welfare of all. Therefore, if duty called for one's complete self-destruction, the virtue of acceding to this demand would be an absolute good, though it would be a private evil. It is certain, however, that no such sacrifice is ever demanded, and that the permanent blessedness of every righteous man is included in the absolute good of the universe. With faith in this truth the moral hero despises the tribulations which attend his course of well-doing. In the midst of the severest sufferings he declares that these light afflictions which are but for a moment shall work out for him a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory.

10. Since, then, causative righteousness, as well as every other form of virtue, aims at absolute good as its obligatory end, may we not conclude that the realization of this good is the generic end of the moral law? But in ordinary language the end of the law is said to be the accomplishment or realization of the right, or of that which is right. All this being so, *the right seems to be nothing else than absolute good considered as an end*, or as the obligatory end. Our analysis of the laws of duty points to this conclusion.

Two objections, however, to the foregoing definition of the right, claim consideration, because these objections, like the definition itself, are founded on a scrutiny of moral thought. First it may be said that moral good—or virtue as an object of desire—is so peculiar in its nature and so different from all other good which duty seeks, that it cannot be classified with the right ends of object-virtue under the head of absolute good. In other words, its character as moral good is

asserted not to consist in its conduciveness to the welfare and happiness of beings, but to be, perhaps, a simple and undefinable quality. In this way it is maintained that causative righteousness, at least, aims at something else than absolute good.

The other objection claims that the more prominent form of rectoral righteousness, namely, punitive justice, has an aim different from, or additional to, the repression of vice and the promotion of virtue; that its object is to inflict punishment on the transgressor; and that this end is philosophically ultimate and not to be explained as a requirement of absolute good.

The arguments thus presented, together with two important topics, may be advantageously considered, if one short chapter be devoted to the subject of moral good, and after that, another to the subject of punitive justice.

CHAPTER XXV.

VIRTUE THE "SUMMUM BONUM."

1. Formerly the word "virtue" designated any efficient quality of character. Effective moral principle was virtue merely by pre-eminence. We now use the term only in its ethical application.—2. The doctrine that virtue is the "*summum bonum*" means chiefly that virtue is the greatest absolute good, though virtue is also the greatest private good.—3. Virtue is an absolute good because it seeks and accomplishes things absolutely good.—4. Also because of its concomitants. (1) It is the foundation of esteem and affection. (2) It places one in right relation to the laws of God and the conditions of happiness. (3) It is an immediate source of contentment and satisfaction.—5. Also because it prevents vice and the dreadful evil which vice entails.—6. Our conception of virtue as the *summum bonum* and as opposed to vice, the *summum malum*, is greatly enlarged when we consider the consequences which may flow from virtue, or from the want of it, in a future life.—7. Moral good may be an end to the practical reason and may be sought "for its own sake," while yet the speculative reason may enumerate the elements which are included in the good.—8. That virtue is dutifully sought only as an absolute good is evident (1) because this is the only characteristic which virtue has in common with other obligatory ends, and (2) because this is the only quality in virtue with which reason can connect moral obligation.—9. The failure of some to see the analogy between virtue as a right end and all other absolute good as an end arises from three causes. (1) Virtue is differentiated from the other forms of good by reason of its peculiar character and exceeding value. (2) Virtue is an absolute good in a variety of ways. The mention of one or two of these is properly rejected as an insufficient account of the rightness of virtue as an end. (3) Virtue has striking characteristics in addition to its absoluteness of good; and these may affect the mind sentimentally, while only absoluteness of good is the ground of duty.—10. Absolute good is the end of all duty.

1. THE word "virtue" had formerly a wider signification than it ordinarily has now. It was applied by the Romans to every quality that belongs to an efficient and vigorous character, or to such a character as composed of such qualities. But *virtus*, or *virtutes*, the *vir* was distinguished from the

mere *homo*. A *vir* was a man considered as endowed with *vires*, or powers. Strength of mind, practical wisdom, resolution, courage, perseverance, energy, entirely apart from any thought of morality, were called virtues. Along with this general signification the word was also used in the sense commonly given to it at the present day; and so designated moral principle, the habitual disposition to do right, or any specific development of such principle. Influenced by the broad conception of virtue, the ancients frequently failed to emphasize the distinction between the moral and the non-moral elements of character; to remedy which defect *the Schoolmen divided virtues into the intellectual and the moral*. They described the latter as dispositions which aim at the realization of the right, that is, as virtues in the modern sense of the word, and they said that intellectual virtues are merely various mental abilities which may be employed in the service either of the right or of the wrong.

The Schoolmen, also, following the ancients, discussed morality more under the head of virtues than under the head of duties. For example, they taught that mundane life should be regulated by four principal or "cardinal" virtues, namely, prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice. In thus speaking of virtues they did not exclude, but rather included, the duties which these dispositions seek to perform; and so their classification of virtues became the basis for their study of the moral law. But in this classification, no hint is given of the distinction between that secondary virtue, which is merely the right exercise of natural disposition blended with regulative principle, and that primary virtue which directly seeks right doing; and consentaneity with which is the essence of secondary virtue. Of the four "cardinal" virtues, justice, alone, has the primary character; prudence, courage and fortitude become moral in the secondary way. This failure to note an important difference, and the acceptance of a superficial list as if it represented an ultimate analysis, introduced much difficulty into the study of ethics. Even yet some are confused in their understanding of the moral law, because they direct their attention more to virtues than to duties, and because they do not discriminate between primary (or practive) and secondary (or commotive) virtue.

In the following discussion the term "virtue" is to be used in its widest moral application. It is to stand for effective

moral principle and for the whole character and activity of man so far as these are governed and qualified by such principle. We are to conceive of virtue as the old Pythagoreans did when they called it the *ἔξις τοῦ δέοντος*—the habit or disposition of duty—considering along with this all the ways in which this disposition shows its efficacy. We have to contemplate virtue with the Stoics as the life of that “wise man” in whom moral principle reaches its full development and operation. And we are to study this life as the supreme good—the *summum bonum*—of rational beings. For when, nowadays, men dutifully promote virtue as moral good, and as the highest good which can be sought, they are simply carrying into practice the old doctrine of the *summum bonum*.

2. This doctrine, though frequently mentioned by moralists, is not discussed by many, nor even carefully stated. A satisfactory understanding of it requires that the *summum bonum* should be regarded in a double aspect. For virtue can be considered either as *the greatest absolute good*, that is, the chief source of prosperity to beings in general; or it may be contemplated as *the greatest private good*, that is, the chief source of happiness to its possessor. These two views are closely related, and may be said to involve one another. But they should be distinguished because the obligation to promote virtue springs from the fact that virtue is an absolute good, while the fact that virtue is a private good appeals only to self-interest or to benevolence. Considering the *summum bonum* from an ethical point of view we maintain, first, that *virtue is the most important form of absolute good*, and, secondly, that *it is a right and obligatory end as having this excellence*.

3. The claims of virtue as a moral end have been already briefly stated (Chap. XXIV.); they must now be given more at length. In the first place, virtue is absolutely good *as permanently aiming at and continually accomplishing things absolutely good*. This holds true whether we consider the practical or the affectional workings of principle. With respect to practical duty we have seen that absolute good is the end of the labors both of moral goodness and of regulative righteousness. Good is the prominent aim of the efforts of goodness; absoluteness of good and the rightness of the end are more regarded in a course of righteousness; nevertheless both good and the absoluteness of it enter into every

law of practive virtue. Sometimes goodness is directly concerned about the absoluteness of the good. For example, philanthropists, seeking to improve the condition of imprisoned or discharged convicts, strive to do this by some method which may be truly and absolutely good. They are quite as much exercised about the right mode or form of good, or the right way of doing good, as about good or the doing of it. Sometimes, on the other hand, the attention of justice or righteousness is called more to the good to be done than to the absoluteness of it; as when the oppressed widow sought redress from the unjust judge. But in every case, practive virtue seeks absolute good; and is itself absolutely good on that account. In like manner, commotive or affectional virtue promotes that absolute good which is found in right developments of natural disposition by reason of their implication with primary virtue, their practical operation and their intrinsic excellence. Thus object-virtue in general is an absolute good, because it is the fruitful source of all those multiplied forms of absolute good which that virtue labors for. For whatever is permanently, and by reason of its own nature, productive of peace, comfort and happiness, men call a good; and they seek virtue under this notion as an end, and, under the additional notion of absoluteness, as a right end.

4. In the second place, virtue is an absolute good *because of certain natural consequents, which, as distinguished from the ends at which it aims, may be called its concomitants*. Three of these are noticeable. First, *virtue renders the possessor of it a proper object of esteem and affection*. Moral excellence is not only admirable in itself, but it is the only ground of rational and enduring love. Goodness when fully developed creates a preeminent personal attractiveness which might be distinguished as moral loveliness. This is not that loveableness, or amiability, which attends an easy temper and pleasant manners, and which is often found in persons whom we cannot esteem highly. It is a quality which unites the good together in a noble friendship, and which is the basis of their expectation of the blessed fellowship of Heaven. A perfect exemplification of this loveliness appears in the character of Jesus Christ.

The second of those concomitants which unite to make virtue an inexhaustible source of happiness, is *that well-ordered condition, both of inward capacity and of outward*

relations, which follows upon conformity to the laws of rectitude. Such is the constitution of the Universe and such the mind of the Creator, that virtuous beings, while seeking absolute good rather than good as privately related, are yet in the way of receiving greater good personally than they could hope for in any other course of life. It is entirely consistent with this statement that the good man is often the subject of sore trials and afflictions. Sorrowful experiences are not the natural effects of virtue, but of the sin and evil to which virtue is opposed; and their ultimate result is to increase the capacity of the upright for virtue and happiness. The good man is assured that, although no chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous but grievous, nevertheless afterward it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby. There is also a rational conviction among men that the ruler of the universe will provide for the welfare of the good and will subject impenitent transgressors to the just recompense of their iniquity. All nations believe and say that it will be well with the righteous and that evil shall overtake the wicked. This judgment arises partly because, under the best ordering of human affairs, the personal prosperity of good men is found not to conflict with the general well-being, but to form a part of it. Therefore, to provide for the welfare of the good is a moral obligation. It is assumed that the permanent state of virtuous beings will be settled in accordance with this principle.

The remaining concomitant to be mentioned, in the light of which virtue is an unqualified good, is *that satisfaction which the virtuous have both in the possession and exercise of their own virtue and in the beholding of the virtue of others.* A virtuous being has a deep and peaceful happiness in realizing the harmony between himself and that law of absoluteness of good which he regards as right and obligatory; and he has similar pleasure in seeing others obedient to that law. He also rejoices in his agreement with all powers and agencies of good and with the mind and government of God. Vice, on the other hand, excites unrest and dissatisfaction in the sinful spirit.

The happiness which thus accompanies virtue, by reason of its moral loveliness, its attendant personal prosperity, and its inward satisfactions, when thought of as fully realized, is often called blessedness. This holy felicity is the endless

portion of the inhabitants of Heaven. It differs vastly in nature and in degree from all happiness not conditioned upon virtue.

5. In the third place—and finally—virtue is a great and absolute good *as being preventive of vice and of the ruin and misery which vice entails*. Rational agents are not granted the choice between a life of virtue and no life at all. They must either be obedient to the rule of righteousness or disobedient to it. They must act either unselfishly, uprightly and for the general good, or selfishly and in disregard of the laws of God and of the claims of their fellow-men. Moreover, although, for a time and influenced by environments, one's disposition may waver between good and evil, character ever tends to become more determinate—more governed by a fixed principle. Such, too, is the power of habit that, when either good or evil gains the ascendancy in one's affections, he is likely, not only to be borne along in his chosen course, but also to become more and more bent on ways of good or ways of evil. Hence the necessity of right decisions when questions of duty come before us. One's destiny for an endless future may at last be settled through an alliance formed by his will with the right or with the wrong. This thought influenced him who wrote:

There is a time, we know not when
A point, we know not where,
That marks the destiny of men
To glory or despair.

This was the thought of Moses, the man of God, in bringing to a close his solemn farewell address to the children of Israel: "See," said he, "I have set before thee, this day, life and good, and death and evil." While virtue is the supreme source of blessings to rational beings, vice is the supreme evil and the source of unspeakable and incurable misery. And, as vice can be prevented only through the maintenance of virtue, the importance of virtue is duplicated; and our obligation to promote it becomes very great indeed.

It is an interesting question whether, in dutifully promoting virtue, we conceive of it more as generative of prosperity and preventive of evil, or as an agency intentionally seeking what is right. Probably men realize the obligation more on the ground that virtue is instrumental to the realization of

the right. At the same time virtue is often recognized as a dutiful end because it is a generative source of good and happiness. One may, indeed, labor for the virtue of an individual or of a community under the influence of some merely natural affection (which may have been enlarged and liberalized, though not subdued, by reason); and, in this case, his conduct would not be virtuous. A bad man might desire his son to be a good man, or a wicked ruler that his people should be virtuous. Nay; men sometimes, from a selfish principle, desire to be virtuous themselves. Nevertheless it is evident that we may and do virtuously desire the spiritual good and blessedness of ourselves and of others; as, for example, when Christians labor and pray for the salvation of sinners. This is a right end, because it is a thing absolutely good.

6. The convictions which men have of the greatness of moral good and the dreadfulness of moral evil arise from a perception of the tendencies of virtue and of vice to produce happiness and misery. They are more than mere records of the course and conclusion of things in this world, however impressive these records may sometimes be. They include an inference from things that are seen to things that are not seen. They assume that the natural effects of virtue and of vice will at last be completely realized. Such are the present limitations and checks of man's condition that virtue has not free scope for the accomplishment of all the good which it desires and labors for; nor yet have pride, enmity, selfishness and passion the power to do all the evil to which they directly tend. But the more serious portion of mankind are deeply convinced that in the total of existence, virtue shall find herself grandly efficacious for good, and that vice shall be terribly productive of evil. Even with respect to our best present interests thoughtful men hold virtue to be a great and absolute good and vice a great and absolute evil. But their estimate of the inner and essential importance of these things contemplates a wider field of experience than that included within the bounds of earthly life. They regard virtue as something likely to be productive hereafter and indefinitely of untold good, and vice as the natural cause of untold evil.

7. Having considered virtue as a great and absolute good, let us now see how *it becomes an obligatory end, because it is an absolute good, and for this cause alone.* All will agree

not only that virtue should be cultivated because it is a good, but also that duty requires this of us not exclusively for our own profit or for their benefit in whom we may be interested, but because virtue is the supreme part of the total of good possible for ourselves and for others. It may, however, be questioned whether this is the only ground on account of which virtue is an obligatory end. Some also may say that men recognize the claims of moral good intuitively and without thought of any consequences flowing from it.

In questions of this kind it is important to remember that the practical reason differs in its mode of action from the speculative, and that the latter must take account of this difference when attempting to explain the operations of the former. *Practical reason frequently unites, in its conception of an end, both the means to be used and the result to be accomplished.* In this way an instrument or agency may be desired, not in order to its consequence or consequences, but as being united with it or them under the same conception. Often, too, when an object is variously productive of gratifications, these are thought of indefinitely or by a kind of reference, and can be distinctly perceived and mentioned only after some reflection. After this fashion wealth, station, power and knowledge, are commonly desired. There is, therefore, a sense in which one might be said to seek virtue simply as moral good and without further thought of its results. As moral good, it is inclusive of its results. But when the speculative reason interprets this action of the practical reason, it does so by enumerating the ways in which virtue is efficacious of good; just as we have attempted to do in the present treatise. We acknowledge that the intuitive reason seeks moral good as an end; but we hold that this end admits of the explanation which has been given. We trust, also, that others will find this explanation satisfactory if, without undue prepossession, they will pursue that method of patient analytic thinking without which progress in philosophy is not to be hoped for.

8. A careful consideration of the ethical judgments of men will be found to support our doctrine in various ways. For example, it will become apparent on examination that *absoluteness of good is the only characteristic which virtue has in common with other ends of moral pursuit.* This is an important point, because all the requirements of morality are right and obligatory, and must agree in some quality on

which their rightness depends or in which it consists. We have seen that all the duties of object-virtue aim at the preservation or advancement of absolute good, and are obligatory on this account. Is not this the case also with the duty of promoting virtue? That it should be so is consistent with the fact that we labor for virtue as moral good and with little thought of its absoluteness. We seek good dutifully in three ways, first as the aim of moral goodness and moral esteem, then as the aim of regulative righteousness, and, finally, as the aim of causative righteousness: and each of these modes of virtue recognises absolute good as an obligatory end. But this absoluteness, or rightness, though always present, is a prominent element of thought only in regulative righteousness. In short, causative virtue seeks moral good as absolute just as moral goodness seeks the absolute of natural good. But to desire either moral or natural good as merely privately related, is not an act of moral principle but only of prudence or of wisdom.

Further; it seems true that *absoluteness of good is the only quality in virtue with which reason connects moral obligation*. If virtue were in no way conducive to the welfare and happiness of beings—if it were neither good in itself nor in any way productive of good—who would feel bound to labor for the promotion of virtue? Moral excellence might excite our interest or admiration, as genius and beauty do; or we might respect it as we do any influential agency in human affairs; but we would not feel under obligation to serve it. Moreover, as already shown, it is not as privately related good that virtue appeals to duty, but as the supreme absolute good.

9. The reluctance of some to accept any conception of moral good which correlates it as an end with other ends of duty, is traceable chiefly to three causes; all of which are explainable in accordance with the theory that absolute good is the universal aim of morality. In the first place, virtue, as we have seen, *has an exceedingly marked character of its own by which it is contrasted, not only with all other good, but even with all other forms of absolute good*. It is the absolute good, not of the outward actions or natural affections, but of the inmost and highest nature of rational beings. It is an absolute good because those who possess it habitually do every right action, whether practical or affectional, and because their course of life leads towards an eternal and holy

blessedness in which they and all the virtuous shall participate. Considering the nature and developments of this good, we ascribe to it a comprehensiveness, a greatness and a spirituality, which elevate it above all other good. Hence it is not to be wondered at that excellent men, desiring to maintain for themselves and others an exalted appreciation of virtue as an end, sometimes seem to deny that virtue is a good at all. At least their language suggests that, in thinking of virtue as an end, they think—or suppose they think—of it, not as a good but as an end higher—more morally attractive and obligatory—than any good or than all good. For our part we think it sufficient to say that virtue is a far higher end than any other good; that it is the highest conceivable form of absolute good which can be developed from the nature of rational beings; nor can we find any reason to believe that good men dutifully labor for virtue except under this notion of it.

In the second place, it is to be noted that *virtue is absolutely good in various modes and directions and that it is a right and obligatory end in each and in all of these modes and directions*. This fact makes it possible to form a partial and incomplete explanation of moral good as an end of duty. Virtue is a right end as seeking, maintaining and accomplishing all things absolutely good—as fostering all absolutely good affections—as being morally lovely—as conforming rational beings to the conditions of prosperous existence—as giving a satisfaction *sui generis* to all holy beings. In all these ways virtue is permanently and by reason of its very nature absolutely good. It is not merely a benefit to its possessor, but it is generally diffusive of good. Evidently our conception of this end is exceedingly comprehensive, and may be regarded as one of the highest generalizations of reason.

Hence fault might justly be found should we teach that our conception of virtue as a right end includes only one or two modes of good, or that it sets forth good as only privately related. On the one hand, for example, it would not be enough to say that virtue is a dutiful end because it is the bond of the harmonious fellowship of rational beings, though this is true; nor yet that virtue should be cultivated because it is a general source of blessedness to rational beings, though that is true. These statements would not give the whole truth of which the practical reason is conscious; and they might properly be objected to by persons who could not make any

more satisfactory statement. On the other hand, it would be insufficient to say that we are bound to seek the moral good of an individual, or of some set of individuals, because it is his or their moral good. This would be true because in this case the private good, being moral, would also be absolute. That is, it would be a part of the absolute total, and would really be considered as such. But the assertion might be taken to mean that the ground of duty is simply the welfare of the person or persons morally improved, others being disregarded; which would not be true.

An illustration of these remarks may be found in the duty of promoting piety, or that form of virtuous life which proceeds from dutiful regard for God as the wisest and best of persons. It would be weak and inadequate to say that we should labor for piety because of the right and good things which it strives for among men, and equally so to say that piety is a moral end because of the good and blessedness which it brings to its possessor and to the society of the godly. These things are absolutely good, and therefore also are aims of virtue. Nevertheless in promoting piety we should be yet more influenced by moral esteem for the divine being and by the desire for his satisfaction. For the good Lord takes pleasure in the right conduct of his servants—in their deeds of beneficence and in their lives of love; the holy Ruler of all is gratified by the virtue and righteousness of his creatures; our Heavenly Father delights in the unfeigned affection of his children; and the God of love rejoices in the prosperity and blessedness of those that fear his name. In short, we should labor for piety as the highest development of good, and the chief good in every way in the eyes of both God and man.

Finally, we should notice that virtue has various characteristics in addition to those which constitute it an absolute good, and that *one may be sentimentally impressed by these characteristics of virtue at the same time that he is dutifully affected only by its absolute excellence*. Hence a good man might find it difficult to seize and to present exactly those aspects of virtue in which he regarded it as a right end, these being necessarily involved with others. Moral disposition and conduct may be considered as conducive to or destructive of the good of some individual or community, that good being thought of only as privately related; in such a case virtue is regarded not as a right thing but as a good thing.

Or virtue and vice may be conceived of simply as dispositions with which we may or may not sympathize. Or virtue may be looked upon as something amiable, and vice as something hateful. Or we may view moral conduct as giving satisfaction or the reverse to the agent or to others—as being solemnly enforced by authority and legal sanctions—or as about to bring the moral agent rewards and punishments. These and other particulars excite within us various sentiments and a general complex sentiment; yet, except so far as they indirectly commend virtue as absolutely good, they do not affect our sense of duty. They should be distinguished from those aspects of virtue on account of which it is a right and obligatory end.

10. In discovering a generic agreement between absolute natural good and moral good as absolute, we have found that unity in the matter of the moral law which is demanded both by philosophy and by the ordinary reason of mankind. At the same time, by insisting on the marked specific character of moral good and on that excellence, spirituality and greatness which distinguished it from all other good—even from such other good as it is obligatory on us to seek—we have endeavored, while explaining, not to weaken our conception of virtue as the superlative end of duty.

CHAPTER XXVI.

PUNITIVE JUSTICE.

1. That Rectoral Righteousness aims fundamentally at the promotion of absolute good, is disputed only as relates to Punitive Justice. The views of Dr. A. A. Hodge.—2. The ill-desert (or guilt) of persons and the ill-desert of sin, defined and explained.—3. The infliction of penalty, though ultimate as an end to the practical reason, can be analyzed and accounted for by the speculative reason. Its aim is the maintenance of virtue as an absolute good and the suppression of vice as an absolute evil.—4. This is the only ground on which we deliberately justify punishment. The animus of punitive justice is to be distinguished from anger, or resentment, and even from righteous indignation. Spite and malice are irrational perversions of resentment.—5. The Christian doctrine of the Atonement as related to Punitive Justice. Inexplicable on the supposition that the end of punishment is simply the infliction of evil on the transgressor. Intelligible on the theory that punishment is designed to uphold the cause of righteousness.—6. The just subjection of the human race to evil because of the apostasy of their first parent was an act of rectoral righteousness which cannot be literally identified with the exercise of punitive justice. But the two modes of righteousness are so analogous that the same use of language properly expresses both. They have a generic community of nature.

1. THE essential or proper aim of that mode of causative righteousness which has been termed rectoral righteousness seems evident. If the animus of this form of principle be the love of virtue and the hatred of vice, it is easy to see that it aims at absolute good, and that of the highest kind. No one will object to this doctrine so far as the duty of bestowing rewards is concerned. All will agree that, in addition to the law of moral esteem, which has been explained in preceding discussions, the only other law conferring special favor on the righteous is that of causative virtue.

Some, however, teach that the duty of inflicting punishment on the wicked is founded on a principle different from, and additional to, that of causative righteousness.

They say that punitive justice looks on the inherent ill-desert of sin, and *claim that this ground of punishment is an ultimate and irresolvable intuition*. They allow that sin should be punished in order to maintain the law and thereby to suppress vice and promote virtue; but they assert that the essence of punitive justice is to punish sin just because it ought to be punished; and that this is a simple and ultimate principle. Dr. Archibald Alexander Hodge, the distinguished son of a yet more distinguished father, in his book on "The Atonement" (page 55), says, "As the essential and irresolvable characteristic of virtue is oughtness and of sin its opposite oughtnotness, so it is an intrinsic and immutable attribute of sin that it ought to be punished. This obligation to punishment is an ultimate fact of moral consciousness; it cannot be resolved into any other principle whatever; it is intrinsic in sin without reference to any other principle."

We question whether Dr. Hodge would have expressed himself so confidently in this passage—and throughout his book—regarding the philosophy of right and wrong, if he had realized the need of an analytical study of ethics. He would have seen that the essential characteristic of that dutiful conduct which he calls "virtue," is not oughtness (or obligatoriness) but rightness; and that the former of these characteristics is consequent upon the latter. In every case of duty a thing ought to be done because it is right; and this rightness can be distinguished from its necessary concomitant. He would have seen, also, that an end, or an object of thought, which is ultimate to the "moral consciousness"—that is, to the practical moral reason—may not be ultimate to the speculative intellect. He might, indeed, find moral obligation to be a simple peculiar relation between a rational agent and the right, but he would scarcely go so far as to say that no reason or explanation can be given for the existence of this relation in particular cases of duty. Accepting "oughtness" as absolutely ultimate and elemental, may we not still inquire, Why ought we to punish the transgressor? Dr. Hodge thinks that philosophical investigation is not needed on such points. He says, "Nothing can be gained here by refinements of the speculative intellect. The Scriptures, the moral sense, and the common judgments of mankind, are our only courts of appeal." According to our view the sacred Scriptures and the daily judgments of men yield the most important concrete presentations of moral truth which can be found. All ex-

planations of philosophy should be subordinated to these; as theory must ever be subordinate to fact. But it does not appear wise to dissuade reason from examining the conceptions of Scripture and of conscience, and from seeking an understanding of them free from confusion and inconsistency, and satisfying to honest inquiry. This investigation will be made in spite of any one's objections; and is it not better that it should be made by those who accept the statements of Scripture and of common sense; and that it should not be left to those for whom no philosophy is sufficiently profound which is not opposed both to the teachings of the Bible and to the ordinary convictions of mankind?

2. The expression "ill-desert," in morals, has a two-fold application. First, it is applied to persons considered as evil-doers and as related to punitive law. It then signifies *the obligation (or obligatedness) of a person to punishment by reason of his sin or ill-service*; for in morals, we are the servants, or subjects, of the law of right. When we say that a person deserves ill, we mean that he has transgressed or disobeyed the law, and is therefore affected by the claims of punitive justice. Ill-desert has precisely the same meaning as demerit. It is the peculiar relation in which the sinner stands to punishment as something right and obligatory. It is just obligation to penalty because of one's disregard of the moral law. And the evident reason of it is that the violated law and the injured cause of virtue must be vindicated and maintained. *It does not arise from any private relations of the guilty person*, else it would have nothing to do with justice, *but from his relations to the moral law*. Such a desert is a simple thing, yet not an absolutely ultimate principle. It is a development of the duty of promoting virtue and the right; in other words, an application of the principle of causative righteousness.

Secondly, the expressions ill-desert and demerit are applied, not to the transgressor as brought under penal condemnation, but to his sin as productive of that relation. This ill-desert of sin is *that quality in personal moral conduct by reason of which this may become the just ground of the ill-desert of the evil-doer*. It is the heinousness of sin. It is the character of sin as being absolutely and extremely evil, in that it is opposed to right doing and to moral good; and as thus necessitating the duty of punishment. For justice ever labors to suppress and prevent, and, so far as possible, to destroy sin,

by mean of threatenings and punishments, simply because it is sin, and, as such, absolutely evil and hateful. But clearly, in connection with this ill-desert of sin, penalty or punishment is not a thing right and obligatory simply as suffering inflicted on the sinner and without reference to its operation in support of right and virtue. On the contrary, penalty as related to sin, no less than penalty as related to the sinner, is simply a suitable and necessary means of suppressing wickedness and of maintaining righteousness—that is, of promoting the indispensable agency and the highest form of absolute good. The teaching, therefore, that all duty aims at absolute good is not inconsistent with the idea of the inherent ill-desert of sin. Indeed it enables us better to understand that idea. It explains ill-desert as arising from the fact that sin is wholly and intensely evil, and that this evil, as the opposite of moral good, should be suppressed and destroyed.

The idea of punitive justice thus given is intermediate between that of Dr. Hodge, which has been already stated, and that of President Porter, who conceives of it as “a form or manifestation of moral benevolence, which is called justice because impersonal equity is one of its chief characteristics,” etc. (EL. MOR. SCIENCE, section 289.) Each of these doctors seems to apprehend one side of the truth too strongly.

3. The doctrine that punitive justice is essentially a mode of causative righteousness cannot be set aside by analytical argument. Nevertheless difficulty may be found in the interpretation of all our experience in accordance with it. In the more rapid and impulsive discharge of punitive duty we sometimes appear to aim simply at the suffering of the sinner, without thinking of any end beyond that. There is a sense too, in which not merely indignation, or righteous anger, but also the calm and deliberate exercise of the punitive disposition, may be said to aim at the infliction of penalty without regard to any end beyond this infliction. The following considerations may relieve the subject of obscurity. In the first place, it is evident that, *while punitive justice seeks only the maintenance of the cause of right and virtue, other dutiful ends may be pursued in connection with this*. Such, for example, are the reformation of the offender, when this is possible; the peace of the community; the protection of the innocent; and the preservation of civil order. These are right and obligatory ends; and each of them is frequently

promoted by punitive actions. But these ends may be sought by means which are not penal; and they are not the objects of the punitive disposition. The essential aim of penal infliction is to enforce respect for law through the punishment of the disobedient, and so to promote righteousness as the supreme good and to suppress vice as an absolute and extreme evil.

In the next place, let it be noted that our minds do not commonly, in their practical workings, regard the punishment of the sinner and the maintenance of righteousness as two distinct things. *They rather regard punishment as being one thing, namely, the infliction of suffering or loss on the evil-doer, so as to maintain virtue and the moral law.* This is a case in which two notions are combined so as to form one notion. There is first the idea of the infliction of suffering on the sinner, and secondly, the idea of the maintenance of virtue and right. The mind can distinctly conceive of each of these things, and can also think distinctly of their connecting relation. But, in the common notion of punishment, both of these ideas, together with that of their relatedness, are contracted together and form but one idea. Punishment, therefore, though properly analyzed and defined by the speculative reason as "suffering inflicted on the evil-doer, so as to maintain virtue and the right," constitutes but one object of thought to the practical reason, and is inflicted as containing its own end, and not for any end beyond itself. (Chap. V.)

Moreover, in compounded motive notions of this kind, one element is frequently more sensibly apprehended than others; because various causes lead the mind to put the stress of its attention more on one element than on others. In such a case we might say that the one element is *thought of* and the others only *referred to*; meaning by this last an indefinite kind of thought. In the present instance the idea of suffering inflicted on the evil-doer is often more prominent than the idea of the maintenance of virtue and the suppression of vice; this is especially the case in the more rapid and impulsive exercises of the punitive disposition. Hence, in an attempted analysis, the infliction of suffering on the transgressor may be taken to be the only element. But both ideas are always present; both are essential parts of the notion of punishment when this is conceived of as an ultimate moral end.

An illustration of the mode of thought referred to above may be drawn from the ordinary conception of good; for this, like the notion of punishment, is not absolutely simple and irresolvable. As already taught (Chap. II.), a good is an object which, either immediately or mediately, is a cause or effective condition of some form of relief, peace, comfort, satisfaction or blessedness. Therefore the conception of anything as a good involves three ideas; first, that of an object viewed by itself or as to its natural essence; secondly, that of satisfaction in some of its forms, whether general or particular, moral or natural; and thirdly, that of the relation of the object to the satisfaction, whether as a mediate or an immediate, an active or a passive, cause of the satisfaction. Of these three ideas the notion of satisfaction, or gratification (including relief from any distress), is the most important; yet it is commonly less definitely apprehended than that of the conditioning object. In most kinds of good—property, for example—the included satisfactions are so various that they can be conceived of only in the general. Hence, and because of the immediate presence of the object, the notion of satisfaction seems to hide itself within that of the object. Yet it is always there, and, like the flavoring ingredient which constitutes the pleasing quality of a fruit, gives to the object its importance and attractiveness. Such is the common notion of a good, when men think and speak of it as an end. A similar account might be given of the conception of evil as the opposite of good.

4. That we have correctly analyzed the idea of punishment as a moral end will become increasingly evident on reflection. For it is to be remembered that *punishment as a duty is a part of what is right and not of what is wrong*, and that we are at present directly concerned only with the aims of virtuous indignation and of justice, not with those either of purely natural anger, or of wicked anger and hatred. Now, though even the moral faculty sometimes acts rapidly and impulsively, in righteous indignation, it is clear that we never act virtuously without some moral thought. Such cases must be accounted for by saying that the practical reason, having formed for herself such a notion as punishment—or as good—follows it by a sort of habit and often applies it instantly, recognizing its intrinsic value and obligatory character, yet not analyzing it so as to note distinctly those elements of it which give it value and authority as a rule.

But *when we act slowly and when we deliberately reflect upon our conduct, then the essential reason of the rule appears; and by this only we justify the rule.* This is a principle of general application in morals. As to the present case, what good man would consider himself justified in inflicting punishment on his children or on other persons subject to his authority, if he could not on deliberation conclude that he thereby was honoring and maintaining the moral law and serving the cause of virtue?

It is important that *we should distinguish anger, including therein even righteous indignation, from the proper and essential animus, or motive disposition, of punitive justice.* Anger, like benevolence, is, in itself, merely a natural exercise of motivity. It becomes moral only as consentaneous with justice. Like benevolence too, it may be divided into the purely natural or instinctive, the rationalized, and the moral. Every form of it, however, is conditioned on a nearer, fuller and more vivid view of its object than is possible, for such beings as we are, in the use of our moral faculty. Instinctive anger, by which we mean that resentment which does not involve any exercise of the rational faculty and which even brutes exhibit, is the simplest form of anger. It is not related to evil as viewed absolutely, nor to any general evil, nor to any instance of evil which can be apprehended only through the processes of the reason. It arises in view of some particular injury as immediately perceived. And, indeed, anger, even after it is more or less rationalized, is still conditioned on a full and vivid cognition of its object, that is, of a person as doing harm. When, in some particular case, a person is suddenly perceived to be causing harm, then we are perturbed and impulsively desire to repel and subdue that person as harmful. For instance, a man may become angry on perceiving that he has lost money through the incompetence of another or that he has failed of a bargain because another has stepped in before him. Such anger is nothing more than instinctive resentment acting with some admixture of rational thought.

A higher sort of anger arises when we see some particular person doing some specific evil which we know that he should avoid as absolute and wrong; and so also committing sin, which is moral evil within himself. The anger thus excited naturally allies itself with the animus of punitive justice. The two for the time may coalesce while we impulsively

attack the evil-doer and strive to inflict on him an adequate penalty. This kind of resentment, which becomes moral when it co-operates with justice, is called indignation. It is distinguishable from the animus of justice because it is more impulsive than the latter, and because it regards sin rather as a doing of evil than as being also itself moral evil. Its view is not so wide and far-reaching as that of justice; for the aims of the latter are more comprehensive than those of any sudden impulsions or passion.

Anger, so far as consentaneous with the true-animus of punitive justice—which animus is hatred for sin as evil—is not wrong but right. Righteous indignation is an assistance given by our natural constitution to our moral faculty, so as to intensify our attention and our feelings and to stir up our activity. Nevertheless anger of any kind is not consentaneous, nor even consistent, with duty, if it be indulged to excess and become a wild passion, or if it be cherished after the provocation for it has grown old or has passed away. It then becomes a disturbing element in moral life. As a rule, we should not allow the sun to go down upon our wrath. With respect to its lawful duration resentment is strikingly contrasted with benevolence—a fact significant of the truth that *good is ever the main and essential aim of duty, while evil, whether punitive or remedial, is inflicted only as subsidiary to good.* The animus of justice, however, remains after the subsidence of righteous indignation; and it gives life, endurance and power to one's determination to punish the guilty.

It would be interesting to study particularly that perturbation and impulsiveness which characterize both natural and moral anger; and also to discuss that wicked hatred of persons, commonly called malice, which exhibits a chronic degeneration of the animus of anger after its perturbation and impulsiveness have disappeared. But the former of these topics belongs rather to psychology than to ethics, and the latter to an analysis of sin rather than to the theory of duty. At present we aim at this last only. We think that it has been sufficiently shown that *punitive justice inflicts penalty on the evil-doer, because penalty is right and obligatory as repressive of moral evil and as promotive of moral good.*

5. The doctrine thus stated has some bearings on two im-

portant teachings of the sacred Scriptures, namely, that all mankind are in a state of condemnation by reason of the sin of their first parent and that the death of Christ was an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of his people. These teachings are commonly known as *the doctrine of the Fall and the doctrine of the Atonement*. According to the first of them the ruin of the descendants of Adam was decided upon before any of them had come into existence and was the just penalty of Adam's sin, the eating of that forbidden fruit—

“ Whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world and all our woe.”

Because of this transgression no human being since the first man and the first woman, has been created in maturity and perfection and surrounded with the conditions of an unbroken happiness. All men have been born in weakness and immaturity, sinful and suffering creatures, and must pass their lives in a world of sin and sorrow and of exposure to endless evil. According to the second doctrine the sufferings of Christ—especially his voluntary death on the cross—are a full satisfaction to justice for the transgressions of those who truly repent, and forsake their sin for the service of God. Therefore believers are treated by the divine government as though they had never incurred ill-desert.

It would be beyond the scope of our discussions to show that the foregoing doctrines are taught in the sacred writings. We find them there; and we would consider them in connection with the philosophy of punitive justice. Taking the more important doctrine first, it is evident that, *if the sufferings of a Redeemer are a satisfaction for the sins of penitent and converted souls, they can be so only through an exception to the ordinary rule of justice*. On any theory the primary design of punishment must include the suffering of the guilty, not that of the innocent. If penal suffering is ever to be assigned to the innocent, this can only be when the suffering of the innocent may serve as a substitute for the suffering of the guilty. It is impossible to see how any arbitrary infliction of pain on the innocent could properly be used as an expression of hatred for sin and in maintenance of the cause of virtue and duty. Arbitrarily directed suffering would be itself wrong, and a discouragement to virtue. The first law of punitive justice must be, “The soul that sinneth, it shall die.” If there be any atonement or expiation through

the sufferings of an innocent victim, it must be an exception to this rule and a substitute for it.

In the next place, *if the infliction of penalty because of transgression be founded on a simple and absolute intuition, then there is no possibility that the ends of justice can be satisfied in any other way than that.* An ultimate principle does not admit of exceptions; it has the nature of a mathematical action. Moreover, the law that the sinner himself must suffer, though not absolutely ultimate, has more right to claim that character than any other rule of punitive justice which can be stated. The doctrine that sin has demerit and should be punished is little more than a secondary way of saying that the sinner has demerit and should be punished. Taken otherwise, and as a separate statement asserting the ill-desert of sin without personally locating the liability to punishment, it is not so evident to reason as the common dogma; and is certainly no more ultimate. In fact neither of these statements is a simple intuition.

Finally, if the aim of punitive justice be the vindication of the broken law and the maintenance of the cause of righteousness through penalty exacted from the transgressor, *it may be that, under exceptional circumstances, this same end can be obtained through the intercession and suffering of another than the transgressor.* An attribute of mercy affects human government whereby sometimes pardon is granted an offender, or the sentence against him is to a greater or less extent remitted. This happens when the culprit is a person of good character and has been misled by sudden strong temptation; when he is heartily penitent; when his punishment would work extreme hardship for the innocent; when intercession is made for him by those who have rightful claims to consideration; and when it is clear that lenient measures will not weaken but strengthen the cause of virtue and morality. The punishment even of the guilty does not seem to be obligatory when it is no longer needed for the vindication of the law; and so would be a gratuitous infliction of evil. Under such circumstances conscientious parents do not exercise their right to chastise their children; and for sufficient reasons civil rulers grant amnesty or pardon to those who have transgressed the laws.

According to the doctrine of the atonement, however, though some of the foregoing considerations apply, *the for-*

givenness of sin against God cannot rightly take place without a satisfaction of punitive law through the sufferings either of the sinner or of a redeemer. From the earliest times the institution of expiatory burnt offerings taught men that "without shedding of blood there is no remission of sins," and we learn from the New Testament that Christ "hath loved us and hath given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savor." The sufferings of our Lord were an "atonement," or "propitiation"; and the explanation of this is that, by means of those sufferings, the law of God and the cause of righteousness were more gloriously vindicated and honored than they could have been by the destruction of the sinners who were saved. From the nature of the case the intercession of Christ could be efficacious only for those whom he properly represented—for those who have at least begun to participate in his life and to exhibit his character. The divine favor cannot be expected for impenitent and wilful transgressors. But forgiveness is offered to all on the condition of faith and repentance. This substitutionary justice finds some analogy in human proceedings. Sometimes—not always—justice is satisfied if a fine, incurred by one person, be paid by another. Occasionally a substitute has been accepted to bear the whole or part of the penalty, and this, especially, when the intercessory expiation has been rendered by him whose duty it is to enforce the law. In that case the purpose of the ruler or the judge to maintain the cause of righteousness cannot be questioned. The doctrine of the atonement, however, receives stronger support from its own inherent reasonableness than from any human analogies.

The question whether the death of Christ was the payment of a penalty or only of a substitute for a penalty, is mainly one of words. If penalty signify, as it commonly does, the suffering to which the guilty have become obligated, Christ did not endure the penalty but only a substitute for it. But if, as Professor Foster of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church says, "Any suffering which has the purpose and effect of penalty is, to that extent and for that very reason, penalty itself" (SYSTEMATIC THEOL., p. 610), then we may say that Christ paid the penalty of our transgressions.

6. *The condemnation of the human race because of the apostasy of their first parent seems less closely related to the principles of punitive justice than the atonement which*

Christ made for believers. So far as Adam was concerned personally, the effects of his fall were truly punitive. But this cannot be maintained in regard to his descendants. They are born into an estate of sin and misery without any transgression of their own. This may in some manner be the just and legal consequence of Adam's sin, but, if so, it cannot be on the ground of punitive justice. To punish, for the fault of their progenitor, countless myriads who had not sinned after the similitude of his transgression—who, indeed, had not incurred guilt of any kind—would have no tendency to vindicate the broken law or to uphold the cause of virtue. On the contrary it would be a violation of the rights of the innocent. How, then, were mankind condemned for the sin of Adam? Must it not have been because, *in the first man, human nature, created in maturity and perfection, had a fair trial, perhaps the most favorable possible, and was found wanting?* Adam, as the best type of unfallen humanity, represented every man, and therefore all men. The story of the Fall, whether purely historical or not, seems to be the record of an occurrence which justified and required a course of dealing such as, we may presume, had never before been followed with rational creatures. Man, now born a helpless and dependent being, is trained from the cradle in lessons of humility and submission, of trust and hope, of temperance and fortitude, of industry and obedience, and is daily called to that life of faith in God in which alone his highest good can be realized. These facts suggest the legal ground of God's severe dealings with the human family. *They are explainable, not on the principles of punitive justice, properly so called, but on those of a cognate rectoral righteousness which aims, in its own way, at the suppression of moral evil and the promotion of moral good.* This development of rectoral duty differs from those of retributive justice in that it relates not to rewards and penalties, but to the wisest and best disposition of man's earthly life. Yet it so resembles punitive justice in its methods, that the two modes of righteousness naturally go under the same name and call for the use of the same terms. There is an analogy between them. In each there is a trial, or probation; in each there is sin or transgression; in each condemnation or account of the transgression; in each, a condition of sin and misery resulting from the condemnation. That the Bible and the creeds of the church should use the terms of punitive justice in speak-

ing of the fall of our race is not to be wondered at. Human language has no other terms so well fitted to express the truth. At the same time reason has the right to interpret this language according to the nature of the case.

This cursory review of two noted doctrines may seem out of place to some who would exclude theistic thought from ethics; and it may be considered by others deficient and unsatisfactory. It will, at least, illustrate the conviction that theological doctrine is a proper subject of philosophical investigation. We cannot conceive how satisfying views of truth can be obtained in any other way.

CHAPTER XXVII.

ABSOLUTE GOOD AND THE RIGHT.

1. The right is absolute good considered as an end. It might be defined as that which is morally attractive because of its absoluteness of good, but this definition would not give proper prominence to the fundamental characteristic of the right.—2. We identify the right with absolute good (1) because men take the right to be good simply in being the right ; (2) because no one can improve upon a right end, unless it be by making it more perfectly right ; it is absolutely good ; and (3) because the attractiveness of the right for us as moral beings seems to be that of absolute good.—3. The relations of the right are identical with those of absolute good as an end. It is inherently superior, and therefore, also, preferable (in the absolute view of reason) to any good which can come into competition with it.—4. Further, it is regally supreme among the ends or aims of life ; and therefore also obligatory upon our personal choice and pursuit. In short every predicate of the right is a predicate of absolute good. Moral obligation defined.—5. The theory which makes absolute good the end of duty may be named Totalism. Its leading conception is a high generalization. In order to grasp this idea the breadth of its applicability must be kept in mind.—6. Utilitarianism is the gospel of common humanity. It advocates the welfare of mankind. But it neglects our inner and higher nature, and subordinates virtue to utility. Its affiliations are materialistic. Blackie quoted.—7. Perfectionism seeks spiritual excellence and the development of character ; which are dutiful ends. But its conceptions are undefined and its aims too exclusively subjective. It is allied to mysticism in philosophy.—8. Motivity ethics teaches the weakness of that virtue which does not incorporate with itself all the natural tendencies of the soul, and which endeavors to act from principle alone. But it fails to see that self-regulation is a secondary mode of duty which presupposes a primary and objective perception of things obligatory. Aristotle's " *medietas* " explained.—9. The truth in Authority Ethics is that obedience to rightful rule is an important form of duty. Some theories throw this into the shade. But the hypothesis that authority is the ultimate ground of duty is entirely untenable.—10. Duty ethics gives just prominence to moral law and moral obligation. In so doing it appeals to common sense, and is better than any system which conflicts with common sense. But it is devoid of philosophical analysis, and

gives no answer to legitimate inquiry. Kant and A. A. Hodge, quoted.—11. Theoretic ethics calls for a comprehensive mental grasp.

1. THE identification of absolute good as an end with the morally right is the conclusion in which our discussions culminate. If absolute good be the essential end sought for in every form of moral goodness, moral esteem, regulative righteousness and causative righteousness, we seem compelled to acknowledge that the right and absolute good as an end are one and the same thing.

Possibly one might avoid this conclusion by emphasizing the distinction between absoluteness of good and its peculiar attractiveness, or what we may call its final-causality. It might be said that the rightness of an end or action *lies in this latter, and not in that excellence from which the attractiveness arises*. Then the right would be defined as the morally attractive, rather than as absolute good considered as having its own peculiar attractiveness. We shall admit for the sake of argument that the right may be conceived of in this way, and that this conception may be distinguished from that of absolute good as an end. Indeed should one define the right as the morally attractive while deriving this attractiveness from the fact that the right is absolutely good, we would say that he had apprehended the truth, and that he had only failed to apprehend our ordinary conception of the right. For men regard the right as attractive by reason of its very nature; which cannot mean that it is attractive because it is attractive, but that it is attractive because it is absolutely good. In other words, *men conceive of the morally right both as absolutely good and as attractive on that account*. This is what we mean when we say that the right is absolute good as an end.

2. This result, reached by a process of comparison, analysis and generalization, is confirmed by a direct examination of the nature of moral rightness. For *one cannot but admit two things to be identical if the essential elements and necessary predicates of the one are also the essential elements and necessary predicates of the other*.

In the first place, it is noticeable that *men consider that which is right to be good simply as being right*. How often do they say of some action or end or course of conduct that it is right and good, evidently deducing good from right and emphasizing the right as being a peculiar form of good!

In the next place, it is a natural dictate of the understanding that *any end, or designed result, which is morally right, could not be bettered*; and that this is a part of its rightness. A different result might advance some private or particular interest more, yet on the whole, what is morally right could not be bettered—it is absolutely good.

It is also a part of the common idea of rightness, that *the morally right appeals to the moral reason*. What is right, in being right, recommends itself in a peculiar way to man, or has a peculiar kind of attractiveness for man, as having a rational nature. Hence their praises who have identified the right with the good, the true, the fair and the beautiful. Hence, too, the love of right and the hatred of wrong in those beings in whom the moral reason has power. But evidently this attractiveness is just that which the absolutely good exercises upon reason as motive—that is, upon man as being able through reason to discern what is absolutely good, and as capable of being affected through this perception.

3. The foregoing are all the elements absolutely essential to our notion of moral rightness. We have indicated rather than explained them because they have previously been dwelt upon at length. The consideration of them identifies the absolutely good as an end with the morally right. But there are several relations in each of which the right has a certain necessary characteristic—a certain property, as logicians would say; and such properties are so intimately united in our ordinary thinking with the essence of the right that we often enlarge our notion of the right so as to take in one or more of them. For men's minds need not, and do not, distinguish carefully between the essential and that which is inevitably connected with the essential. Let us study these necessary characteristics in their relation to our definition of rightness. In this way the definition may be further tested.

First of all, the practical reason recognizes *an inherent superiority of the right over any or all good which can in any way compete or conflict with it*. It is more valuable than anything which can take its place. Men feel that, on the whole, nothing would be lost even though many precious interests were ruined in the maintenance of what is right. Plainly this is a necessary quality of the right as absolute good. For such good, when compared with any other form of good possible in the case, is of necessity more valuable, or a superior good. Moreover, in most cases where good as

particular or private is contrasted with the right, we perceive that to neglect the right for the good would be to sacrifice a very great absolute good for a comparatively small personal or private interest. And the contrast between the right and the not right is yet more marked when, as constantly happens, what is useless or injurious is opposed to what is right. This inherent superiority often gives a peculiar phase to what is right and at times seems included in our conception of moral rightness.

Another property of the right—which indeed immediately follows from its superiority—is *its superlative attractiveness as an end, its preferableness to any possible competitive end*, in the view and sense of the moral reason. This preferableness belongs to the right as having superlative excellence; it is the superlative attractiveness of this excellence. Because of this preferableness men ascribe a supreme dignity and office of guidance to the moral reason as discerning and tending towards the right. Hence, too, we recognize the supreme worth of the moral law, which is that product of the moral reason in and by which she indicates and sets forth the right for our pursuit and realization. Here again—in this preferableness—do we not have a necessary predicate of absolute good, as being inherently superior—and, in most cases, vastly superior—to any good, or other end, which may enter into competition with it? For the “wise man” ever loves and chooses the right as *being better than aught else*.

4. Further, the right, as related to competitive ends, has not merely a superlative preferableness but also *a regal supremacy*. It not merely solicits but demands the highest place among the aims of life. A ministerial supremacy, also, among our motivities, is claimed by conscience, or the moral reason, as the representative of duty. The right, in its appeal to the soul, may meet with no decided opposition. When there are no strong competitive ends a spirit attuned to virtue chooses the right simply for its own sake and as the noblest of ends, without consciously deciding against other aims. In such a case no conflict occurs between the right and other motive ideas, and one might say that the right is chosen just because it is the right, or because of its absolute superlative excellence. But when the right is opposed to other motive thoughts or objects and this opposition is sensibly felt, then the moral reason claims for the right a supremacy over all other ends. If in such a case one should

choose the right, he would use peculiar emphasis in saying that he chose it because it was the *right*, or because it *ought* to be chosen. Thus an honorable man of business in surrendering all of a large property to satisfy creditors does so because this is a thing *right* and *dutiful* or a thing that *ought* to be done. In this he recognizes that inherent supremacy which the right has over every competitive end in the view of the moral reason. But what is this supremacy but the just claim of absolute good, on the ground of its superiority to all other motive objects?

This supremacy often does not belong, as a realized fact, to the right. Man, in the exercise of the total of his motive regards, frequently finds other ends more attractive than the pursuit of absolute good. But lordship always belongs to the right in reason and in law—that is, in the judgment of the moral reason and in the law which is the product and conception of that reason. In other words, it is always claimed by reason in behalf of the absolutely good.

Finally, *the right is recognized as having obligatoriness, and is often conceived of as the obligatory.* This characteristic is closely allied to the last; indeed, the two are to be distinguished from each other only as different aspects of the same thing. For we speak of the right as supreme among ends, but as obligatory upon persons. This obligatoriness is an immediate consequence of the supremacy of the right over ends. For that which is supreme over all competitive ends, must be supreme also over all of one's motive life, and so also over the person as living and choosing. Hence we say that persons are *bound* to the observance of the right, or are subjected to the right—this obligation or subjection existing, of course, in law and in the conception of the moral reason. Hence, too, we are bound to obey conscience as the exponent of the right.

An operative sense of the right as thus obligatory, or supreme over oneself, renders one willing to perform any labor or make any sacrifice in its service. And when we thus recognize the right as obligatory, then we speak of duty as that which we owe to the right, and say that in doing duty we do that *which we owe or ought to do*. For generally some price must be paid for the realization of right; some sacrifice, however willingly, must be laid on the altar of principle.

This sense of the obligatory is to be distinguished from the desire to have an easy conscience and from the fear of pun-

ishment or hope of reward. Should one do what is right merely to escape punishment, to gain a reward, or to be free from troubling emotions, he could not properly be said to do right because he ought to do it, though such motives are not wrong *per se*. The right becomes the obligatory as claiming royalty or supremacy over that personal life in which man aims at various ends. When men obey the obligatory, they act simply from an operative sense of that supremacy which the right claims. Now evidently this obligatoriness, this supremacy over personal life—like that absolute preferableness and that legal supremacy over all competing ends, to both of which it is closely allied—is a necessary characteristic of absolute good as the end prescribed by the moral reason.

The foregoing analysis makes it clear that every attribute or property of moral rightness may be accounted for by identifying that rightness with absoluteness of good in an end. With this identification every aspect of rightness is luminous and intelligible, while, if we reject and deny it, there is left indeed a grand name, but its authority, like that of a sovereign whose power has been taken away, may be boldly questioned.

Thus, too, our expectation has been realized that an understanding of moral rightness would include an understanding of moral obligatoriness; and we are also put in a position to define that moral obligation which pertains to persons. This is the correlative of moral obligatoriness. It is the legal relationship in which a person, as endowed with rationality, stands to the right as supreme in law over one's life and self. It is his being subject or bound, in law, to absolute good as an end.

5. The general theory of morals advocated in the present treatise asserts that the fundamental aim of duty is the total good of which the case admits or any part which may help to constitute that total. For this reason this theory might be designated **TOTALISM**. Some such term might distinguish it from the other theories which are current, that is, from Utilitarianism and Perfectionism, and from Motivity Ethics, Authority Ethics and Duty Ethics.

Comparing Totalism with these systems its fundamental doctrine seems specially abstruse. This was to be expected

if this doctrine springs, as we think it does, from a more exhaustive analysis of moral life than has been made heretofore. A doctrine which unites the contrasting phases of truth presented by various theories, and which is intended to explain every possible development of duty, may be simple and clear, but it is necessarily abstruse. For this reason it may not be accurately apprehended if dwelt upon too much in its own abstractness. It should be held as related to the theories for which it provides harmonization and to the specific forms of duty which it brings under a universal law.

The moral life may be compared to a lofty mountain which presents different appearances to the beholder according to the direction from which it is surveyed. Some of its sides are steep and encumbered with rocks; others bear a forest growth; others are upland pastures; others, which enjoy a warm exposure, are terraced into orchards and vineyards. From some points this mountain may appear exceedingly high; from others, only of a moderate elevation. Should one in a neighboring valley perceive it towering above all surrounding peaks, its snowy top might seem to pierce the sky. Should he look at it from a point many miles distant upon a widespread plain, he would not appreciate its magnitude and its altitude. Or should he gaze upward from some too near locality where a projecting shoulder of the mountain shut off a view of the regions beyond, he might mistake the lower elevation for the summit. In a similar way, if one's thought be concentrated upon some one phase of a great subject or be limited to a peculiar point of view, he may form conceptions that are partial and incorrect. It is also confessedly difficult to find a position from which to see the whole truth at one time; and, even should this be accomplished by an all-comprehensive survey of facts and a painstaking generalization, the result may be unsatisfactory unless correlated with specific aspects of the subject as seen from less elevated points of observation. The sight of the mountain from a balloon soaring above it or a photograph of it taken from an aerial height, would give a truer view of the mountain as a whole than could be obtained from any terrestrial position, yet the view gained from above would be lacking in significance, were it not interpreted by the help of observations taken in less exalted places. It becomes more determinate and intelligible when considered in connection with the partial views. Therefore we may expect the totalistic conclusion concerning

the right to be confirmed and illuminated by a comparison with competitive doctrines.

6. This theory agrees with utilitarianism in asserting that the right is a species of good and that practical moral goodness is the fundamental virtue. The idea of good is the source from which every form of utilitarianism has drawn its vitality. The hedonistic, the eudæmonistic, and the humanitarian developments of doctrine, each in its own way, make "good" the aim of morality. The defect of these systems is that they offer no adequate distinction between that good which may be sought by a wise self-interest, or even by public-spirited benevolence, and that which principle seeks as absolute and right. The most noted utilitarian definition of the end of duty is that it is the greatest good of the greatest number. Such is, at times, the aim; at other times we are not bound to care for the greatest number, but only to seek the greatest good, or good simply. Utilitarianism gives no sufficient account of this good which is the aim of duty. The old egoism dignified the pursuit of self-interest with the name of virtue; humanitarian ethics bestows this title on the disinterested pursuit of the happiness and prosperity of all, and has used this principle to explain moral goodness and regulative righteousness. But it is not a distinctively moral principle. Moreover the application of it has been so limited to objective duty that utilitarianism has fairly earned the designation, given it by Professor Blackie, of ethical "externalism." (FOUR PHASES OF MORALS, p. 333.) This system does not recognize as it should, the inherent importance of affectional duty—of right loving and right feeling; and it neglects the developments of principle in moral esteem and causative righteousness. It makes happiness rather than virtue the *summum bonum*. While utilitarianism in its best presentations has great claims on our consideration, it must be regarded as belonging to an incomplete stage in the progress of ethical science.

7. Perfectionism emphasizes that side of morals which utilitarianism slights. It recommends the cultivation of virtue as the end of life, and bases all duty, including that of beneficence, upon that principle. But it gives no satisfactory conception of the excellence which it enjoins. We are told that perfection is a thing simple and ultimate; or we are offered some strange definition of it. It is spoken of as the realization of the true self—as the development of the

divine in man—as the attainment of the highest efficiency—as the fullest and freest exercise of activity—as the harmony of our spiritual powers—as a combination of the harmony with the activity of our powers. But we are not told that the perfection to be realized is virtue as the supreme good. The perfectionist is precluded from this definition. He is seeking to determine the essential or primary aim of virtue, and it would be absurd to say that virtue primarily aims at its own existence. One might as well say that the primary use of money is to procure more money; or that government is instituted solely in the interest of the rulers. Even the supporter of absolute despotism would say that government exists for the benefit of mankind. The principal objection, however, to the perfection of the perfectionist is, not that it is unintelligible, though it is sufficiently obscure, but that it is an incompetent explanation of morality. This defect is so sensibly felt that most perfectionists—for example, Professors Janet, Mackenzie and Bowne—fall back on utilitarianism as a supplementary theory.

The strength of perfectionism lies in two statements, first, that virtue is the greatest aim of duty; and second, that virtue, when cherished, performs every duty and accomplishes every right end. Nevertheless the promotion of virtue is not the primary and fundamental principle of duty. That is to be found in the service of absolute good. Virtue is not the only, but the highest, form of that good.

8. The merit of motivity ethics is that it brings before us the connection between moral life and motive life in general. *The natural and the moral modes of activity are so closely related that they may unite in one*; as they do in every holy being. Duty requires that our entire experience should be controlled and qualified by principle. This fact renders possible a system of ethics the fundamental idea of which is the regulation of our motivities. Just as the cultivation of virtue, under the law of causative righteousness, may lead to the performance of every other duty, so the right exercise of natural affection may produce conformity to the whole moral law. This might take place under the control of an enlightened sentiment of honor, and yet more under that of a wise benevolence. We are told that “love is the fulfilling of the law”; we know, too, that the truly honorable man will neglect none of his obligations, but will strive earnestly to discharge them all. It is easy to understand how

Dr. Mark Hopkins places all duty in right loving, and how Dr. James Martineau believes that it resides in the right government of our desires. Then, also, Aristotle's doctrine of the "medietas," or *μεσότης*,—that virtue lies in the choice of a mean between extremes,—is the imperfect statement of a law regulating the pursuit of objects under the promptings of our natural inclinations. The doctrine of Aristotle reminds one of a certain political party who call themselves the "Middle of the Road" Populists, and who thus declare their resolution not to deviate, because of any inducements, however tempting, from their own distinctive principles and policy. With them, evidently the "middle" is the "correct" course, and is determined not so much by the avoidance of extremes as by adherence to settled views. So, also, because the decision of a dispute frequently lies between contending claims, and should always be for the right, and not for the private advantage of either party, justice is sometimes thought of as pursuing a middle course; though this is not the essential aim of justice. Among the Greeks *ἕς μέσον ἀμφοτέροις διχάζειν* signified, not to choose between extremes, but to judge fairly or impartially. Aristotle's *μεσότης* teaches that conduct as proceeding from natural tendencies should be regulated by principle, and has little further significance. He himself found a governing end in eudæmonism. Modern motivity ethics proposes various rules, but, in the last resort, adopts the pursuit of "good" as the determining law. Even Martineau says, "the rule is reducible to that of rational benevolence."

Thus it is taught that our inward life must be controlled by a reference to good. But it is not explained how the good referred to is absolute good, and is identical with the right—how the practical pursuit of it is the primary form of virtue—and how this originates a law for our motivities, not as a faculty primarily concerned about our motivities, but as having first an objective operation of its own.

9. Authority ethics, whether theistic or anthropic, throws little light on the radical nature of moral law. But *it directs attention to a form which the law often takes, and also to a dutiful obedience which may result in the performance of every other requirement of morality.* For when one is instructed in duty by some earthly superior or by some divine revelation, the inherent claims of right conduct are reinforced by the obligation of obedience; and so the law is supported

by a double influence. We may especially say that the man who does all the will of God performs all his duty; for God's will and law are the perfect standard of righteousness and of goodness. In a less absolute way the expectations and demands of those in authority over us—of parents, instructors, judges, rulers, and of society at large—present a code to which we feel bound to conform. Here, as in obedience to God, a sense of dutiful subjection unites with the simple sense of duty. These considerations explain how some are led to base ethical theory on the principle of obedience.

Moreover, our obligation to obey the divine being calls to mind his peculiar right to the service of his rational creatures. Loyalty to him rests not merely on the justice and wisdom of his rule, but yet more on his personal character and his holy benignant disposition. He is the perfect object of esteem and affection. Our obedience to his law should express our love and devotion to himself. And when we remember that all the resources of the divine government are employed for the destruction of evil and the advancement of virtue, and that we are called to co-operate with God for the accomplishment of spiritual good, it is evident that the life of duty has a broad theistic side. This aspect of morals should not be treated with neglect.

No one can deny the importance of those views which authority ethics brings under consideration. At the same time it is to be noted that these views do not depend on the doctrine that moral law is based on the requirements of authority; nor, indeed, is this doctrine now held without qualification by any reputable writer. Anthropic moralists do not say that the rules of righteousness arise from accidental custom or arbitrary enactment, but that they are modes of doing which experience has shown to be necessary to man's welfare. And those who teach that moral law is the expression of the divine will, are careful to add that this will is the expression of the divine nature, that is, of the unchanging disposition of the Almighty. But what is this disposition except God's love for what is right and his desire that absolute good should prevail throughout his universe?

10. Duty ethics is the least philosophical of moral theories. It asserts that all, or most, of the laws of duty are discerned by a simple intuition of the mind, and are not explainable by any fundamental principle. One can say only that each law prescribes a duty. The dictum of Kant, "Act on that

maxim which thou canst will to become a universal law," is not an explanatory principle, but only a test—a very imperfect test—of duty. His other saying, "There is nothing good," that is, morally good, "but the good will," might be taken as a utilitarian definition of virtue, if his "good will" were the disposition to promote happiness. But he means only the will to do right: and, like all other writers of the intuitional school, he leaves the right undefined.

Duty ethics is an unsatisfactory system, the product of dogmatic, not of analytic, thought; yet it brings to view very important truths. In this form of doctrine *the deliberate moral sense, or practical moral reason, of mankind, asserts the superiority of its own conclusions over all theories of the speculative reason which may conflict with those conclusions.* In order to complete results both these modes of intellect must work in harmony. The habitual decision of an honest and well-informed intelligence is almost certainly correct. The universal agreement of such judgments is called by philosophers "the common sense" of men. Any theory which conflicts with this stands in need of revision and amendment. We do not say that "the intuitions of reason" are always incapable of explanation. They are by no means confined to intuitions of ultimate truth. But they are most reliable. Therefore, also, the ordinary rules of morality are to be followed except when the reasons for a departure from them are so convincing, and so founded on principle, that "the exception proves the rule."

We have to thank duty ethics also for maintaining that *the right, by reason of its very nature, is the obligatory.* The older utilitarians deny this truth altogether; and some advocates of authority ethics confound moral with legal obligation. The "duty school" make "oughtness" their fundamental conception. They advocate "duty for duty's sake." "The essence of all that is moral," says Dr. A. A. Hodge, "is that it ought to be." We prefer to say that the essential aim of morality is the right, and that obligatoriness is a necessary property of the right. Possibly the adherents of duty ethics would accept this statement and allow that "rightness" and "oughtness" are distinguishable. But, whether they would or not, we must agree with them that moral obligation is a most fundamental conception.

Finally, we commend this school because of *the prominence which it gives to law as the product of right reason.* Some

moralists exalt ends to the disparagement of those tried methods of the practical judgment whereby good is to be safeguarded and promoted. This neglect of established law, especially by writers whose explanation of the aims of morality is inadequate, is a dangerous mistake. Ancient Epicureans and modern humanitarians have erred in this way. No such fault can be charged upon the duty school. On the contrary, they seem sometimes to undervalue the claims of goodness and of moral esteem while hearkening to those of regulative and of causative righteousness. This is not a necessary characteristic of duty ethics. It is rather a tendency connected with its downright advocacy of law and right. It can, and should, be, guarded against. When that is done, duty ethics may claim a preference over any theory whose analysis of the moral law is defective and misleading. Dogmatic adherence to truth is better than a reasoned adoption of error.

11. In view of the variety and the importance of the truths made prominent by the different ethical systems, it is evident that the science of morals calls for a comprehensive grasp of mind. Clearly, also, the unifying principle of the moral law should be understood, not as an independent abstraction, but as the central element of a system. Moreover, while absolute good is the end of duty, our choice and our appreciation of this end are constantly modified by varying perceptions of its characteristics. We consider, at different times, its excellence and attractiveness; its absoluteness; its rightful leadership of our affections; its direct claim on our service; its manifestations in the form of law; the enforcement of its pursuit through power and penalty; the rewards which must fall to its faithful followers; and its highest form as moral good, or virtue—itself a great reward, the antidote of all evil and the supreme source of blessedness. Because of these different aspects the right is contemplated with a variety of sentiments and with a mingling of these together. All this arises naturally in view of the diverse developments and relations of absolute good as an end. Hence, to appreciate the essential aim of virtue, absolute good must be viewed in its fullest and most complete realization. Our thought should comprehend every aspect of the moral life and every department of the moral law.

choice; for which reason the ethical doctrine of free agency is often called the doctrine of free-will, or of the freedom of the will.

2. But, while the terms "free will" and "freedom of the will" are needed in ethics to qualify "free agency," it is to be noticed that these expressions themselves are used ambiguously. Some mean by them that man is free as having the power of choice, no matter whether this power itself be free or not; while others say that *moral freedom consists both in having the power of choice and in the freedom of that power*. The former theorists identify freedom with the possession of a will, but assert that the will is controlled by external factors and therefore is not free. As not riches but the owner of them is rich, and not wisdom but he who has it is wise, so not the will but he who possesses a will is free. The latter reject this view, and say that a certain freedom of action—or exemption from control—must belong to the will in order that he who is endowed with this faculty may be free. In the one case we are told that man is free because he has and exercises a will, while yet the will is absolutely determined by the "greatest apparent good" or "the strongest combination of inducements" or by "the most powerful motives," and so is governed by factors outside of itself. In the other case we are told that man is free, first because he has a will, and, secondly, because that will is really—that is, efficiently—determined, not by anything outside of itself, but wholly by the operation of its own nature.

This latter statement seems to be the more reasonable, and to express better what all men feel to be the fact. Yet we may admit for the sake of argument that the expressions "free will" and "freedom of the will" can be employed to signify the freedom of man as willing, whether the will itself be free or not. Acknowledging that the words may be used in this sense, we shall argue that philosophical truth requires the other meaning, namely, that man is free not only as willing but also because the will itself is free. According to this doctrine the will, and therefore also the soul in willing, acts wholly from within, is self-determined, and, in this way, free. In other words man in the act of choice is not determined by any factors except those which are to be found in the act of choice itself.

3. In thus defining free agency or free will, we have stated

that doctrine which we would use these terms to express. The liberty which this doctrine claims for the faculty of choice might be called *the essential freedom of the will*, because it necessarily attends the act of volition. This thought also might be more simply indicated by calling it *volitional freedom*. As it is implied in every moral act, it is sometimes spoken of as "moral" freedom; but this last designation has the disadvantage of being ambiguous. Ethical writers mention various modes of freedom in connection with the life of duty; hence we hear from them of several varieties of moral freedom. Of these volitional freedom, alone, is inseparable from the nature and operation of the faculty of choice. This liberty is the subject of present inquiry; in order to an understanding of it, we must distinguish it from other modes of freedom, especially from those which are closely related to it.

Freedom, in this primary and proper sense of the word, can belong only to voluntary beings. It is the condition of such beings when their life and conduct are not subject to the control of any power external to themselves. One is free so far as he is exempt from the government of others, and so can act as he chooses. In a secondary sense one's powers are said to be free when they are not controlled by other powers; and it seems impossible that one should be free with respect to any of his powers unless that power also should be free. One is not free in respect to his hands if his hands be tied. So one is not free in respect to his will if his will be enslaved. But an ability to act determinately with one's powers is not inconsistent with freedom; it is rather demanded by freedom. At least conduct entirely separated from the guidance of intelligent motivity would be the action of a lunatic or a madman rather than of a free moral agent. So much for the general conception of freedom in its original and proper use.

The freedom of a physical agent is not a literal freedom. We sometimes speak of material things acting freely, but they have only an imperfect and figurative liberty. We say that the wind blows freely over the prairie and that the river flows freely toward the sea; this means only that the air and the water move without restraint, there being no obstacle to their progress. We know well that in each case the motion is determined by external attractions and repulsions which the moving bodies could not at all resist. In particular they

choice; for which reason the ethical doctrine of free agency is often called the doctrine of free-will, or of the freedom of the will.

2. But, while the terms "free will" and "freedom of the will" are needed in ethics to qualify "free agency," it is to be noticed that these expressions themselves are used ambiguously. Some mean by them that man is free as having the power of choice, no matter whether this power itself be free or not; while others say that *moral freedom consists both in having the power of choice and in the freedom of that power*. The former theorists identify freedom with the possession of a will, but assert that the will is controlled by external factors and therefore is not free. As not riches but the owner of them is rich, and not wisdom but he who has it is wise, so not the will but he who possesses a will is free. The latter reject this view, and say that a certain freedom of action—or exemption from control—must belong to the will in order that he who is endowed with this faculty may be free. In the one case we are told that man is free because he has and exercises a will, while yet the will is absolutely determined by the "greatest apparent good" or "the strongest combination of inducements" or by "the most powerful motives," and so is governed by factors outside of itself. In the other case we are told that man is free, first because he has a will, and, secondly, because that will is really—that is, efficiently—determined, not by anything outside of itself, but wholly by the operation of its own nature.

This latter statement seems to be the more reasonable, and to express better what all men feel to be the fact. Yet we may admit for the sake of argument that the expressions "free will" and "freedom of the will" can be employed to signify the freedom of man as willing, whether the will itself be free or not. Acknowledging that the words may be used in this sense, we shall argue that philosophical truth requires the other meaning, namely, that man is free not only as willing but also because the will itself is free. According to this doctrine the will, and therefore also the soul in willing, acts wholly from within, is self-determined, and, in this way, free. In other words man in the act of choice is not determined by any factors except those which are to be found in the act of choice itself.

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are controlled by the force of gravitation, which acts from without quite as much as from within.

But even were it possible to conceive of some self-efficiency whereby a body devoid of thought and soul could act spontaneously in the absence of stimulus or impulse from without—a star, for example, freed from external guidance and able to journey hither and thither in space—we would ascribe freedom to such a body only in a secondary way, very much as we apply the term “agent” to material factors in a secondary way; as when we speak of chemical agents and re-agents. Just as a genuine agent, or doer, is always a thinking person, so freedom, in the full and proper sense, belongs only to beings possessed of intelligence and will.

Again: as already said, the *freedom of outward conduct*, though often included in free agency, *is not included in that radical free agency which pertains to the conduct of the will*, and which is identical with the freedom of the will. External actions are free when they proceed from volition, or are voluntary. This freedom arises in part because the actions are not restrained or prevented by physical force; for if there were an effectual hindrance the will could not cause the actions. But the freedom of conduct depends essentially on the fact that the conduct is voluntary. Civil and religious liberty are modes of this outer freedom. They exist when people are not restrained by authority from the proper pursuit of their temporal and their spiritual interests. Whatever is done voluntarily, shares in the honor of that freedom which belongs to the action of the will itself.

4. In the next place, *volitional freedom*—the essential freedom of the will—is *to be distinguished from that liberty which consists in exemption from any compulsory inducement to choose*. We often say that a person is not free who does not have this last mentioned liberty. A galley slave chained to his oar is not free to refuse to work. He is compelled to choose labor in preference to severe punishment. He has not the privilege of choosing a course of action according to his unconstrained desires and preferences. In like manner men daily speak of their liberty of choice as being limited, or even destroyed, by various practical “necessities.” Certain lines of conduct are possible, and would also be immediately pleasurable. But they would lead to ruin or disgrace. So men restrain themselves and say that they are “not at liberty” to act in the way proposed. Yet, in a deeper sense,

they are free to act or not to act in that way. The galley-slave could refuse to labor at the oar, accepting punishment, perhaps death, instead; and, in so doing, he would be acting freely. In short volitional freedom is not destroyed by the advent of compulsory inducements; and that freedom is the only liberty necessary to moral action. The martyr who suffers at the stake rather than violate his conscience, and the patriot who sacrifices his life for his country, disregard inducements which would compel submission were it not for the strength of principle. Yet their conduct is voluntary and free, and as such, of a noble excellence. The liberty necessary to moral agency involves only that one should distinctly understand the requirements of duty and that he should have the faculty of choosing whether to act in accordance with them or in disregard of them.

5. Further: *this radical freedom inseparable from moral action is not to be confounded with that freedom which is called "spiritual,"* and which is exemption, to a greater or less extent, from the control of evil inward tendencies. Spiritual liberty is the condition of one who is not subject to the dominion of any irrational habit, or passion, or appetite, or who, as the apostle puts it (ROMANS VI., VII.), is delivered from "the law" or the dominating power "of sin." The poet Cowper celebrates this liberty in a passage beginning,

"He is the freeman whom the Truth makes free,
And all are slaves beside."

A man given up to selfishness, sensuality, avarice, ambition, or any other vice, habitually disregarding and belittling the suggestions of principle, becomes the slave of sin; and his slavery is not the less real because it involves the continual consent and co-operation of his will. A thoroughly bad man gives this consent heartily, and is seldom troubled with qualms of conscience. He does not resist the power of evil but works with it, as one who is rowing down a stream. Therefore he does not realize the strength of that sin which has "dominion over him." But should he become spiritually awakened—should his "better self," his moral reason, be brought to exert its enlightening and moving power, then a struggle arises within his soul. He becomes conscious of the force of inward evil. And if, through the help of God, he successfully resist that force and enter upon the faithful

performance of duty, he finds that he is still only partially a freeman. He sympathizes with Paul, "I find then a law that, when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man, but I see another law in my members *warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.*"

A being of perfect character always chooses the right, no matter at what cost or sacrifice. Some Stoics taught that only such a being should be styled virtuous or righteous. This position ignores the fact that the love of the right may exist in varying degrees of strength and that a degree of principle which in all ordinary circumstances would prefer the right may prove insufficient for a time to resist some compulsory, insinuating or mind-engrossing influence. He must be called a good man whose prevailing habit of life is to prefer the right, even though grievous faults may be mingled with his performance of duty. The best of men during the present life are virtuous only in this incomplete way. They love the right and are pursuing it, but they have not attained perfection. Nevertheless it is of the nature of virtue, even of imperfect virtue, never to be satisfied with imperfection. The good man presses on to the mark of his high calling. When he yields to temptation there is a sense in which he sins unwillingly. He is conscious of doing so in despite of that better nature which usually controls him. His deep desire is to attain absolute freedom from the power of sin. But while good men during the present time are not free from this power and while bad men are largely or wholly subject to it, this lack of freedom, furnishes no palliation or excuse for the commission of sin. The liberty of free will or free agency, on which moral life is conditioned, is quite different from that spiritual liberty in which the saints of God rejoice. It involves only the faculty of intelligent consent or choice, whether the action of this faculty be controlled by some prevailing inclination or not.

6. Volitional freedom—freedom of the will—may be, and often is, abridged by the sophistical and blinding power of temptation, by the distracting agitation of passion, and by the weakness of mind and spirit induced by suffering and distress. These causes tend to prevent or render defective that exercise of intelligence on which moral choice depends. So far as they make a man incapable of that choice, they make

him incapable of moral conduct. But unless one loses his reason altogether, there remains some moral capability.

Moral life is always possible just so far as the perception and choice of the right and of the wrong are possible. It is conditioned only on the faculty of choice with its inherent freedom.

7. We have now to distinguish volitional freedom from a liberty which some identify with it, but which, we are convinced, has no existence except in philosophic fancy. *Many maintain that the will is free for the reason that the act of choice differs from all other events in being, partially at least, exempt from the law of cause and effect.* It is not questioned that the will causes its own actions and that volition conforms to the rule that every event must have a cause. But it is held that, in this case, the same cause, under absolutely the same conditions, is capable of producing diverse or opposite effects. We are told that the will, though influenced by inducements and desires and by its own habits and tendencies, has the power of acting independently of these factors, and even contrary to the united influence of them all. Ordinarily, it is said, the will follows that combination of motive tendencies which occupies the mind at the time of making a choice. But it is contended that this faculty is capable of an opposite course; in short, that it can act in opposition to all influences which may operate upon it or within it. This means that man, in any case, has the power of choosing exactly the contrary of what he does choose, and that, too, without any change in the factors affecting his decision. Accordingly this strange capability of the will has been called "the power of contrary choice." It is not taught that man can choose two opposite things at the same time, but only that, at the very moment of his choosing one, he has full power to choose the other.

If one should assert that the will has an internal nature whereby it can form a choice independently of external influences, this might be accepted as expressing a truth; but we cannot believe that this internal nature, which determines the choice, has the power, without any change of conditions, to cause a different choice from that which actually takes place. Such a power would not be that ability to choose between alternatives which the will undoubtedly possesses. It would be an ability to choose one alternative under precisely the same conditions, external and internal, which have attended

the choice of the other. The doctrine of "the contrary choice" affirms also that if precisely similar inducements were presented under precisely similar conditions of intelligence and will, there might be a second choice directly opposite to the first. In this case that rule of causation would be violated according to which precisely similar causes under precisely similar circumstances are followed by precisely similar effects. For the law of cause and effect, in a broad sense is composed of various related principles, and comprises all that part of ontological truth which pertains to power and its operation. (PERCEPTIONALIST, Ch. L.)

The doctrine of "the contrary choice" must be rejected because of its opposition to our intuitional perceptions of the necessary laws of existence. A cause which does not act according to law is a thing inconceivable and incredible. Experience, too, is against the contrary choice. In every case of volition one acts in view of inducements. No one can choose unless there be objects of choice. Even the Almighty could not choose without ends of desire. Choice consists in the adoption of an object, not accidentally, but for some reason; and no one ever made two opposite choices in precisely the same state of mind and for precisely the same considerations. We may grant that objects have no efficiency to move the will; that they are merely conditions of its action; but this only helps to define the doctrine that preference springs from the will itself, acting determinately with its own efficiency and according to the laws of its own nature.

The fact that the will sometimes shows indecision or indetermination *does not prove an ability to act without or against motives but an inability to do so*. Whenever man really puts forth a volition, he determines himself towards some object, and this too, according to law and in a way that should admit of explanation. Assuredly so far as moral life is concerned, no other conception of voluntary action is admissible. Were it possible to conceive of a choice determined in any other way than by a preference of ends or objects, such a choice could have no moral character. No act is virtuous unless the will seeks the right, not without motive, but because it is the right and in preference to any competitive end; and no act is vicious unless the will adopts some other end in preference to the right. A will which would choose right or wrong without being governed therein by its own prefer-

ence for right or wrong, would not act either virtuously or viciously.

The doctrine of the contrary choice is a perversion of the truth that there is always an hypothetical possibility of a choice the opposite of that which actually takes place. So far as the general functions of intelligence and will are concerned God and holy beings could sin; there is need only of a change in the inclination of their wills. Under a similar condition devils and wicked men could practise virtue. But hypothetical possibility is consistent with actual impossibility; and so an hypothetical power of contrary choice is consistent with the absolute impossibility of such a choice. A man could make a contrary choice so far as the general capacity of his intelligence and will are concerned. But this choice, being conditioned on a change in the inclination of the will which does not take place, is actually impossible. The doctrine of the contrary choice asserts an unconditional, not an hypothetical, ability to choose the contrary of what is actually chosen; and is, therefore, an absurdity. (Respecting necessity and possibility, real and hypothetical, see the PERCEPTIONALIST, Chaps. XX., XXI.)

8. If volitional liberty do not imply the absence of compulsory inducements, or a deliverance from the control of evil habits and sinful tendencies, or an exemption of volition from the law of cause and effect, are we not thrown back on the definition of free will already given, namely, that *the will is free in that its operations result immediately and exclusively from its own efficiency?* Sometimes we speak of the will as being attracted by this object or by that, and as being governed or determined by inducements. Such language is figurative. The truth is that man as a self-moving agent chooses or refuses objects or ends when they are placed before him, and the whole efficiency of this action lies in the man himself, not in the objects chosen or rejected. The enticing power of temptation and the repellent force of pain lie not at all in those objects which may produce gratification or distress but solely in the tendencies of the soul to seek pleasure and to avoid suffering. In this way the will—or the man in willing—is self-determined and free.

It cannot, indeed, be said that the primary and essential action of the will is a determination to determine. That would involve the endless and impossible regression which President Edwards ridicules. We do not assert that the will

in every case determines about its own action, but only that, in every case, the will determines its own action. *Choice springs wholly from the faculty of choice; it is not determined by any power outside of that.* But it is also to be admitted that, in addition to the simple self-determination of the will, there is a compound self-determination, founded on the simple, whereby the will—or the man—may determine to determine itself. Man can contemplate himself as a free agent and can direct his motive regards in such a manner as to affect the development and exercise of his desires. In this way man is capable, to a certain extent, of self-guidance and self-control. This reflex operation of the will continually mingles with its primary action and should be always exercised in the behalf of moral principle. Such self-determination does not interfere with the essential liberty of volition. Presupposing that the will acts according to its own preference, it seeks to guide that preference by the suggestion of motive ideas. This no more limits freedom than any mode of persuasion does. Indeed self-control is the condition of a desirable liberty.

9. The points already discussed are those which have been commonly debated in connection with the question of free will. But a topic logically prior to every other in the philosophy of volition remains for consideration. Attention to it has been deferred in order that our explanations of volitional freedom might not be charged with any greater singularity than that which really belongs to them. We regard it, however, as a matter for astonishment that, while there has been much dissertation during the past three generations respecting the freedom of the will, there has been comparatively little—almost none at all—concerning the nature of the faculty itself. Commonly the will is defined as the faculty of choice, and is then asserted to be one of the ultimate or radical powers of the mind: after which the laws of its activity and the question of its freedom are discussed. We are persuaded that the perplexing philosophy of the will would have been relieved of some of its obscurity if the essential nature of this power had been made the subject of inquiry.

Our definition of the will as the faculty of choice is derived from common knowledge and stated in common language. It merely opens the way for investigation. The satisfactory interpretation of it calls for painstaking thought. It is, how-

ever, sufficient warrant for the statement that the action of the will includes all the activity of the soul in choosing. Some express this truth by saying that the will is the man, or the soul, as choosing and as capable of choosing; an assertion substantially correct, though one might object to it that a faculty or power cannot be literally identified with the substance in which it inheres. The fact is that we do not assert an absolute identity but mean only that the faculty of choice embraces all of human endowment that is engaged in the act of choice. Dr. S. G. Burney, in his "Studies in Psychology," has stated this point very simply in the following words, "*To say that the man wills, that the mind puts forth volition, and that the will acts, are different forms of expressing the same thing.*"

10. We also follow Dr. Burney in using the term "volition" for the action of the will or of the man in willing. This word is sometimes employed in a more restricted application; but, in a broad sense, volition and choice are synonyms which present the same thing, though from different points of view. Choice is the action of the will considered as directed towards an object; volition the same action considered merely as proceeding from its appropriate faculty. *When these words are applied to things specifically different, choice signifies the formation of purpose or determination, or the purpose when formed; and volition that act of will which immediately precedes effort, or conation.* For often we first form a resolution or purpose and afterwards, renewing this and adding to it the judgment that the time for effort has come, act according to it. Dr. Burney characterizes these two modes of the will's action as the *determinative* and the *executive*. Possibly this latter designation might be advantageously replaced by the term "*imperative*"; because the term "executive" may be judiciously reserved for the exertion or work, whether of mind or of body, in which purposes are carried out. This is not volition but only the consequent of volition. To identify antecedent with consequent here would be to confound willing with doing. We should, however, discriminate between the original choice with its resultant state of resolution and that final volition in which the original choice is renewed, completed and terminated. Both are modes of choice or volition, but the term "choice" is more frequently applied to the original purpose and the term "volition" more frequently to that final exercise of will which somewhat

resembles an order or command that is to be immediately obeyed.

Before Immanuel Kant philosophers assigned to the soul only two general faculties, the understanding and the will, including in this last the faculty of desire. "Kant," says President Porter, "introduced the three-fold classification adopted by Sir Wm. Hamilton, which recognizes the phenomena of knowledge, of feeling, and of will, and giving the intellectual, the emotive, and the conative, or impelling, faculties." This division does not distinguish will from desire, on the one hand, or from exertion, on the other; and so is not conducive to clear thinking. Dr. Porter adds: "Professor Thomas C. Upham was the first English writer who distinctly adopted the three-fold classification of the powers of the soul into intellect, sensibility and will." (MORAL SCIENCE, p. 59.) Upham, however, and later writers who adopt that classification, distinguish volition both from thought and from desire, though not from effort or exertion; and it is commonly taught, also, that volition is a simple and ultimate mode of psychical action.

11. We believe that the philosophers of the present day make a mistake in regarding the will as an ultimate and simple power. They are right in treating it as a distinct faculty. It is a power which performs a definite work of its own and which is distinguishable from intellect, on the one hand, and from motivity, on the other. But they fail to consider the question whether the will may not be a complex faculty, and volition a compound resultant of the action of intellect and motivity. The affirmative answer to this question seems to us supported by the analysis of experience. Is it not a fact that every choice or purpose includes, as a part of its very self, the conception of some object to be sought and a judgment concerning the means necessary for its attainment? Is it not also clear that the strength of a determination or resolution consists in the general desire for the chosen object which follows upon the previous play of undetermined motivity, and which is compounded from those desires which have become dominant? Undoubtedly the motivity of volition differs strikingly from ordinary desire. It is more stable, less emotional, less distributed among ends, and more closely related to means. Yet it has radically the same nature. It is like steam generated from its latency in cold water and carried hither and thither through flues and pipes, and which now finds itself at

work in the cylinder of the locomotive; or like electricity, no longer moving in waves and currents over the surface of the earth or gathering in clouds and flashing across the sky, but collected in dynamos and motors and accomplishing an allotted task.

The older writers of philosophy perceived the radical identity of the faculty of choice with the faculty of motive feeling. They recognize wishing and willing—or desire and volition—as two activities of one general power, the *voluntas*. For example, President Edwards, in his “Treatise concerning Religious Affections” (Part I. p. 1), says, “God has endowed the soul with two principal faculties—the one . . . by which it discerns and judges of things; which is called the understanding; the other . . . by which the soul beholds things, not as an indifferent, unaffected spectator, but either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting. This faculty is called by various names; it is sometimes called the inclination, and, as it respects the actions that are determined by it, the will. . . . The affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination but only in the liveliness and sensibility of exercise.” President Edwards uses the term “affection” for motive tendency in general. Evidently the faculty which he describes, which “beholds things,” which is manifested in “liking and disliking” and which, “as it respects the actions that are determined by it” is called the *will*, is man’s general endowment of desire or impulse.

12. It is, however, to be remarked that in addition to those desires which are excited by objects and ends, *special modes of motivity operate in view of the action requisite for the attainment of such objects as may gain our preference*. These special impulses have the peculiarity of relating to the conduct of one’s self as a personal agent. How often do we speak of decision, or decisiveness, of stability of purpose, of determination, of pre perseverance, of carefulness, of self-control, of adherence to duty, as things which we must realize in conduct! The dispositions which aim at and produce these qualities of action, and wherein we deal with ourselves as persons, enter as special factors into volition. They belong to will as a faculty of reflex self-determination, and distinguish the full exercise of this power from every other development of motivity. The man in whom these dispositions are active is described as having a forcible character or a strong will, while another is spok-

en of as weak in character and will. We therefore concede to President Porter that the will, as a specific faculty, contains elements over and above those of definite thought and desire respecting objects and the means for their attainment. (MORAL SCIENCE, sections 23, 24.) But we say that these added elements are themselves modes of intelligent motive tendency.

It is also to be noted that the will, as modified by these practical dispositions, exercises a power whereby its own action is often settled, or made determinate. This power is not that either of intellect or motivity, but of effort or exertion. Its working in the economy of volition is analogous to that of attention in the economy of thought. As attention is not memory, perception, reason, imagination, nor any other kind of thinking but a sort of service which the conative faculty performs for the intellect, and which in this secondary way, becomes a nintellectual function, so that effort or *nisus* of the spirit whereby our minds cease from further debate and become fixed upon a considered object and course of conduct, is a contribution which the conative faculty makes to the faculty of will. We may form a preference or spontaneous choice without any such exertion, but such effort is called for when alternative objects contend with each other for our adoption. In such cases the soul, acting on reasons and seeing the necessity for decision, drops the consideration of some objects and settles definitely upon others. The efficiency which man thus puts forth in his own self-guidance, is evidently different from that executive power which he afterwards employs for the realization of his plans. It has an important, though a subordinate place, in the faculty of choice. It is a necessary element of fully developed volition, as attention is of effective intellectual activity. But it is not the controlling factor in the act of choice. That factor can be found only in the exercise of intelligent motivity.

The theory of volition which has now been presented makes little claim to originality. It is essentially a reversion to the doctrine commonly held till within the last fifty or sixty years. It defines the will as the resultant of all of man's motive nature, and asserts that this conception of the faculty contributes to a clear understanding of free moral agency.

13. The affinity of will as a general faculty to the capability of determinate desire is witnessed by common language, in which one who acts "according to his wishes" is said to act "willingly," while one who is compelled to act "contrary to

his wish" is said to act "against his will." Willing, here, is nearly synonymous with wishing. Indeed, *the "will" of which moral quality may be predicated is a comprehensive faculty.* It embraces not only that definite adoption of an object and of a method for its realization which we commonly call choice but also our determinate desire for an object while we may be yet ignorant of its exact description and of any means for its attainment. Some say that this definite settled desire, this willingness, this "readiness to will," is itself a kind of choice or preference; and such a statement is not to be condemned. But evidently it is allowable only because the will or faculty of choice may be taken in a broad sense for the total of man's motive nature as acting determinately, whether it issue in the choice of a particular object and course of effort or not. Certainly, so far as morals are concerned, the essence of the will is simply determinate desire. Hence Moses, wishing that the Children of Israel should act virtuously in every donation for the tabernacle, said, "Whosoever is of a willing heart, let him bring it an offering to the Lord"; and the Apostle Paul, speaking of the liberality of Christians, says, "If there be first a willing mind *προθυμία*) it is accepted according to that a man hath and not according to that he hath not." The essence of virtue is this will—that is, this intelligent, determinate, controlling desire—for the realization of the right.

14. In order, however, to avoid misunderstanding in connection with this subject, we must not forget that narrower sense of the word "will" in which the term sets forth *a power the freedom of which is not contemplated in the present discussion.* Man's rational and moral "will," sometimes called his "better nature" or his "true self," does not include all of his motive nature as employed in choice or in determinate desire, but only his motive disposition so far as it may exhibit the leadership of principle. There is also an evil "will" which seeks to enforce its own sinful predominance, and with which our better nature—our nobler will—contends. Either of these wills may be subdued by the other while yet the general faculty of choice is free. For since the subjection either of the righteous or of the sinful will does not result from physical force but from the prevalence of the other will within the soul, man still acts freely from the totality of his motive nature. The apostolic statements "I cannot do that which *I would*" and "when *I would* do good evil is present with me,"

relate to the rational will and not to the general faculty of preference.

15. The doctrine that choice is compounded of intellect and motivity throws a light on free agency which cannot be obtained from the theory of a will which is not the outcome of intelligence and desire. President Porter teaches truly that *the free is the voluntary considered not simply in itself but as opposed to the non-voluntary and the involuntary*. We can understand this if the voluntary be the determinate exercise of motivity; for we can see how volition, as the working of man's motive nature from its own efficiency, is self-determined. We can see, also, how the full exercise of will shows a double self-determination; because not only ends and methods are considered but also the reasons for "making up one's mind," that is, for decision without delay, and for practical exertion if the time for exertion has come. But when we are told that man's will does not follow its own thinkings and desirings, and that it is a mysterious, unreasoning, self-determining power, we are bewildered. We ask, Is there such a power? And, if there were such a power, what morality—what merit or demerit—could attach to the exercise of it? It is clear that *only an intelligent motive will can act rationally and morally*.

Our conception of the choice faculty explains also how human conduct is predictable, and how, in certain circumstances, it may even be foretold with certainty. Man's motive disposition, operating determinately and subject to man's own direction, does not act without law but is a law unto itself. One's conduct from day to day and from hour to hour varies with the workings of his volitional nature. But this nature, though it may be changed, never changes without a cause; it abides the same. Hence we can say beforehand, "The liberal man will devise liberal things; the wicked will do wickedly; the deceitful will act deceitfully; the coward will show cowardice; the honest man will discharge his obligations; and the pious man will fear God and keep his commandments." How often speaking of our intimate acquaintances we express absolute confidence respecting the way in which they will conduct themselves! And when, as often happens, we find ourselves mistaken, we ascribe our error to our defective knowledge of the disposition and circumstances of the agent. But were it possible to perceive all the inward springs of one's activity and to estimate their varying operations under the changeful conditions of his life, we judge that the particular

deeds of individuals might be foretold as accurately as their general course of behavior. Hence also we say, that the Divine Being has a perfect foreknowledge of human conduct.

16. This *prescience of events*, however, *does not necessitate them, nor even cause them to be certain*. It presupposes their certainty and follows upon it. God's foreknowledge does not prove that human volition is produced by any agency external to man's own faculty of choice. If the will act from its own efficiency alone and according to its own law, an infinite intelligence may perceive how a man will conduct himself under any given circumstances. Human prescience is consistent with free-agency; so is God's foreknowledge. Moreover there is no reason to suppose that God's vision of the future is not correlated with the antecedents of that future. He not only sees the end, but he sees the end from the beginning. The "*punctum stans*"—the present which includes an eternity past and an eternity to come, is merely a figurative and paradoxical device to support the statement that the divine knowledge of all things is as perfect as that of immediate intuition. God's omniscience is an intelligence which penetrates the possible and the future just as his immensity and omnipotence comprehend the present and the actual. But it leaves human freedom untouched. It gives no reason to believe that man's volitions are necessitated in the same way as physical events are necessitated. It shows only that man's conduct may be infallibly predicted by one whose knowledge concerning the laws and the circumstances of human life is absolute and unlimited.

Nevertheless, at this point it may be asked, *If the human will, though free from external causation, is itself a cause which operates according to law, is there not here, after all, a species of necessity?* Is it not impossible that the will should not act, and therefore necessary that it should act, according to its own nature and law? Those who answer these inquiries affirmatively have been called Necessitarians, and those who give a negative answer have been styled Libertarians; though both parties assert the freedom of the will and deny that there is any fatalistic necessity. Contentions on this subject are not likely to cease very soon, but they arise somewhat from differences in the use of terms. If the necessary be that which will take place no matter what one's disposition may be and which must take place though one's will be opposed to it, there is no necessity in voluntary action, but only a certainty. But if

whatever follows inevitably under given conditions be necessary, and necessity be any connection of antecedent and consequent which may be a ground of certainty, then there is a kind of necessity here. Every choice or volition being the resultant of the total activity of man's motive nature, it is evident that any action contrary to the totality of one's nature would be impossible for him; and that man must choose as he chooses. The necessity thus described is not opposed to the voluntary and the free. It is *a necessity that the will should be free and should act freely, because, while there is no external power to prevent volition, all the power in man himself is employed in its production.*

The question, however, recurs, Should the term necessity be applied to this inseparable connection between man's motive nature and his conduct? We confess that we can find no better word, nor indeed any so appropriate. Therefore, in a mild way, we accept the necessitarian name. At the same time we have no blame for those who maintain that the will is not subject to any necessity and who yet believe that choice does not take place in a haphazard, accidental way, but according to law and with certainty. This is the position of some who deny that they are necessitarians, but who would admit that they are "*determinists*," such as the venerable Dr. Charles Hodge; and even of some who call themselves "*libertarians*," such as the late Dr. S. G. Burney, the able professor of theology in the Cumberland Presbyterian church.

17. Our discussion may conclude with a few remarks concerning *the relatedness of the human will to the divine*. Christians commonly believe that man's voluntary life can be, and is, affected by the gracious influence of God. Perhaps the following positions on this subject may be accepted as reasonable. *In the first place*, God, at the beginning, created man and endowed him with intellect and will. Therefore, although man acts as a "*first cause*," inasmuch as the efficiency determining his volitions lies wholly in himself, he is not an absolutely first cause. He is a self-moving cause brought into being by the First Cause of all. *In the second place*; God created man holy and with a will entirely inclined to good. But, by reason of the weakness of a finite nature, man was fallible. Under the influence of a powerful tempter our representative parent fell into an estate of sin and misery. Thus moral evil, which entered the world without divine intervention, is the perversion of a life originally faultless. And *in*

the third place; while grace never injures souls, it often changes them for the better. For God, who at the first made man in his own image, can create him anew in righteousness and true holiness. Such a transformation is not the destruction of man's will, but a restoration of its excellence—a restoration intended to be permanent.

18. The foregoing theory of volition asserts a kind of necessity but also adopts some libertarian ideas and is very far removed from fatalism. In certain respects it occupies a middle ground; yet it is not a compromise between opinions. It is the product of analytic rather than of eclectic thought.

CHAPTER XXIX.

PERSONALITY.

1. Personality is assumed in all ethical thought. The denial or misconception of it is a source of error.—2. A person is (1) an enduring spiritual substance, endowed with (2) individuality, (3) rationality, (4) self-consciousness, and (5) motive dispositions. The personality of madmen. The doctrine of the Trinity.—3. The definitions of St. Thomas and Boethius, of Mr. Locke, and of Professor Janet, discussed.—4. Free-will or free agency is primarily and preeminently the freedom of the person who has the will.—5. Actions are right or wrong only as related to personality. On this ground also, but in another relation, they are virtuous and vicious. Hence the origin of two modes of moral approbation and disapprobation becomes evident. Martineau criticized.—6. Judgments of merit and demerit explained. Hickok criticized.—7. Moral responsibility defined. The word "duty" as applied to a relation signifies the moral obligation of persons. As applied to personal conduct the word has two meanings, (1) the obligated, (2) the obligatory.—8. Motive character is the important aspect of personality. It is the origin of free-will, the condition of virtue and vice, and the basis of moral responsibility. Prof. George S. Fullerton quoted.

1. PERSONALITY is a fundamental assumption in morals. The ideas of freedom, reason, will and choice, of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, of approbation and disapprobation, of merit, demerit, reward and punishment, of duty, and of responsibility, would be robbed of significance if man were not a person. The very fact that personality is a universal element of rational life tends to bring this important characteristic into neglect. As material substances are often assumed without mention in statements respecting force and its operations, so the spiritual substance is often silently supposed in assertions regarding the laws and workings of psychical powers. Such abstract language originates from the convenience of leaving unmentioned what must be necessarily understood. But we must not be misled by it into attributing a separate existence to the abstractions mentioned. Virtue and vice, rea-

son, character and will, are only different phases of the life of persons.

In common affairs, and while in contact with realities, men think accurately enough without defining their conceptions. This is not the case when theorizers are using ideas to construct a system. The speculative inquirer who does not carefully determine what his conceptions represent, is certain to be involved in confusion, if not in error. Moreover, our first definitions should explicate that thought which belongs to the ordinary use of terms. One should lay aside all preconceptions and should direct his scrutiny to the object, or class of objects, which men have before them when they speak a given word. That word may afterwards be employed in some peculiar or technical sense; but it should first be given its ordinary meaning. Then, if it is to have a technical signification, this too should be defined; and sufficient reason should be given for the departure from common usage.

2. The following definition of a person is derived from the analysis of ordinary thought: *A person is an enduring spiritual being endowed with individuality, rationality, self-consciousness, and motive disposition.* No material substance can be a person though the body within which the soul dwells, as the outward instrument and representative of its occupant, is sometimes called "one's person." Only a spiritual being can be such a person as that of which we now speak; and even a disembodied spirit may be such a person. Again, a person is a unit—an individual. The idea of unity seems to originate in the consciousness of one's own existence. So far as observation goes, every physical substance can be separated into parts; the ultimate atom has not yet been discovered; therefore divisibility is regarded as a primary quality of matter. But spirit asserts itself to be a monad. Though possessing a complex nature it is conscious that its various powers reside in a single substance. Sometimes in legal language an incorporated company is called a person, but this is a secondary form of speech and signifies merely that a certain aggregate or organization of men is, in some respects, to be dealt with in the same way as the individual and literal person is dealt with.

A person, also, in common with all other substances, whether spiritual or material, has a protracted existence; it is not transitory like a thought or an action. Though this is not a prominent element in our conception of personality, it is always present. Our first knowledge of time as a continuous

kind of entity undoubtedly is obtained in connection with the perception of our own enduring states and of that yet more enduring self, or substance, which is the subject of those states. This immediate cognition of the abiding ego is the beginning of memory and of the knowledge of one's personal identity. The consciousness of one's identity during a brief continued present prepares the soul to assert its own unbroken existence notwithstanding interruptions in the consciousness of living. At all events the perception of one's continued existence is an acknowledged attribute of personality. (Compare the chapter on Consciousness in the PERCEPTIONALIST.)

In the next place, although the spirits of brutes have a protracted existence, the term "person" is reserved for a higher order of beings—that is, for spirits endowed with reason. No creature who is incapable of understanding the laws of moral and social life and of intelligently conforming to them is a person; no horse or ox has personality. When lunatics and madmen are included among persons, it is understood that they have a rational nature, though this may be undeveloped or deranged. Their personality is in *posse* rather than in *esse*; therefore they are not treated according to the rules made for persons. Evidently, also, self-consciousness—the faculty cognizant of one's own existence, doings, and powers of doing—is an element of personality. It is incredible that any rational being should not be aware of his own existence and of his own powers and their operations. Yet some philosophers believe that the mind which has filled the universe with evidences of a marvelous wisdom and knowledge is ignorant of itself; they formulate for us the idea of an impersonal pantheistic substance. Such a conception is irrational in the extreme. God must be a person just as man is a person, except only that his infinite intelligence must yield a more perfect self-knowledge than any created being can possess. But the divine personality of which we now speak signifies only that God is a self-conscious, spiritual substance. It does not refer to the doctrine of the Trinity—that there are three persons in one God. The assertion of three personal lives in one substance introduces a kind or style of person not inconsistent with that at present considered, yet different from it. The ordinary person has one conscious life resident in one substance.

Finally, the possession of motive character is a part of personality. Possibly a purely intellectual being conscious of his

own activity as a thinking agent but devoid of motive tendency might be imagined; and such a being might be called a person. But he would not be a person in the ordinary sense of the term. He would be incapable of virtue and vice, because these are motive dispositions. He would be without will whether as the faculty of definite choice or in the broader sense as the power of determinate desire. He would be insensible to the calls of duty, interest, passion or affection. In short, he would not be a person in the sense required by moral science. Indeed, so far as etymology is concerned, the word person ("per-sona") sets forth motive character more than any other attribute of rational beings. Originally the *persona* was the mask through which the actor sounded forth the words of his part. Then it came to designate the fictitious personage represented. After that it was applied to existing individuals as having each a character of his own.

For all the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players.
AS YOU LIKE IT, II., 7.

3. A person, then, is an enduring spiritual being, individual, rational, self-conscious and endowed with motive dispositions. Possibly other points might be mentioned; these are the essential characteristics. It might be said that every person is a moral being, but this is involved in rationality, self-consciousness and the capacity of motive action. Indeed, if we remember that reason has a practical as well as an intellectual function, a person might be briefly defined as a spirit endowed with reason. The peculiarities of personality arise from the possession of this power. One cannot disapprove of the teachings of Boethius and of St. Thomas, who said that a person is a rational substance (*substantia rationalis*), or an individual substance of a rational nature (*rationalis naturæ individua substantia*). Mr. Locke, also, says admirably, "Person stands for a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking being in different times and places." (ESSAY, II., 27, Section 9.)

This conception of a person is the ordinary conception of the rational self. Now should one enlarge this idea by adding to it that character of excellence which every person should seek to realize, and should he say that man's great duty is to develop his own personality—his true selfhood—we might

question the perspicuity of such language, yet we could not deny that one should strive for his own excellence; especially for his own moral excellence. But should one go farther and say that the reason for self-cultivation is not the best development of ourselves as individual rational beings but the development of ourselves as parts of an omnipresent spirit, we would ask whether such a doctrine be consistent with consciousness and with common sense. We cannot accept the teachings of Janet, who says, "The person is not the individual. The individual is composed of all the special accidents which distinguish one man from another. . . . The person is the consciousness of the impersonal—the spirit." (THEORY OF MORALS, PREFACE, VII.) These statements are affected with pantheistic absurdity. The person *is* the individual; and is no less a person because he has peculiarities of his own as well as a nature in which he resembles others. Moreover, the person is not "consciousness" but the being endowed with consciousness; and the principal things of which he is conscious are not "impersonal" but his own existence and his own powers and their operations. We acknowledge our most intimate dependence upon God—that in him we live and move and have our being. Nevertheless we are moral beings not as parts of God but as his creatures, and as having separate personal existence of our own.

4. That morality is a development of personal life should be constantly borne in mind and allowed to qualify every ethical conception. For example, the liberty essential to moral action and commonly called "freedom of the will" is literally freedom of the person—of the agent. It is called "free will" in order to indicate the part of human nature to which it is attached. The agent is free because, in the exercise of his volitional power and in the presence of inducements, he is self-active and cannot be prevented from this self-activity except by causes which remove or destroy the possibility of his willing. The same doctrine is taught when man is called a free-agent, but not so unequivocally; for this expression does not expressly locate the freedom.

5. Again, our conceptions of the right and the wrong and of the virtuous and the vicious become clearer and more exact when connected with the idea of personality. The distinctions between virtue and vice, on the one hand, and between right and wrong, on the other, are sometimes treated as if they were one and the same distinction, whereas we can only say

that for some purposes they are equivalent. For instance, ethics might be defined either as the science of right and wrong or as the science of virtue and vice. Right and wrong are the primary objects of moral judgment and choice, while virtue and vice are primarily personal dispositions, and only after that, and secondarily, objects of aim and effort. It would not, therefore, express the truth to say that all moral life consists in the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice, unless one should employ the words *virtue* and *vice* in part metonymically and so as to include the objects which these dispositions have in view ; which is sometimes done in common speech. Speaking literally, as we *should* speak in philosophy, the primary objects of moral aim and avoidance are the right and the wrong.

In this connection two modes of moral approbation and disapprobation claim our attention. For we may approve or disapprove of personal actions, together with the ends which they seek to realize, as being right or wrong, or of personal actions, together with the dispositions from which they spring, as being virtuous or vicious. The essential object of the one kind of approbation and disapprobation is the end to be accomplished as being right or wrong ; that of the other is the animus from which the action proceeds as being virtuous or vicious. Approbation of the first kind was in the mind of the poet when he wrote :

“ Video meliora, proboque ; deteriora sequor.”

The second mode, in which excellence of disposition is recognized, appears in the following stanza respecting a generous deed :

“ Such goodness ought to live as long
As men read stories told in song,
And virtue merits, as reward,
The approbation of a bard.”

The recognition of both these modes of approbation is necessary to a clear understanding of the action of the moral faculty. We should particularly note that the approval of the right is naturally prior to the approval of that disposition which seeks the right. The very existence of virtue is conditioned on the power of approving the right and of disapproving the wrong. We agree with Dr. Martineau when

he says, "The approbation or disapprobation which we feel towards human actions is directed upon them as *personal phenomena*"; but we cannot accept his further statement, "It follows that what we judge is *always the inner spring* of an action as distinguished from its outward operation." On the contrary, there are two judgments; first, one respecting "the outward operation," considered not simply in itself, but as the possible object and aim of "the inward spring," and as being thus the condition of a motive tendency which may or may not put forth its energy; and, secondly, there is a judgment concerning the actual exercise of rational motivity, whether it be a desire for the right or a desire in opposition to the right. Both these judgments relate to the person as having motive capability, but the second more directly, inasmuch as it concerns the actual exercise of disposition. Moreover, the first mode of judgment—that directed towards actions and the ends which they serve—commonly contemplates an action not as actual, but as conceived of and possible; and asserts that the action contemplated, by reason of its own nature or effect, is right or wrong. Not Martineau alone, but other eminent writers as well, failing to perceive two modes of judgment, recognize that only which assumes the actual exercise of motive disposition. This mistake has resulted in much unsatisfactory theorizing.

6. Because the approval and disapproval of things right and wrong only refers to possible dispositions, while the approval and disapproval of virtue and vice relate to actual dispositions, the latter forms of judgment have a closer connection with persons than the former. They contemplate the whole nature of the moral agent as actually active, and therefore are properly styled *judgments of persons*. *This same completed relatedness to personality belongs also to judgments of merit and demerit.* These assume the full exercise of one's free agency. They presuppose the approbation or disapprobation of inward disposition, and thereupon, on the ground of causative righteousness, propose to encourage moral goodness by rewards and to repress moral evil by punishments. The simplest form of the judgment of merit is that which asserts "worthiness of spiritual approbation"; because the esteem of oneself and of others is itself a reward of virtue. This is a desirable end and one properly sought in connection with the pursuit of duty. But it is not, as Dr. Hickok and some others maintain, the fundamental and ex-



planatory aim of morality. Moral principle first of all seeks the right—that is, absolute good as an end. After that, and because of that, it receives our esteem and praise. It is in the pursuit of the right that virtue becomes “worthy of spiritual approbation.”

7. The thought of personality is involved also when we speak of man as the subject of duty, and of responsibility. By duty in this connection we mean the obligation of a person to desire and to seek the right; responsibility is the liability of a person to be called to account if he disregard the requirements of duty. Sometimes conduct is spoken of as being obligated, but this is only a short way of saying that the person is obligated with reference to his conduct. For the obligation, or binding efficacy, of the right as an end, affects, first, oneself as capable of desire and choice, then one's desire and choice, and, finally, whatever action or doing may be needful to the accomplishment of the right. The choice and the voluntary conduct of a person are obligated to the right very much in the same way as one's labor and money are legally bound for the payment of debts. The labor and money, on the one hand, and the choice and conduct, on the other, are not obligated in precisely the same sense in which the person is bound. Nevertheless his obligation puts them in a new relation; they are things in respect to which he is bound and are affected and controlled by his obligation; and this, their relationship, is naturally called their obligation, or obligatedness.

Let us note, in passing, that the word “duty,” in addition to that abstract sense of moral obligation which we have just considered, has two concrete significations. According to the first of these it stands for any activity of a rational being—for any desire, choice or action—as obligated or due to a right end, or for such activity in general as due to the right in general. In other words, duty is that which is due. This is its more proper and common meaning. According to the other signification duty is any rational activity conceived of, not as obligated, but as obligatory; as when we speak of the *claims* of duty, or say that we are *required* by duty to do so or so. For the very same action, for instance, the payment of one's debts may be thought of either as due and obligated to a right end, or as including a right end, and therefore obligatory upon the agent. Hence, also, the adjective “duti-

ful," as applied to actions, may signify either that an action—such as truth-telling—is obligated, or that it is obligatory.

It is noticeable, however, that the term "duty," as indicative of things obligatory, is not quite coextensive with "the right." It applies to right ends only so far as they are embodied in actions. The glory of God and the good of mankind are right ends, and, as such, part of the right; but they are not duties. On the other hand, when we say, "It is man's duty to choose or desire the right," this choice or desire, as the simple objective embrace of the right, is a duty; but it is not as yet a right and obligatory thing, any more than absolute good as such is the right. Absolute good becomes the right only when regarded as an end; and so virtue, to be a thing right and obligatory, must become an end and the object of its own regards. In its simple initial exercise, virtue is duty only—not the right, but that love for the right which is the deepest of all duties.

8. Motive character is the most important aspect of personality. Were the soul not endowed with motive dispositions morality would have no sufficient reason for existence. Man is a moral being, not simply because he perceives the difference between right and wrong, but yet more because he is capable of desiring and choosing the one or the other.

Moreover, our treatment of persons as moral beings assumes not only that they have motive dispositions, but also *that their life and conduct proceed from those dispositions*. Our esteem and affection for good men and our disesteem and aversion for the wicked relate entirely to their inward dispositions. No course of conduct, whether actual or proposed, excites approbation and good-will or disapprobation and dislike, if it do not exhibit determinate desire either for or against the right. All efforts for the moral improvement of ourselves or others aim at the betterment of character. The moral education of the home, of the school, of the state and of the church, seeks to develop right habits of disposition, and is successful only when these take possession of man's nature and manifest themselves in his voluntary conduct. The will contemplated by moral agencies is but the outcome of inward dispositions. It is not a power which acts independently of all law, but one which acts according to its own laws, and which may be induced to act in accordance with the law of duty. Finally, praise and blame, reward and punishment, and every effort of rectoral righteousness, deal with man as

the possessor of a motive character. These actions take place in view of the animus of conduct and are designed to influence the exercise of disposition in the time to come. In short, rectoral righteousness aims to encourage virtue and to discourage vice by attaching honor and pleasure to obedience and disgrace and pain to disobedience. It appeals directly to our motivities.

Thus human life is moral *not because man is without law, but because he acts according to his own mind and disposition*. His free agency is not only consistent with the efficient exercise of his motivities, but is realized in that exercise. And, such being the case, human conduct is at once certainly free and freely certain. It is certainly free because man's volitional faculty is doubly self-determined (Chap. XXVIII.); it is freely certain because self-determination takes place according to the laws of man's own voluntary nature. Rewards and punishments do, indeed, imply that actions are not yet determined by the agent and that their performance is conditioned on his free will. But this is entirely consistent with their certainty when the operation of the free will is taken into account. Although punishments and rewards pertain to contingent actions, it is to be remembered that what is contingent and uncertain from one point of view and under one antecedent may be logically necessary and certain from another point of view and under another antecedent. Indeed every ordinary antecedent of contingency may, upon more perfect knowledge, be completed into an antecedent of necessity. (See MODALIST, Chap. XXI.) This principle holds good in respect to moral conduct just as it does in respect to all other cases of indeterminate sequence.

The determinist doctrine of freedom is well defended by Prof. George S. Fullerton, of the University of Pennsylvania, in the *Popular Science Monthly* of December, 1900. His closing words are especially noteworthy. He says, "I believe most heartily in freedom. I am neither fatalist nor materialist. I hold man to be a free agent, and believe that there is such a thing as justice in man's treatment of man. I refuse to regard punishment as the infliction of pain upon one who did not do the thing for which he is punished, could not have prevented it, and cannot possibly be benefited by the punishment he receives. I view with horror the doctrine that the teacher's desk and the pulpit, the force of public opinion and the sanction of law, are of no avail. I am un-

willing to assume, without evidence, that each man's breast is the seat of uncaused and inexplicable explosions, which no man can predict, against the consequences of which no man can make provision, and which set at defiance all the forces which make for civilization."

CHAPTER XXX.

THE CONFLICT OF DUTIES.

1. Duties never conflict, but the laws or rules, of duty sometimes do.—2. Moralists discuss this subject but have not developed any theory respecting it. The views of Janet, Thomas Aquinas, the Jesuits, and the Jansenists.—3. Cicero's "De officiis" offers a starting point for inquiry. His "*honestum*" and "*utile*" are the morally right and the morally expedient. These have a community of nature.—4. The right, as opposed to the expedient, is clearly and unquestionably an absolute good; and therefore unchangeably dutiful. The expedient, though a good, is only presumptively absolutely good; and it may at times be found to conflict with absolute good. Therefore the right is not merely duty but always duty; the expedient is duty but not always duty. This is Stoic doctrine.—5. When the "*honestum*" and the "*utile*" conflict, the former should prevail. This principle is self-evident, but the application of it is difficult. The Academic and Stoic statements of it differ only verbally. The precept, Do not do evil that good may come, explained.—6. While right never yields to expediency, we must remember that a rule of right is imperative only so long as the case retains its ordinary character. In exceptional circumstances the rule may be questioned. It may not set forth the absolute good for those circumstances.—7. Further, with a change in circumstances what is expedient may become the absolutely right; then its subordinate character disappears.—8. When two aims of expediency conflict, the greater good is to be preferred, all selfishness being excluded.—9. The conflict of one "*honestum*" with another will be considered in the next chapter.

1. WHAT is called "the conflict of duties" is literally the conflict of laws or rules of duty, as these are conceived of by us. A duty is that which it is right and obligatory to do and wrong not to do. Therefore, if it were possible for one duty to be inconsistent with another, it would be at the same time both right and wrong to do the very same thing—right because it is duty, wrong because it is opposed to duty. But rules or conceptions of duty, as applied to a particular case, may conflict with each other, and then—since they cannot

both be right—it is necessary for us to judge between them, and to determine which rule should prevail.

2. Prof. Janet, speaking of the “Conflict of Duties,” says, “If you open all the great treatises on morals, both ancient and modern, you will hardly find anywhere a discussion of this problem.” He declares that Cicero is almost the only philosophical author who has made the conflict of duties the subject of specific inquiry. (THEORY OF MORALS, Bk. II, Ch. VI.) However, theologians, especially the great mediæval doctors, have given much attention to questions of duty. Thomas Aquinas, in his “*Summa Moralis*” (which is the second part of his “*Summa Theologica*”), discusses an immense variety of such questions, but each for itself in a dialectic way and without proposing general rules of judgment. The same may be said of those ecclesiastical writers of later times who dealt with cases of conscience and developed the science of casuistry. The reasonings of many of these, being superficial and misleading, brought the name of casuistry into disrepute, as if it meant only the sophistical advocacy of evil. This disesteem was intensified by the controversy between the Jesuits and the Jansenists, in which the former, on the ground of paramount duty to God and the Church and humanity, justified strange exceptions to the ordinary rules of duty, while the latter asserted that the reasonings of the Jesuits were subversive of all morality.

There is, nevertheless, a department of inquiry which, if rightly pursued, should redeem the name of casuistry from dishonor; and which, indeed, has not been wholly neglected, although few moralists have made it the subject of separate treatment. Much of what is called Practical Ethics considers difficult questions of duty. This is done, not by segregating these questions from the direct exposition of the laws of righteousness, but by studying each in connection with the specific law which seems to be properly broken or violated in some exceptional case. In this way many difficulties are wisely discussed. It is also to be allowed that it is better not to deal with ethical perplexities without a previous examination of the right rules to which they relate and of the reasons for those rules. But while cases of conscience should be distributed throughout practical ethics, they may also be more thoroughly considered if gathered under heads according to the laws which they bring under debate, the cases of each class being collated with each other and being studied just as jurists

study cases in civil law. - For questions respecting crimes, torts, debts, contracts and other obligations, respecting realty, personalty, marriage, divorce, trusts, inheritances, and so forth, are now largely settled by the examination of co-ordinated judgments and opinions. Only in some such way right decisions, or those as nearly right as possible, can be hoped for in questions of dispute.

Moreover, while the investigation of the conflict of duties belongs to applied morals and not to general abstract morals, and must be conducted through specific practical discussions, it is a function of theoretical ethics to define the scope of this investigation and to indicate principles according to which its problems may be determined. Certainly any system setting forth a universal doctrine of duty may be expected to yield some general directions, based on that doctrine, for the guidance of the judgment.

3. That our suggestions on this subject may have some little support from authority, let us refer briefly to the teachings of Cicero. Although these do not exhibit deep analysis, they contain noble ethical doctrines, and they indicate a method of procedure more distinctly than any later writings have done. Reproducing the views of Panætius, Posidonius and other Stoics, whose works are no longer extant, Cicero divides *officium*, or duty (*τὸ καθήκον*), into two kinds: first the *honestum*, or that which is always and invariably right (*τὸ κατ'ορθότητα*); and secondly, the *utile*, or the dutifully expedient (*τὸ καθήκον*, in the more limited sense of the term). He then mentions three main inquiries. The first of these asks, Is it right or is it wrong?—*Honestumne esset an turpe?*—The second asks, Is it expedient or is it inexpedient?—*Utile esset an inutile?*—And the third asks, What shall we do in case the right and the expedient appear to conflict?—*Si id quod speciem haberet honesti pugnaret cum eo quod utile videretur?* The three books of the "De Officiis" are devoted severally to these three inquiries. But the first book closes with a brief discussion respecting which of two *honestas* is to be preferred in case both cannot be realized, and the second with a similar discussion when the choice must be made between two *utilitas*. Thus three cases of conflict are mentioned; first, that of the *honestum* with the *honestum*; secondly, that of the *utile* with the *utile*; and thirdly, that of the *utile* and the *honestum* with each other.

In order to appreciate the thought of Cicero we must

understand accurately his conceptions of the *honestum* and the *utile*. He does not distinguish these as the right and the useful often are contrasted nowadays, when the idea of the useful is dissociated from that of moral obligation and stands for the beneficial, or advantageous, simply as such. Cicero discriminates between what is necessarily or essentially right and obligatory and what is assumed to be right and obligatory because promotive of some form of benefit or advantage. His *utile* might be better translated the "helpful" than the "useful." It is poorly expressed in English by the term "expedient." An action not certainly known to be productive of absolute good may generally be assumed and believed to be productive of absolute good provided it be promotive of some particular benefit or advantage; and this is the case with the expedient since it contributes to some specific form of good and may be presumed to contribute to the total good of which the case admits. This being so, the *honestum* (or the right) and the *utile* (or the expedient), as the two forms of *officium* (or duty), may be said each to participate in the most important characteristic of the other. For the morally expedient is always right and obligatory (though not with an absolute unchangeableness); and the morally right is always helpful and advantageous (though with a broadness of reference peculiarly its own). The essential difference between the *honestum* and the *utile* is that the one is absolutely good without any possibility of losing this character, while the other is held to be absolutely good with that possibility or contingency added. On this account a thing expedient, if found invariably and necessarily to contribute to a right end, ceases to be expedient and becomes right *per se*; while, in many cases, an action right or wrong *per se*, if denuded of the consequences included within our full conception of it, and thought of only in its immediate operation, is no longer right and obligatory *per se*, but a proper subject for the rules of expediency. It may even, through a change of relations, assume an opposite obligation to that which belonged to it at first. Telling the truth, which is the action of veracity, may become actionable slander; while the killing of a man, which is ordinarily murder, may become the dutiful execution of a criminal.

Cicero expressly asserts this community of nature between the *honestum* and the *utile*. Rejecting the doctrine that ex-

pediency ever really conflicts with the right, he accepts the Stoic view that whatever is right is expedient and that nothing is expedient which is not right.—*Dubitandum non est quin nunquam possit utilitas cum honestate contendere. . . . Quicquid honestum sit, id utile esse, nec utile quicquam quod non honestum.*” (DE OFFICIIS, lib. III. cap. 4.) These statements do not express analytic thought; and they may seem paradoxical. But they are fundamentally correct; they spring from a practical apprehension of the truth.

4. As the distinction between the right and the expedient has not been mentioned in previous discussions and is one of great importance, let us dwell upon it a little even at the risk of some prolixity. Some things are absolutely good (and therefore right and dutiful) necessarily and certainly, so that they cannot, in the cases and under the circumstances which they presuppose, be aught else. Such things are often said to be right *per se*; they are not merely duty but always duty—*καθῆκον καὶ ἀεί καθῆκον*; as the Stoics said. Other things, which in themselves are good in some private or limited sphere of relation, must also be regarded and treated as absolutely good and entitled to our dutiful pursuit, except when, under special circumstances, it can be shown, from the absolute point of view, that they would be harmful rather than beneficial. Ordinarily such advantages are not only consistent with absolute good but included in it, as the part in the whole; because absolute good is the total good possible in a case or any part of that total. Therefore, unless sufficient reason to the contrary appear, it is our duty in every case—it is required by the law of moral goodness—to seek our own best interests and those of others. At times, however, we must sacrifice present immediate or private interests to the absolute good. Here, then, is a class of aims and actions which are duty but not always duty—as the Stoics would say, *θῆκοντα ἀλλὰ οὐκ αἰ καθῆκοντα*. Things which are thus right and obligatory “*per accidens*,” or in a contingent and probable way, are the *utilia* of Cicero, while things necessarily and invariably right are the *honestia*. This distinction is made with English words when the right and the expedient are contrasted with one another, though not always when these terms are used independently.

The opposition between the right and the expedient is not that between what is right as an end and that which is right as a means to the end. A means, or mode of action, con-

nected with a right end participates in the rightness, or absoluteness of good, belonging to the end. If it be inseparably connected with an end right *per se*, it has the same perfect rightness with the end, and does not differ from an action right *per se* except in our way of thinking of it. Even this conception, too, may be changed through a synthesis of the means used with the end gained, after which the means is regarded not merely as necessarily right but also as right *per se*—as a part of that which is right in itself. As already said, the expedient, or *utile*, though necessarily good, is not necessarily right, or absolutely good. Under exceptional circumstances it may operate for evil, in which case it ceases to be expedient, and becomes wrong. On the other hand, as has been stated, if it can be shown that some mode of action hitherto regarded as expedient is necessarily promotive of absolute good, it ceases to be expedient and becomes right in the unchangeable way. The expedient is known to be good and is presumptively absolutely good, but it is not invariably and certainly such. It occupies the same place in ethics that contingency does in logic. For when contingency is “unstable” it may be displaced either by necessity or by impossibility. (THE MODALIST, Ch. XXI.)

5. The principal rule of Cicero regarding the conflict of duties is that when right and expediency—the *honestum* and the *utile*—are opposed, *the right should always prevail*. Cicero quotes with approval the precept of the Academics and Peripatetics: “*quæ honesta sunt anteponuntur iis quæ videntur utilia*,” and also the stronger Stoic statement, “*quidquid honestum est, idem utile videtur; nec utile quidquam quod non honestum*.” (DE OFFICIIS, lib. III. cap. 4.) The difference between these rules is merely verbal; it arose because the Stoics restricted the term *utile* to the expedient, or dutifully advantageous, which alone is good from the absolute point of view, while the Academics used the conception in a broader way so that it covered both the expedient and that ordinary good which at times is not expedient. Evidently, too, the rules are identical in operation. According to the Academics, what seems good, and, in a sense, is good, is denied to be expedient and dutiful when it conflicts with the right. According to the Stoics, what seems good but conflicts with the right is to be rejected as being no good at all; as indeed, it is not from the absolute point of view.

The reasonableness of subordinating the expedient to the

right is self-evident. Plainly the contingently right and good can be no longer binding when it conflicts with that which is necessarily and absolutely right and good. Translating this into common language we say that no prospect of advantage or benefit can justify the doing of wrong or the failure to do right. This was the thought of St. Paul when he said, "If the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory why yet am I also judged as a sinner? And not rather, as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say, let us do evil that good may come—whose condemnation is just?" The "evil" spoken of by the Apostle is the infraction of right; the "good" is that the pursuit of which, so long as it does not conflict with the right, is desirable and expedient.

While the doctrine of Cicero and of Paul respecting expediency cannot be questioned, the use of it calls for much moral intelligence. In every case one must determine whether there is an absolute right which is to be preferred to the expedient. Cicero gives no direction here except that we should follow Nature, or reason, or the voice of God. "That a man should seek his own interest through the robbery of another is," he says, "more opposed to Nature than death, than poverty, than grief and the rest of the evils which can befall one's body or estate."—*Magis contra Naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera quæ possint aut corpori accidere aut rebus exterminis*. He adds that to spoil and wrong another for one's own emolument involves the disruption of that human society which nature calls for—*quæ maxime est secundum Naturam*. (LIB. III. cap. 5.) These words might be taken to teach that one's unreasoned sense of duty should be his guide in difficulties; but that is not their true meaning. Cicero himself appeals to reason and judgment to determine what things are right and what are not. He acknowledges that many things which appear to be right by Nature at times become not right; for example, to do things promised, to abide by agreements, to return trust-deposits, may cease to be right and binding if they would work injury to the party to whom the obligations were incurred.—*Multa quæ honesta Natura videntur temporibus fiunt non honesta. Facere promissa, stare conventis, reddere deposita, commutata utilitate fiunt non honesta*. (LIB. III. cap. 25.)

6. In questions concerning the right and the expedient two things should be borne in mind.

First, it seems clear that *the unchangeableness ascribed to the ordinary rules of right pertains rather to fundamental principles or aims embodied in the rules than to the rules themselves*. Consider, for instance, the practical laws of justice, or regulative righteousness. Each of these seeks to conserve and promote some radical interest so far as that interest consists with and forms a part of the absolute good of men. One law cares for human life; another for truth between man and man; another for personal chastity; another for the rightful possession and use of property; another for the maintenance of order and the needful subordinations of society. Every one of these aims belongs necessarily to human welfare, and will last as long as our race inhabits the earth. The pursuit of it is an unchangeable law. Moreover the ordinary methods for conserving and promoting these interests have a certain fixity. They are to be followed under all ordinary circumstances. But in exceptional circumstances these methods may prove inconsistent with absolute good, and in that case must be replaced by others. They are unchangeable only within certain limits. In like manner the affectional laws of regulative righteousness require reverence, good will, courage, prudence, self-restraint, and other virtues which always have been and always shall be obligatory upon men, yet which may be exercised in excess or upon improper occasions. Since, then, circumstances may arise in which the common rules of righteousness do not apply—or at least should not be applied—wisdom suggests that the requirements of right be scrutinized and determined before any strong claim of expediency, and especially of benevolent expediency, be rejected. It may be found that the occasion does not demand the application of the rule of right and that no conflict really exists between the right and the advantageous.

Ordinarily, however, the common rules of duty limit the scope of expediency. The good man sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not. To seek one's own advancement or that of one's friends or family, or country by falsehood and deceit, by theft and robbery, by unprovoked violence and war, is condemned by all, and by none more loudly than by those who are guilty of just such conduct. Jacob had no right to deceive his father, even though his aim was to obtain the fulfilment of the promise that "the elder shall serve the younger." And our Saviour, when offered all the kingdoms of

the world if he would do obeisance to the tempter, made the proper answer: "Get thee hence, Satan; for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." In such cases as these the course of duty is plain. One sees at once both what the rule of right is and how it conflicts with expediency. But were there a question respecting what strict duty required, one's course would not be so easily determined.

7. The other point to be considered in the controversy between right and expediency, or more exactly between what appears to be right and what appears to be expedient, is that *what is dutifully expedient may, under some circumstances, become essentially and absolutely right*. The expedient is a development of duty under that law of goodness which is an essential and unchangeable part of morality. Certain modes of doing are found preventive of specific evils and promotive of immediate advantages or benefits. They become duties because presumptively and probably they contribute to absolute good. Should any one of these on occasion conflict with the right, it would be no longer expedient but, absolutely speaking, evil and wrong. But if, under other circumstances, it were seen certainly productive of good and of good only, it would no longer be expedient but a thing strictly right and obligatory, being an absolute requirement of the law of moral goodness. For example, liberality is a duty governed by expediency, but if one can give to a worthy cause without neglecting any prior claims, and it becomes perfectly clear that the gift will help to accomplish great good, one's duty becomes a matter of strict and incontestable obligation. So, before the advent of Christianity and in the ruder ages of the world, even good men considered monogamy a duty of expediency rather than of strict right. But now, under the authority of Christ and the conditions of a higher civilization, a man is to cleave unto his wife, and they twain are to be one flesh.

When expediency in this way loses its identity by rising into the region of perfected obligation, if it then appear to conflict with the right, it no longer does so as expediency, but only as one alleged case of rightness may conflict with another. Thus there may be an apparent exception to the rule that the expedient should give way to the right. When Caiaphas said, "It is expedient (*συμφέρει*) for us that one man should die for the people and that the whole nation perish

not," he advocated the murder of an innocent man on the ground of public policy, an iniquitous proposition. Yet he spake better than he knew. The benefit which the death of Christ was to procure for mankind was so great and so sure that his voluntary laying down of his life, which, under other circumstances, would have been sinful suicide, became the highest conceivable example of self-sacrificing virtue. Many patriots and heroes might be mentioned who have gladly died for their country or their race, but a more than human grandeur surrounds the cross of the Son of God who gave himself for the salvation of the world.

8. Further consideration of the oppositions of right and expediency would lead into detailed casuistic discussions. We turn now to the conflict, that is, the apparent conflict of the right with the right and of the expedient with the expedient. One general principle applies to both these cases of contest, whether one's choice is to be made between two forms of right or two forms of expediency: *That course is to be preferred which promises the greater good.* This principle is applicable to questions of expediency with fewer precautions and qualifications than when right appears to conflict with right. For this reason we shall speak of expediencies first.

The expedient being the advantageous or beneficial considered as presumptively a part of absolute good, evidently, if there be no conflict with right, only the greater of two alternative advantages can be an obligatory end. If the other alternative were preferred, one would fall short in his duty to seek all the good within his power. A specific form of this principle requires that, other things being equal, the good of the greater number should prevail over that of the less. For example, it is contrary to duty that civil government should confer privileges upon any class if, without detriment to the public welfare, they can be conferred upon the people generally. In every case political policies should be framed in the interest of the greatest number. It is, of course, understood that before two duties of expediency can be the subjects of choice neither of them has been found to conflict with the right. Therefore, though one may rightly contemplate the private benefit of himself or of others, he must exclude from his consideration the seeking of it in a selfish or unjust or reckless manner. Every plan subordinating absolute to private good, the right to the expedient,

must be rejected. But this being settled, the greater good for oneself or for others should prevail over the less.

In making this choice the moral faculty does not act independently of that rational judgment which determines questions of advantage and of disadvantage, and which assigns different values to different presentations of good. Duty accepts the conclusions of reason and of experience concerning the desirable and declares that the more desirable should be chosen. In consequence of this a considerable part of virtue consists in the wise pursuit of the best interests of oneself and of others. In an earlier discussion (CHAP. III.) the question was considered how things naturally good are given different values. We have now merely to note that morality takes account of these values. Cicero, having defined the *utile* as that branch of duty which pertains to the necessities, supplies, resources and facilities of life—*ad commoda vitæ, copias, opes, facultates*—declares that strength is to be preferred to agility, good health to pleasure, and wealth to great bodily power. But a sound condition of mind and body is more desirable than riches; glory and honor, also, are better than riches. These and similar counsels imply that advantages succeed each other in progressive importance and somewhat in the following order: first, the mere pleasures and comforts of life; secondly, property and other external resources; thirdly, corporeal soundness and capability; fourthly, knowledge and mental development; fifthly, social gifts and practical ability; and sixthly, moral and spiritual excellence. This last is the highest good, the most precious and the most permanent of treasures. How the pursuit of specific advantages is to be regulated in order to the attainment of the best results should be a leading inquiry in practical ethics.

9. The most difficult portion of casuistry concerns the conflict of the right with the right, and it is of such importance that it merits a discussion by itself. We shall speak of it, and of the rules of judgment pertaining to it, in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XXXI.

RULES OF CASUISTRY.

1. When one rule of duty is opposed to another, our first inquiry should be concerning the value of each rule. One or other of the two may be without moral validity. Christ and the Scribes. The "code of honor."—2. When one incontestable rule conflicts with another a reference to absolute good must determine which rule should prevail. Various specific canons of judgment are merely applications of this principle. David and the shewbread. Cicero quoted.—3. Sometimes the manifest demand of some weighty and imperative interest shows a change in the requirements of absolute good, and that an ordinary law must be superseded for the time.—4. This is especially the case when the law, if observed, will not produce its usual results but great absolute—and therefore wrongful—harm.—5. Or when the rule claiming dominance will secure vastly greater good—in the absolute point of view—than the other. Grotius and Prof. Pollock quoted.—6. Hence private rights may be displaced by public necessities. The Supreme Court of Tennessee quoted. Eminent domain.—7. Hence defensive or punitive justice may supersede moral goodness or regulative righteousness, that is, may suspend the operation of these modes of duty. Foster quoted.—8. Again, when the chief use of one rule is to advance the end of a more fundamental rule, it may be supplanted by a better mode of attaining that end. Cicero, Our Saviour, St. Paul, and Pres. Porter, quoted. Dr. Van Dyke's Fourth Wise Man.—9. Finally, variation from a rule is justifiable when the end of the rule, without reference to any other rule, can be accomplished as well through some new and better method. Porter quoted.—10. While canons of judgment are helpful, every case must be studied on its own merits and with a single mind to **know** and to do the right.

1. BEFORE deciding between two incompatible modes of conduct both claiming to be laws of duty we must first consider whether both are strictly laws of duty. As, when right and expediency appear to contend we must find that the one alternative is right and the other merely expedient before we can say that the latter should yield to the former, so when two modes of conduct both claiming to be right and obligatory are mutually opposed, we should ascertain whether both really are requirements of duty before we undertake to determine

between them. If investigation should show that one of them was not a matter of duty at all we would have no question to settle as between obligatory laws. When the Pharisees and Scribes said to the Saviour, "Why walk not thy disciples according to the tradition of the elders?" they supposed they were pointing out a breach of principle. But our Lord replied, "Well hath Esaias prophesied of you hypocrites, as it is written: This people honoureth me with their lips but their heart is far from me. . . . Full well ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition. For Moses said, Honor thy father and thy mother, and whoso curseth father or mother, let him die the death. But ye say, If a man shall say to his father or his mother, It is Corban, by whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me, he shall be free. And ye suffer him no more to do aught for his father or his mother—making the word of God of none effect through your tradition which ye have delivered." (MARK VII., 11.) A Rabbinical doctrine, under color of respect for God, encouraged men to dedicate property to religious uses which was needed for the care of aged dependent parents. In the judgment of Christ, and in that of right reason, this never was a requirement of duty. It was a despicable selfish device of sanctimonious hypocrites. It was an arrangement which no honest mind could accept as moral. In like manner, none of the requirements of priest-craft, superstition and heathenism, have more than the semblance of obligation. This is true also of various perverted conceptions of duty, including that "code of honor" which authorizes, in reparation for insults, real or fancied, an attempt to murder, none the less criminal because it may be accompanied with some peril to oneself. In such cases conscience is not called upon to decide between conflicting duties, but simply to abandon the wrong for the right.

2. A wholly different question arises when one incontestable rule of obligation conflicts with another; as, for example, when David fleeing from King Saul "entered into the house of God and did eat the shewbread, which was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them that were with him, but only for the priests." Thus David, in order to save his life and that of others, violated what he acknowledged to be a solemn ordinance of God. Finding two obligatory rules mutually opposed, he obeyed one rather than the other. In such a conflict of laws there is no real conflict of duty, but only the

subordination of one duty to another more imperative. The authority of the inferior obligation is not destroyed, but becomes latent in the presence of the superior obligation. As the commands of the supreme civil or military ruler supersede those of any subordinate officer when the directions of the two are incompatible, while the authority of the inferior officer still exists for its proper purpose, so a more essential requirement of duty may displace one less essential. And thus all parts of the moral law are congruous and co-operative with one another, because each aims to accomplish its own share in the realization of absolute good, and is limited in its operation by that aim. Every rule of duty is fitted, under given circumstances—that is, under the circumstances ordinarily met with—to protect and promote a specific form of good. But when, in a special case, the prescribed mode of action would not, from the absolute point of view, promote good but result in evil, it ceases, for the time being, to be right and obligatory and is superseded by the conduct which the case calls for. Hence, too, an ambiguity arises; for the mode of conduct ordinarily obligatory may be spoken of as right when, for the occasion, it has ceased to be right. Nor, indeed, can it be denied this name until the reasons for the exception have become perfectly clear.

Other things being equal, a law of duty is to be honored in proportion to the excellence and importance of the interest which it serves. It might therefore be supposed that duties could be arranged in a scale of rank, a hierarchy of laws, according to which, in every case, a superior duty would take precedence of an inferior. This, however, is not possible, because often a lower form of good is imperatively necessary for the ends of duty; in which case the pursuit of it may displace that of a higher mode of good; just as, with David, the supply of extreme bodily wants superseded the observance of a religious law. Though “the life is more than meat and the body than raiment” there are times when food or clothing must be sought in preference to any nobler object. The life of duty may be likened to an army every part of which is so closely connected with headquarters that any subaltern may be authorized through special orders to act independently of any instructions except those of the commander-in-chief. Therefore questions between contending duties commonly call for inquiries respecting the good and the evil of the case from the absolute point of view.

This agrees with the teaching of Cicero concerning cases in which a regular requirement of duty should be superseded. He says that we must fall back in such cases on two fundamental rules, first to injure no one, and, secondly, to serve the common good.—*Referri decet ad ea quæ posui fundamenta justitiæ, ut ne cui noceatur; deinde, ut communi utilitati serviatur.* (DE OFF., lib. I, cap. 10.) This cannot mean that no private harm is ever to be inflicted; duty sometimes necessitates the sacrifice of private interests; but only that private welfare is to be consulted so far as the necessities of the case will allow. Nor can it mean that the general welfare should be sought inconsiderately, but that it should be promoted in such a fashion as will result in the greatest good and the least evil of which the case admits. In short the words of Cicero unconsciously point to absolute good as the generic law of morality and the ultimate test of duty.

3. Subordinately to this principle reason uses some applications of it as specific rules of judgment. Let us attempt to formulate some of these.

In the first place, it is evident that *no exception to any law of righteousness can be justified except for weighty and imperative considerations.* When we remember that every moral law naturally conserves or promotes some fundamental interest, we see that the setting of it aside, even for a time, is permissible only when the action prescribed would produce evil instead of good or when some great sacrifice, as of freedom, property, health or life, is indispensable to prevent overwhelming evil or to accomplish abounding good. No law of righteousness should be broken except for what may be called compulsory moral reasons. Besides, the disregard of some rule of right, even when little or no benefit directly attaches to the observance of the rule, is not at all to be allowed. Much inconvenience and suffering should be endured simply to maintain the habit of obeying the laws of duty. This habit confers disciplined strength upon character, and is an invaluable aid to human weakness.

4. In the next place—supposing that proper regard for the law is cherished; and stating more positively what we have already said—a *rule of right may be neglected when the observance of it seems certain not to produce good but great and wrongful harm.* Were a dagger intrusted to one for safe-keeping, it should not be surrendered to its owner if it were clear that he would immediately endeavor to commit a murder

with it. Herod, the Tetrarch, should have broken the oath and the promise which he made to the daughter of Herodias instead of ordering the execution of John the Baptist. Jephthah should have disregarded his vow when he found that the fulfilment of it would result in a cruel wrong. Cicero goes so far as to say that promises are not binding if the performance of them will be useless to him to whom the promise was made, or even if they will do more harm to the promiser than good to the party to whom the promise was made.—*Nec promissa igitur servanda sunt ea quæ sint iis quibus promiseris inutilia. Nec si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint cui promiseris contra officium est majus anteponi minori.* (DE OFFICIIS, lib. I., cap. 10.). In these statements Cicero scarcely gives sufficient reason for the violation of one's word, though perhaps the example which he uses in illustration of them does. He says that a lawyer might neglect an engagement to appear in court, in case his son were taken dangerously sick and required the presence of the father at home. Certainly paternal duty in a case of life or death would justify the failure to keep a business appointment.

The question suggests itself, Should marriage engagements ever be broken? We think that they may rightly be broken if it become clear that the proposed union would be unhappy and productive of evil results. But such a step should not be taken lightly; and the party breaking the contract should be liable for any injury which the engagement has done the other party, even though neither may be farther injured by the failure of contract.

5. Thirdly, *one rule of right may displace another when vastly greater good*—in the absolute point of view—*will be accomplished by following that rule than by the observance of the other.* Grotius supports this principle when he says that reason forbids the infliction of any hurt on any one unless there be some good to be brought about by it.—*Dictat ratio homini nihil agendum quod noceatur homini alteri, nisi id bonum habeat aliquid propositum.* (DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, lib. 2, cap. 20.) But this precept must be accurately understood and must be used with care, if we would avoid the abandonment of the right for the expedient, which is never allowable. The end to be gained must be more than an ordinary advantage or anything merely desirable. It must present itself as a thing absolutely good—as a right and dutiful end. As compared with the competitive form of good, it

must have that imperative importance which is often styled "necessity." Under all ordinary circumstances human life is to be sacredly protected, yet in war many lives may be sacrificed in the cause of justice or of liberty. In common law, also, we are told that "acts done of necessity to avoid a greater harm are on that account justified, though they would be otherwise unlawful. Pulling down houses to stop a fire and casting goods overboard, or otherwise sacrificing property to save a ship or the lives of those on board, are the regular examples. There are also circumstances in which a man's property or person may have to be dealt with promptly for his own obvious good, but his consent or the consent of any one having lawful authority over him cannot be obtained in time. Here it is evidently justifiable to do what needs to be done. It has never been supposed to be technically a trespass if I throw water on my neighbor's goods to save them from fire, or, seeing his house on fire, enter on his land to help in putting it out." (POLLOCK ON TORTS, Ch. IV., Section II.) In all such cases an obvious imperative duty sets aside that mode of action which is ordinarily obligatory.

6. A fourth precept—a kind of corollary to those already given—is that *private rights may be superseded by public necessities, that is, by great and paramount public benefits*. In cases of this kind the private damage done should be compensated for when possible from the public purse; otherwise the satisfaction of contributing to the general welfare must be one's consolation for loss or annoyance. When the smallpox invaded the city of Knoxville, Tennessee, in the year 1882, the authorities of that place established a hospital in the midst of the fairground; after which for some months, as often as occasion required, infected clothing was burnt at a spot some four hundred yards distant from numerous dwellings which surround the fairground. The fact that this burning gave forth an offensive smoke and smell formed the basis of an indictment upon which the authorities of the city were convicted of having established a nuisance. But the case being appealed, the supreme court of Tennessee set aside the conviction and concluded its decision as follows: "The rule applicable to such a case is that if the act was done by public authority or sanction and in good faith, and was done for the public safety and to prevent the spread of the disease, and such means used as are usually resorted to and approved by medical science in such cases, and was done

with reasonable care and regard for the safety of others, then the parties were justifiable in what they did and the parties inconvenienced could not complain, nor could the state enforce a criminal liability for results of temporary inconvenience or unpleasantness that accrue from the use of such proper and accredited means for the safety of the community." (REPORTED 12 Lee, 146.)

The most common case in which private rights are entrenched upon for public uses is that of "eminent domain." This is the right of the state or government to take the property of a citizen when it may be needed for some important purpose; and it may extend to the total extinguishment of one's title by the sovereign power of the State. Under English law the exercise of this right is followed by the payment of an appropriate compensation. The use for which the property is taken must be public in its nature. The benefit need not be universal, but it must be a contribution in some form to the welfare and progress of the community, or of the district in which the property is situated. For example, private land may be taken for roads, canals, bridges or fortifications, or for the site of public edifices. In some States, also, as in New York, private property may be taken for private uses; for instance, a necessary private road may be opened through a man's farm without his consent. The principle governing such a case is kindred to that of eminent domain. An imperative private need displaces a private right because otherwise the total good possible in the case would fall far short of realization. (See CHASE'S BLACKSTONE, p. 79.)

The exercise of this confiscating power is often allowed by statute to corporate bodies and especially to municipalities. Hence cities lay out streets, squares and parks, and construct fountains, aqueducts, bridges and other improvements, in proper locations. A similar principle places the erection of buildings under municipal regulations, so that a man cannot build as he pleases on his own lot. The control of private property for the benefit of the public was very energetic in Paris during the reign of Napoleon III. Multitudes of houses in narrow streets were torn down in order that the present grand boulevards might be opened and that the gay capital of France might be rendered more attractive and prosperous.

7. A fifth mode in which one rule of right is superseded

by another occurs when *the methods of defensive or punitive justice displace those of moral goodness or of regulative righteousness*. Evil-doers forfeit all consideration inconsistent with the steps necessary for the prevention and punishment of crime. The maintenance of the moral law is not only an absolute duty but is superior to any aim which can come into conflict with it. An extreme illustration may be seen in the death penalty for murder, or when that protection which the law throws around life is forfeited by criminal conduct. Foster in his treatise on Crown Law (section 267) says, "The execution of malefactors under sentence of death for capital crimes hath been considered by former writers a species of homicide founded on necessity. I think it hath with propriety enough been so considered; for the ends of government cannot be answered without it. . . . Where persons having authority to arrest or imprison, using the proper means for that purpose, are resisted in so doing, and the party making resistance is killed in the struggle, this homicide is justifiable. . . . When a felony is committed and the felon fleeth from justice, and a dangerous wound is given, it is the duty of every man to use his best endeavors for preventing an escape; and if, in the pursuit, the party fleeing is killed, where he cannot be otherwise overtaken, this will be deemed justifiable homicide. For the pursuit was not merely warrantable, it is what the law requireth and will punish the willful neglect of." Foster teaches, also, that the law justifies homicide which occurs in the attempt to prevent felony or in the defense of one who is feloniously attacked. He says, "Where a known felony is attempted upon the person, be it to rob or murder, here the party assaulted may repel force by force; and even his servant then attendant on him, or any other person present, may interpose for preventing mischief; and if death ensueth, the party so interposing will be justified. In this case nature and social duty co-operate.—A woman, in defense of her chastity, may lawfully kill a person attempting to commit a rape upon her. The injury intended can never be repaired, and Nature, to render the sex amiable, hath implanted in the female heart a quick sense of honor, the pride of virtue, which kindleth and enflameth at every such instance of brutal lust. Here the law of self-defense plainly coincideth with the dictation of Nature.—An attempt is made to commit arson or burglary on the habitation. The owner or any part of his family, or even a lodger

with him, may lawfully kill the assailants for preventing the mischief intended. Here, likewise, Nature and social duty co-operate." (CROWN LAW, Section 273.) The "Nature" of which Foster speaks is chiefly that practical moral reason which perceives the absolute good, or the right, in every case, and its requirements.

8. A sixth rule of judgment in moral questions is that *when the chief use of one right end is to serve another or others, more fundamental, the pursuit of the former is subordinate to that of the latter; while—as was said at the beginning—all specific right ends are to be sought subordinatedly to absolute good as the ultimate end of duty.* This thought indicates how the operation of most moral laws is subject to limitations. It may be illustrated by the teaching of Cicero respecting the cultivation of wisdom, which, he says, should not be allowed to interfere with the practice of justice. Wisdom was regarded by the ancients as the first of the four leading virtues and as being inherently and necessarily an aim of duty. But the foundation of wisdom is the knowledge of our relations to our fellow-men and the importance of wisdom is that it qualifies us to act aright in these relations. Justice—including not merely justice in the narrow sense, but also beneficence and liberality—is the bond of human society and the virtue which contributes most to the welfare of mankind. Therefore, says Cicero, when the pursuit of wisdom conflicts with the duties of justice, precedence should be given to the latter.—*Ita fit ut vincat cognitionis studium consociatio hominum et communitas.* (DE OFF., lib. I., cap. 43.)

In the Jewish and the Christian systems of morality the observance of the Sabbath is an essential point of duty. We are to rest one day in the week from worldly business and to use that day for religious worship and spiritual improvement; it is to be the Sabbath of the Lord our God. This institution is connected with the highest welfare of mankind, and is to continue as long as reverence and love for God are felt on earth. Yet our Saviour teaches that the law of the Sabbath is to be modified as occasion calls for it by the operation of a more fundamental law. It may even be suspended in favor of the law of humanity. He says, "The Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath." The observance of the holy day is to be subordinate to the necessities of life, and is to be wisely adapted to circumstances so as to secure

from it the best possible results. In like manner the duty of obedience to civil rulers ceases when they have become guilty of insufferable tyranny. For government was made for man and not man for government.

Compliance with any moral precept is no longer obligatory when it would defeat the main objects for which the rule exists. Even the duty of caring for one's life may be properly neglected in the pursuit of very great and noble ends. The Apostle Paul, with martyrdom in his thought, said, "I count not my life dear unto me so that I may finish my course with joy and the ministry which I have received of the Lord Jesus, to testify the gospel of the grace of God." (ACTS XX., 24.)

The ancients so far subordinated life to honorable living that they commended suicide in extreme cases. Cicero applauds Cato for dying when he could not otherwise escape from the power of a hated tyrant.—*Moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit*. But Christian philosophy teaches that a man may accomplish good even in the lowliest condition, and that no loss of worldly prosperity or honor, nor even the prospect of pain and suffering, can justify self-destruction. Possibly, however, death by one's own hand is to be preferred to certain unspeakable tortures and horrors such as savages inflict upon their captives. During the late Chinese insurrection it was reported that the women of the legations at Peking were given pistols so that in case all their defenders were slain they might find in death a refuge from outrage by the Boxers. Some contended that such a course would not be suicide, but a justifiable defense of personal honor by the only means available. We think it would be suicide, but find it difficult to say that suicide would be blameworthy in such a case.

The duty of veracity, also, is limited by the ends which it is designed to serve. One must never bear false witness against his neighbor, and the truth must be told in courts of justice or elsewhere to all who have the right to know the truth. But there is no obligation to impart knowledge by which any one would receive needless injury; on the contrary information should be withheld in such a case. In extreme cases we may even deceive those who are seeking to accomplish evil. Dr. Henry Van Dyke in his story, "The Other Wise Man," tells of an aged Median, a seeker after God, who used falsehood to turn away the soldiers of Herod from

a house containing children who, but for this intervention, would have been slaughtered. The virtuous nature of the man compelled him to violate the rule of veracity, not indeed without compunctions arising from habits of moral judgment, yet in a way that secured for him the favor of Heaven. President Porter, also, mentions with approval the conduct of Orria, a Roman matron, whose husband and two sons were very sick. "One of the sons died just as the father had reached the crisis of his disease. The mother wiped away her tears and approached the sick bed of her husband with a cheerful air. As he inquired after her son, she replied. 'He is better;' and rushed from the room unable to restrain her grief." Dr. Porter asks, "Was such a falsehood criminal?" and replies, "There are few who will say that it was." (ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE, Section 230.)

Dr. Van Dyke, in a preface to a late edition of his story, comments on the falsehood of the wise man as follows: "I have been asked many times why I made the Fourth Wise Man tell a lie, in the cottage at Bethlehem, to save the little child's life. I did not make him tell a lie. What Artaban said to the soldiers he said for himself, because he could not help it.

"Is a lie ever justifiable? Perhaps not. But may it not sometimes seem inevitable? And, if it were a sin, might not a man confess it and be pardoned for it more easily than for the greater sin of spiritual selfishness, or indifference, or the betrayal of innocent blood? That is what I saw Artaban do. That is what I heard him say. All through his life he was trying to do the best he could. It was not perfect. But there are some kinds of failure that are better than success."

These words of Dr. Van Dyke are an elegant expression of Christian sentiment, and a valuable though unassuming contribution to ethical thought. We would add to them only that the word "lie" is a harsh name for the untruth told by Artaban. If there be no lie except when unjustifiable deceit is used, then the untruthful assertion of the wise man was not a lie but a dutiful falsehood.

Some further remarks by Dr. Porter are characteristically judicious. He says: "To all attempts to enforce absolute rules with no real or apparent exceptions, it is enough to reply that, in respect to the rule of veracity as in regard to every other rule of external conduct, *exceptio probat requi-*

lam. The act and spirit of love and uprightness should be supreme and absolute in controlling our communications with our fellow men. . . . The man who is controlled by the law of duty will fail neither in spirit nor in act to speak the truth in his heart and with his words *whenever his words have any importance in respect to that confidence which is a social necessity in the intercourse of man with man.*" It will be seen that the radical end of the law is here set forth as determining the extent of its application, this end itself being subordinate to the supreme law of "love and uprightness."

9. Finally, *variation from a specific moral law seems allowable when it is clear that the object of the law can be accomplished as completely but more beneficently in some new way.* It is our duty to give alms to the needy, but whenever the poor can be encouraged and enabled to provide for themselves, we should go to pains and expense in this mode of doing good rather than in the other. All citizens in proportion to their means are under obligation to share in the expenses of the government. But the laws regulating taxation, especially as regards personal property, have been found very unequal and unjust in their operation. It is estimated that not more than five per cent. of the personalty in the city of New York is assessed, and that even this taxation is very unevenly distributed. A man of moderate means is more likely to be assessed in proportion to the amount of his property than a man of great wealth, while weighty excuses are offered for falsehood and perjury. Either our laws should be reformed or some other means than taxation should be employed, in whole or in part, for the raising of public revenue. It is said that the city of Glasgow defrays all its municipal expenses from the income of the franchises and public works belonging to the city. The time may come when the management—or the control—of public utilities by the State will yield sufficient public revenue without resort to a demoralizing system of taxation.

Again, the ends of punitive justice seem sometimes obtainable without exacting the penalty—or at least the full penalty—from the transgressor. It may be questioned whether the payment of a fine by a friend while the evil-doer himself remains impenitent and defiant, would be any satisfaction to justice, even though a civil tribunal might accept it as such. But were the payment of the penalty accompanied by the sincere contrition of the offender and by a

well-grounded assurance that there would be no repetition of the offense, and it were felt that the cause of righteousness had been really upheld, penal justice might make no further demands. In his coronation oath the King of England pledges himself "to administer justice with mercy"; which means not simply that he is to exercise both these attributes, but that he is to use mercy instead of justice whenever the ends of government are obtainable in that way. It is especially the duty of rulers to recognize the difference between the inveterate and hardened criminal and that transgressor whose reformation may be reasonably hoped for. Frequently the sentence of the latter may be suspended whilst he is put under probation and encouraged to lead a better life. The treatment to which he is then subjected largely loses its punitive character and becomes reformatory; and, should he respond properly to good influences, the liberties forfeited through wrong-doing may be restored to him. When the laws of the state are thus controlled by benevolence and seek the welfare of even the guilty, they most resemble the government of Heaven. For

Earthly power doth then shew likest God's,
When mercy seasons justice.

MERCHANT OF VENICE, IV., I.

Yet neither in human nor in divine law should justice be displaced by mercy unless at the same time the ends of justice can be realized. If the transgressor himself does not pay the full penalty, the law must in some way be adequately honored and the cause of righteousness maintained. Here, again, let us listen to President Porter. After defining punitive justice as a form of "moral love" which manifests itself in hatred for sin, he continues: "Such moral love, though it be called justice, may also desire to reclaim and recover to that moral health which is shown in repentance as manifested in acts of duty. If now this recovering pity reclaims and pardons at the same time that it leaves unquestioned its just and energetic displeasure towards evil, *it is just to pardon, in the largest sense of justice, as it is to inflict the threatened penalty.* It may be questioned whether this higher ideal of justice can often be safely applied under the limitations of the human State, which must concern itself chiefly with external conduct and can only indirectly and imperfectly

deal with the inner life. But we cannot doubt that it controls that spiritual kingdom in which moral relations are supreme and the hearts of all are judged by the discerning yet pitying eye of the living God." (ELEMENTS MOR. SCI., Section 289.)

10. We have now set forth seven leading thoughts which may serve as rules of moral judgment. They have suggested themselves in connection with the teachings of Cicero (which are those also of the Stoics and Academics) respecting the *honestum* and the *utile*; but they can scarcely be said to be derived from those teachings. The ideas of Cicero have served only as starting points of inquiry. While such rules as those proposed are called for in the science of casuistry, it is to be borne in mind that every case of conscience, like every case in law, must be settled finally on its own merits; and also that, in practice, precepts avail little if one be not governed by the single-minded desire to know and to do the right. Every law of duty aims at absolute good. Those who are set on this supreme end will find assistance in rules, and will apply the rules correctly. But the selfish and unprincipled will be likely to adopt sophistical interpretations of their own.

CHAPTER XXXII.

SOCIAL ETHICS.

1. Essentially duty is neither egoistic nor altruistic but what might be called absolutistic or totalistic.—2. Yet the rules whereby moral principle is applied mostly take an altruistic form. Hence some erroneously make ethics a purely sociological science. Mackenzie quoted.—3. The division of duties into individual and social is not the same as the division of them into egoistic (or egoic) and altruistic (or altruic).—4. One science may have topics in common with another. This is especially the case when two investigations both bear on the conduct of life.—5. Sociology should be founded on fact rather than on conjecture. Prof. Giddings quoted.—6. And should apply ethical methods and principles to practical questions.—7. The word "sociology" sometimes designates a group of sciences including anthropology, archæology, ethnology, economics, jurisprudence, the theory of the State, and others. But it often now denotes the general science of society and of social relations.—8. The family. The true conception of marriage. The law as touching divorce. The mutual obligations of husband and wife, and of kinsfolk. The directions of Moses and of Christ.—9. Friendship as cultivated among the ancients. Its place under Christianity. Cicero and our Saviour, quoted.—10. The obligations of patriotism and humanity. The "moral progress of the world" consists chiefly in the growth of humanity.—11. The error of an extreme socialism. The world needs some new methods, but no methods will avail much unless the spirit of unselfish justice be cultivated.

1. DUTY may be either egoistic or altruistic: that is, it may be directed towards oneself or towards others. The essential principle of duty, however, is neither egoistic nor altruistic but seeks all the good of which the case admits. One's duty to himself cannot be considered as affecting himself only, nor one's duty to others as affecting them only. The distinction which we must recognize between egoistic and altruistic duty belongs to practical rather than to theoretical ethics. It arises from contemplating the different ways in which the general aims of duty are to be realized.

This is evident, because the very same principle may lead to both forms of duty. For example, the law of regard for truth, in dealing with others calls for veracity and forbids deceit; in one's own life it requires the cultivation of wisdom and knowledge and the cherishing of inward simplicity and sincerity. The duty of purity prohibits not only outward breaches of the seventh commandment, but also the degradation of one's own character by obscene thoughts or deeds. So completely are moral actions united in a network of causation that we cannot think of any duty to others which does not involve duty to oneself, nor of any duty to oneself which does not involve duty to others. The commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," which primarily refers to the property of one's neighbor, implies also that one should not waste or misuse his own property; that would be a kind of stealing from oneself; it inculcates also the duty of maintaining for oneself an honest and independent spirit. So the prohibition, "Thou shalt do no murder," relates first to the lives of other men, but also forbids suicide, which is self-murder; and it requires further the suppression of hatred within ourselves; for, as St. John says, "He that hateth his brother is a murderer." In like manner the various elements of religious duty—love for God, obedience to His will, reverence for His name, for His holy day and His ordinances of worship—are obligatory not only because of the Divine claims upon us, but also because the religious life is needful to one's best welfare. With respect to the last commandment of the Decalogue the question may be raised whether the duty which it enjoins is more altruistic or more egoistic. Covetousness is a disposition unfriendly to the prosperity of one's neighbor and the opposite of that readiness to promote the welfare of others which ought always to be cherished. But it is to be condemned no less for its wretched influence upon oneself than because it tends to the robbery and wronging of others.

2. Thus the distinction of rules into egoistic and altruistic pertains to the application of principles rather than to the principles themselves. At the same time it is noticeable that the great majority of moral rules have an altruistic form. This has arisen because men feel more the need of asserting altruistic than of asserting egoistic morality. While both modes of duty need to be inculcated, the duty which a man is to perform towards himself is not so likely

to be neglected as that which he owes to other people. At least the effort to enforce it does not have the same evident usefulness. Hence, though love and care for oneself are a duty, the command is not to love oneself, but to love one's neighbor as oneself—the duty of rational regard for one's own welfare being supposed or understood. This peculiar prominence of altruistic obligation has led some ethical writers to treat of duty as if it pertained to man only as a social being. Such is the mistake of those utilitarians who say that the essential aim of the moral law is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Others, also, who are not utilitarians, fall into error when they say that "Ethics is a part of social philosophy." (MACKENZIE'S MANUAL, Bk. III., Chap. I.) The truth will permit us to say only that the happiness of the greatest number is one great aim of duty, and that many ethical questions are sociological.

In further proof that the moral aim is not exclusively altruistic we may refer to the great divisions of the moral law. In each of these the duty which we owe to others is accompanied with a corresponding duty owing to ourselves. The main precept of moral goodness is the golden rule: Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye also so to them. That is, Do the same good for another that you might reasonably desire for yourself if you were in that other's place. This implies that you yourself have a claim for good not only from others, but from yourself as well. We are not commanded to consider the good of others exclusively. The affectional requirements of altruistic goodness is thus stated: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." So far is this from prohibiting self-love that it presupposes self-love, and requires that one's love for his neighbor should be as sincere and earnest as that for himself. Turning from moral goodness to the rules of regulative righteousness, we find that every specific law of duty has an egoistic as well as an altruistic bearing. Over against every right which belongs to one's neighbor a similar right may be claimed for oneself, and should be insisted upon so far as needful to one's best welfare. The rules, also, of affectional regulative righteousness relate primarily to the proper exercise of one's own natural dispositions, and find their immediate end in the inward excellence and happiness which this produces. Then, moral esteem—that preferential principle according to which the good become the objects of special affection,

while love and favor are withdrawn from the evil-minded—conveys with it the duty of rendering oneself worthy of that favor which falls to the upright and well-disposed. Finally, causative righteousness, the virtue-promoting principle, requires one to take proper measures for his own moral efficiency as well as for that of others. In short, every department of the moral law, in seeking its own form of absolute good, has an egoistic as well as an altruistic development.

3. Another discrimination arising from the consideration of persons as the objects towards whom duties are directed is closely related to the distinction between egoistic and altruistic obligation, but is made from a different point of view. It is that which distinguishes individual from social duty. Every duty either to oneself or to another single person may be called individual, or individualistic, because it is a relation between units of the family of being; while those duties which one owes to a collection or organization of people—to a family, a community, a church, a State, or any other association—or which are due to individuals by reason of their connection with, or position in, an organized body, may be termed social, or socialistic. We may give this designation also to the duties which any society by reason of its functions may owe to other societies, or to individuals. This logical division sets forth the fact that certain duties arise by reason of the union of human beings in different modes of association which would not devolve upon people apart from their social relations, and the object of the distinction is to promote clear thinking in a department of philosophy which may be dealt with either as a specific science or as an investigation common to two sciences—Ethics and Sociology.

4. That the same subject may be considered in two or more systems of thought, need not be wondered at if we contemplate the origin of sciences and the way in which each determines its own sphere of research. When a noticeable number of facts, or phenomena, are seen to have some radical similarity and to be of special interest or importance, they naturally form a subject of inquiry. A rational being desires to understand clearly what their essential nature is, what their differences are, and how they are related to each other and to surrounding phenomena. Thus a science originates. Another science finds a reason for existence in the cognizance of another class of facts and another community of nature. But inasmuch as every science seeks to examine all the phen-

omena properly subject to its investigation, whether they fall within the scope of another science or not, it follows that the territory of one science may overlap that of another, and that there may be a field common to them both. For instance, ontology, which discusses the forms and laws of being, introspective psychology, which considers all the operations of mind, and logic, which is the science of rational conviction, have a part common to them all. One investigation, also, may be a branch or an offshoot of another; as algebra or geometry is of mathematics, and as mineralogy or palæontology is of geology.

Every science, when developed fully and without artificial limitation, extends as far as its own fundamental conception does, and investigates all the modifications of that conception and their relations. In this way it determines its own sphere. Moreover, as the principal characteristic contemplated by one science sometimes unites with and modifies the determinative characteristic of another, it happens that not merely the same objects, but also the same qualities of the same objects may be considered by two sciences. The science of medicine and the science of botany both discuss the distinguishing marks and the curative properties of certain herbs and roots. Medicine may not discuss the natural peculiarities of the plants as fully as botany, and botany may not treat of the healing virtues as fully as medicine, but it would be an unwise restriction to exclude from either science the truth which is more completely stated by the other. In the one case we would not describe the medicines thoroughly; in the other we would fail to explain important qualities of plants. For example, there are two kinds of the sumac shrub, one of which is harmless, and the other of which though beautiful in its berries and its leaves, is extremely poisonous. It should not be touched or handled at all. What botany would be perfect that did not tell of the dangerous qualities of the poison sumac?

Undoubtedly the extent to which one science should consider matters which fall more directly under the cognizance of another science varies greatly. In every case the question of need and of advantage is to be considered. But it seems clear at least that those investigations which bear on practice should make a free use of each other's facts and principles. During the early part of the nineteenth century political economy—economics, as it is now called—was treated

as if the only subject to be considered was the production and distribution of material wealth under the workings of self-interest and the law of supply and demand. In consequence of this, the satisfactory solution of economic problems was found impossible. The leading economists of to-day make constant use of ethical and sociological ideas. They acknowledge the brotherhood of man as a fundamental principle of their science, and seek to determine in what ways the greatest welfare of all classes of persons in the community may be secured. In like manner, political science discusses not only the origin of the State and the forms and modes in which political power is exercised, but also the ends, and especially the moral ends, of government. The science of law, also, becomes wholly unintelligible, or at least wholly unsatisfactory, if it be not to some extent placed on a moral basis. It must, and it does, constantly appeal to right and equity. It would have little value if it did not aim to promote the administration of justice. Therefore, also, we have to say that Sociology—which some earnest minds are endeavoring to develop—must prove comparatively valueless if it consider only the origin, the necessary conditions and the natural results of human association, neglecting the moral questions which arise in connection with the different forms of social union.

5. No philosophy of society can command respect for its authority or for its importance unless two rules be followed in the construction of it. First, *it must be founded on fact rather than on conjecture or hypothesis*. The laws of man's association and intercourse should be looked for in customs and institutions which now exist in different parts of the world, or which have been known to exist within historic times. The sympathetic fellowship and the gregarious habits of the lower animals may also be profitably studied. These, too, are facts, and they illustrate the rudiments of society. But that must be an imperfect and unsatisfying sociology which finds its most important and controlling thought in the theory that man was developed myriads of years ago from an irrational creature—that the primitive man was simply "a good gorilla," happily differentiated from his fellows—and that all animals, including man, have become what they are through a long process of "natural selection"—that is, a process in which, without any direction of design, the law of "the survival of the fittest"

explains the evolution even of moral beings from proto-plastic ascidians. To us this theory is an unproved and improbable hypothesis—an hypothesis, also, very remotely related to the problems of society. Therefore, while the doctrine of theistic evolution, as it may be called, seems reasonable; while we may believe that the world and its contents are the outcome of a development conducted throughout measureless ages; we cannot place much value on such statements as the following by an able professor. Professor Giddings, of Columbia University, says, "The earliest men left no archæological remains; they had not yet advanced beyond the use of sticks and unchipped stones—a fact to be remembered in all discussions of the antiquity of man. If no paleolithic remains earlier than the late quaternary period are found, it does not follow that man did not exist until the late quaternary. On the contrary, it is certain that if flints were then chipped by men, earlier men had lived who had not thought of chipping flints. Therefore the association of the earliest men, like that of many savage hordes to-day, must have been conditioned by the abundance and accessibility of the kinds of food that could be obtained by the hands, aided only by stick or stone. The forest hordes of Brazil subsist on roots, bulbs and nuts, calabashes and beans, wild honey, bird's eggs, grubs from rotten wood and insects. The earliest men must have lived in much the same way, but perhaps more bountifully, probably adding to their resources shell-fish and easily captured animals." (PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY, p. 211.) While reading this passage one naturally asks, Is it really so "certain" that primitive men had not sufficient intelligence to make use of tools? Is it not strange that the Brazilian savage, after countless years of evolution, is no more advanced than the supposed pre-historic man? And is it not possible, after all, that the original parents of mankind were rational and moral beings, it may be of simple life, yet superior to the degraded savages of to-day?

Moreover, when one adopts as a fundamental truth that man and mind are the product of physical interactions, he places the science of sociology, and that of human life in general, on a most unsatisfactory basis. It has never been found, and in the nature of things it never can be found, possible to account for spiritual activities without recognizing the radical duality of mind and matter. Professor

Giddings thinks that social phenomena differ from psychical only in being more complex; which may be allowed. But he also seems to think that this is the chief difference between psychical and physical phenomena; which cannot be allowed. He says (p. 417), "While affirming the reality of sociological forces that are distinctly different from merely biological and from merely physical forces, the sociologist is careful to add that they are different only as products are different from factors; only as protoplasm is different from certain quantities of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen and carbon; only as an organism and its co-ordinate activities are different from a group of nucleated cells having activities that are unrelated. . . . He finds nowhere a social force that has not been evolved in physical organic process, or one that is not at every moment conditioned by physical facts." Spencerian associationalism is in great vogue at the present time; but it is too superficial a doctrine to be permanently popular among educated men. We have discussed it elsewhere. See Chapters VI., VII., XXXV. and XXXVI. of the PERCEPTIONALIST.

6. The second rule to be followed in sociological inquiry is *to devote special attention to practical and moral questions*. This thought is recognized by Professor Giddings, though in an imperfect way. He says (p. 403), "The science of ethics examines critically the elements that enter into the conception of goodness and the criteria that are applied to experiences, objects, actions, and relations, in order that it may arrive at a true notion of the ideal good. Sociology must examine them" (that is, those elements and criteria) "historically and inductively—in their evolutionary aspect—as a part of its study of the process of social choice." Thus the direct examination of moral facts is referred to ethics, while sociology is regarded as an evolutionistic science concerned only about the process whereby ethical life may have been developed, and considering morality only so far as it may be related to this development. We are convinced that clear views on the moral functions of man as a social being are to be obtained through the direct examination of living facts rather than through speculations about the development of hypothetical races which, if they existed at all, were half men and half monkeys. One might almost as well discuss the morality of the inhabitants of the moon as that of such questionable people. Whatever value may at-

tach to these captivating speculations respecting the evolution of society, the fundamental moral ideas of sociology should be obtained from ethics, or from ethical sources, and should then be applied by the sociologist to his own problems with the knowledge and intelligence acquired through his investigation of social facts. Social ethics is a subject common to ethics and sociology. But ethics naturally will discuss more the nature and ground of the principles involved, and sociology more the application of the principles.

7. The word "sociology" was invented by Comte to designate the whole philosophy of man as a social being. According to this wide sense sociology included not merely that general science of society to which the name sociology may be specially limited, but also several sciences which deal with specific phases of associated life, and which, logically speaking, are offshoots of the general science. Social psychology—the psychology of social activity—is perhaps inseparable from general sociology. But anthropology, archæology, ethnology and the comparative philosophy of religions are gradually substantiating their claims to a place among the sciences; economics, jurisprudence and political science, or the theory of the State, have already done so. Many ethical questions arise and may be thoroughly treated in connection with these specific investigations; and, when any question is thus thoroughly dealt with, there is less need that it should be discussed under the generic inquiry. Thus different sciences may limit and modify one another. For example, while a treatise on practical ethics should define the duties of men in economic and in political relations, the detailed consideration of these duties may be wisely left to works on economics and on politics: and, in like fashion, a treatise like the present, which aims at a general theory of morals, can do little more for social ethics than to indicate the leading topics of this department of investigation.

8. Foremost among these are the duties connected with domestic relationship. Whatever else may be in doubt respecting the past of the human race, we may assume that there have been fathers and mothers and children, brothers and sisters and other kinsfolk, from the earliest times. Moreover there seems always to have been a strong disposition for one man and one woman to unite permanently in fellowship and sympathy with each other, and in affectionate care for their children. Our Saviour not only taught the doctrine

of monogamy, but also held that the pristine mode of marriage was the union of a man and a woman for life. When the Pharisees asked Him, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" he answered, "Have ye not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female?" (or, as the words might mean, and as the argument suggests, "a male and a female"). "And he said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh.

. . . What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." Of course our Lord had not the advantage of modern scientific instruction; and may have been mistaken. But evidently (if Matthew and Mark tell the truth) He believed that marriage was originally and normally the union of one man and one woman for life. He taught that any dissolution of that union, except for the extreme violation of its vows, was not to be permitted. "He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives, but from the beginning (*ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, originally) it was not so." (MATT. XIX., 5-8; MARK, x., 2-12.)

Without discussing whether Christ was mistaken or not, and whether polygamy and other marital arrangements may not be degenerate deviations from the primitive institution, it is plain that nature and reason offer strong considerations in favor of the monogamic family, and that, in this sense at least, a divine origin may be claimed for this institution. Clearly that personal affection and esteem which should exist between husband and wife, and which are the basis of honorable marriage, are stifled by the air of a polygamous household; nor do such sentiments flourish when marriage vows are lightly esteemed or are made only to be broken. Without the protection of marriage woman becomes a degraded slave. The foolish doctrine, advocated by some, of a union to last during the pleasure of the parties and to terminate when either is tired of it, falsely promises equality and freedom. It really gives to the unprincipled an advantage over the defenseless, and opens the door to injustice and wrong. Woman finds her true sphere when she is permanently installed as the bosom friend of a good man and the mother of the children who may be given them. In that position she enjoys both equality and freedom. Marriage is also the best provision for the husband and father. Then

how imperatively the welfare of the little ones, and their preparation for the responsibilities of life, demand the permanency of domestic relations! Without parental care the majority of children would not survive their infancy, and those that did would be wretched objects of charity. But the offspring of virtuous wedlock not only have their physical wants lovingly supplied, but are also advantageously situated for mental and moral development. No other institution could take the place of the well-ordered family towards making the inhabitants of the world worthy men and women. Even the poorly conducted home, which may perhaps fall below the average, is more conducive to this end than any agency would be that could be substituted for it.

Nor does parental affection cease when there may be no further necessity for parental care. It follows sons and daughters after they have reached manhood and womanhood, and after they have found homes and begotten children of their own. It gives birth to friendships which continue throughout life, which powerfully counteract the natural selfishness of the heart, and which prepare men to recognize the brotherhood of humanity.

So great is the importance of thoughtfulness before entering upon marriage, and so great the necessity that the union once formed should be perpetual, that divorce should not be granted except for the most imperative reasons. Our Saviour names adultery as the only sufficient justification for the putting away of one's wife. Elsewhere (1 COR. VII., 15) continued and wilful desertion seems mentioned as a sufficient ground for the annulment of the marriage bond, this being, like adultery, a gross violation of one's vows. No other causes than these seem sufficient. Yet our Lord intimates that there may be cases in which the most perfect rule of conduct cannot be wisely insisted upon. When his disciples said, "If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry," he replied, "All men cannot receive this saying except they to whom it is given." Possibly legislatures and courts of law, dealing with all kinds of persons, may find it necessary to follow a less absolute rule than that which commends itself to the enlightened Christian. In so doing, they might plead Mosaic precedent. In all cases, however, the State and its officers should adopt every practicable measure to promote the sanctity of the marriage rela-

tion. If the strictest rule is not to be enforced by courts of law, it is because the effort to enforce it would produce more evil than good.

The central duties connected with the family are those of the husband and the wife. The one is the natural head and public representative of the family; the other is to be the helpmeet and companion of her husband. Each is to respect and love the other; but the duty of love belongs more to the husband and that of respect to the wife. She is to "obey" her husband, not in any slavish fashion, but rather in rendering him aid in his plans and efforts for the welfare of the family and the accomplishment of his work in life. He, on the other hand, is to give all consideration to her judgment and her wishes, and to cherish her as the dearer part of himself. In exceptional cases the husband may not be fit to be the head of the family, or may forfeit his right to that position, or he may use his authority to require wrongdoing. Under such circumstances the wife may assert an independence which she should not ordinarily claim.

The duty of children to their parents is obvious. In their early years they should implicitly obey, and, throughout life, they should love and honor father and mother. Also, if there be need, the comfortable support of parents should be provided for.

That brothers and sisters should live in love and harmony, and that affectionate kindness should prevail among those related by blood or affinity, is a teaching both of nature and of morality. The rule which requires one to do that duty first which lies nearest to him and to care first for those who are immediately known to him, is applicable here. This rule, familiarly expressed in the maxim that "charity"—that is, beneficence—"begins at home," assigns a particular sphere of usefulness to every one and makes him specially responsible for the good that can be accomplished within that sphere. A carrying out of this principle should not—indeed does not—lessen one's general good will towards others. On the contrary, the genuine practice of its requirements enlarges one's capacity for goodness. The aim of Nature is to unite all men in sympathy and fellowship.

9. Therefore, also, the duties of friendship should be recognized. Persons whose tastes are similar, whose dispositions are congenial, and who have an admiration for each other's conduct and mode of life, naturally become friends. They

are then bound together by mutual trust and affection, and find that they can do more for each other's welfare and happiness than if they were strangers to one another, or even if, with a thorough knowledge of each other, they had not been united in confidence and love. A principal advantage of kinship is that it suggests and facilitates the formation of friendships. Without friendship kinship loses half its value. And a noble friendship cannot be founded on kinship alone, nor on any other external basis, but is always conditioned on sympathy, respect and confidence.

The ancients dwelt more on the obligation to cultivate friendship than the moderns do. The social condition even of the civilized part of the ancient world was not favorable to the development either of general benevolence or of the best form of domestic affection. It was inferior in this respect to the state of things in the Christian society of the present day. But among the cultivated Greeks and Romans, especially among those of them who were given to philosophical pursuits, the virtue of friendship found much encouragement. The excellencies of this virtue are fully set forth in ancient books, as, for example, in the treatise of Cicero, "*De Amicitia*." In Christian writings the duty of general benevolence is more prominent than that of friendship; for which reason some have contended that the religion of Christ is opposed to private attachments. It is even alleged that our Saviour requires his followers to suppress affection for father and mother, for wife and children, and for friends. This interpretation of our Lord's language is entirely untenable. He means only to assert that his own claims to our love and service are supreme, and that we should be no more influenced by our dearest friends in opposition to him than if they were our bitterest enemies. (LUKE XIV., 26.) Christ himself in his own conduct illustrates friendship; for he "loved Mary and her sister and Lazarus"; and John was "the disciple whom Jesus loved." Christianity purifies friendship from the narrowness and selfishness with which it is sometimes mingled; and it discourages any intimacy which would obstruct the discharge of duty. But it encourages in every way the devoted mutual love of worthy souls. If this religion ever appears to neglect friendship, it is only because the clear shining of the sun swallows up the light of lesser luminaries.

10. Christianity brings the duties of benevolence and be-

nescience into a wonderful prominence. Among the ancients patriotism was a living virtue, but humanity—the love of mankind at large—was not much more than a high-sounding name. What is known as the moral progress of the world has consisted chiefly in a growing recognition of human brotherhood, resulting partly from the influence of advancing civilization, but chiefly from the teachings of the cross. The moral inferiority of the best men and women among the Greeks and Romans to the best men and women of modern times cannot be ascribed to any want of culture among the ancients, but only to the fact that the uplifting power of the Christian faith had not yet begun its work among mankind. The ideals of Christianity have not yet found adequate realization anywhere. The ordinary morality, even of the most enlightened modern nations, falls far short of that heavenly goodness which the gospel inculcates. But there is cause for congratulation that higher and better rules of conduct are daily commending themselves to men, and are being more and more acted upon both by individuals and by communities. The duties of caring for the sick; of instructing the ignorant; of assisting the needy; of providing for the aged and the infirm; of defending the rights of the weak; of giving to honest industry its share, not only in the comforts, but also in the enjoyments of life; of contributing, according to one's ability and one's resources, to the general and public good; are steadily gaining a stronger hold upon the hearts and lives of men.

11. Some who are devoted to humanitarian aims think that these would be more fully realized than they now are if private property were abolished, or if, at least, the management of every kind of business and the distribution of the means of living were transferred from private companies and individuals to officials appointed by the State. This is proposed by many who call themselves Socialists. Doubtless no one has the expectation that human selfishness would immediately disappear if this plan were adopted. The hope, rather, is that the workings of selfishness would be greatly counteracted and defeated, that the reasons for an exclusive individualism would be largely removed, and that men under the potent influence of the new system would gradually come to live every one for all and all for every one. That is a consummation to be desired. But the realization of it through the abolition of separate property, or through the

denial of freedom in the use of honestly acquired means, is visionary and impracticable.

The right of private property exists, not simply for his sake who may own the property, but chiefly because the recognition of this right is necessary for the welfare of all. It arises out of that subserviency to absolute good in which every right is rooted. Such being the case, it is not so absolute as to be free from all limitations. On the contrary, it is subject to such qualifications as the absolute interest of all may require, and therefore also to the regulation and control of proper authority. But the idea of the total abolition of private property is absurd. The state may enjoin its citizens to contribute to public purposes according to some equitable rule—it may keep, or bring under its own control, every business which involves the use of a public franchise or which is dependent for peculiar privileges on legislative favor—it may curb those who would use exclusive rights for the upbuilding of grasping monopolies—it may set bounds to the acquisition of wealth, or, at least, to the transmission of colossal fortunes, undivided and undiminished, to those who have not earned them. But at the same time public authority should protect the acquisitions of industry and enterprise, in order that energetic self-reliant character may be developed, and so that every man may be able both to provide for his own and to give to him that needeth.

What the world needs is not so much a change in those rules of duty which are generally acknowledged in Christian nations as a more thorough application of them both by communities and by individuals. Society should be more thoroughly governed by the spirit of justice and benevolence—by that unselfish spirit which seeks absolute good in every case, the completest good of which the case admits.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

ECONOMIC ETHICS.

1. The true definition of economics. Prof. R. T. Ely quoted. The great problem is, How may human welfare be best promoted by the management of material resources? Hence every economic question has an ethical side.—2. Ethically private property is a trust to be administered for human welfare. Dr. Parkhurst quoted. Proprietary and contractual rights are determined by law and may be modified or superseded by more fundamental rights.—3. In economic ethics the prominent questions are (1) altruistic and (2) governmental.—4. Government regulates economic activity so as to restrain selfishness and greed; and also conducts some forms of business successfully. The Post-office.—5. Other enterprises managed by States and municipalities. The public-school system, etc.—6. In addition to maintaining justice and order the State has positive economic functions. The prevention of pauperism. Free instruction in useful trades.—7. "Honest money." Free coinage. Superintendence of financial institutions. Savings banks. Land laws. Laws regulating inheritance.—8. State control of industry. The socialistic proposal is impracticable; but some degree of government ownership may be desirable. Patent rights. Copyrights. Public franchises.—9. The public ownership of great monopolies. Has society a right to "the economic surplus"? Holmes quoted. Experiments should be made with a view to safe progress.

1. PROFESSOR RICHARD T. ELY, of the University of Wisconsin, after speaking of sociology as "a comprehensive science, or rather a group of sciences," and of economics as "a branch of sociology," defines the latter science as follows: "Economics is the science (1) which treats of those social phenomena due to the wealth-getting and wealth-using activity of man, and (2) which deals with all other branches of his life in so far as they affect his social activity in this respect." In these words this eminent teacher asserts the right to employ ethical thought in his science, inasmuch as the moral part of man's life is interwoven with man's wealth-getting and wealth-using activity. This claim is made more specifically when Professor Ely asserts that the subject of

economic study is not merely material wealth and its production and distribution, but *man in his relation to wealth*. He says: "Among the most serious of mistakes is to consider man simply as a producer of goods—one 'by whom' are all things of interest to our science—while the infinitely greater truth is that man is the one 'for whom' they are produced. Of course no one denies this truth; but men might almost as well deny it as to leave it out of account. The result of such neglect is that men devise with great skill rules by which man may be made the best possible manufacturing machine. It sometimes quite escapes the notice of these wise men that in making of man the best possible manufacturing machine, they may make him a very poor sort of a man; that in teaching him to supply his wants very bountifully they may prevent him from developing and correcting these same wants. They forget that there are two kinds of poverty, one a lack of goods for the higher wants, the other a lack of wants for the higher goods. To become rich in goods while losing at the same time the power to profit by them is unfortunately one of the commonest retrogressions in human experience. We do not mean that the whole problem of human development is the subject of economics, but simply that manhood—rounded human development—is the goal of all social sciences. None must consider their subject so narrowly as to exclude that object." (OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS, Bk. I., Ch. X.)

It is not within the plan of the present writing to advocate any specific doctrines or any particular system of political economy. That would be beyond the scope of ethical instruction. But we congratulate ourselves on the fact that the application of moral principles is recognized by able men as a part of sociological inquiry. Whatever may be thought of the conclusions of Professor Ely, his writings have the two important qualifications without which no great progress can be hoped for in any science concerned with human conduct. First, his discussions appeal for a justification of their suggestions to actual history and experience rather than to imaginary fact; and, in the second place, they are pervaded throughout with the ethical spirit. Professor Ely's motto, "THE MANY, NOT THE FEW," which appears on the title-page of his book, bears witness to this last characteristic; as do also many pregnant sentences with which his chapters are enriched. Asserting that "the most important economic

function of the State" is the maintenance of the right of private property, he nevertheless teaches that this right, as well as every other, exists only as an instrument of human welfare, and should be upheld only so far and so long as it subserves that end. He says (p. 257): "All true rights are rational rights, rights which can show good reason for their claims and can justify their existence on the ground that they promote human welfare. There is *no possible basis of human right except human welfare.*" Speaking of expenditures for the comfortable support of working men and their families, he says (p. 104): "It is a great mistake to think of man only as a producing machine and of the things which he consumes as *capital spent for the sake of production*. . . . When goods are used to satisfy human wants directly they are rendering the ultimate service which goods can render; to speak of them in such cases as employed in production is to forget the most important of all truths—that *they are employed for the satisfaction of man.*"

Elsewhere (p. 311) commenting on the duty of those possessing wealth to use it in the service of mankind and to be themselves laborers for the world's good, he says, "Legally the wealth is mine, but morally it is simply a new opportunity for me to help in the progress of humanity; for, ethically, I myself am not my own. . . . The idle man is morally a thief. He receives but gives nothing in return. Any man who by past services of his own has not earned the right of repose, is a shameless cumberer of the earth; unless, indeed, he is physically or mentally incapacitated for useful employment. Would the world suffer if you should die? That is the test. If you merely clip coupons then no one would miss you. Others would willingly relieve you.—But your service need not be manual toil." In another passage, referring to the marvelous industrial development of the United States, he says (p. 103): "A force mighty, and it almost seems irresistible, is at work day and night, day and night, never ceasing, thrusting upon us more and more serious social problems. These problems can never be solved by the policeman's club or the soldier's bullet; for this quiet onmoving force laughs such repression to scorn. Only righteousness can solve them; for only in righteousness is there power to enable us to adjust ourselves to our new environment." Again, defining the end to be aimed at in the determination of salaries and wages, the professor says (p. 206):

"Men should receive according to their wholesome wants, not according to their strength. The latter is the law among swine. But the most indubitable right we possess is the right to develop our wants; for this is the development of our life. A maximum of wholesome wants, with a distribution in proportion to those wants, is the economic goal of society."

The foregoing quotations, taken from different parts of Professor Ely's book, indicate sufficiently his use of ethical thought, and the fundamental moral principle which he applies to economic problems. The law that human welfare is the end of economic effort is the supreme rule by which all other rules are to be interpreted and controlled. The true end of economic action is not the exclusive good of any individual or of any class. It is the welfare of humanity—of all human beings whom our action can affect, but especially of those who most need our care. Nor are we to seek simply the physical prosperity of men, but also the satisfaction of their higher wants and the normal development of these wants in order that man may attain the capacity for true happiness. All human business should be regulated so as to advance every human being towards the best and noblest life of which he is capable.

2. This law making the welfare of man the supreme aim is important not only because of its direct operation, but yet more because of the light which it throws upon every other law of economic duty. While it does not set aside but establishes the right of private property, it conflicts with a very common selfish construction of that right. It enables us to understand what this right means and what its limits are. Ethically speaking, private property is a trust to be administered for our own good and that of others. That it is not an absolute and irrevocable right is forcibly stated by the Rev. Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst in a sermon on the text, "Ye are not your own." "Perhaps," he says, "in the longer or shorter time that Adam and Eve occupied Paradise, they congratulated themselves by calling it *their* garden. God never gave it to them any more than he made over to you the plot of ground that you call *your* garden. The phrase by which the case is stated in the second chapter of Genesis is worth attending to. "The Lord God took the man and put him into the Garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it." There is nothing there about God's deeding the Garden to him, or

even giving it to him. He never gives anything to anybody; for that would be to surrender his own title—to abandon his own ownership; which he never does." To this we may add that God himself claims no selfish ownership of the Universe, but is the manager of it for the welfare of all. His law and the law of morality have instituted the right of property for the best interests of all concerned; and this right may be limited or set aside whenever the maintenance of it is inconsistent with those interests.

The infraction of property rights by private persons is justifiable only in extreme and exceptional cases, but nothing is more common than the supersession of them by public authority. The exercise of "eminent domain," the condemnation of "rights of way," the exaction of requisitions for necessary uses, the enforcement of building regulations, the destruction of infected animals and of noxious goods, and, above all, the imposition of taxes and of duties, often amounting to more than half the value of the articles assessed and sometimes to their entire confiscation, show how completely private property is subject to governmental authority. It is true that this power is sometimes used unjustly and tyrannically; but its action always receives approbation when it is necessary for the prevention of great evil or the accomplishment of great good. With the welfare of man in view, the law not only lays heavy burdens on property but recognizes new rights of possession and abolishes old rights, as the interests of society may demand.

The right of contract, and that of the free employment of one's means, and every other economic privilege, are defined and limited by their relations to human welfare. The courts will not enforce agreements which would perpetuate the slavery of the sweat-shop or which would exact exorbitant interest from the poor. The laws prescribe penalties for those who would enrich themselves by extortion or oppression. They suppress any business which proves a nuisance to a neighborhood or to the community, or, if this be found impracticable, they seek to reduce every injurious business to the smallest possible dimensions.

3. While human welfare is the law of economic morality, the practical application of this law brings two thoughts into prominence. First, the duties which chiefly demand our attention are altruistic, and relate largely to the assistance of the weak and needy. Every one is bound under ordinary

circumstances to seek his own comfortable well-being, but the man of average intelligence does not need to be told to take good care of himself, but rather to be reminded at times that this is not the only rule of duty. Moreover, while we are bound not to injure the well-to-do, but to contribute to their prosperity, there is less need of our caring for them than of our caring for others. Commonly interference in their affairs, even though well meant, would do more harm than good. If the wealthy and independent ask aid in some worthy enterprise, it should be granted. But plainly, in such a case, we should be chiefly influenced by a respect for the general good, because it is by no means certain that an increase of wealth will prove a blessing to those who have already a competence. Riches, when acquired too easily or in an unfair way, or when devoted to selfish indulgence, are often a curse to the persons and families who possess them. But the claims of the poor and needy cannot be questioned. We are especially bound to aid those who are struggling for an honest livelihood, or who are striving to earn for themselves and for others the means of comfort, independence and respectability. Economists tell us of a certain "standard of life," or style of living, which ought, if possible, to be placed within the reach of every human being. The aim of true economic wisdom is not "to make money," but to supply all the legitimate wants of man—not merely his physical needs, important as these are, but also his social, mental and moral wants; for lasting happiness is impossible for any rational being if his higher nature be neglected or suppressed.

In the second place, it is noticeable that *the principal questions now calling for discussion in economics, relate to the political or governmental care of man's material interests.* Duties arising from the private relations of business and industry are not difficult to understand. They are those of justice, good will and mutual helpfulness. In the exchange of commodities there should be honesty and veracity. While a fair price should be asked and paid, the seller should candidly state the character and quality of his goods, and the buyer should incur no obligations which he is not sure of being able to discharge. In the employment of labor the master, instead of striving to obtain services for the lowest possible wages, should reward faithful work with such compensation as his business will warrant, and as will

adequately and honorably remunerate the employee. On the other hand the workman should be faithful and willing, not substituting his own will and his own interests for those of his master. And every man, no matter what his position may be, should render such help as he may both to his necessitous neighbor and to any others whom he can aid in their plans of life.

4. These principles are simple, and they have great weight with a large proportion of the inhabitants of every civilized country. The number of well-disposed and well-principled merchants, manufacturers, tradesmen and working-people in the world is much greater than one might at first suppose. Were this economic morality universally diffused, there would be comparatively little need for the governmental control of economic interests. Unfortunately, in almost every sphere of employment, some persons are to be found who are governed by selfishness and greed. These necessitate laws for all. There is also a tendency in great business organizations to forget that humanity which is sensibly felt when the relations of men are near and intimate. Hence wrong and oppression arise; hence, too, it is sometimes difficult if not impossible for good citizens, without governmental furtherance, to conduct business in the most desirable way. The power of selfishness to force its methods of business on competitors must be counteracted by law. Were the adulteration of goods permitted; were there no restriction to the employment of women and children; were business and manufacturing concerns allowed to do business beyond reasonable hours or on days which should be devoted to recreation or moral improvement; in short, were immunity granted to any deceitful, overreaching or injurious method, then those who are desirous of conducting business in an honorable way would find themselves at a disadvantage, and would be almost compelled to fall in with evil courses. Even a small minority, if not restrained by law, may be able to defeat the wishes of a majority. The following letter which appeared to-day in a popular New York journal is illustrative of this point: "Would it be too much," says the writer, addressing the editor, "to ask you to assist in the passing of a bill, which I believe is before the House now, to compel butcher-shops to be closed on Sunday? There are eighteen men at our market, and our boss is ready and willing to close, but we cannot get our opposition to join. We start at 5 o'clock in the morning and work until 7 p. m.,

and on Saturday till 11 p. m. Why should we not be entitled to have all day Sunday? [Signed] Employees of the Market."

Then also certain kinds of business which cannot safely be intrusted to private hands, or which are beyond the scope of private enterprise, are undertaken by the government and carried on so as greatly to promote the general welfare. The most conspicuous example of such a business in our country is the postal service. This carries letters to every part of the United States or Canada at the uniform rate of two cents per ounce and newspapers at the rate of one cent for every four ounces or fraction thereof. It also conveys circulars, books, and other printed matter, and small packages of merchandise, at very low rates. The purpose of the government in this enterprise is to give every citizen of the republic, equally, the means of communicating with every other citizen, irrespective of any thought of distance or expense. Indeed, through treaties and postal unions, provision is made for sending letters to any one in any part of the world. This vast undertaking could not be conducted by any private company without State protection and co-operation, and even then it would not be managed so completely for the general welfare as it is now. The desire for immediate gain, and the necessity for dividends, would cause the neglect of our less populous regions; and the expense of the administration would be greater. Salaries would be paid like those now given by some great corporations whose presidents have a larger annual remuneration than that of the president of the United States. Probably, too, among the expenditures of such a company would be one for maintaining a lobby at Washington in order to secure and perpetuate valuable favors. The object of the post-office department is not to obtain revenue, but to spend public money in a way that confers a great benefit upon all the people. Nevertheless it wisely makes a small charge for its services, and the revenue thus received covers most of the expense of the enterprise.

5. Other industries conducted by the State are the planting and preservation of forests, the construction and stocking of fish hatcheries, the improvement of rivers and harbors, the building and maintenance of light-houses and docks, and the making of roads, bridges, canals and aqueducts. In some parts of our country the formation of dams and conduits and the distribution of water for irrigating uses has been under-

taken by the State. Municipalities, also, exercising political power, not only provide police protection for the people, but also build and own water works, sometimes of a stupendous magnitude, supplying the inhabitants millions of gallons daily; and, along with these, a system of sewerage, for the health and cleanliness of the city. Parks, museums, libraries, poor-houses, dispensaries, hospitals, are also maintained at great expense.

Perhaps the most important enterprise undertaken by public authority and at public cost is that of education. The American people are lavishly liberal in providing free instruction for all the children in the land, so that they may become self-respecting and self-supporting citizens, a blessing to themselves and to their country and their race. The traveler visiting our cities is struck by the imposing and commodious buildings which are erected for the young folks of every neighborhood, while, as he drives through the country, the school-house is found in every district, however scattered and few the inhabitants may be. Not only the children and youth are cared for, but night-schools and lecture-courses are instituted for all who may be desirous of self-improvement. Probably our system of free education is not more generally diffused than similar systems in other countries are, but it seems to be more generally accepted and used by all classes in the community than that of any other country. It augurs well for the future harmony and prosperity of our people that the children of the poor and of the well-to-do sit side by side at the desks and on the benches of our schools. Moreover, in this country more than in any other, the State provides for the higher education of youth. In most of the commonwealths of the American Union not only grammar-schools and high-schools but also colleges and universities are supported from the public treasury. This, too, does not check the private endowment of educational institutions; for there never were greater benefactions of this kind than have appeared during the last twenty-five years.

6. All civilized governments of the present day actively care for economic interests. They do not confine themselves to protecting property, commerce and industry, from the machinations of fraud and the attacks of violence. The theory of some that public authority is merely "the watch dog" to drive off thieves and robbers is not accepted by any political power. Indeed, it never has been fully adopted

anywhere. Not only is the promotion of economic interests necessarily connected with the protection of them, but the progress of civilization renders positive governmental care for the material welfare of men more necessary and more desirable from day to day. The assumption that the functions of political society have any other limitations than those resulting from a respect for the absolute good of all is wholly gratuitous. It may indeed be allowed that the State should not undertake any business which can be safely and wisely left to private agencies, and that due encouragement should be given to individual enterprise. Yet undoubtedly society as politically organized has a proper sphere of economic activity. It may be said that, in addition to the administration of justice, government should exercise four different functions concerning the material interests of men—not, indeed, rashly or needlessly, but as human welfare may require. First, *it should seek to conserve and improve the conditions of prosperity.* Secondly, *it may control and regulate industry of all kinds in the interests of justice and humanity.* Thirdly, *it may assume the management of some forms of business when that seems necessary and desirable.* And fourthly, *it may collect and expend revenues for the promotion of human welfare.*

Under these four heads many topics are included which can be adequately treated only by the political economist. The present chapter merely mentions some questions which have won for themselves more or less consideration. Among measures relating to economic conditions the care of the poor and the prevention of pauperism may be named first. The destitute should be provided for; the aged and infirm, especially, should be kept in decency and comfort. Many helpless people without any fault of their own find themselves in want; but even those who have been guilty of improvidence are not to be neglected. Only we must be careful not to encourage the lazy pauper and the professional beggar. Suitable work should always be required of the able-bodied as a condition of his receiving food and shelter. And one chief aim of charitable effort should be to prevent habitual pauperism; for this is an evil more easily prevented than cured. In times of prosperity free labor-bureaus should assist workmen to obtain remunerative engagements, and, when private employment may be lacking, laborers should be given governmental work at living wages. It is the interest and duty of

society to provide any who are willing to work, but cannot find employment, the opportunity to earn a living. A few years ago, during "hard times," the city of Cincinnati appropriated \$135,000 for the payment of laborers to be selected by the "Associated Charities" of the city. The men were usefully employed on public parks and highways, and it was found necessary to use only \$75,000 of the appropriation.

A far-reaching method of preventing poverty and of advancing the welfare of the people is the technical education of their children. The boy who has gained some knowledge of a trade or business is likely to rise above the ranks of the common laborer, and, even if he does not find opportunity to do so, will be more capable of caring for himself and for others than he would be without such training. And the girl who has learned to be even an efficient cook, seamstress or housemaiden, can obtain good wages in a comfortable home. For the mass of the poorer people in our large cities, and even in the rural districts, mere book-learning should be supplemented by some practical education. Industrial schools, such as the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, are doing much to elevate the colored race; and similar schools are improving the prospects of youth in our northern cities. This sort of education deserves both private and public support.

7. Some important duties devolve on government respecting money as the common measure of values and means of exchange, and as a repository of accumulated resources. Civilized countries have always used silver and gold as money metals, because of their compact intrinsic value, their indestructibility, their convenient divisibility, and the easy identification of the coins made from them. Not only do we appraise all kinds of property in terms of money, but all—or almost all—business agreements and promises take the form of pecuniary obligations. Bank notes and bills of exchange, debts and credits of every kind, the deposits in institutions for savings, bonds issued by the government or by municipalities or corporations, and the policies and annuities of insurance companies, have their value measured entirely by that of the money they promise to pay.

When men form pecuniary agreements which are not to be fulfilled in the immediate future, they do so subject to any fluctuation which may take place in the value (or purchasing power) of money, but it is desirable that neither the creditor

nor the debtor should gain any great advantage in this way. In forming the agreement the value of money is regarded as practically stationary; the expectation is that the creditor shall be paid in money of about the same value as that mentioned in the contract. This expectation ought not to be interfered with by any arbitrary governmental action, as, for example, by diminishing the weight of coin or by making irredeemable paper promises a legal tender. Hence we say that the State should furnish "honest money." At the same time governmental measures to secure a sufficient supply both of metal and of representative money to meet the increasing requirements of business are justifiable. To this consideration our system of national banks owes its origin. Justice demands only that no promissory money be allowed to circulate which is not redeemable in real money, whether it be gold or silver.

Of late years some have advocated the free and unlimited coinage of the precious metals at a value ratio different from that of these metals in the market of the world. This does not seem advisable; but no proper objection could be made to free coinage at the market ratio. There would be some advantage if the standard coins of silver and of gold were of the same weight exactly, say one ounce troy; if then governmental authority should declare the ratio which all such coins should bear to each other so far as the mint issue for a term of years is concerned—say five years. At the end of this time the ratio of the coins to be minted during another term might be determined according to an average of market values. Fractional coins might be issued as they are now. Under such a system unlimited free coinage might be both reasonable and advantageous.

Another function of government connected with money is the supervision of banks, insurance companies and like fiscal institutions. Most states employ expert bank examiners and require public semi-annual or quarterly statements so that all may know the standing of these institutions. Special enactments regulate savings banks and limit the ways in which money intrusted to them may be invested. In most of the countries of Europe the State itself, or the municipality, receives the savings of the people, paying a small interest on the deposits; and postal-savings banks, operated somewhat as our money-order offices now are, have proved extremely popular. There is need for such a system in the United

States, especially in the rural districts and less populous portions of our country. Great damage is inflicted upon any community when the gatherings of its industrious poor are lost through the incompetence or rascality of managers. When the Freedmen's Savings Bank, to which the enfranchised negroes of the South had intrusted millions of dollars, failed, a cruel blow was struck at human progress. Had all the money thus lost been made good to the negroes by the United States, not only these poor people but the country at large would have been the gainer.

We cannot now speak of the subsidies, land-grants, bounties and protective tariffs with which our government supplements the incomes of transportation companies, sugar-producers and manufacturing concerns. While these measures have their uses, they are matters rather of policy than of duty. But commendable care for human welfare is manifested in the land laws of the United States. These are designed to distribute the public domain among actual hard-working settlers to the exclusion of speculators and men of wealth. Great good has been accomplished by these laws. Our country, however, has yet something to learn from France, whose laws respecting the disposition of the property, and especially of the real estate, of deceased persons, have greatly lessened the number of those owning vast fortunes and added to the number of those who enjoy a competence.

8. The control of industrial business belongs to the State in the same way and with the same limitations as the control of human affairs in general. Every business is subject to public regulation just as far as justice and humanity require. Neither employers nor employed should be permitted to disregard the law that the interest of every man connected with a business should be fairly cared for. The violence of striking workmen should be prevented, and the "boycotting" of others who are willing to work is not to be tolerated. On the other hand, employers should not be allowed to exact excessive labor from those in their service or to give an unreasonably low rate of wages. To effect these ends State boards of arbitration have been appointed, and laws have been enacted against the importation of a cheap degraded class of foreign workmen. The subject is one of difficulty, but the authority of the State to regulate the relations between capital and labor cannot be questioned.

Just at present the right of laborers to combine and to

negotiate concerning their claims and grievances through such agents as they may choose is a matter of contention. Some managers of great corporations say that they will treat with their employees directly, but not with representatives whom the employees may appoint unless they be some of the employees themselves. It seems reasonable that workmen who may not have a competent spokesman among them, or who may think it unadvisable to present their own case, should be permitted to use the services of those in whose talents and character they have confidence. Is it going too far to say that employers might properly be required either to negotiate through the agency chosen by the workmen or to accept some form of arbitration? So long as employing companies are small and numerous, their employees can deal with them on comparatively equal terms. But the officers of large corporations are so separated from the body of the workmen, so independent of their inferiors and so influenced by the desire of reporting dividends, that they sometimes fail to appreciate the just claims of employees.

The socialistic remedy for labor troubles is universal government ownership. That seems a chimerical idea and one that promises more evil than good. But there is one kind of business establishments which should be specially subjected to public control and which may sometimes be profitably conducted by the government itself. We refer to those which by reason of the nature of the business, or by legislative favor, or both, are monopolies. Patent rights and the use of public franchises should be limited by consideration for the interests of the public. After the work of authors or inventors or the enterprise of capitalists has been sufficiently rewarded, the people in general should become heirs of the advantages which legislation has rendered possible. No one claims that a patent right or a copyright should last forever; and few will say that great monopolies should not be restrained from excessive and extortionate profits, especially when they owe their opportunities to the favor and protection of the State. No franchise should be granted in perpetuity or without conditions securing the interests of the public. As we write the daily papers report (March 26, 1901) that, "The supreme court of Michigan this evening filed an opinion upholding the ruling of Commissioner Osborn that the earnings of the Wabash Railroad in Michigan exceeded \$3,000 per mile last year, and that the company must reduce its passenger fare

in Michigan to two cents a mile." This decision evidently carries out a provision of a railroad law.

9. Great difficulties attend the control of monopolies by the State; and great evils have arisen in connection with monopolistic enterprises which have sought and obtained subsidies, land-grants, valuable franchises, the pledging of the public credit, and other governmental aids. City councils and State legislatures have been corrupted. Even federal law-makers and officials have been the subject of disgraceful scandals. Immense fortunes have been accumulated by a gigantic swindling of the public. For these reasons—and for others—many advocate the "socialization," as it is called, that is, the government ownership and administration, of monopolies. It is proposed that cities should own not only water works as most cities now do, but also lighting plants and street railways, and that railroad, telegraph and telephone lines should become public property. It is claimed that these measures have been adopted in some countries with great success. It is worth considering whether some experimentation in public ownership and management might not contribute to the general good. It would certainly help us to understand whether anything further might be done in the interest of the public without wrong to existing monopolistic enterprises. It might tend to limit that "watering of stock" of which we hear, whereby companies can go on paying dividends which the public would not justify them in paying upon their actual investment, while they keep down the wages of their workingmen under the pretense of the necessity of paying just interest on capital. It might enable the people to judge whether, after all charges for risk, rent, interest, wages and management, were liberally met, there would remain any "economic surplus" which should fall to the public rather than to private individuals.

Some years ago the United States government deliberated whether to foreclose a mortgage on a transcontinental railway which had been largely built at public expense for private profit. Might it not have been well at that time to try the experiment whether the United States could not successfully manage a railroad? The private ownership of great monopolies has in some respects been of great benefit to this country, but it has also been the chief cause of that unhealthful concentration of wealth which has been proceeding with great rapidity of late years. A high authority, Mr. George K.

Holmes, of the United States Census Office, made the following statement in the *Political Science Quarterly* for December, 1893: "Twenty per cent. of the wealth of the United States is owned by three one-hundredths of one per cent. of the population; seventy-one per cent. is owned by nine per cent. of the families; and twenty-nine per cent. is all that falls to ninety-one per cent. of the population." When we remember that true economic prosperity is a state of affairs in which the good things of life are naturally distributed among the greatest possible number of people, and in which, especially, the industrious citizen may have his full share of comforts and enjoyments, must we not support every private and every public measure which may tend to that consummation?

CHAPTER XXXIV.

MORALITY AND THE STATE.

1. Politics and jurisprudence defined. Sir Henry Maine quoted.—
2. The State defined. Holland and Ihering quoted.—
3. The use of compulsory power is necessary to the existence of political society, but is not the sole function or method of a State. Wolf quoted.—
4. The State exists for moral ends. Grotius and Cicero, Hobbes, the Supreme Court of the United States, and Prof. Bluntschli, quoted.—
5. The State is a moral person only in a limited sense. The commonwealths of our Union are States only in a qualified sense.—
6. Civil law defined. The philosophy of command and authority. Blackstone, Austin, and Salmond quoted.—
7. Blackstone's definition of law, as criticized by Austin, Christian, Chase, and Sharswood ; and as interpreted by himself.—
8. Though his language states the truth, it is not strictly literal. Blackstone and Story on the disregard of judicial precedent. Blackstone's doctrine defended.—
9. The origin of common law, and of equity jurisdiction. Kent, Markby, and Salmond quoted. Law takes cognizance of external conduct as right and wrong ; and also of the animus of conduct as being innocent or vicious. "The king's conscience."—
10. Private persons may disregard the law in certain exceptional cases. Blackstone quoted.—
11. The fundamental principle of legal morality. Salmond quoted.

1. THE words "politics" and "jurisprudence" are used ambiguously. Often the former signifies the more aggressive political activity of a country or a community ; as when we speak of a man entering into, or withdrawing from, politics. Sometimes, however, this name is given to *the science of civil government or the general theory of the State*. For example, we distinguish the "Politics" of Aristotle from his "Ethics." In this latter signification the phrase "Political Science" has the advantage of being unequivocal.

Jurisprudence sometimes denotes the laws of a country taken collectively, that is, all those rules of conduct which are adopted or ordained by the supreme authority of a State, no matter how they have been formulated and issued, whether by the decrees of emperors or by the action of legislatures

or by the decisions of judges and courts. Occasionally, too, it signifies a treatise setting forth and explaining these laws or any definite portion of them. Hence we hear of Equity Jurisprudence, of Medical Jurisprudence, and of the Jurisprudence of France or of Russia. But this term is also used to designate *the general science or theory of law*, that is, of the rules of conduct sanctioned or enforced by the supreme political authority, and which, as distinguished from merely moral or customary rules, are styled "positive" law. Sir Henry Maine says, "Jurisprudence is the science of positive law." This sense of the word is connected with the original Latin use of it, which indicated merely a competent practical knowledge of the law and of procedures under it. Among the Romans a jurisconsult, or counselor-at-law, was said to be "*prudens in jure civili*," or "*juris prudens*."

The science of jurisprudence is inseparably connected with politics or the science of civil government, and may be considered a branch, or offshoot, of the latter. One's theory of law naturally attaches itself to one's theory of the State. Both investigations belong to the sociological group of sciences. Both, too, involve ethical teachings regarding the State and its laws. This last point seems very plain; yet eminent authors differ in their statements respecting it. Some say that the State is founded simply on the coercive power of society; others that it is also essentially a moral institution. Some say that "the field of legal rules of conduct does not coincide with that of moral rules and is not included in it" (POLLOCK'S JURISPRUDENCE, p. 44); others that the essential spirit of the law is to maintain and to enforce that which is just and right. These conflicts of opinion, or, at least, of statement, probably arise from the fact that the exact truth cannot be set forth without modifying explanations. It may throw light on this subject to consider briefly, first, the theory of the State and then the theory of law.

2. Let us start with a definition applicable, not only to developed commonwealths, such as we ordinarily have in mind, but also to the rudimentary beginnings of political society. Generalizing from the fewest number of essentials we say that *the State is society organized to act in every possible way, and when necessary by the use of force, for the protection and benefit of all subject to its care*. By "society" here we mean any collection of people not under the control of

others and so able to act under an independent supreme authority from within itself. When Henry M. Stanley, the explorer, was leading an expedition in Central Africa, some Arabs under his command committed murder and entered into plots endangering the lives of all. Stanley tried the ringleader of them, and had him hanged in the presence of the whole troop. That was an act of sovereign authority and such as the chieftain of any African tribe might have performed in similar circumstances. In like manner, when Abraham, a pastoral patriarch, "armed his trained servants born in his own house," united this force with those of his confederates, Aner, Eshcol and Mamre, and pursued and routed the army which had taken Lot, his kinsman, captive, he was the agent in an act of sovereignty, though the military organization which he headed was only temporary. In this case, as in that of Stanley, there was no permanent exercise of a supreme authority, and therefore no State in the ordinary sense of the word, but there was action which under some circumstances might have been the beginning of a permanent political organization.

Commonly a State is composed of the people inhabiting a given territory or claiming that as their country. This characteristic arises because no power can exercise the supreme control of a people without subordinating to itself every other power within the territory occupied by that people. It is conceivable that a nomadic tribe, in wandering over sparsely settled lands, might preserve its independence in the midst of other tribes roaming in the same region. But this condition of things could not exist after the development of agriculture and commerce; nor would it naturally exist long under any circumstances. A developed commonwealth necessarily possesses and controls a given territory. The definition of Professor Holland is to be commended: "A State is a numerous assemblage of human beings, generally occupying a certain territory, amongst whom the will of the majority, or of an ascertainable class of persons, is, by the strength of such a majority or class, made to prevail against any of their number who oppose it." This definition gives the determining characteristic of a State; for wherever that characteristic exists we can say that a State exists. At the same time it is not exhaustive; it does not give all the essential attributes of the State; it is an adequate definition only by way of suggestion. (THE MODALIST, Chap. VI.)

The German professor, Ihering, expresses himself differently from Prof. Holland, but practically to the same purpose. He says, "The State is the form of the regulated and assured exercise of the compulsory force of society."

Though the best State is that which is composed of intelligent freemen, this excellence is not necessary to the existence of the State. There is need only that society should be organized in some political way. One or more persons must have possession of the supreme power and exercise it over society at large. Hence the different styles of government, democracies, oligarchies, republics, and the limited and unlimited forms of monarchy. Moreover, though no State can exist without rulers, it may be conducted without any formal adoption and promulgation of laws. In primitive times the patriarch or chief of a tribe ruled his people according to his own judgment. Such probably was the government of the "kings" who were the contemporaries of Abraham. The first military conquerors exacted tribute and submission from those subjected to their power, but left the administration of justice to local authorities who used their own wisdom in hearing and settling disputes. Customs and precedents arose from the repeated decisions of wise judges. Prof. Holland is right in saying "Morality may precede but law must follow the organization of a political society." (JURISPRUDENCE, p. 41.)

3. Though Holland's definition of a State is correct so far as it goes, two particulars are needed in order to render it complete. First, it is to be noticed that, although the State uses compulsory force and could not exist without the exercise of sovereign power, *it is not to be supposed that the whole office of the State is to act in a coercive way.* On the contrary, a great part of the function of political society is to address the patriotism, the public spirit and the sense of duty of citizens, and, aside from any thought of compulsion, to unite the sentiments, the resources, and the efforts of the people for the common good. This thought is admirably expressed by Wolf in his "*Jus Gentium*" (PROL., Section 9). "The State is a society of human beings drawn together for the sake of promoting the common good by their united powers."—*Societas hominum communis boni conjunctis viribus promovendi causa contracta civitas est.* The fact is that the State is formed at first and sustained afterwards quite as much by interest, affection and principle as by force

and fear. Though these latter elements are essential, they often are, and always ought to be, secondary to the others.

4. In the next place, we must supplement Holland's definition by saying that the State is commonly conceived of, not simply as an organized and sovereign power, but also as existing in moral relations, as being bound to seek justice and the common welfare, and as entitled for this reason to our obedience and support. This ethical status may be considered—as it certainly is—a necessary property of political society. But a necessary property can always be considered and treated as an essential attribute if we simply enlarge our conception of the object contemplated. Therefore it is not surprising if many—perhaps most—include this property in their very notion of the State. Hence that noble definition which Grotius took from Cicero, "The State is the perfect union of freemen for the sake of justice and the common good."—*Civitas est coitus perfectus liberorum hominum juris fruendi et communis utilitatis causa sociatus.* (JUS BELLI et PACIS, Cap. I.) Hence Hobbes, though advocating absolutism, does not consider the state as intended for the benefit of its sovereign lord, but as a common inheritance to be ruled by one in the interest of all. "The commonwealth," he says, "is one Person of whose Acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence." (LEVIATHAN, p. 88.) The Supreme Court of the United States, also, says "A State is a body of free persons united together for the common benefit, to enjoy peacefully what is their own and to do justice to others." (CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA, 2 Dallas, 456.) This statement of the Supreme Court makes no mention of sovereignty and can scarcely have been designed as a complete definition, but evidently it sets forth prosperity, peace and justice as the ends for which political society exists, and conceives of the State as an institution promotive of these ends.

For our purpose it makes little difference whether the State be considered simply as society organized so as to employ sovereign power and it be then added that this organization exists under moral relations, or whether the definition be of an organization existing for moral ends; the result is the same; in either case the state is a moral entity, and, figuratively speaking, a moral person. Literally, political society



is not a person but an assemblage of persons. But, as this society acts as one body, and with intelligence and design, and can, in various ways, be regarded and treated as a unity, this truth may be expressed by using the word "person." Professor Bluntschli even incorporates this idea in his conception of the state. He says, "The state is the politically organized public personality of a given country."—"Der Staat ist die politisch organisirte Volksperson eines bestimmten Landes." (LEHRE VOM MODERNEN STAAT, I., p. 24.) A commonwealth is a person only in the same way that any corporate organization is a person; but its personality is preëminently ethical because both those who act for the state and those who have dealings with it are constantly seen to be in relations of duty. No one asserts that either the agents of the state or its subjects always act from a sense of duty. There have been many heartless tyrants, faithless officials and disloyal citizens. But it is clear that the ethical nature of man belongs to him in his political as well as in his other relations, and that any theory of the state—any politics of any kind—which leaves this fact out of consideration, takes an imperfect view of the subject with which it deals.

This doctrine seems too evident for denial. Yet some authors show a tendency to ignore it or to minimize its significance. They represent the State as the embodiment of brute force rather than of rightful sovereignty, or they regard it simply as a necessary association of men from motives of self-interest. When such writers touch on the moral aspects of civil government, they seem to explain these as the mere dictates of power on the one hand and of fear and prudence on the other. (We should never forget that man is first a moral then a political being, and that the State with its rights and duties is a development of his ethical no less than of his rational capabilities. The State does not originate morality but is founded upon it. With this understanding we say that the State is bound to defend itself, its territory and its citizens against foreign aggression; to define the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of itself and of its members; to suppress the wrong and enforce the right by courts and penalties; and to take such measures and make such laws as may maintain justice and promote the public good. In the discharge of these functions, too, the State may rightfully claim the recognition and friendship of every other State, as well as the obedience and loyal support of every

person living under its care. In short, political society is as truly a subject of moral law as the individual man is.

5. Here it may be asked whether the State, as a moral "person," is subject to punitive justice in the same sense as individual men are. We would say: Not exactly. Individuals who, as the officers or the subjects of a State, willingly participate in wrong, are individually responsible for their evil-doing. In this way the majority of a political community may share in a common guilt and be included in one general punishment. But when a widespread calamity overtakes a nation because of the wickedness of its people or their rulers and many suffer who took no part in that wickedness, this is not penal retribution in the strict and proper sense, though it may be a necessary and righteous ordering of events, and may be called punitive justice because of its union with and its external resemblance to the operation of punitive law. It is to be borne in mind that the State is not a person literally and in all respects, and that some things can be said of a person which cannot be said of a State. (Compare Chap. XXVI. 5.)

It may remove some occasion of obscurity to observe that the word "State," as occurring in the phrase "The United States" and as applied to the several commonwealths of the North American Union, is used in a limited sense. It designates a political society which exercises some but not all the rights of sovereignty over its members. Every commonwealth in the Union is subject in certain respects to the authority and laws of the central government; and this government, no less than that of each State, is limited in its functions by the constitution of the United States. Before conceiving of the American people as a State in the full sense of the word—as a political society with unrestricted sovereignty—we must combine together the State governments, the central government and the constitution-making power of the people of the United States; and so think of the American State or nation. And, of course, this great organization, as well as those constituent of it, exists in ethical relations.

6. The laws of a State are permanent expressions of its sovereign will, and must, therefore, participate in the moral status of the State. Nevertheless, as jurisprudence is often discussed separately from politics, and as authorities differ

regarding the connection between morality and law, some additional discussion seems desirable.

A law is a rule—that is, a general mode—of conduct adopted or prescribed by a sovereign political authority for its own observance or for that of others. Most laws directly regulate the conduct of the subjects of the State, and rules of this class are often called “the laws” by way of *præeminence*. Definitions generally speak of them only. Such laws are of the nature of commands, that is, they are expressions of the sovereign will with a demand of compliance or obedience. This demand assumes that one will may exercise control over another, or others, either through a simple imperative force, or through a claim to rightful authority, or by a show of coercive power. In the first of these cases, as when parents direct an infant, the command appeals to a sense of inferiority and dependence; in the second, as when a dying patriarch enjoins his children, the command appeals to a sense of moral obligation; in the third, as when a conqueror orders his enemies to bring their tribute, the command appeals to fear and the sense of subjection. Command is to be distinguished from counsel or request and from every motive suggestion other than that of over-mastering will, or coercive power, or rightful authority. Blackstone says, “Counsel is only a matter of persuasion; law is a matter of injunction. Counsel acts only upon the willing; law upon the unwilling also.” (COMMENTARIES, p. 44.) In civil government the state exercise the force of its *will*, and, at the same time, asserts both its right to rule and its determination to *compel* obedience. There may be an authority founded simply on compulsion and fear; and some speak of this as the only authority belonging to the State and its laws. We shall see that such teaching arises from an incomplete apprehension of the truth.

John Austin (1790--1859), a follower of Jeremy Bentham, recognizes no duty or obligation except the binding force of compulsory authority. He says, “If you express or intimate a wish that I shall do or forbear from some act, and if you will visit me with an evil in case I comply not with your wish, the expression or intimation of your wish is a command. . . . Being liable to evil from you if I comply not with a wish which you signify, I am bound, or obliged, by your command, or I lie under a duty to obey it. Command and duty are, therefore, correlative terms, the mean-

ing denoted by each being implied or supposed by the other. Wherever a duty lies a command has been signified; and wherever a command is signified, a duty is imposed." (JURISPRUDENCE, Section 19.) This theory of duty and obligation leaves out morality, or rather explains it away. It rightly sets forth law as a command issued by the State to its subjects and enforced by courts and penalties; but it robs the law of moral quality. Professor Salmond properly objects to the Austinian doctrine that it "leaves altogether out of sight the ethical significance of law; that it empties the conception of its ethical content." Then, after denying that we can deduce the theory of legal rights, wrongs and duties from the bare conception of law as a command of the State, Salmond continues: "The truth is that the rules of action enforced by the State are, in theory at least, the rules of right and wrong. The administration of law is, in theory at least, the administration of justice. . . . This relation between natural law and civil law must be recognized by any satisfactory theory of the latter; and, for this reason, we must prefer the definition of Blackstone, which recognizes the ethical element, to those of Bentham and Austin, which reject it." (JURISPRUDENCE, 95.)

7. Blackstone's definition, to which Salmond refers, is that of municipal, or civil, law. Sir William says, "I call it municipal law in compliance with common speech; for, though strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of one single *municipium*, or free town, yet it may, with sufficient propriety, be applied to any one State or nation which is governed by the same laws and customs. Municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined to be a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a State, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." (COMM., p. 44.) This definition was found objectionable by Christian, who annotated on Blackstone in the early part of the nineteenth century and whose criticism is quoted by Professor Chase of the New York Law School, as follows: "A municipal law is completely expressed by the first branch of the definition, '*a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a State*'; and the latter branch '*commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong*' must either be superfluous or convey a defective idea of a municipal law. For, if right and wrong are referred to the municipal law itself, then whatever it commands is right and whatever it

prohibits is wrong, and the clause would be insignificant tautology." By this Christian means that if Blackstone founded right and wrong, duty and obligation, on the command of the State, as Austin does, his words would be meaningless surplusage; as they certainly would be. That was not Blackstone's theory: so Christian continues, "But if right and wrong are to be referred to the laws of nature" (that is, to the moral law) "then the definition will become deficient or erroneous. For, though the municipal law may seldom command what is wrong, yet in ten thousand instances it forbids what is right. It may forbid an unqualified person to kill game; it may forbid a man to exercise a trade without serving as an apprentice, etc. All these acts were perfectly right before the prohibition of the municipal law." CHASE'S BLACKSTONE, p. 9.)

The reasoning of Christian in this criticism is fallacious. It rests on an ambiguity of the word "*right*." This term may signify that which is consistent with duty as well as that which is required by duty—that which of itself is allowable and innocent as well as that which is obligatory. (CHAP. IV.) That the law often prohibits what otherwise would be innocent and right is entirely harmonious with Blackstone's teaching that the law always commands what is right and obligatory.

Professor Chase says that Judge Sharswood proposes to amend the last clause of Blackstone's definition, so as to read, "*commanding what is to be done, and forbidding the contrary*." This amendment, however, is not an improvement. It is ambiguous. It may mean either "*commanding what is to be done as morally obligatory*"; which is Blackstone's meaning; or, "*commanding what is to be done as legally compulsory*," which may be Sharswood's meaning, and which certainly would satisfy Austin. Perhaps Blackstone's thought would be more perfectly expressed should we say, "*commanding what ought to be done and prohibiting the contrary*," the oughtness here mentioned being that of moral obligation. For Blackstone does not teach that civil law commands only what the law of nature requires and prohibits only what is contrary to that; he expressly asserts that municipal law may, of itself, make some things right and others wrong. He says, first: "Those rights which God and nature have established and are, therefore, called natural rights, such as are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws

to be more effectually vested in every man than they are. . . . On the contrary, no human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner himself commits some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine, or natural, duties, such as the worship of God, the maintenance of children, and the like, receive any stronger sanction," (that is, stronger moral sanction) "from being also declared to be duties by the law of the land." Then Sir William continues: "*But with regard to things in themselves indifferent, the case is entirely altered.* These become either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or misdemeanors, according as the municipal legislator sees proper, for promoting the welfare of society and more effectually carrying on the purposes of civil life. Thus our own common law has declared that the goods of the wife do instantly upon marriage become the property and right of her husband; and our statute law has declared all monopolies a public offense. Yet that right and this offence have no foundation in nature but are merely created by the law for the purpose of civil society." (COMM., 54, 55.) All this signifies that the regulations of the State, made in addition to laws originally moral, are obligatory upon us because "the powers that be are ordained of God," or, if you prefer, are clothed, by natural necessity and justice, with the right, and with the duty, of making rules for the conduct of civil life.

8. Blackstone's definition of law, as interpreted by himself, sets forth truth. At the same time it is to be admitted that his language cannot be taken in strict literality. To use the words of Professor Salmond, it sets forth what the law is "*in theory*," and what it merely approximates in fact. For the rule prescribed by the supreme power in a State does not always require only what is right and forbid only what is wrong. Sometimes iniquitous laws have forbidden what is right and required what is wrong. It is to be acknowledged, also, that the laws even of civilized countries have never yet perfectly served the ends of justice and the interests of humanity. The work of the legislative reformer always has been, and probably always will be, necessary. Mr. Blackstone's words must be interpreted in accordance with these facts, which were well known to him, as they are to everybody. It was his design to state the essential and proper function of the law. He wished to teach that the main body of the laws of every developed State do prevent wrong

and promote justice and the public good; and that this is the proper aim of all legislation. Even when those who should administer the laws are corrupt and unprincipled, the laws themselves are, for the most part, the dictates of justice and wisdom. Moreover, Blackstone uses unqualified language because he saw that the purposes of judicial interpretation might make it well to conceive of an ideal law which should perfectly defend the right and promote the good, and *with which, by a kind of legal fiction, existing law might be identified*. He would have both judges and people believe that the law ever seeks what is right, and that if in any case, the acts of legislatures or judicatories oppose the right, this is the fault of those who formulate or who interpret the law or who speak in its name, and not of the law itself. He speaks like one who should describe the sun as giving perfect light and clearness, in disregard of the fact that it is often clouded and sometimes eclipsed.

This doctrine of Blackstone may be illustrated by his teaching concerning the force and use of legal precedents. "Judicial decisions," he says, "are the principal and most authoritative evidence that can be given of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law. . . . It is an established rule to abide by former precedents when the same points come again in litigation. . . . Yet this rule admits of exception where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason—much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine law. But, even in such cases, the judges do not pretend to make a new law but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For, if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, *but that it was not law*—that is, not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined. And hence it is that our lawyers are, with justice, so copious in their encomiums on the reason of the common law; that they tell us that the law is the perfection of reason, that it always intends to conform thereto, and that what is not reason is not law. Not that the particular reason of every rule in the law can be always precisely assigned, but it is sufficient that there be nothing in the rule flatly contradictory to reason; and then the law will presume it to be well-founded." (COMM., p. 69.)

Similar language to that of Blackstone was employed by Justice Story. Speaking for the Supreme Court of the

United States respecting judicial decisions, he says: "They are at most only evidences of what the laws are and are not of themselves laws. They are often re-examined, reversed and qualified by the courts themselves, whenever they are found to be either defective or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect." (SWIFT v. TYSON, 16 Pet. 1.) "The law," evidenced by recorded decisions, has only an ideal existence except as it is derivable from those decisions themselves. So far as ethics is concerned it makes no difference whether one says that law commands the right and forbids the wrong, or that all law ought to do so. Either statement teaches that the essential function of law is to promote what is right and good.

Blackstone's teaching has been objected to as encouraging judges and others to disregard actual law whenever in their opinion it may conflict with moral principle. But his design was only to make a forcible statement of the ethical obligation and purpose of law. He did not mean that judges should set aside any clearly established rule, but only that, in cases of doubt, it should be assumed that the actual law agrees with the ideal law and intends only what is right and good. This assumption is needed in judicial interpretations, and, in cases where no other ground of decision can be found, allows an appeal to the well-known principles of morality. But it does not lie within the province of courts to alter any clearly established law even though it may differ from that ideal to which all law ought to conform. The utmost that judges can then do is to exert what influence they can to have the actual law made conformable to that ideal which alone is the law of absolute right and justice. To do more than this would be to violate their oath of office, to usurp a power not given them by the sovereign authority of the State, and to introduce arbitrariness and uncertainty into the administration of justice.

9. That law aims not simply to enforce a supreme will, as Austin teaches, but to maintain right and to further the general welfare, may be illustrated by *the origin both of common law and of equity jurisdiction*. Chancellor Kent says: "A great proportion of the rules and maxims which constitute the immense code of the common law grew into use by gradual adoption, and received, from time to time, the sanction of the courts of justice, without any legislative act or interference. It was the application of the dictates of natural justice and of cultivated reason to particular

cases." Originally suits in equity were conducted before the king as the sovereign source of justice or before the chancellor acting in the king's name and with that supreme authority which alone could supplement and rectify the imperfect working of the common law. "It was the king's conscience," says Sir William Markby, "which was moved by an injustice; and, because it was one not remediable by the ordinary law, the chancellor received a commission to remedy it, sometimes from the king himself but sometimes also from parliament." (ELEMENTS OF LAW, Section 120.) The king's conscience here means simply the best moral judgment of the sovereign authority. "In its origin," says Salmond, "the jurisdiction of the chancellor was absolutely unfettered by any rules whatever. His duty was to "do that which justice and reason and good faith and good conscience required in the case." (JURISPRUDENCE, 89.) This discretionary freedom of equity jurisdiction has in the course of time been almost entirely abandoned. Precedent rules now in chancery proceedings as much as it does in those of common law. And it is now wisely held that relief from the imperfect operation of laws and precedents must be sought chiefly from the legislature.

Some say that civil law cannot have ethical character because it does not take cognizance of our unexpressed thoughts or desires, but only of our external conduct. This assumes that actions as such have no moral character, whereas they can be right or wrong, though they cannot be virtuous or vicious, without reference to the animus from which they proceed. (CHAP. VI.) Besides, the law does take cognizance of the intents of the heart so far as these are manifested by external conduct or may be affected by external control. It deals with man as an intelligent rational agent and with his life so far as it can be influenced by the power and authority of the State. Criminal law relates to moral guilt or innocence and is designed for the suppression of wickedness. One important end of legislative and judicial action is to improve the moral condition of mankind. But even should we leave these ends of causative righteousness out of view, all civil rule should be pervaded with the spirit of equity and beneficence, and should aim at the absolute good of those whom its action may affect.

10. As we have seen, no judge or other officer inferior to the supreme legislative power, has the right to set aside an established law, nor would it be wise or safe to grant him

such a right. Along with this principle, however, it is to be remembered that private individuals are sometimes justified in disobeying the actual laws of a State and in refusing demands made by public authority. This arises because the State does not always perfectly fulfil its function and so does not always command only what is right and forbid only what is wrong. When rulers require what is contrary to "the law of nature," as it is called—that is, to moral principle—it is our duty to disobey them. "This law of nature," says Blackstone, "is superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries and at all times; no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original." (COMM., p. 40.) By validity and authority here Sir William does not mean the actual constraining and compulsory force of a law; as Austin supposes he does; but only its moral obligation. He illustrates his thought by applying it to the crime of murder, and says, "Those human laws that annex a punishment to it do not at all increase its moral guilt or superadd any fresh obligation *in foro conscientiae*" (p. 42).

Besides laws commanding immorality, Blackstone says that another class of laws may be disobeyed, though we are not under obligation to disobey them. He refers to cases in which a law forbids or enjoins something which "is wholly a matter of indifference and where the penalty inflicted is an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to arise from the offense. But," he adds, "where disobedience to the law involves in it also any degree of public mischief or private injury, there it falls within our former distinction and is also an offence against conscience." (COMM., p. 58.)

In the class of cases last mentioned, Sir William says, "*The alternative is offered to every man 'Either abstain from this or submit to such a penalty;'*" and his conscience will be clear whichever side of the alternative he thinks proper to embrace." The question now suggests itself whether, in case the State itself or its law attempt great wrong upon a person, it may ever be morally justifiable not only to disobey public authority but also to avoid, if possible, the penalty for disobedience. If a sovereign reduced the common people of a certain district to slavery or serfdom, prohibiting them, under penalty of death, from leaving their farms or engaging in other work than the appointed slavery; or should the law

require a certain class of inhabitants, say Jews or Christians, on the penalty of forfeiting all their goods, to pay half their income into the public treasury, while other people should be taxed only five per cent. of their income; would the persons so wronged be justified in seeking to elude both the excessive demands of the State and also the penalties attached to non-compliance? We think they would. When a government becomes intolerably bad, the oppressed have the right of revolution provided they have good reason to expect success. When they have no such hope, nothing seems left for them save avoidance and evasion. Society as a whole has no more right to commit robbery or murder than a single person has; and there seems to be a right to protect oneself against public as well as against private wrong.

We admit that one should endure injustice at the hands of the State if, by so doing, he can serve some great and worthy end. But would it not sometimes result in harm rather than good to yield willing obedience to tyrannous laws? We are not clear that even Socrates was right in refusing that escape from an unmerited death which his friends had secured for him. When he chose hemlock instead of liberty, he gave the Athenians a last lesson of respect for State authority which may—or may not—have been effective, but which he might have declined giving if he had found some way of serving his generation better by living than by dying.

11. This discussion may be closed with a quotation from Professor Salmond, which not only exhibits the ethical character of law and its administration, but also indicates the fundamental principle to which legal morality appeals. He is explaining the difference between "*damnum*," or injury in our modern sense of the word, and "*injuria*," which is wrongful injury, and such as calls for redress. "*Damnum sine injuria*" is not wrongful, and does not call for redress. For example, competition in trade may be ruin to individual traders, but the general result is gain to society; hence such competition, though hurtful to individuals, is not wrongful—it is "*damnum sine injuria*." The quotation which we desire to make is as follows: "That, in respect to good and evil, the general may differ from the particular consequences of an act, and that an act is to be judged as right or wrong from its general, not from its particular, results, are facts which we have already had occasion to notice. The purpose of the administration of justice is to put down *that which is*

absolutely evil, not that which is merely relatively so; and hence there results an important instance of 'damnum sine injuria.'" (JURISPRUDENCE, 160.) Here a writer, expounding, not ethics but jurisprudence, states the fundamental aim of justice—that is, of conservative and defensive duty. (CHAP. XXIII.) Using the best language at his command he declares that justice aims at the suppression of "that which is absolutely evil." This teaching is simply a specific aspect of the doctrine that the end of all morality is the realization of "absolute good."

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE ETHICAL ASPECT OF RELIGION.

1. Morality and religion are not inseparable.—2. Commonly the moral life enters into and modifies the religious.—3. Religion also affects morality (1) by enlarging the sphere of moral relations, (2) by adding divine authority to the law of duty, and (3) by the expectation of future rewards and punishments.—4. Christianity is superior in ethical power to every other religion.—5. It gives the true conception of God.—6. Its morality is perfect.—7. It presents a faultless exemplar of virtue.—8. It reveals divine love.—9. It offers just pardon to the penitent.—10. It promises spiritual help.—11. It asserts the unspeakable worth of man.—12. It speaks of Heaven and of Hell.—13. The hypothesis of a future life is necessary to explain the divine government and to show the complete reasonableness of the moral law.—14. The promotion of Christianity is a great duty. Even those who may doubt its doctrine should support its morality. Believers are bound to use every proper means for the prevalence of their holy faith. Daniel Webster and Justice Story quoted.

1. MORALITY and religion, ethics and theology, are closely related, yet not so closely that the one may not exist without the other. There may be an abstract ethics which makes no reference to things divine; and there may be a theology which ignores the requirements of duty while it discourses on the invisible and supernal. Not only do some books on moral theory leave religious faith out of consideration, but sometimes men sincerely respect the rules of right and wrong and yet profess themselves without any belief in God and without any definite expectation respecting a future life. Mr. John Stuart Mill was such a man; and all those who call themselves agnostics have a morality without a religion. On the other hand many heathen myths regarding gods and goddesses, and even some celebrated cosmogonies, are devoid of ethical import. They are stories of mighty strife, triumph, passion and suffering, or else strange hypotheses concerning creative energy or thought; but they have no moral significance. Ordinarily, however, religion and morality are more

or less combined. Frequently, even, in practice, they form but one system of faith and conduct, every part of which is affected both with theological belief and with ethical principle. This union naturally takes place in all deeply religious natures and is observable in persons of the highest intelligence as well as in the ignorant and superstitious.

2. That moral activity should become incorporated with religious life necessarily follows whenever men think of God as an intelligent being interested in sublunary events and especially when they regard themselves as existing in personal relations with God or with those beings whom they believe to rule the universe. For any spirit of high intelligence must have a moral nature, and his connections with other beings must be the subject of moral law. A divine person, being greater and wiser than the inhabitants of earth, is regarded as exalted above them not only in character and in power but also in authority. We bow to him as our superior. We also claim from him that protection and help which the wise and mighty should render the dependent and weak.

Moreover, the moral character of a people often modifies their religious creed. Indeed the religious belief of an individual is affected by his personal tendencies. Men form ideals according to their ambitions, their wishes, or their fears, and then persuade themselves that gods corresponding to these ideals are actualities. Heathen deities are mostly the personification of some powerful thought or influence. The Scandinavians were a daring heroic race; and they believed in Thor and Woden. The Greeks were creatures of sentiment and activity, who lived in strife and rivalry; they worshipped gods endued with every human passion. The Egyptians were submissive slaves of depotism and sensuality; they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man and to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things. A desire for the free indulgence of low lusts originated the Mahommedan heaven and the "revelations" of Joseph Smith—the Mormon. The enervated inhabitants of India, weary of life, seek Nirvana, or unconscious absorption into Deity, as their chief end, and adopt a religion of inaction and contemplation. The practical money-loving Chinese, content themselves with the precepts of Confucius, and burn incense at the shrines of their ancestors.

3. On the other hand, a people's religious faith greatly

influences their mode of living; so that, in many cases, it is difficult to say whether religion is more controlled by morality or morality by religion. Three principal ways may be mentioned in which moral life is affected by the belief in things unseen.

First of all, the sphere of moral obligation is enlarged when we take into consideration the world of spirits. Without religion duty would be limited to our earthly relations; with it we are led to reverence things divine and to seek the spiritual welfare of ourselves and others. An immortal god is exalted above dependence on human aid for the supply of his wants and for protection against evil. One would no more think of contributing to his needs than the peasant does of rendering aid to some great king or emperor. Yet moral goodness recognizes that the most elevated have personal claims on the lowly. Even though we cannot confer practical benefits on a superior, it is our duty to cherish a desire for his happiness and to rejoice in that happiness if it exists. This is especially incumbent on us if the superior being be virtuous and worthy of our respect. He may, for this reason, deserve our supreme affection. Then, also, a knowledge of the world to come imposes new duties upon us in respect both to our eternal prospects and to those of our fellow-creatures. We are led to regard the present life as a probation and preparation for an endless state of existence. We recognize the duty of living as immortal beings should, and of providing for a life beyond the grave.

In the next place, religion strengthens moral life *by adding divine authority to the simple claim of duty*. Men acknowledge the right of deity to command their service, and regard this right as arising not merely from controlling power, but yet more from the fact that the divine government is in the interest of righteousness. Among the ancients the priests and the oracles were the agencies through which the gods were supposed to direct mortals in matters of importance. Probably a dread of the displeasure of the gods and a desire for their help was more influential than reverence for them and confidence in their righteous rule, but undoubtedly these latter considerations were entertained by the more thoughtful heathen. And the Hebrews, who were distinguished from the rest of mankind by their belief in the one only true and living God, completely identified the divine will with the requirements of morality. They held that the

law of the Lord is perfect and his judgments true and righteous altogether. With them the course of duty was that prescribed by the divine authority. "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter," said the preacher; "fear God and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man." Indeed this regard for the Supreme Being and his sovereign law seems to enter into every developed conscience. When the good man is tempted, he says, "How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?" (GEN. XXXIX., 9.)

Finally, most, if not all, religions *influence the life of duty through their doctrines respecting rewards and punishments*. Mankind generally believe that the wrongs of the present state shall be righted in another world, and that, after death, the just and the unjust shall receive happiness or misery according to their deserts. Hence the Tartarus and Elysium of the ancients, and those solemn judges, Rhadamanthus, Minos and others, who determined the fate of departed souls. It is to be admitted that the pains and the pleasures which different systems of faith assign to the unseen world are largely imaginary. Perhaps, at first, they were only the figurative representation of things not clearly or surely known; yet the moral sense of men forms a reasonable expectation that a course of patient goodness during this present time will be rewarded by a state of blessedness hereafter, and that a course of grasping selfishness or of determined wickedness will lead to future misery and ruin. Upon the supposition of another life of which our earthly life is a beginning, it is impossible to suppress the anticipation of good and evil consequent upon our present conduct.

4. The advocates of the Christian religion claim that it is superior to all others in the excellence of its precepts and in its influence over those by whom it has been sincerely adopted. When Christianity is compared with Mohammedanism and its bloodthirsty butcheries; with Brahmanism and its degrading idolatries; with Buddhism and its lifeless forms; with Confucianism and its stereotyped worldliness; with Mormonism and its abominations; with the ineffectual teachings of infidelity or of superstition; or even with the culture of abstract ethics or philosophic morality; we find a power in the religion of the Nazarene which we do not find elsewhere. The effectual working of this power does not appear in all who profess the Christian faith, but it is

seen in Jesus Christ himself and in those true believers of whom Christ said, "By their fruits ye shall know them." The fruits of Christianity are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, goodness, meekness, temperance, faith; against which there is no law.

The perfect combination which Christian faith makes with moral principle has led some philosophers to assert that religious thought is the essential source of ethics, and that there can be no ethical science except that which is distinctively Christian. We should not, however, confound the development of moral enlightenment and power with the first construction of ethical doctrine. There may be a correct abstract theory of right and wrong independently of religious principle. It is sufficient to say that true morality tends towards religion and finds its completion in religious faith and life. For the consideration of things eternal not only strengthens the moral motive, but also helps to an understanding of important ethical problems.

5. As the glory of Christianity lies chiefly in its moral or spiritual results, it may be worth while to inquire in what way this religion, when held in its purity, exerts its acknowledged influence for good. One element of the power of Christianity is that *it imparts a true knowledge of the Divine Being*. The conceptions of deity entertained by both ancient and modern polytheists have been utterly unfit for moral use. They have sprung from the imaginations of men under the influence of fears, hopes and passions; not from reason and knowledge. Nor has philosophy, apart from Christianity, ever succeeded in gaining any adequate comprehension of God. A study of ancient theories shows that in the old time "the world by wisdom knew not God." Plato's "Idea" was an unintelligible abstraction. Aristotle's *πρώτον κινούν*, or First Cause, was an impersonal and distant power. The Stoics made God the soul of the world—a semi-unconscious being scarcely distinguished from the laws of Nature. Other systems were still less satisfactory. God was air, fire, ether, the infinite, or some other widely diffused substance or force, out of which the universe has sprung. Modern philosophy, except so far as it has affiliated with Christianity, is not much superior to the ancient. The "positive" school, who base all knowledge on associated sensations or "feelings," develop agnosticism. The idealists, who make all existence the evolution of thought, tend to-

wards pantheism. Those more sober thinkers who accept the common beliefs of mankind have a more rational conception of deity, but sometimes conceive of God as far removed from his creatures and from intervention in their affairs. Such thinkers are called deists; they make God simply the great lawgiver of Nature. The true God is not only infinite, almighty and personal, but also a holy being, a loving father, a living and active friend, whose providence is continually engaged in beneficent designs. To serve such a being with reverence and devoted affection is the most solemn duty and the most elevating experience possible for a finite spirit.

6. A second cause of Christianity's efficiency for good is *the perfection of its morality*. The precepts of Christ are high, spiritual and heart-searching. They are even too lofty for human realization. This results, not from any want of wisdom in them, but from the weakness of our race. The ethics of the Old Testament, set forth in the decalogue and in the laws of Moses, is a noble scheme of duty, requiring us to love God with all our hearts and our neighbor as ourselves; but it is eclipsed by the brightness of the Gospel. Our Saviour's interpretations of the law of God seem rather to have been inspired from Heaven than to have been devised on earth. He not only enjoins absolute purity of heart and an unreserved acceptance of the rules of righteousness, but he expects a readiness to lay down one's life in the service of God or for the cause of humanity. We must love our enemies, do good to them who hate us and pray for them who despitefully use us and persecute us. The spirit of Christianity is a combination of moral faultlessness with energetic goodness and tender benevolence. It is sometimes indicated by the word "holiness," a term peculiar to the true religion, and expressive of the most complete spiritual excellence. This disposition is referred to in the Old Testament in the command, "Be ye holy; for I, the Lord your God, am holy"; but it receives its clearest exemplification in the character of Jesus the Christ.

7. This brings to mind a third source of the moral power of Christianity, namely, *it presents to us a faultless exemplar of virtue*. The Scriptures teach that the Lord Jesus was, in a special sense, the Son of God, and that he was so united to his father in nature and in life as to be the representative of God on earth. He himself said, "He that hath seen me hath seen the father," and again, "I and my father are

one." Most Christians believe that he was in some very literal sense "God manifest in the flesh." He claimed for himself many of the attributes of deity, as the power of miracles, the authority to forgive sin, the right to the absolute devotion of the hearts and lives of men, and the office of that sovereign judge by whom the final destinies of men are to be determined. Believers in all ages have revered the exalted lordship of Christ and have felt this to be a very powerful as well as a very moving mode of the divine supremacy.

But, apart from the doctrine of his divinity, the life of our Saviour as a man was the most impressive exhibition of moral excellence that the world has yet seen. His conduct, as recorded in the Gospels, is marked by an actual nobility and goodness far transcending the best ideals of virtue that moralists have ever framed. His love for righteousness and his hatred for iniquity were intense and unqualified. In his soul reverence for God and submission to the divine will were absolutely controlling principles. His benevolence towards others, his compassion for the suffering, and his pity for even the worst transgressors, were unbounded. His life was a miracle of goodness, and was surpassed only by the heavenly magnificence of his death, when he endured the cross for mankind, the just for the unjust, that we might live. Thus Christ set us an example, that we should walk in his steps. When he says, "Follow me," he calls us to the noblest career of which rational beings are capable.

8. A fourth source of the power of Christianity is that *it is a revelation of divine love*. "Herein," says the Apostle John—"herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his son to be the propitiation for our sins." (I. JOHN X., 10.) The inhabitants of Christian lands are so accustomed to the story of the cross, that they cannot realize its amazing and tender attractiveness. But with what wonder, in apostolic days, the message of Heaven's love must have been received by those who till then had sat in darkness and in the shadow of death! Till that time they had worshipped selfish and immoral divinities. They now realize that a being of unspeakable dignity and of infinite compassion has come to earth, and has sacrificed himself for their redemption. They are overwhelmed by this manifestation of love. In our own day a similar impression is made when any worshiper of idols, or any disciple of Mohammed,

Zoroaster, Buddha or Confucius, is brought to see and to appreciate the wonders of the Gospel. In the best of other religions the divine goodness is but a speculative doctrine; in Christianity the fact that "God is love" shines like the sun in the heavens. The believer is made to feel that this love is great beyond conception; that its height and depth and length and breadth surpass human knowledge. A sense of this love, shed abroad in the heart, excites a deep trust in God as our heavenly father and adoring gratitude to God and to the Redeemer whom God has sent. The Apostle Paul expresses this sentiment when he says, "I live by the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me." GAL. II., 20), and also in the title which Paul gives himself, "the slave" or "bondman" of Jesus Christ. (*ὁ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος.*) He considered himself no longer his own but Christ's purchased servant. The same sentiment is still cherished among believers, as the following verse of a hymn may testify :

O glorious suffering Son of God,
 May I thy faithful servant be—
 Thy slave bought with thy sacred blood
 And cruel agony !

9. A fifth source of the power of Christianity lies in the fact that *the death of Christ reveals not only the love of God but also the divine hatred for sin*, and is, in a sense, a satisfaction to the divine justice. The death of Christ did not take place according to the ordinary rule of rectoral righteousness; for this requires that the transgressor should suffer, and does not contemplate any sacrificial substitute. The atonement of the cross appears to have been an extraordinary arrangement whereby the essential end of punitive justice—that is, the vindication of God's righteous government—might be effected without the destruction of the believing sinner. This certainly is the meaning of those Scriptures which represent Christ as rendering a satisfaction to the divine law in the behalf of his people. He himself said that he came to give his life "a ransom for many." We are told that "he bore our sins in his own body on the tree," and that we have "redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins." He is the "lamb of God" who was "slain for us." Paul says that "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us;" and that sinners are "justified freely through the redemption

that is in Christ Jesus; whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past . . . that he might be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." (ROM. III., 23-26.) The justification here mentioned is plainly the righteous pardoning of those who truly accept the Gospel; and the belief spoken of is not a mere intellectual conviction but the principle of a new life. It is that faith which overcomes the world, which works by love, and which purifies the heart. In short, the salvation of the Gospel is conditioned on that heart-felt acceptance of the truth which is accompanied by a radical reformation of heart and life.

The objection to the doctrine of the atonement that God is a being of infinite goodness and compassion and therefore need not be rendered willing to save the penitent, is founded on a misconception. The Scriptures represent the sacrifice of Christ as arising from the exceeding pity of God for sinners and from his desire that they should be saved. The sufferings of Christ show God's hatred for sin. They illustrate—as Paul says, they "*declare*"—the principle of righteousness that "the wages of sin is death." But they also reveal that God has found a way for the righteous forgiveness of transgression, and that he is infinitely ready to receive the repentant sinner. Believing these things, men are brought to hate those evil ways which necessitated the sacrifice of God's only begotten Son, and are filled with peace and joy and confidence in God. They can say, with the Apostle Paul, "Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea, rather, that is risen again, who sitteth at the right hand of God and ever liveth to make intercession for us." A holy faith displaces guilty fears, and inspires hope and courage.

10. A sixth source of the power of Christianity is *the promise of the Holy Spirit* to be the "paraclete."—or comforter and helper—of God's people. Our Saviour, referring to his ascension, said that he went to his father expressly to send down this Spirit; by whose aid souls are led into truth and strengthened for duty. The apostles and prophets were inspired by this messenger to be the oracles, or mouth-pieces, of God; and all believers look to him for help to understand the way of life and to accomplish their high calling. A consciousness of his indwelling presence—of the "communion of the Holy Ghost"—increases the Christian's sense of

duty, and makes him, however humble he may be, strong to resist temptation, patient under afflictions, and expectant of blessing in the midst of the sorest trials and in the extremities of death itself.

11. But the most noticeable mode in which Christianity has exerted moral power, and in which its influence upon society increases from day to day, has been *its assertion of the inexpressible value of humanity*. The Gospel of Christ gave—and still gives—to the world the highest possible conception of the worth of man, and that, too, in a way which impresses this truth upon the public at large, and not merely upon those who are philosophically inclined. In heathen and unchristian countries and in many professedly Christian lands, dignities and emoluments have been lavished on the few at the expense of the many. The poor and ignorant, indeed all dependent for their living on their daily labor, have been treated as if they existed only for the service of their more fortunate neighbors. Under some religious creeds the common people are regarded as different in nature and origin from the superior orders; and under some political constitutions the lives of thousands have been sacrificed to the interests of one man or of a ruling class of men. Moreover, those philosophies which have inculcated general benevolence, have failed to impress men with the living importance of this principle; they have merely refined the feelings of some select disciples. Christianity declares aloud the infinite preciousness of those immortals for whom the Saviour died. It makes the great end of life to be the temporal and the eternal happiness of every individual soul. Our Lord himself gives the divine estimation of humanity in those well-known words, “God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life.” (JOHN III., 16.) This conception of God’s desire to bless and save every inhabitant of the world has given direction to the labors of Christians for the last two thousand years, and is to-day the central thought of all evangelical and missionary operations. It is the fruitful parent of a thousand forms of benevolence. It is affecting, and changing for the better, every department of man’s activity—not merely his religious and domestic, but also his industrial and commercial, his social, and his political, life. It has established, and is establishing, the kingdom of God on earth.

12. In the seventh place, and finally, we may notice an influence which Christianity has in common with other systems of religion in that *it foretells a happy future for the righteous and a dreadful perdition for the impenitent.* The doctrine of future rewards and punishments does not have so central and prominent a place in Christianity as the doctrine of God's love and salvation has; yet it is distinctly taught, and that, too, by the merciful Saviour himself. His words are a solemn warning concerning the just and necessary consequence of the rejection of God and righteousness. "Fear not," he says, "them which kill the body and after that have no more that they can do. But I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: Fear him which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, fear him." (LUKE XII., 4.) Our Lord, also, describing his own course at the final judgment, says, "When the Son of Man shall come in his glory and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory; and before him shall be gathered all nations. . . . Then shall the king say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. . . . Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels."—(MATT. XXV., 41.) Doubtless much biblical language respecting future blessedness and wretchedness is figurative; but this does not make it meaningless. Christ's words expressed his belief in realities. Moreover, there is nothing figurative in such statements as, "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." (JOHN III., 36.)

Some cannot accept these teachings; nor, indeed, any religious doctrines which involve the supernatural. But this is an extreme position. In our view, *nothing is more natural than a supernatural religion*; that is, nothing is more reasonable and to be expected. At the same time we hold that theological doctrines are no more to be received without proof than scientific doctrines are. But at present we are not concerned with the evidences of Christianity, nor even, to any great extent, with the reasonableness of its tenets. We have only been endeavoring to explain the practical moral influence of this faith. Whether a system whose operation for good has been, and is, so powerful, is not really

sustained by rational evidence, is a question worthy of consideration; that inquiry, however, is not within the scope of our present undertaking.

13. Reverting to the philosophy of religion in general we must observe that some belief in a future state of existence and in a righteous divine government seems necessary to the solution of a perplexing moral problem. *Why*, it is asked, *is the duty of extreme self-sacrifice, including, it may be, the surrender of life itself, sometimes imposed upon the virtuous man?* Self-preservation is said to be the first law of nature; and it certainly is a duty devolving upon us all. No one has the right to expose himself recklessly to ruin. The drunkard, the opium eater, the fashionable devotee of pleasure, who undermine their own health by their excesses, are guilty of sinful self-destruction. The voice of duty says to every one "Do thyself no harm." In some of our States an attempt at suicide is punishable by fine and imprisonment. At the same time cases arise in which one must subordinate his own interests to those of the public and even sacrifice his life for the welfare of his country or for the cause of righteousness. Leonidas, Regulus, Arnold Winkelried, are examples in point. History honors the names of many heroes who have cheerfully faced death for their fatherland. In such cases there is a conflict of interests, but there is not really a conflict of duties. The higher duty sets aside and supersedes the lower. Christian martyrs, in both ancient and modern times, have acted rightly when they have obeyed God rather than man—testifying to their faith in Jesus when they knew that death would be the penalty for their faithfulness. We approve such conduct.

But the question arises, Is there not something strange and wrong in the system of things which calls for such self-sacrifice? If the universe is governed by moral goodness, ought not the welfare and happiness of the righteous to be fully arranged for under the plans of a divine providence? No satisfactory answer to these inquiries seems possible except on the theory that death does not end all, and that the earthly life is only a preparation for a heavenly one. When we are told that present sacrifice is necessary to test and develop virtue, and that it is rewarded by eternal gain hereafter, we see how the system under which we live, with all its mysterious trials, may be the best, not only for the general good of all, but also for the particular good of the individual.

It was on the basis of this expectation that the apostle said, "Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." (II. COR. IV., 17.) This, too, is the hope held out in our Saviour's words, "He that keepeth his life shall lose it, but he that loseth his life for my name's sake and the Gospel's, the same shall find it." In the eternal plan of God all things work together for the good of those who love him. The ages to come shall show that the welfare of the righteous and the welfare of the universe are one.

14. If religion in its best development be an embodiment of the noblest moral principle, it is plain that causative righteousness calls upon us to promote this form of life in ourselves and in others. Indeed, since genuine piety results in every kind of goodness, it should be cultivated on every moral ground. The consistent Christian is not only the honest man, but also the practical philanthropist. As the Apostle James says, "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction and to keep oneself unspotted from the world."

It may be asked, however, whether one who has no belief concerning God and no expectation of an hereafter, should favor the religious life in others. Certainly one cannot be expected to propagate a system of faith which he believes to be false. At the same time the practical moral workings of a system which one cannot theoretically accept, may have claims on his consideration. If the choice be between Christianity with righteousness and heathenism or infidelity with immorality, there is little question which we should favor. But the fact is that the real atheist is an eccentric rarity; even the agnostic absolutely sure that God cannot be known is not often found. The honest doubter has generally a wavering belief. His mental posture is expressed by Cicero, who, after asserting his own confident expectation of immortality, said that, even though this belief were unfounded, he would rather live and die in the assurance of it, than in the expectation of ending his life in blank nothingness.

But, whatever may be said of agnostics, the duty of those who believe in the religion of Jesus Christ and admire its divine morality is very clear. They should give it every support within their power. No one will dispute this statement,

so far as private effort is concerned, but some may question whether the body politic should take any action in furtherance of Christianity. To us it seems only right that the State should favor true religion as well as every other agency of human welfare. From the nature of the case public authority cannot wisely advance the interests of one denomination or sect of Christians to the exclusion of others. Besides, the abuses which have grown up in churches established and controlled by the State indicate that the organized work of promoting religion is best carried on by voluntary associations. All this may be true, while yet the State should favor Christianity in every proper way. The right position on this subject is that of Daniel Webster in the Girard will case, which is that also of the best judicial authorities both in England and America. It is that "Christianity—general tolerant Christianity—is the law of the land." This means that it is the duty of the State not only to observe the rules of Christian morality but also to favor and promote the Christian religion in every reasonable way. For a chief rule of the Gospel is that we should contribute to the establishment of God's kingdom on earth by every means at our command.

Let us quote also the teaching of Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. He says (Sec. 1871), "The promulgation of the great doctrines of religion; the being and attributes and providence of one Almighty God; the responsibility to him for all our actions, founded upon moral freedom and accountability; a future state of rewards and punishments; the cultivation of all the personal, social, and benevolent virtues;—these never can be a matter of indifference in any well-ordered community. It is difficult to conceive how any civilized society can well exist without them. And, at all events, it is impossible for those who believe in the truth of Christianity as a divine revelation to doubt that it is the especial duty of government to foster and encourage it among all the citizens and subjects. This is a point wholly distinct from that of the right of private judgment in matters of religion and of the freedom of public worship according to the dictates of one's own conscience."

CHAPTER XXXVI.

A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.

1. Though Christianity is not a philosophy, it harmonizes with the Stoic theory respecting a well-ordered life.—2. The “Nature” mentioned by the Stoics is that constitution of things in which man lives, and of which he himself is a prominent part.—3. To understand their doctrine we must inquire how enjoyment and suffering arise (1) from our spiritual constitution, (2) from our physical conditions.—4. Spiritual nature originates pleasure (1) in the action of its powers or capabilities, (2) in the apprehended realization of things desired or desirable. The fundamental capabilities of spirit enumerated.—5. Spiritual nature is a source of pain (1) when the exercise of its powers is obstructed or overstrained or disordered, (2) when we are disappointed or grieved by untoward events. There are positive as well as negative causes of mental distress.—6. Bodily pleasures and pains cannot be connected with the essential qualities of matter. But they originate from our physical constitution and the operation of its powers.—7. In what sense are pleasure and happiness natural, or harmonious with Nature, while pain and distress are unnatural, or at variance with Nature?—8. First, in that the primary operations of spiritual life tend towards happiness and away from misery. Every painful mode of spiritual life is either secondary or abnormal.—9. Secondly, because the primary desires of spirit seek enjoyment and shun suffering. Anger or resentment is a secondary motivity.—10. Thirdly, because the arrangements of physical nature are promotive of pleasure and limitative of pain. But in respect to man this principle must be taken with a special qualification.—11. Man’s own reason is a part of that Nature to which his life must conform in order that he may be happy.—12. This is especially true of that Moral Reason which in every case perceives and seeks absolute good.—13. So far as the teachings of Nature and of Reason are correct they represent the mind and will of God. This was taught by the Stoic identification of God and the Universe.—14. An illustration of the problem presented by human life.

1. CHRISTIANITY is not a philosophy. It is a system of faith constituted from historical facts, religious doctrines and practical teachings. All of these doubtless harmonize with one another; but they were not given to the world by

Jesus and his apostles in theoretical form. They appear before us very much as the phenomena of the natural world do. Like these they may be made the subject of speculative inquiry; after which we may have a philosophy of the Christian system.

As this religion proposes to lead men in the way both of duty and of happiness, a radical part of the philosophy explanatory of it must be a theory of happiness and of duty. That philosophy of life, however, which we are now about to state, has not been suggested by any analysis of Christian doctrine, but by the study of more ancient teachings. After obtaining but little light from the Academic and Peripatetic theories of wisdom and virtue, we were surprised to find that the Stoic conception of a rightly-ordered life grew more and more satisfactory the more it was considered. The language of the Stoic masters is somewhat obscure and their teachings paradoxical; but their main positions, rightly interpreted, seem entirely reasonable.

2. Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and their successors held that the virtuous man and the happy man are one, and that in order either to be happy or to be virtuous we must "live according to Nature." Though this teaching has always commended itself to serious thinkers, it is so indefinite that it has failed of general acceptance and has not proved philosophically available. To understand it one must know what is meant by "Nature" and what is meant by "According to Nature." The fragments which have come down to us from the ancient writers do not explain these points; which, nevertheless, are capable of being understood.

First, it is clear that the "Nature" now to be considered is not a constitution of things which excludes social and moral development. Uncivilized and savage races are sometimes said to exist "in a state of Nature"; as animals and vegetables do in an island that has never yet been inhabited. Some cynics, perverting the Stoic doctrine, regarded this as the excellent life. But the Nature conceived of by these Cynics is simply a condition of affairs unaffected by social and industrial civilization. It is the natural as opposed to the instituted and the artificial. Nor do we now mean by "Nature" the material and visible universe; although the word sometimes has that signification, as when one is said to admire the beauties or to study the laws of Nature.

The Nature of which the Stoics spoke is that abiding con-

stitution of things in which man finds himself and of which his own being with its bodily and its psychical powers forms a prominent part. Out of this underlying constitution with its permanent components and conditions the laws of all good and of all evil arise. Some such thought as this in regard to the trials of life is expressed by the author of the book of Job, when he says, "Affliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither doth trouble spring out of the ground." For these words teach us that tribulation and sorrow are not accidental things nor yet the product of causes foreign to the life of spiritual beings. They come into existence according to law and in a way that may be understood.

3. In order to perceive how the laws of life are rooted in Nature we must first consider the sources of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery. This will show us the origin of good in the ordinary sense of the word. After that we shall see also how absolute good, or the right, can be called a dictate of Nature.

4. The constitution of things under which we live is two-fold, partly corporeal, or material; partly spiritual. Which of these aspects of Nature shall we study first? Certainly the spiritual; because suffering and enjoyment are psychical things. Even when produced by bodily causes, they are experienced, not by the body, but by the soul. Considering carefully the constitution of spiritual beings with reference to enjoyment and suffering, we find that the former connects itself with (1) the normal exercise of certain fundamental powers or capabilities of spirit, and with (2) the apprehended realization of the ends of motivities (or desires) related to those capabilities; while suffering attends (1) the restrained or overstrained, or disordered exercise of our powers, or (2) the perceived occurrence of events of an opposite character to those in which our radical motivities find satisfaction. In other words, the pleasures of spirit arise partly from the exercise of its essential powers in a healthful and harmonious way about their proper objects, and partly from the apprehended realization of the aims kept in view by our fundamental motive tendencies; while the sufferings of spirit arise partly from the restraint, disorder or over-exertion, of our primary capabilities, and partly from the soul's failure to find satisfying objects, or from its contact with objects or events antagonistic to its fundamental seekings. This doctrine was stated in a previous discussion which considered

the nature of happiness and misery (Chap. II.), but the present inquiry concerns the fundamental source of these experiences. That we have indicated this correctly will become more apparent if we review in detail the radical capabilities of the human spirit.

The powers of thinking and knowing are essential parts of our constitution. Hence there is enjoyment in thinking and knowing. And, this being tasted, the desire arises for mental occupation and information; in the apprehended satisfaction of which desire there is additional enjoyment.

In one part of our life we exercise efficiency and the control of instrumentalities; accordingly we have pleasure in the possession and use of power. Therefore we also seek these things as an end, and rejoice when we attain them.

We are born into the companionship of others and can sympathize with them, as they with us. In agreement with this there are social pleasures. There are also social desires and a peculiar contentment when these are gratified.

We are surrounded by the order and wisdom, the beauty and sublimity, of the universe. In correspondence with this we are delighted to perceive these things. We then naturally aspire to live in contemplation of the grandeurs and excellencies of the world; and are happy when such aspirations are realized.

Reason enables us to distinguish the good and the bad—what is to our profit and what is to our injury. We have enjoyment in skillfully pursuing the one and carefully avoiding the other. To obtain the good and to escape the bad become the ends of rational motivity; and we find solid satisfaction in vanquished adversity and established prosperity.

A sympathetic concern of one spirit for another is a primitive endowment of our nature. In connection with this we rejoice in the welfare of others and in their deliverance from evil. On these aims altruistic affection is founded; the realization of them results in the happiness of gratified benevolence.

An intimate personal acquaintance with one in whom estimable and amiable qualities are seen, results in feelings of admiration and regard; and when some close or tender relation is formed between the persons, there is natural affection, or there is the love of complacency. Hence the pleasures of friendship, of true marriage, and of domestic life.

Hence also the longing for the esteem of others, and the joy of possessing that esteem.

Once more, man is a moral being, the subject of perceptions and sentiments impelling him to virtuous conduct. These, when they fully control one's activities, produce peace and contentment. They also are accompanied with strivings after moral advancement; and moral excellence, when attained, is the chief source of blessedness—indeed the indispensable source.

Thus the exercise of every fundamental capability and the satisfaction sought by every motivity of spirit, this satisfaction following on the apprehension of a desirable result, whether it be actually desired or not, are attended with enjoyment.

5. Evidently, also, suffering arises (1) when through some obstruction or disorder, or from the want of suitable objects or opportunities, or because of a burdensome load, our powers do not act with freedom and ease, but with difficulty; and (2) when our motivities fail of the satisfaction desired, or when we encounter results or experiences which are undesirable. Contemplating all these sources of trouble, we see that they sometimes act in a negative and at other times in a positive way. (1) What merely restrains or disappoints is irksome. To be debarred from knowledge or from doing; to be kept in weakness or in poverty; to be secluded in darkness or in loneliness; to be deprived of friendship or of honor; to be without suitable objects of affection or to lose them or be denied them; to be neglected in one's interests or rights, or to see others neglected; to witness the moral deficiency of others or to realize one's own—these things cause discomfort and grief to any normally constituted person. (2) But many causes of mental distress are more than mere counteractives of good; they are positive; they have an evil efficacy of their own. Man suffers not only from fettered exertion, but also from undue or improper exertion; not merely from the weakness, but also from the disorder, of one's faculties; not only from deprivation of power and influence, but also from the oppression of a tyrant or task-master; not merely from loneliness, but also from superabundant or disagreeable society; not merely from the absence of things fair to see, but also from the presence of the horrible and ugly. Often one not only experiences the loss of goods and of the means of prosperity, but is overwhelmed with distress—

ful misfortunes; a man may not only be deprived of friends and dear ones, but may become the object of aversion and dislike, and may himself become a misanthrope. When one is bereft of honor, he is for the most part subjected to disgrace; and the moral sense, when it fails to cheer with its approbation, invariably disheartens by its disapproval. In short, mental sufferings frequently arise from positive causes; not simply from the obstruction of our activities and the disappointment of our desires. Such causes are the active opposites of those which give us pleasure.

6. Turning now to the material part of that universe in which we live we find that the causes of corporeal pleasure and pain do not connect themselves with the fundamental qualities of matter as those of mental enjoyment and suffering do with the native capabilities of spirit, while yet they evidently arise out of the actual constitution of our bodies and of the world about us. That physiological structure in which the soul dwells is endowed with powers of nutrition and growth and life, and with organs of motion and of sense. The healthful action of these powers and organs affords pleasure; whereupon we have appetites and corporeal desires; and these when gratified give an added satisfaction. The world around us, also, is replete with objects which stimulate and occupy our activities, with supplies for our bodily wants, and with the causes of agreeable sensations. Moreover, unpleasant and painful experiences arise from the diseased action or the abusive exercise of our bodily functions, and from physical operations repugnant to our senses and to our corporeal desires. Evidently an analogy exists between the origin of mental and that of physical pleasures and pains. In each case these depend on the mode in which the powers and functions of body or soul are exercised, and on the way in which our desires are gratified or offended. But the analogy relates chiefly to the pleasantness and unpleasantness of mental and bodily functions.

7. An exception to the rule that pleasure accompanies the normal and pain the abnormal exercise of a power will be noticed under the next head of discussion. For the Stoics teach not only that pleasure and pain arise from radical conditions in Nature, but also that those causes which produce pleasure are more natural—more in accord with the constitution of things under which we live—than those are which produce pain; and this point calls for explanation.

One might say that as pleasure arises from ascertainable causes and not by accident, it results according to Nature. But this use of language would not indicate any difference between the origin of pleasure and that of pain, inasmuch as the latter no less than the former can be traced to ascertainable causes. The Stoics taught that virtue is the supreme good, or cause of happiness, and that it consists in a life according to Nature. This implies that good and happiness belong to a life conformable to Nature and that evil and misery attend a life at variance with Nature. In the language of Ueberweg the Stoics held that "pleasure is the natural result (*ἐπιγέννημα*) of successful endeavor to secure what is in harmony with our nature." So the questions present themselves, What is the meaning of this phrase "according to Nature?" and, In what sense do those causes which produce happiness agree with that constitution of things under which we live, while those which produce pain are repugnant to it? In answer to these queries we shall state a few propositions which seem reasonable, without attempting any extended proof of them.

8. First, it appears that the *primary* or *essential* operations of that part of Nature which is internal and spiritual do not produce suffering, but enjoyment. When we consider the primary capabilities of spirit—those manifested in intellectual or æsthetic activity; those employed in business and practical labors; those which show themselves in social life; those engaged in the pursuit of pleasures and comforts; those which consider interests and strive for their advancement; those occupied in beneficence and altruistic effort; those in which personal esteem is the dominant factor; and those of which a sense of right and a love of moral excellence are the chief elements—we find that the normal working of our powers and tendencies (in which each accomplishes freely its own function) is accompanied with pleasure. But the abnormal operation of any capability, when it is oppressed or overdriven, or affected with disease, or out of harmony with other powers or with one's environment, produces pain. The capabilities of spirit form a sort of society in which each member is fitted for a certain place and for a certain work in that place. Pleasure arises for each and for all from the harmonious and successful performance by each of its proper task. The obstruction or violation of this law of life causes distress. Since then each power yields enjoyment while per-

forming its own proper function, happiness may be said to attend an activity according to Nature, and unhappiness an activity contrary to Nature.

Now we encounter the fact, already considered in a previous discussion (Chap. II., 14), that the exercise of some natural capabilities, as those of fear, grief, disappointment, resentment, a sense of the ugly or disagreeable, and the feeling of being wronged, are essentially painful. This fact would conflict with our theory of happiness but for one circumstance. The experiences to which it refers have a secondary character and are related to the law of pleasure and pain in an exceptional way. The capacity for them is a kind of necessary attachment to the capacity for their opposites. Often, too, though painful in themselves, they serve some end of good. As bodily pains warn against bodily dangers; as the comfort of rest follows the weariness of labor; as hunger compels one to take needful nourishment; so fear and sorrow and dissatisfaction contribute to our escape from misery and our attainment of happiness. Moreover, every one of life's troubles, if properly used, becomes the means of high spiritual advancement.

Remarks kindred to the above apply to the fact that pleasure sometimes attends the extreme and abnormal use of our capabilities. This, also, is an attachment to our capacity for true happiness. But it is unnatural in that it sets forth not the complete and permanent working of Nature, but a temporary gain to be followed by enduring loss; and in that it tends not to the development but to the destruction of one's original capability of good.

9. In the next place it is to be noted that the fundamental desires, or motivities, of spirit universally aim at enjoyment in one form or another, and urge us to the pursuit of it. Not one of them seeks as an end the pain or evil of oneself or of others. No human being desires pain for its own sake, but always enjoyment or happiness. Men do sometimes, in anger or resentment, seek to inflict suffering on others; and this feeling may degenerate into hatred or enmity. But all inimical feelings are secondary formations; they are only attachments to the primary tendencies of life. They arise when prior aims have been obstructed, and are directed to the removal or suppression of obstruction. So far as sufferings are the objects of primary desire, they are the objects of aversion and not of pursuit. Pleasurable activity alone can

be considered conformable to the fundamental promptings of spirit.

10. When we turn to that aspect of Nature which is external to us and which is either material or manifested chiefly through material agencies, we find that its arrangements and workings are on the whole promotive of enjoyment and limitative of suffering. In arguing this point the relations of the soul to the body and its relations through the body to the outward world may be considered together, as they are intimately related. By means of bodily organs the soul is capable of numberless agreeable sensations; and these organs are constantly used in man's intellectual and practical activities. At the same time the physical universe is replete with means for gratifying the senses, with objects to interest the mind, and with opportunities of employment and achievement. Thus man's corporeal endowments and his material surroundings encourage him to seek a life of happiness.

But, while this is so, no one can assert that the conditions of earthly life are fitted to produce unalloyed enjoyment. The utmost that can be claimed is that they ordinarily give the expectation of a comfortable experience, always, however, mingled with trials, exposed to accidents, hardships and diseases, and terminating at last in weakness and dissolution. Were bodily enjoyment the whole end of man's existence certainly that end is, as a rule, very imperfectly realized. Nature's bestowal upon us of the capabilities and means of enjoyment are proof of the goodness of her disposition only on the hypothesis that the evils of life are the unavoidable conditions or the necessary instrumentalities of the greatest attainable good. In the case of the lower animals such a supposition is not unreasonable. Their experience, in what is for them a state of Nature, seems fairly comfortable and enjoyable. The pains and necessities to which they are subject are needful stimulants to action and dissuasives from danger. The plan of their life, under the impelling and guiding power of appetite and instinct, appears to yield them much satisfaction, together with a minimum of suffering. Their existence is probably transitory, as their nature seems unfitted for immortality; but they have their creature comforts while life lasts; and their death is probably a painless ending.

In the case of "the rational animal" more thought is needed than in the case of the brute to show that earthly life

is designed for his best happiness. We may allow that man's disagreeable experiences act as deterrents from injurious courses; we may maintain that the average human life contains many gratifications and enjoyments; yet the multiplied distresses of mankind compel the admission that if Nature had in view simply our temporal good, she has only partially accomplished her purpose. This consideration does not disprove that Nature aims at human happiness, but it suggests that Nature has not arranged to satisfy man from material resources (this being either impossible in itself or inconsistent with higher aims) and that man's temporal well-being is to some extent subordinated and even sacrificed to a greater welfare.

11. This brings us to another point without which the Stoic contention respecting the best life cannot be understood. It is that *man's own reason is a part of that Nature to which he must conform* if he would live happily and well. This point was taught by Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus even more strenuously than the general doctrine of which it forms a part. It is the key to the general doctrine. The rational faculty is not only part of that constitution of things to which we belong, but it is the only medium through which man may be kept in sympathy with Nature and her laws. It is the instrument whereby we apprehend and apply the suggestions of Nature. Without Nature, Reason would be useless, being bereft of light and guidance, but without Reason Nature could not be a rule for human conduct. Reason forms her precepts after considering the aims of particular motives and in view of the necessities and opportunities of our environment. She stands not for herself alone, but for all the components of Nature, whether internal or external, according to the proper claims of each. Life must be a failure if the counsels of this guide be counteracted or ignored. So far as human beings are concerned, we should not teach absolutely that Nature aims to make them happy, but only that Nature aims to make those happy who live according to reason. Those who do not live according to reason do not live according to Nature; and it would be impossible for Nature to make them happy.

Hence it is not maintained that it is the intent of Nature to give the wise man a perfect felicity during the present life, but only to give such comfort and satisfaction as may consist with his lasting good. The conception of happiness

which reason uses is limited to the attainable and the enduring. It includes only those gratifications which the wise man may wisely seek and hope for. And, although the portion of the wise may for the present be mingled with sorrows and disappointments, he does not regard these as ultimate evils, but rather as the necessary instruments of welfare. For all things are working together for his good.

12. Moreover, *the reason of which the Stoics spoke is not content with any partial view of life and its practical relations.* Especially it does not confine itself to the consideration of one's own interests. Keeping in view the true order of all things (θεωρῶν τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν); it pursues the befitting and the right (το καθήκον, το κατόρθωμα), and so is the origin of virtue.

This absolute exercise of reason, though it does not aim at private interests, is consistent with rational regard for the particular good of oneself and one's friends. Indeed, as we have seen in the discussion concerning happiness, right reason is necessary to one's own best good. (CHAP. II., 6.) In other words, virtue, which is the highest mode of conformity to Nature, because it is the realization of the law of the absolute reason, also confers upon its possessor the highest happiness.

13. One other statement completes the Stoic doctrine. The conception of Nature entertained by Zeno and his followers was pantheistic. Or perhaps we should say it was, in a confused and imperfect way, theistic. They held that "the working force in the universe is God; that the beauty and adaptation of the world can have come only from a thinking mind and prove, therefore, the existence of Deity" (Ueberweg). Their maxim that "God and Nature do nothing foolishly" (ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδεν μάτην ποιοῦσιν) teaches that the operations of Nature are governed by wisdom and virtuous goodness. In his hymn to Zeus, Cleanthes says, "Nothing takes place without Thee, O Deity, except that which men do through their own want of reason. But even that which is evil is overruled by Thee for good, and is made to harmonize with the plan of the world." "The Stoic theology," says Weber, "is a kind of compromise between pantheism and theism. God is identical with the universe, but this universe is a real being, a living God, who has a knowledge of things (νοῦς), who governs our destinies (πρόνοια), who loves us (φιλόανθρωπος) and desires our

good (κηδεμονικός, ὠφέλιμος, εὐποητικὸς ἄνθρωποις) ; without, however, participating in human passions." Evidently this God who pervades Nature is a personal and almighty spirit by whom all things consist and in whom all creatures live and move and have their being. Thus, in declaring that man should live according to Nature, the Nature within us and the Nature around us, the Stoics added a divine authority to the laws of life formulated by human reason. For they regarded Nature as manifesting the mind and will of God. Christianity differs from Stoicism in this teaching only in presenting a more satisfactory conception of the Supreme Being.

14. So far as we know, nothing better than the Stoic philosophy of life has been developed either in ancient or in modern times. But it is to be confessed that the problem to which it relates is a complicated one, and includes some distracting elements. It calls for the consideration of human life in all its aspects and connections. It is affected with a special complexity because Nature deals with man not simply as a rational, but also as an imperfect being. It is necessary that the destructive tendencies of selfishness and passion should be counteracted and overcome.

The argument showing that Nature seeks the happiness of rational beings may be compared to the reasoning through which an intelligent observer may come to understand the purpose of an ingenious machine. If an Arab chief saw for the first time the movements of a locomotive, he would soon perceive that the essential use of such an engine is to draw cars or coaches along a railway. The action of the piston-rod in making the wheels revolve and the strength of the coupling devices by which the passive members of the train are attached to the locomotive, are proofs of this design. Such a conclusion would not be invalidated by the fact that the engine occasionally pushes backwards instead of pulling forwards, this reverse action being only incidental to the main end to be accomplished. Nor would the Arab's judgment be altered upon seeing that the train is supplied with brakes, intended to resist its rushing progress and to bring it to a standstill. The box above the boiler from which a gritty stream is let down through tubes in front of the wheels, may excite surprise; for the action of the sand on the rails and wheels is wearing. But it is needful to prevent the wheels slipping on an upward grade. The intense flame

passing through the boiler tubes will certainly in time consume them. But it is indispensable for the generation of steam. If any part of the machine, a lever, a valve, a rod or a rivet, be imperfect or ill-adjusted; if the furnace do not yield sufficient heat or the axle boxes are not supplied with oil; there is jarring friction and waste; and, if the difficulty be not remedied, great loss or damage may ensue. Finally, the use of the mighty motor is attended with dangers, some arising from the incompetence of employees; others from the insecurity of the roadbed and of the country to be traversed; others from that liability to mishap and breakage which is inherent in every human mechanism. Hence, on some occasions all progress is obstructed, and, on others, passengers and freight are overtaken by ruinous accidents. Notwithstanding these things, the main purpose of the invention is seen to be not regression nor retardation, nor loss nor injury, but the comfortable passage and safe transport of men and goods from one point to another. Moreover, this judgment of intelligence does not assert that the locomotive is able to accomplish its mission itself and without oversight, but only that it does so under the management of competent men and while these men observe the directions of their superiors.

This illustration of the Arab's judgment concerning a locomotive shows how the end of a complicated mechanism can be seen only when all the parts of it are considered, and when its main working can be distinguished from those incidents which are necessitated by the conditions under which it operates. But the arrangements of the universe affecting man's destiny, and their relation to the course which wisdom calls on him to pursue, are far more difficult to comprehend than the functions of any mechanical invention can be. The philosophy of happiness and misery, of good and evil, might be the subject of an extensive treatise. Nevertheless we are convinced that any satisfactory theory of wisdom and virtue must ally itself with the Stoic doctrine that *man's chief good is to be realized by his living in harmony with Nature, with Reason, and with God.*

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The references given below indicate the pages on which any subject is mentioned or on which any authority is cited. They are especially intended to cover all *definitions* and all *quotations*. But each of them may be wisely supplemented by consulting one or more of those *synopses* which have been prefixed to the several chapters of the treatise.

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